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SUMMARY
This thesis aims to construct a sensitising framework of
concepts and propositions in order to establish foundations for
an interpretive sociological understanding of the process of
politics in formal organisational arenas. In doing so, it seeks
to consider and discuss some broader issues and problems which have
engaged the recent interest of general sociologists, but which have
been more or less neglected by practitioners in the organisational
sub-field. A detailed critical examination of the "politics-
related" literature reveals the tacit existence of three types of
approach to the topic, none of which provides a sufficient grounding
for the sociological study of organisational power and politics.
~he weaknesses of existing contributions are sho~n to lie
as much in their dominant methodology of theorising as in the
latter's content, and it is therefore imperative to clarify certain
methodological matters before progressing very far. It is in fact
argued that, in order to comply with the demands of the theoretical
assumptions underlying this thesis, the academic activity of theor-
ising must be sensitising rather than definitive.
In spite of their various shortcomings, the prominant theories
in the area offer important clues as to the nature of power and
politics, and these clues are transformed into three conceptual
themes - of order-conflict, of possibilities-impossibilities and
of the two faces of power - which act as analytical points of
reference for the development of a sensitising framework. To explore
the pivotal characteristic of the interpretive sociological approach
to political action, viz. the subjective meaningfulness of such
action, discussion focuses primarily upon participants' everyday
theorising activities which, through their interpretive and
strategic functions, mediate between the objective social world of
organisational life and the observable process of organisational power
and politics.
(vii)
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The state of any sub-field is inextricably linked to the
state of its embracing discipline, and some sub-fields are in the
vanguard of the latter's general development while others follow,
often reluctantly, in its wake. The variations in this relation-
ship between sub-fields and general discipline have not, to my
knowledge, been examined, but most sociologists could intuitively
rate their own specialisms on a scale from (say) "progressive" to
"recalcitrant". It has been my continuing experience that, in
spite of the growing number of sociologists involved in this area,
in spite of the generous and increasing supply of organisational
studies and theories, the sociology of organisations not only has
been relatively impervious to developments in general sociological
debate, but also constitutes an area of research which, at this
stage in its evolution, remains largely unsociologicall in perspect-
ive and in imagination.
The reasons for this latter state of affairs are no doubt
complicated, but it certainly is not accidental. Historically, the
sociology of organisations was created by a mid-twentieth century
convergence of interests between management theory and industrial
sociology, but there is li"Ltle doubt that the former "parent" has
wielded the greatest and most lasting influence. 'Organisation
theory' or 'organisational analysis' are often used as synonymous
with or equivalent to the 'sociology of organisations', indicating
that sociologists tend to consider their projects as interdisciplin-
ary rather than sociological. Interdisciplinary work is not to be
decried, but neither should its limitations be concealed. Of
especial significance in the predominance of unsociological research
in organisations, is the eclecticism of interdisciplinary studies
(see 3.2.4) and their prescriptive nature - the latter feature
obviously reflecting the influence of managerial interests in the
area.
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The relative insularity of the sociology of organisations
is illustrated by the fact that even the most fiery and persistent
of theoretical debates tend to go unnoticed - anyway, unnoted - in
the organisational context. The major issues of power, of order
and change, of consensus and conflict, of structure (system) and
action have roused relatively little interest among organisational
sociologists - if we are to take their research and reports as
indicative of their interest. Organisations are more or less defined
,
as "systems" or "structures" of authority and control, but rarely are
the sociological implications of this feature explored, either
theoretically or empirically. The treatment of 'power' as an organ-
isational issue is at times pitiful: the confusion of power and
authority; the faulty extrapolation of how power actually works
from the formal (i.e. organisation chart) knowledge of how it should
2work; the obsession with typologies of power and authority rather
than with theorising them; the banal discussions of leadership
traits and styles. At its worst, these are the ingredients of an
alleged "sociological" analysis of organisational "power".
In this thesis I shall be examining the existing sociological
analysis of organisational power "at its best", and it will become
clear that there is still much work to do in order to establish even
foundations for the study of this topic. With the exception of a
few notable studies (see Chapter Three), the failure to realise the
potential of the concept of power has been paralleled by the failure
to consider how power is used, and the processes through which power
enters into the organisational process. In short, the sociology of
organisations has seriously neglected the political dimension of
organisational life. While other social units, ranging from society
as an abstract system to the family as a concrete group, have been
investigated by sociologists, political scientists and social anthro-
pologists as "political" entities, there has been an implicit
resistance to the interpretation of work organisations in particular,
and formal organisations in general, in this light. The view that
organisational politics concern "••• irregularities, backdoor deals,
and subtle blackmail. ••" (Crozier, 1964, p.106) or the "dirty linen
aspect" (Mouzelis, 1975, p.159) of organisational life appears to be
2
common even among those sociologists who enthusiastically advocate
the study of power in organisations.3 The impression is evidently
that politics are abnormal and fleeting events, rather than a normal,
patterned, constitutive social process in formal organisations.
This myopic view may consolidate the (self) images of those who
exercise power in organisati?ns, but the task of the sociologist is
to take his topic "seriously" and not to be distracted by prevailing
ideologies. Indeed, the power of the latter must themselves become
a topic for sociological scrutiny.
In order to study organisational politics seriously, it is
above all necessary to overcome the insularity of the sub-field of
organisational sociology. First, those concepts, propositions,
issues and debates which arise in general sociology and in other
areas of research, need to inform the broad theoretical tone of the
approach; second, organisational power and politics must be considered
in the context of social life in general, so that, specifically in
Part Three, it is essential to avoid the tendency to compartmentalise
the two arenas . These two injunctions are, of course, mutually re-
.inforcing •
In this Introductory Chapter I have three objectives which
must be accomplished before the real work can commence. First, and
most importantly, it is necessary to outline the major assumptions
which underpin the thesis, the latter's theoretical scope, and the
general themes which structure the approach that I shall be advocating.
Second, I shall briefly discuss some conventional views of power and
authority and the issues that are raised in their conceptualisation.
This will not only set the conceptual scene for the thesis (particul-
arly Part One) and preview some of the theoretical problems in this
area of research; it will also prevent the possibility of confusion
during the thesis when reference to these ideas is necessary, but
when their explication would be lengthy and distracting. I shall
conclude the chapter with the traditional outline of the structure
of the thesis, set in the context of the assumptions and themes that
will have been introduced.
1.1. Voluntarism, Power and Politics
1.1.1 The Postulate of Voluntarism
One of the major debates in sociology of recent years has
been over the relative strengths and weaknesses of the structural
and interpretive theoretical positions. The debate over these
"two sociologies" (cf. Dawe, 1970; also, for example, Cohen, 1968
4 .and Silverman, 1970 ) and the~r respective lines on philosophical,
methodological and sociological issues, is of real importance for
comprehending recent theoretical contributions, and it is crucial
for the arguments below to make clear my own position regarding
this debate. I do not think that it is sensible to "side" wholly
with one position or the other, but the fundamental assumption which
guides my theorising places it more -or less .in the inter-
pretive camp.
In general, structuralism asserts that sociology should be
concerned with the discovery of global patterns (structures) which
provide an overall picture of the way social units work and what
they are like. This requires the surrendering of more "local" infor-
mati on (e.g. about individual or social groups) which add little to
the overall picture. The causes and consequences of these structures
should also be seen in global terms; causes are best conceived as
"external" constraints on human behaviour, shaping the latter
independently so as to create the observed patterns of social inter-
. 5act~on.
My commitment to an interpretive sociological approach is
directly related to my belief that social action must be explained in
terms of the subjective meanings which actors themselves attach to
their behaviour. This view derives from Weber's classic definition
of the nature and scope of sociology (Weber, 1964, p.88ff.), and is
not particularly controversial in itself. Structuralists themselves
usually concede that subjective meanings are the immediate 'causal'
factors in individual social action, but would suggest that they are
. d' . 11 6intangible and impossible or too diff~cult to stu Y emp~r~ca y,
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and that, even if they could be understood, the information they
provide is too "local" to be of any great use in explaining general
patterns.
Structural factors and subjective meanings are both important
in sociological explanation, but the latter have a prior significance
because they are the immediate "causes" of the actual courses of
action chosen by actors. The (interpretive) process of choice is
not independent of "external" factors - unless it were "unrealistic"
but it cannot be assumed that actors will act directly (i.e. without
subjective mediation) in response to structural 'stimuli'. The
assumption concerning the prior significance of subjective meanings
can be called the "postulate of voluntarism", and it implies
" that the relationship between action and social
phenomena which precede it is always mediated by
the actor's interpretation of the phenomena. In
this sense, action is voluntary so that, strictly
speaking, the actor is never propelled in any
particular direction by external conditions in
themselves." (Clarke, 1975, p.3).
Where sociologists seek social structure and its "external"
causes, without considering the interpretive work of social actors,
the approach may be called "deterministic", and the results of the
approach are heavily biased towards the overall stability of social
patterns. Such a structuralism treats deviations from the general
pattern (i.e. where actors behave "unpredictably" with respect to
external constraint) as insignificant relative to the overall pattern
itself, and fails to distinguish between various possible reasons
why actors are apparently "propelled in a particular direction by
external conditions". However the intended and unintended conse-
quences of "deviations" may under certain circumstances become
forces for structural change, rather than "deviations from order",
whereas the implicitly assumed routine "support" for the system may
be highly precarious. With such omissions, due to the failure to
study interpretive work, the weight of structuralist presumption
. 5
favours stability and order, and rules out, as sociologically
"uninteresting", potentialities for social change.
On the other hand, the postulate of voluntarism, which
obliges the sociologist to examine subjective meanings as a
priority, is associated with an approach that treats social patterns
as sociaLLy contingent. The effects of structural factors qua
"external constraints", and hence subsequent behavioural outcomes,
are dependent upon how social actors make sense of, and act upon
their interpretations of, the factors in question. As a result
stability and order are always potentially vulnerable, since global
social patterns or structures are subject to processes of subject-
ively meaningful social action. Concerning order and change,
interpretive sociology has no internally determined preference,
because both social states - indeed all empirically possible
states - are created by social actors whose variable 'interpretive
schemes' are the primary focus of enquiry.
These arguments will be elaborated during the thesis, but
the preliminary points are as follows. The present theoretical
effort is based upon the postulate of voluntarism, which implies that
social (organisational) reality be analysed as socially contingent
rather than externally deterw~ned (see also Chapter Five); it also
implies, as a matter of priority - not of exclusiveness - that social
(organisational) life, including its 'political' aspects, be under-
stood in terms of the interpretive work ("everyday theorising": see
especially Chapters Eight and Nine) of actors living through and
hence sustaining (or not) the social (organisational) process.
1.1.2 Power and Politics in Formal Organisations
Taking further this broad distinction between structural and
interpretive sociology, it has been argued by structuralists that
concentration on the interpretive work of social actors not only
tends to "miss" the broad patterns of social life by becoming over-
whelmed with local details - as suggested above - but also places too
much emphasis on human "choice". This stress in tum gives social
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life an image of a "free-floating" process, in which people "do
their own thing" independent:' of constraint (of , Martin, 1977, p.32):.·
The study of power in formal organisation provides a
peculiarly apposite context in which to consider this theoretical
issue viz. the role of constraint in interpretive sociology.
'Power' is seen by many as a constraining social force par excellence.
As a concept, it responds to the need to incorporate in a theoretical
framework what Dahl has called a "primitive notion", the essence of
which is referred to by White (1972) as the "significant affecting"
of courses of social action. During the exercise of power, the
person(s) whose behaviour is being "affected" will usually, though
not necessarily, experience the situation as constraining.7
Th 'f 1 Lsat.Lon'8 " 11 t d " 1e orma organlsa 10n lS usua y por raye as a SOCla
unit or arena which, by virtue of its defined characteristics, places
inescapable constraints on its participants. It is conceived as an
internally disciplined, highly structured entity which is ordered by
an imposed system of hierarchical relationships and made to work by
the socially constraining influence of authority and other more im-
personal processes of control. Not surprisingly, the sociology of
organisations has, until recently, been dominated by structural
analysis (or variants of it, e.g. systems theory, socio-technicism)
which acquires its plausibility through examining these "obvious"
characteristics as external, determining constraints.
I do not suggest that power and formal organisations are not
socially constraining - to do sO would be to undermine the credibility
of this thesis before it starts. However the structural postulate of
constraint as an externally determining force contravenes, for what-
ever reason (e.g. convenience, heuristic simplification), what we
know about how social action is generated. An interpretive sociol-
ogical analysis of power in organisations requires that the postulates
of constraint and of voluntarism be reconciled, but only by giving
prior explanatory significance to the latter. This will involve the
reformulation of the process of "significant affecting" and of the
concept of. "organisation structure", so that constraint is not under-
stood naively as an unmediated external force.
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An adequate view of power is a prerequisite in any attempt
to understand political process.
general context
As White (1972) has argued in a
" a statement about the actual or possible
componerrt.s of power to some extent constitutes
or implies a statement of some actual or possible
components of politics" (White, 1972, p.481).
Power and politics are thus closely intertwined both as topics and
as concepts. In this thesis I shall refer to the political process
in organisations - which is constituted by political actions - as
organisational politics. As a general statement, to act as an
introductory reference point, I consider organisational politics as
those related sequences of social (inter)actions in which organis-
ational participants exercise power with and against one another with
the purpose of influencing significant (to them) aspects of organis-
ational life. In short organisational politics are a social process
internaZ to the organisation.9
Politics may be analysed in two ways, with respect to both
the intentions or purposes of political acts, and, relatedly, to their
consequences for organisational life. In Part Three, I shall be
interested in both facets. At one level, politics comprise political
actions, which may be comprehended as subjectively meaningful courses
of action followed by participants who, as individuals, groups,
departments, or even as the organisation, attempt to control their
own organisational lives. As a process of social interaction, this
will involve loosening or evading the constraints imposed by other
participants (individuals, groups etc.) and/or tightening or
imposing constraints on others. Political action is therefore one
kind of socially-mediated behaviour in an organisational context in
which power and constraint are exercised, although not always in an
overt manner.
Political actions may in turn be conceived as component
"parts" of.the social process I am calling organisational politics.
8
This process is not arrived at by a simple 'aggregation' of political
actions, meanings, intentions etc., but results from the intended
and unintended consequences of successful and unsuccessful attempts
to control, in varying degrees, work and life in the organisational
arena. The consequences of this network of political actions are
equally important, sociologically, as the intentions, because the two
will mostly diverge. Political action, by intent or consequence,
shapes, sustains, adapts and changes the 'structure' of the organis-
ation, and the examination of such action as subjectively meaningful
to participants allows the interpretive sociological approach to
account for all these possibilities.
1.1.3 Theorising Organisational Power and Politics
Both academics interested in studying and explaining organis-
ational politics, and participants whose lives and actions are inter-
woven in those processes, engage in interpretive work in order to
comprehend their scientific and everyday experiences of that process.
My thesis is entitled "Theorising Organisational Power and Politics"
precisely because it aims to examine the problems associated with the
"academic and "everyday" theorising of that topic. Implicit in the
title are the three tasks to which the thesis is devoted: first, to
examine critically those approaches which have theorised organis-
ational power and politics; second, to develop a general sensitising
framework, built upon the postulate oi voluntarism, with which
organisational power and politics can be theorised as a subjectively
meaningful social process; third, and complementarily, to make the
central and prior problem of that framework, an ·understanding of how
participants themselves theorise organisational power and politics.
As with many theses the preliminary task is to consider
cri·tically the Hays in which social scientists have attempted to
make sense of the topic. As I shall explain below, it is crucial
to know how sociologists in particular have theorised power and
politics in organisations, but the acquisition of that knowledge is
not a straightforward job of processing formal definitions. In
general, I shall argue that many approaches in the literature fail
9
to construe the meaningfulness and complexity of the subject-matter,
while others provide highly insightful views of the latter but do
not take their analysis far enough. It is important to understand
why these approaches have failed in or have fallen short of their
objectives, and I shall contend that quite often the theoretical
frameworks themselves are antithetical to the discovery and investi-
gation of organisational politics as a complex, contingent social
process.
The second task implicit in the title is the overall purpose
of the present effort viz. to theorise organisational power and
politics within interpretive sociological parameters. Within the
present context, it is not possible to elaborate all the relevant
arguments, but I have concentrated on those aspects of such an
approach which I believe are most in need of development and refinement.
These problematic aspects constitute the third task referred to in the
title, viz. the necessity of examining how organisational participants
themselves contrive to act 'politically' by theorising the organis-
ation and producing interpretations which serve as the subjectively
meaningful focus of such action. These acts of "everyday organis-
ational theorising" are the ("voluntaristic") interpretive work which
mediate between structure and power (as "constraint"), and the observed
action and process.
My theorising is therefore not intended to be "complete" in
the sense of covering in depth all facets of the topic, but it does
seek to make the case for, and show possible lines of penetration into,
the study of "everyday organisational theorising". I shall argue
that such a study can be conducted by extending and refining some of
the prevailing themes in the literature.
One of the major differences between academic and everyday
theorising is that, on the face of it, the former is more rigorous,
systematic and formalised. The 'respectable' sociologist entering·
into a theoretical discussion of, say, power and politics would first
of all define his concepts concisely and precisely; on the other
hand, to do this in everyday life would be to court social failure
.e.g. becoming socially defined as an 'eccentric' or a 'bore'.
, 10
However, in my reading of sociology, the formal definitions of
concepts, which embody the theorist's undoubtedly fine intentions,
are quite often more misleading than helpful. This occurs because
formal definitions tend to lose their clarity and neatness in the
developing arguments, as concepts come "face to face", so to speak,
with other concepts in the construction of propositions and
"compound" ideas. To be more specific, however precisely 'power'
is defined as a concept, the theoretical work of that concept involves
it in relationships with other concepts and ideas, so that the
effective meaning of power as a conception or "view" (cf. Rawls,
1972, pp.5-6, and Lukes, 1974, p.27, note 1.( in which Rawls is
cited) within the theoretical framework may, and frequently does,change.
In order to understand how a topiC, such as power and politics, has
been academically theoPised, therefore requires the discovery of what
I shall call the "effective conception" of power and politics - which
is usually as implicit as it is explicit - rather than the uncritical
acceptance of the formal definition or concept.
Although this argument is not new, many social scientists '
continue to presume that the phenomena they wish to encapsulate can
be easily and completely defined by detailing those 'es~ential'
criteria for the recognition of those phenomena. While. such
"complete definitions" (Waismann, 1960, p.122) or "enumeratory
concepts" (Novak, 1972, p.380ff.) might be possible in some disciplines,
most sociaL phenomena, including power and politics, are too complex,
with too many potential descriptive dimensions each with unforeseeable
possibilities for extension (see also 5.1.3). Such phenomena can
only be approximated by complicated, compound 'concepts' in which
inhere many undescribed, possibly indescribable, characteristics.
Novak (ibid.) calls concepts which are pregnant with theoretical impli-
cations and propositions, "syndromatic".
It is not surprising that power and politics are difficult to
define completely, because they are compound ideas whose meaning
within a framework depends upon how they are theorised with respect
to other concepts of "power-political" relevance - for example, order,
conflict, opportunity, constraint, structure, action. The relation-
ship between these concepts, and the topic in question, "fill out" or
"expand" defined concepts, thereby altering the effective meaning of
power and politics.
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In Part One, a great deal of effort is expended on the
arduous task of teasing out the effective conceptions of power and
politics in the literature, and in Part Three the theoretical and
conceptual dimensions (themes) identified are examined, elaborated
and interrelated in order to present a fuller theoretical image of
the topic.
1.2 Prevailing Conceptions df Power and Authority
I have already suggested that 'power' and 'politics' are
closely interrelated ideas and topics, so that, if politics are seen
as the exercise (s) of power for various goals - p.ersonal, sectional,
organisational - with various consequences - e.g. supporting or
changing (aspects of) organisational life - it becomes important in
a thesis of this nature to develop an adequate, though necessarily
incomplete, conception of power. In Part One, especially in
Chapters Two and Three, I shall be considering in depth the existing
views of power in organisations and their implications for the study
of organisational politics. In this respect, I shall be arguing
that the dominant "orthodox" views have tended to reflect, in part
or whole and in various combinations, those conceptions of power -
and their sociological traditions - which prevail in general sociology.
The present section serves to introduce these prevailing conceptions
of power and of authority in order to indicate some of the conceptual
issues and controversies in the area, but also to establish a platform
from which to discuss, compare and contrast organisational conceptions.
Although, in a sense, the following views of power and
authority are ideal-typical, I have tried to avoid the problem of
constructing conceptions which are attributable to nobody because of
their abstractness, by citing the writings of those authors most
directlyas·soc La't.e d with the concept ion in question.
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1.2.1 Conceptions of Power
The views of power espoused by orthodox organisational
sociologists derive from three major approaches which have dominated
the social sciences in the 1950's and 1960's: structural-
functionalism, exchange theory and behaviourism. These three
'approaches' are not equivalents in many senses (e.g. it is evident
that behaviourism is more of a method than a theory) but each does
present a logically consistent view of power, its sources and its
consequences. The importance of understanding the traditions which
inform and certify theories of organisational power is two-fold
first a tradition operates like a pair of glasses, facilitating
theorising by concentrating vision; second, and at least as important
because it is often not raised to the level of consciousness, a
tradition operates as a pair of blinkers which prevents the theorist
entering into a dialogue with other traditions. As with traditions,
so too with the conceptions these traditions promote.
(a) The Systems Conception of Power
One of the most important influences on organisational sociol-
ogy has been the structural-functionalism associated with Parsons'
general social systems approach. My concern is not to examine the
logic and implications of this approach, a well-documented pastime of
many sociologists, but to outline the conueption of power that it
permits and encourages.
Social systems are conceptualised as goal-seeking, which is
therefore one of the functional prerequisites of social life. Power
takes on its significance in the Parsonian social world because it
. 10 f 1responds to the problem of goal attalnment. Parsons orma ly
defines power as the :
" capacity to mobilise resources in the interest
of the attainment of a system goal" (Parsons,
1956, p.228).
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Furthermore this capacity is not the possession of human beings but
is an attribute of the total system, in the sense that the system
provides resources, facilities etc. to parts of the system in order
"••• to get things done in the interests of collective goals."
(Parsons, 1960, p.1Sl).
Power is thus a generalised capacity to use a "system-based
holding of resources", (Rogers, 1973/74, p.1431) for system goals.
Since the term 'system goals' is used interchangeably with
'collective goals', it becomes clearly associated with the question
of 'social legitimacy' (see below p.1S). Parsons broaches this point
directly in his most developed contribution to the analysis of power :
"Power ••is the generalised capacity to secure the
performance of binding obligations by units in a
system of collective organisation when the oblig-
gations are legitimised with reference to their
bearing on collective goals and where in the case
of recalcitrance there is a presumption of
enforcement by negative situational sanctions •••"
(Parsons, 1967, p.30Si my emphasis).
The functionalist conception of power (e.g. Dubin, 1960) may
be conceived as a variant of the basic systems idea, since it too
eschews 'the interpersonal aspects of power in favour of the view
that power is conferred by the system upon units which perform the
most important functions most exclusively'.
In summary this conception of power takes the 'system' as
the overriding focus of analysis, and the system allocates the
generalised (impersonal) capacity, in the shape of resources and
obligations, to those subunits wh i.ch contribute most (on some
criterion) to the achievement of the system's goal. In short,
power is created by the system and used for the system, and because
it reflects collective interests (by assumption), the systems
conception preempts the problem of legitimacy. Finally, because
power is related by definition to goal attainment, it is a positive
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resource (although it may be based on negative sanctions) rather
than a creator of opposition (cf. Thompson, 1970a, pp.xi-xii;
Lynd, 1959, p.35; see Giddens, 1968, p.263ff. for a critical
discussion of the parsonian position on power) .
(b) The Exchange Conception of Power
The second major tradition to have influenced views of organ-
isational power is exchange theory, which, initially associated with
the social psychology of George Homans, finds its primary sociol-
ogical exponent in Blau (1964) .11 Although Blau aims to build up a
macro-theory of social structure, he does not take as his basic
premise the 'systemic' nature of social life, but starts from micro-
theoretical assumptions about exchange processes. Most social inter-
actions are assumed to involve an exchange of intrinsic benefits,
and, since "rational" men are assumed to seek rewards and benefits,
many of which are only available from social relationships, social
actors must involve themselves in social exchanges with others.
Social interactions are therefore occasions wherein partici-
pants r'eceive and offer rewards, and ask for or perform favours. As
long as rewards and favours are forthcoming in equal amounts the
relationship remains symmetrical and balanced. However, when one
party becomes a consistently greater supplier of rewards or doer of
d d tl2 .favours, the other party becomes epen en on and 1ndebted to the
supplier - given that certain other conditions regarding the non-
substitutability of services supplied etc. Initially, then, power
emerges from exchanges which are asymmetrical, when benefactions
supplied cannot be repaid in full.
In its primitive, emergent form, the nature of exchange
conception differs from its systems equivalent. In the latter, as
we have seen, power is system-based and system-related in its
usage, but there is no such presumption underlying the emergent
exchange notion. Power is initially interpersonal, deriving from
the self-seeking manipulation of social relationships. Subsequently
power cannot be defined as, a facilitating characteristic of social
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life - indeed, its essence lies in the constraining of people on pain
of a negative sanction viz. the withdrawal of the rewards, services
etc. which the power recipient values or needs (Blau,1964, p.116).
This conception always requires an exchange between inter-
actants, but if power recipients cannot reciprocate the favours or
rewards how is the balance of the relationship maintained?
Reciprocation occurs, according to Blau, because recipients must
grant prestige and acknowledge status superiority to the supplier of
rewards. Where this situation occurs repeatedly, power and status
differences become crystallised in structures so that such inequalities
lose their emergent qualities.
In summary, the primitive exchange conception concentrates on
the interpersonal aspects of power as an emergent quality of all social
life. Being generated within social relationships, this conception
allows for the possibility of sectionalist interests and always, by
definition, involves some kind of exchange between participants.
Power is acquired when one member of the exchange supplies rewards or
performs favours for the other, who, not being able to find alternative
sources or do without, becomes dependent on the first. This position
allows the supplier of rewards to demand favours in return, on pain of
the withdrawal of the valued rewards.
(c) , The Behavioural Conception of Power
This view, associated with the work of Dahl (1957, 1971), is
not so much based upon rigorous theoretical reasoning as a compromise
between an intuitive concept of power and the conditions which must
be fulfilled to raise its empirical study to the level of "responsible"
science (Dahl, 1971, p.354). In effect Dahl begins from the oper-
ational problems of how to study powe r scientifically and allows the
conception of power to emerge within the limits set by the solution
of that problem.
The overriding criteria which determine the general shape of
his view are that power must refer to acts of power, and that these
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acts must be observabLe to the researcher. The definition of power
which Dahl chooses to match his behavioural stipulations refers to
the successfuL attempt of a power wielder to shape a recipient's
action (Dahl, 1957). Power, then, exists in its exercise, since
one cannot observe a 'capacity', and power can only be recognised
as such if the wielder's intentions are realised.
From the viewpoint of forming a research strategy, the only
sensible way to observe acts of power is to enter overt decision-
making situations and to record the successful influence attempts of
various decision-makers. This stricture effectively ties the
behavioural conception of power to formal decision-making processes.
In order to obtain a picture of the real distribution of power, Dahl
argues that only the "key" decisions should be studied, i.e. those
decisions over which there exists manifest conflict. As a consequence
the effective behavioural conception of power involves reference to
overt opposition on decision topics (Dahl, 1971, p.359).
I shall let Lukes (1974) provide the summary of the behavioural
conception of power. The context and purposes of his "one-dimensional"
view of power are fundamentally different from those of the present
study, but it corresponds directly to the behavioural conception.
" this .•• view of power involves a focus on
behaviour in the making of decisions on issues
over which there is an observable confLict of
(subjective) interests, seen as express policy
preferences, revealed by political participants"
(Lukes, 1974, p.15).
Although there are few studies which use these conceptions in
their pure sense - and since they have been abstracted from particular
theorists this is hardly surprising - we shall see in Part One below
that organisational sociologists have drawn upon them, either singly
or in some combination.
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1.2.2 Conceptions of Authority
The conceptualisation of authority concerns the articulation
of power and legitimacy. The problem of legitimacy poses a re-
current theme in the history of theorising about power, and the way
the problem is conceptually resolved may be seen to shape the result-
ing concept of authority. As with the discussion of power, I shall
endeavour to examine purely conceptual questions although, since the
organisation has been the most prevalent locus of theorising about
legitimacy and authority, it is difficult to prevent some anticipation
of the considerations in Chapter Two below.
Before exploring the conceptual variations and ramifications
of the notion of authority, it is necessary to establish the ground
meaning of 'legitimacy'. The "normal" C:lmmon-sense usage of the
term is probably best reflected in dictionary definitions which
emphasise that legitimate actions are lawful or in accordance with
laws (i.e. sanctionable rules established by some "authoritative"
process) • Such a usage confirms the formal images of legitimacy
which are part of the managerial tradition in organisational theoris-
ing. The sociological image of 'legitimacy' is less formal and
legalistic. For Weber (1964), an action or state of affairs
acquires legitimacy to the extent that the actor's orientation to it
reflects a belief in its legitimacy, independent of the bases of that
belief (Weber, 1964, p.124). Through Weber's writings, legitimacy
has become associated with the orientation or attitudes of the actors
themselves rather than with a characteristic of the state of affairs
itself.
Where the legitimacy of an action is grounded in (i.e. theoret-
ically granted with reference to) a set of legal or formal codifi-
cations independent of the beliefs and evaluations of the actors
subject to that action, I shall call it 'formal legitimacy'. Where
actors orient their behaviour with respect to a (moral) belief in the
to 13 h h t th t dappropriateness of that order or ac 10n , w et er or no a or er
or action accords with formal/legal criteria, I shall use the term
'social legitimacy'. Whereas formal legitimacy is prescribed by
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rules, social legitimacy is conceded by social actors. It is, of
course, both a theoretical and an empirical possibility that an
action or order may fulfil the conditions of both definitions and
hence be socially and formally legitimate.
Having clarified the notion of legitimacy and the basis of
its sociological relevance, we can now consider the typical ways in
which it has been seen to articulate with the notion of power.
The first thing to note is the general sociological agreement
that power per se does not involve legitimacy14, and that authority
does involve legitimacy in one of its two senses. A dispute does
exist, however, over the nature of the relationship between power
and authority. Two positions are discernible.
One position argues that authority may be defined as
"legitimate power", where legitimacy might be 'social' or 'formal'.
The exponents of the former view locate their theorising in the
Weberian tradition :
"If the legitimacy of the exercise of power is
acknowledged by the subordinated individuals we
speak of legitimate power •••" (Goldhamer and Shils,
1939, p.17l the authors place this statement in
the context of a discussion of Weber's typology of
authori ty) •
"Authority, or legitimated power, involves voluntary
obedience based on some idea which the obedient
holds of the powerful or of his position".
(Gerth and Mills, 1953, p.195).
"Only the shared values of a collectivity can
legitimate the power of a superior and thereby trans-
form it into authority". (Blau, 1964, p.207).
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15 .Goldhamer and Shils, Gerth and Mills and Blau all provlde
examples of how social legitimation can change power into authority.
Bierstedt (1974a and 1974b) agrees that authority rests upon the
legitimacy of power, but offers the formalist interpretation. He
criticises the consensual image presented by Weberians because it
fails to take account of the "mandatory" or "compulsory" nature of
obedience to authority :
"Authority is ••• a function of the formal organis-
ation of an association and it is exercised in
accordance with specific and usually statutory
norms and statuses. It makes no appearance in
the informal organisation". (Bierstedt, 1974b,
p. 252) .
In short, power (or latent force) becomes institutionalised (Bierstedt
1974a, p.229), that is embodied in formal roles and statuses
(Bierstedt, 1974b, p.251). It is because Bierstedt insists that
compliance to authoritative commands is obligatory and compelling
whilst simultaneously clinging to the notion of legitimacy, that
ultimately he must offer a formalist view of authority. Despite the
logic of his own position, Bierstedt qua sociologist wants to argue
that mandatory compliance is in the end based on the consent of the
collective, but he can only achieve this result by the unsophisticated
use of a consensus assvflPtion (Bierstedt, 1974b, p.25S).
The second position regarding the relationship between power
and authority agrees with the first that authority possesses the
quality of legitimacy, but argues that to define authority as a form
of power is certainly misleading, and probably "inept" (MacIver,
1947, p.8S). Far from referring to a capacity or power characterised
by some form of legitimacy, authority refers to :
" the established right, within any social order,
to determine policies ~tc J
p.83) •
" (MacIver, 1947,
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This relationship between power and authority is substantially
supported by Parsons :
"Authority is essentially the institutional codes
within which the use of power as medium is organ-
ised and legitimised ••. [It is] the aspect of
status in a system of social organisation by
virtue of which the incumbent is put in a position
legitimately to make decisions that are binding,
not only on himself but on the collectivity as a
whole •••" (Parsons, 1967, pp.319-320; my
emphasis) .
Authority, to paraphrase, defines the rights of role incumbents
with respect of decision- or policy-making, to the acquisition and
to the use of power (ibid.). Unlike power, authority in this view
is neither held nor exercised, but sets the legitimate constraints
on the use of power by some actor in a formal status or office.
The legitimacy of this institutionalised code of rights may
be conceded by actors within the social unit in question, or im-
posed by the system or system power-holders (formally or functionally
legitimated) • When an author like MacIver acknowledges that myths
and ideologies may be used in the "construction" of a consensus, the
question of whether author~ty is conceded or imposed becomes a matter
for philosophical debate. However, where institutionalisation16 as
a macro-system process is the ultimate legitimator and distributor of
rights (e.g. Parsons), or where rights are simply those formally set
down in the "rules" (e.g. Fayol, 1949, chapter 4), legitimacy is
effectively imposed on formal grounds.
From the above, it is evident that whether authority is a
form of power or a set of rights defining the scope of power, it is
always based on legitimacy, and the latter can either be seen as a
property to be dispensed by members of the collectivity in question,
or one which is attributed to authority independent of their volition.
This groundwork completed, we are now in a position to offer a three-
fold typology of conceptions of authority along the same lines as
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that produced for power above.
(a) The "Institutional" Conception of Authority
This conception of authority emerges from its relation to
a formalist notion of legitimacy. In one way or another, this
view associates the legitimacy of authority with its institutional-
isation within a system or collectivity (e.g. Bierstedt, 1974a and
1974b;Parsons, 1967). The right or capacity of authority
becomes attached to certain statuses or offices in the structure
of the collectivity, and its allocation is guaranteed by the formal
rules or legal order of that collectivity. The distribution of
authority arises and is 'sanctified' because it reflects and contri-
butes to the formal/"rational" needs or goals of the system. Quite
often there are attempts to legitimate sociologically what is
essentially an "institutional" conception, i.e. to transpose its
formal legitimacy into a social legitimacy. (For example, Parsons'
implicit and Bierstedt's explicit assumptions about consensus on the
formal distribution of authority) . Authority is impartial and im-
personal because it is realised through offices or statuses and is
accepted because it operates for the collective good and is a
cultural expectation (Bierstedt, 1974b p.253ff.i Parsons, 1967,
p. 319ff.) .
(b) The "Normative" Conception of Authority
Just as the notion of formal legitimacy binds together
theorists with different views of the relationship of power and
authority, so too with 'social legitimacy'. As we noted above,
Weber argues for a "normative,,17 conception of authority in which,
for various reasons, social actors share the view that the enactment
of a 'capacity' or the exercise of a 'right' is justifiable and valid.
It is for general conceptual purposes irrelevant whether the 'object'
socially legitimated is the command itself (which may, for example, be
seen as 'rational') or the office/official whence the command origi-
nated. This conception needs no assumptions about consensus, since
the empirical existence of general agreement with the social order or
a type of command must be verified as a precondition of authority.
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In short, the 'subordinates' in any potential authority situation
need to be directly or indirectly consulted to establish the extent
of social legitimacy. Similarly, the impartiality of 'authority'
cannot be assumed, since, in terms of a sociology of authority,
such a feature cannot reside in an influence attempt itself, but is
attributed to or withheld from that attempt by the social actors in
question.
(c) The "Behavioural" Conception of Authority
A third conception of authority may be called "behavioural"
because, like its counterpart in the area of power, it is built around
the empirical problem of its recognition. Several theorists have
taken as indicative of the legitimacy of authority, the continued com-
pliance of subordinates :
"When a persuader becomes insti tutional.ised, in the
sense of being always accepted and thus legitimated
by the recipient, this becomes authority". (Hall,
1972, p.207i my emphasis) .
Whereas the grounds for ascribing legitimacy to the institutional
conception are "formal", and those for the normative conception are
"social", in the behavioural view legitimacy is implicit in the act
of obedience.
It is not my intention to evaluate those general conceptions.
Critical assessment of the major conceptions of organisational power,
which in varying degrees incorporate the above, is a primary task in
Chapters Two, Three and Four.
1.3 Plan of the Thesis
In this chapter I have introduced the major assumptions and
arguments which underpin the theoretical work that lies ahead.
Before moving to the substantive details, I wish to provide a broad
overview of hmv the thesis unfolds within its formal structure.
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In Part One, the main purpose is to examine critically what
.might be called the 'politics-related' literature of organisational
research. "Power", "control", "authority", "influence" etc. are
part and parcel of the vocabulary of organisation and of organis-
ation theorists, and, in a sense, anyone who says anything about
organisational life - its structure, process and functioning - at
least implicitly has something to say about organisational power
and politics. Yet some selection is necessary, both because of
the vastness of the organisational literature and because my treat-
ment of organisational studies - given the need to abstract the often
concealed or implicit conception of organisational power and politics
is particularly detailed and lengthy.
I believe that I have selected first those aspects of the
literature which bear most directly on the topic of this thesis and,
second, those theorists whose contributions to the topic are most
notable. In Part One, it will be suggested that those theories
which belong to the politics-related literature may be grouped
together according to the conceptions of power and politics they
encourage. Specifically, it is possible to discern three general
types of approach - the "unitary", the "pluralist" and the "critical" -
and I shall examine these types of approach (and their component
theories) in order to discover their strengths and weaknesses. From
this investigation of the literature I shall extrapolate "conceptual
themes" which are germane to a theoretical understanding of the topic
and which may subsequently, in Part Three, be explored and extended
within an interpretive sociological perspective. One theme of order
and conflict emerges from the "orthodox" (unitary and pluralist)
views of organisational power and politics examined in Chapters Two
and Three; the second theme, counterposing the first face ("politics")
and the second face ("structural power") of power, derives from the
critical interplay between the types of approach reviewed in Chapters
Three and Four.
Part Two constitutes a methodological and theoretical bridge
between Parts One and Three. Chapter Five trkes up a methodological
problem that is a persistent feature of much of the academic theorising
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evaluated in Part One. Many academic theories appear to be involved
in a form of tautology, in which power and politics are theorised,
not with reference to the socially contingent organisational world,
but by the degree of conceptual closure or circularity defineiinto
the theoretical framework. Theories 'work' because they must do so
through a "watertight" set of internal definitions. As a result of
this brief methodological excursion I recommend a "sensitising"
approach to sociological investigation, thereby ensuring both the
framework's empirical orientation and its sensitivity to future possi-
bilities.
The theoretical compone.nt of this "bridge" reopens for more
detailed discussion the crucial problem of reconciling the postulates
of voluntarism and constraint within an interpretive sociological
framework, and from the ensuing arguments there arises a third
conceptual theme to add to those of 'order-conflict' and the 'two
faces of power'. This theme addresses the possibilities and im-
possibilities of social action. The second "bridging" chapter
(Chapter Six) summarises the arguments of the previous four chapters,
and prepares the three conceptual themes for their theoretical
extension and..exploration in Part Three.
In this last Part of the thesis, my aim is to develop a
sensitising framework of ideas and propositions which, drawing upon
previous arguments, can make interpretive sociological sense of
organisational power and politics while not foreclosing on future
empirical possibilities. The postulates of voluntarism and of
social contingency are thus parameters of the central effort to under-
stand (possible) variations in the way organisational participants
interpret (Chapter Eight) and "strategise" (Chapter Nine) the
political dimension of organisational life. The two untenable
extremes of "free-floating phenomenology" wi.t.hout;constraint and of
"structural determinism" without an adequate account of social-inter-
pretive mediation are avoided by considering the "structural frame-
work" of organisational power (Chapter Seven) as a set of biases or
predispositions which are theorised by participants, and enacted,
adapted or resisted according to structural, social and interpretive
factors.
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While respond~ng specifically to the need to theorise
organisational power and politics, Part ~hree addresses a number
of important sociological - theoretical and methodological - issues.
I thereby hope to contribute, if I may return to my opening remarks,
to the integration of the organisational sub-field into its broader
disciplinary area as a specialism which can fully participate in and
illuminate issues, problems and debates of general and genuine socio-
logical interest.
Chapter One
·NOTES
1. There are, of course, very important exceptions, many of
which are referred to in the main body of the thesis.
For example, the works of Mouzelis (1975, originally 1967)
and Silverman (1970) were landmarks in their own right in
the field of organisations, and both sociologists are
.sharply critical of the state of organisational sociology.
2. See Champion (1975) for classic examples of this (e.g.
p.153) and other unsociological assertions.
3. In these quotations, both Crozier and Mouzelis are referring
in particular to Dalton's study (1959) which will be examined
in Chapter Three.
4. The length and significance of this doctrinal dispute is
indicated by thp- list of references to it in Corrigan, 1975,
pp.236-237 (note 5).
5. Durkheim (1938), of course, provides the clearest statement
of this view •
.6. The complexities and intangibility of subjective meanings
raise very important theoretical and methodological problems,
some of which will be discussed in the later parts of the
thesis. At this introductory stage it is sufficient to
defend the need to study them by appealing to the argument
that if, as is clearly the case, actors do behave according
to subjective meaning, it is incumbent upon sociologists to
try to study them however "complex" or "intangible" they may
be. Alternatively, to neglect them altogether and investi-
gate only "hard", quantifiable factors, is not only to over-
simplify social factors for the sake of appearing 'objective',
but also to "trammel" sociological analysis (Hyman, 1972,
p.69). See Chapter Five.
7. For reasons that will become apparent (see 1.1.3) I am not
going to define "formally" what I mean by 'power', nor, by
inference, '\i~hatI specifically intend by the notion of
politics. My views of these social phenomena, which are
complex and related to other important 'political' ideas,
will develop coherently during Part Three.
8. During the thesis I shall speak simply of "organisations",
and this should be understood as referring to those complex,
more or less formalised institutions which have become the
conventional focus of organisation theory and the sociology
of organisations. I shall not, for example, include the
State in this category, although it might be analysed as
such and, indeed, much of what I say could be relevant to it.
On the other hand, I shall be particularly interested in work
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8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
(cont'd)
and industrial organisations, not only because of a personal
interest in them, but also because of the massive amount of
research that has been undertaken in them.
This is not to deny that important political actions and
processes occur with respect to external groups (e.g. other
organisations, agencies and institutions). The li~e between
'internal' and 'external' politics is impossible to draw,
and external political relationships will inevitably
influence internal ones (and vice versa) - e.g. union-
management politics. In general, I am interested in intra
organisational relationships (i.e. human participants in
the same arena) rather than interorganisational ones.
The importance of power is further inflated in the Parsonian
organisational world because the organisation is specifically
and primarily oriented towards the attainment of goals (Parsons,
1956) . The association of power with the goal-attainment
problem area also makes clear the distinction between power
and social control. Whereas power is a positive goal-
seeking capacity, social control is located in the integration
problem area and is largely a system of constraints.
Georg Simmel's work on dyads and triads anticipates much of
social exchange theory as it has developed in the hands of
Homans (1961) and Blau (1964). I have concentrated upon
Blau's contribution for two reasons: first, he provides the
clearest statement of exchange theory as a socioZogicaZ
enterprise with some affinity to the symbolic interactionist
traditions of, for example, Goffman, whereas Homans remains
mainly within a behavioural psychological perspective;
second, Blau consciously aims to conceptualise power within
his broader framework.
Blau readily assimilates Emerson's analysis of power-
dependence relationships, and his conditions of power
(Emerson, 1962 and 1964), into his exchange theory of power
(Blaue, 1964, p.118ff.).
To argue that actors orient their behaviour with reference
to such beliefs does not imply that the-actors therefore
conform to the dictates of the order they define as
legitimate. Weber makes this point explicitly (1964,
pp.125-126; see also Coegg, 1975, p.60ff.), although, as
we shall see, this aspect of the Weberian legacy, as with
so many others, is often overlooked.
We have already seen that Parsons' view is an important
though relatively isolated exception. His general systemic
notion acquires legitimacy by its assumed relationship to
the attainment of collective goals.
Blau (1964, pp.205-206) actually distinguishes between "formal
authority" and "legitimate authority" which approximately
corresponds to the difference between "institutional
authority" and "normative authority" (see below p.22) •
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16. It should be remembered that there is no necessary
relationship be twee n institutionalisation and formalism,
since the former can be a genuine social process. The
problem with the Parsonian view, and structural-functionalism
in general, is their tying of 'institutionalisation' to
system goals or needs rather than to processes of social
interaction. Others take a directly formalist view of the
process e.g. Bierstedt, 1974a and 1974b, see above.
17. The term "normative" has been selected, in spite of its
unhappy connections with Parsonian theory, to indicate that
actors share a sort of moral belief in a social order or
action. Since the normative conception is not behavioural,
there is no presumption that a shared sense of the validity
of a command will inevitably lead to collective compliance
or behavioural consensus. This is therefore in accord
with Weber's conception of legitimacy (Weber, 1964,
pp.125-126; see n.13above.)
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PART ONE
POWER AND POLITICS IN THE STUDY
OF ORGANISATIONS
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CHAPTER TWO
ORGANISATIONAL ORDER POWER AND AUTHORITY
Ultimately any study of organisational behaviour must say
something - either directly or by implication - about power, because
organisation is a political phenomenon. However, some studies may
be expected to reveal images of power, its sources, its purposes and
its consequences, more explicitly than others, and it is such studies
which constitute the politics-related literature and upon which I
shall be concentrating in Part One. For the reasons put forward in
Chapter One, the critical analysis in the following three chapters is
lengthy and thorough, as I seek to discover and establish the effective
conceptions of power and politics permeating the approaches in question.
In the present chapter I am particularly interested in those
approaches which confront the conceptions of power and of authority in
an attempt to comprehend how organisations achieve a workable degree of
order and stability. In the three main sections of the chapter I shall
deal in detail with Simon's decision-making approach,with Etzioni's
compliance theory, and with mainstream sociological approaches to organ-
isational authority. I shall suggest that their common concern with
the (implicitly 'political') accomplishment of order, leads to other
similarities such as a concentration of hierarchy, and to a subsequently
weak concept jon of organisational power and politics.
2.1 Simon's Decision-Making Approach to Organisational Behaviour
It is interesting to note that the topic of decision-making at
the societal and community level has been invariably treated, almost by
definition, as a political phenomenon. At the organisational level,
however, decision-making has been subjected to a very different type of
approach, one which emphasises rationality, the predictability of the
actual decision, and the probability of the "correct" decision being
made. consequently the vast area of organisational decision-making
theoryl has been dominated by economists and administrative scientists,
very few of whom have considered in adequate detail the role of social
and political factors in the process of decision, and their influence
on the decisional outcome. Indeed, as will become apparent, the
31
process of decision has been largely neglected as an actual sequence
of social actions, since theorists have tended to concentrate on
producing 'models' of varying degrees of abstractness and heurism that
purport to predict the "best" decisional outcome.
The foremost representative of the modern approach to organ-
isational decision-making is Herbert Simon, whose work in this area
has inspired a large number of developments in the theory of organis-
ation, which cover a vast theoretical range. Since it is impossible
to cover this wide range in the present context, I have decided to
focus on what may be considered the central core of his theory of
organisational decision-making2, treating other emergent theories
where it seems most appropriate3•
Simon's intentions are clearly discernible from these core
works under scrutiny. His major aim is to liberate the theory of
administration from the straightjacket of the traditional, formalistic
approach of seeking the universal principles of organisation (Simon,
1957a, Ch.2i March and Simon, 1958, Ch.2), and this is to be accom-
plished by considering administrative behaviour as decision-making
4(Simon, 1957a, p.8). In order to achieve this objective, it is
necessary to push the frontiers of decision-making theory beyond those
mapped out by micro-economics. This progress is to be achieved by
taking an analytical, behavioural approach, viz. to understand how
people actually take de~isions in organisations.
This statement pinpoints basic differences between Simon's
approach and the alternatives provided by traditional administrative
theory and conventional micro-economic analysis. Simon has discussed
the weaknesses of these approaches ina number of places.
former he says
Of the
"Administrative description suffers currently from
superficiality, oversimplification, lack of realism •••
It has refused to undertake the tiresome task of
studying the actual allocations of decision-making
functions". (Simon, 1957a, p.38).
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To the extent that they do not suffer by having purely
prescriptive concerns, micro-economic theories most certainly share
with administrative theory the failure to analyse human decision-
making behaviour in a realistic way, by assuming that economic men
always maximise. In addition, the premise that organisational
decisions are taken by only one person (the entrepreneur) also over-
simplifies what is a very complex behavioural phenomenon.
In what follows, I shall first outline the major components
of Simon's theory; there will follow a critical discussion of these
components with special reference to the theme of organisational
politics; finally, I shall bring together the major points of critic-
ism, from which overall conclusions may be drawn.
2.1.1 Decision-Haking and the Problem of Organisational Order
In contradistinction to conventional economic theories of the
firm: Simon considers the decision-making unit of the organisation to
comprise its complete membership, so he cannot simply assume decisions
to be the reaction of one economically motivated man, the entrepreneur.
Furthermore Simon, as one of his main theoretical premises, postulates
that the individual as a human being is potentially autonomous, in the
sense that he has the logical capacity to make decisions independently
of the presence or of the wishes of other people. This assumption is
particularly interesting for my purposes, ~ince the weight that Simen
places on decision-making as "rational human choice" in a formally
organised arena, reflects the underlying premises of this thesis (see
Chapter One) •
With his premises, Simon confronts one of the major recurrent
problems for sociological analysis, namely, how and why do individuals
surrender their autonomy to a larger social body; in Simon's case,
the 'formal organisation'? This, of course, is the organisational
equivalent to the problem of social order6.
Having consciously eschewed the behaviourally more simple
solutions to this problem, the majority of Simon's work can be seen as
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an attempt to construct a theoretical alternative based upon more
realistic, philosophical and empirical assumptions.
Simon's theory of organisational decision-making may be
analysed in terms of a number of interrelated sub-theories which
cohere logically to answer two questions. First, when organisational
decisions are not taken by one person alone (as is typical of such
decisions), how does the decision-making unit of the organisation
operate such that all the individual decisions of participants produce
a collective decision? In short, as was posed in the last paragraph,
how and why do individual actions become organisational behaviours?
Second, in what way and to what extent can the resultant decisions,
both individual and collective, be described as 'rational'? In order
to answer the first question, Simon constructs sub-theories regarding
the anatomy of organisational decision-making, the operation of organis-
ational influence, and the nature of human motivation in organisations.
The second question requires the development of the concept of 'bounded
rationali ty' • I shall outline his argument in this sequence.
Choices or decisions are always based upon an assessment of the
information held with respect to the pending decision, in the case of
the "autonomous individual", the relevant information having been
accumulated ~y himself and resulting f~om a number of prior 'sub-
decisions' taken in the recent past. Each of those subdecisions will
in turn have been based upon an assessment of available, collected
information ..• and so on, demonstrating the relevance of a 'means-ends
7chain' scheme in understanding individual choices. However complete
autonomy is not possible within the organisation, so that, if decision-
making activities are to cohere in an integrated manner, they must be
constrained in some way.
Simon conceives of the formal organisation as a specialised
corporate entity, and this specialisation is not only horizontal in
the traditional sense of the division of labour or of work, but is
also vertical :
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" vertical specialisation •.• refers to the
division of decision-making duties between operative
and supervisory personnel." (Simon, 1957a, p.9).
The organisation as a decision-making unit therefore operates in such
a way that the decisions of individuals at different hierarchical
levels hang together more or less tightly; but what are the mechanics
of this confluence of the individual in the collective? According to
Simon this occurs because organisational decision-making may be seen
as a means-ends chain (see Simon, 1957a, p.62ff.) not dissimilar from
that already described for the autonomous individual. It is postul-
ated that any organisation has ultimate objectives which define (often
ambiguously) the tasks and purposes of its participants as a collect-
ivity. These goals are established by top decision-makers, and
represent the "value premises" for decisions to be taken at the level
immediately below. For any two contiguous organisational levels, the
decisions taken at the higher one set the decisional context of the
lower level; at this level the participants accept the higher decisions
as value premises for their own decisions which normally result in more
practical interpretations. In addition to the acceptance of guiding
values, the taking of a decision also requires certain factual infor-
mation on the availability and consequences of competing decision possi-
bilities. 'I'hisinformation constitutes the factual premises of the
decision, and such data may result either from the activities (and
hence decisions) of other organisational members, or from the search
activities of the decision-maker himself. The decisions at one level
are in this way seen to define the remit of the participants at the next
level down, and so on until the operative level is reached. This chain
of decisions from top to bottom links together the decision activities
of all organisational participants, by focusing their attentions on
behaviour, which is increasingly limited in its scope and practical in
its character as the hierarchy is descended, but is nevertheless, by
virtue of this chain, related to (and once, twice ... 'nth' removed fromj
the ultimate objectives of the organisation.
Having explained the anatomy of organisational decision-making,
there remains the question of why this process should happen. If
35
participants share the human characteristic of freedom of choice,
why do they surrender to the demands of the organisation, and accept
as their own those decisions which define more or less rigidly the
nature of their behaviour? Together, the sub-theories of organis-
ational influence and of human motivation attempt to reconcile choice
with (apparent) constraint.
It is at this stage that the implicitly political aspects of
the approach emerge. Simon investigates in some detail two forms of
organisational influence, viz. authority and identification, which
respectively exemplify the "external" and "internal" modes of
acceptance (cf. Simon, 1957a, p.123).
"Of all the modes of influence, authority is the one
that chiefly distinguishes the behaviour of individuals
as participants of organisations from their behaviour
outside such organisations. It is authority that
gives an organisation its formal structure .••"
(Simon, 1957a, p.l24).
In its most general form, authority is defined as a relationship in
which:
"The superior frames and transmits decisions with the
expectation tllat they will be accepted ~y the subord-
inate [and the] ••• subordinate expects such decisions,
and his conduct is determined by t.hem'", (Simon,
1957a, p.125).
Only when these two behaviours co-eXlS~ is there an authority
8relationship, so that if obedience/acceptance is not forthcoming,
the attempt to exercise influence is not authority. The reasons for
obedience/acceptance are irrelevant in terms of Simon's "objective and
behaviouristic" definition - that'a command is obeyed is sufficient,
for this shows that decision premises have been accepted without
question.
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Authority and identification are not unrelated actions:
"Initially, [organisational objectives] ..• are
usually imposed on the individual by the exercise
of authority over him; but to a large extent the
values gradually become 'internalised' and are
incorporated into the psychology and attitudes of
the individual participant". (Simon, 1957a, p.198).
With repeated subjection to organisational goals through the acceptance
of authority, the participant gradually and often unconsciously absorbs
them into his own system of values and beliefs, resulting in a kind of
9voluntary, unsolicited loyalty to the organisational cause. Where
a participant's personal goals are the same as the organisational goals,
his decision-making behaviour is unproblematic even in the absence of
authority.
The argument so far may be summarised as follows: organis-
ational decision processes are supportive of organisational goals
because of the mechanics of vertical specialisation, and because the
organisation constrains the behaviour of individuals by providing
decision premises which first are accepted uncritically (through the
operation of authority) and second gradually become internalised (as
the individual identifies with the organisation) . But why should
individuals allow the organisation to erode their freedom by imposing
authority? Simon's analysis of this problem, effectively establish-
ing a theory of human motivation in organisations, is based upon
Barnard's theory of inducements and contributions. (See Barnard,
1938, especially Chapter 11)
"The contributions of personal efforts which
constitute the energies of organisations are
yielded by individuals because of incentives".
(Barnard, 1938, p.139).
From the individual's viewpoint
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"The members of an organisation ••• contribute to
the organisation in return for inducements that
the organisation offers them". (Simon, 1957a,
p.lll) •
The mix of inducements offered will vary from organisation to organ-
isation, but Barnard distinguishes bet\veen what may be called
"objective incentives", such as material and monetary benefits,
shorter hours etc., and "subjective incentives", such as religious
salvation, realisation of ambition, intrinsic job satisfaction and
the like. Although he acknowledges this distinction, Simon has
concentrated upon the objective, especially monetary, inducements
10almost to the exclusion of others. As a general proposition
regarding motivation of participants, it is argued that individuals
will (continue to) contribute as long as the inducements offered out-
weigh, or at least balance, the contributions they must make to the
. . 1 11organlsatlona process.
Drawing upon this proposition, it is suggested that partici-
pants will therefore continue to obey/accept uncritically (within
limits) the commands of superiors, as long as the balance of contri-
butions/inducements is not unfavourable to them. Simon gives three
interrelated reasons to .account for the probability of obedience/
acceptance: first, on his engagement, the employee accepts the
legitimate right of the employer to comman~ his behaviour (within the
limits of the area of acceptance; see below) - this is true especially
in the formal contractual sense (Simon, 1957a, pp.130-l3l); second,
to have joined the organisation implies that the employee has already
assessed the effects of these organisational requirements in terms of
his inducements/contributions balance, viz. in return for the induce-
ments offered, he forfeits the right to determine his own behaviour;
and finally, the majority of organisational demands will fall within
his "area of acceptance" (Simon) or "zone of indifference" (Barnard)
from the organisatiorls viewpoint, this area or zone may be expanded
by the application of further inducement.12 (Simon, 1957a, p.116).
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The full answer to the first question (viz. how do the actions
and decisions of individuals become integrated into the decision-
making unit of the organisation) can now be given. In deciding to
join the organisation, each participant surrenders his right and
capacity to determine fully his behaviour, and, by his uncritical
acceptance of premises handed down by his superior, ensures that his
activities and choices are relevant to the objectives of the organis-
ation. This situation will continue as long as organisational demands
neither require greater contributions than inducements nor fall outside
the limits of acceptance.
The second question involves a brief discussion of Simon's
theory of rational choice. It is probably for this work that he has
. ed Lad 13 b h . 1 .recelV most ace alm, ut e starts from a conventlona vlewof
rationality :
" ~ehaviourJ is rational in so far as it selects
alternatives which are conducive to the achievement
of the previously selected goals." (Simon, 1957a,
p.4) •
The central distinction between individual behaviour and organisational
behaviour which underpins the total theory, continues to playa large
role in his analysis of rationality. Commencing from the examination
of the ratiollality of individual cho.Lce, he constructs a theory of
rationality in organisational decision-making by simple aggregation
within the context of his theory of the operation of the decision-
making unit.
In a number of memorable articles and chapters, Simon
decisively repudiates the view of the organisational decision-maker as
a "maximiser", and substitutes a view of human choice as "satisficing,,14
He explains a number of psychological objections to the maximising
concept of human decision-making, and postulates what he calls the
"principle of bounded rationality" :
39
"The capacity of the human mind for formulating and
solving complex problems is very small compared with
the size of the problems whose solution is required
for objectively rational behaviour in the real world
or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective
rationality. II (Simon, 1957b, p.198).
Since organisational decision-making occurs through behaviour of
individuals who " .•• have not the wits to maximise" (Simon, 1957a,
p.xxiv), the organisational process is also constrained, and limited
to the achievement of a bounded organisational rationality. Organis-
ational rationality is ensured, by the decision (means-ends) chain as
described above, since the behaviour of individuals is thereby oriented
towards the organisation's objectives; but the psychological limits
on their choice behaviour are necessarily inherited by the organisation
in toto.
In summary, ~~e organisation as a decision-making unit operates
cohesively by placing a system of formal constraints on participants'
organisational decisions; and rationality, although hampered by the
psychology of the decision-makers themselves, may be achieved by
ensuring that the individuals' 'boundedly rational' behaviours are
'influenced' in the direction of the organisation's objectives.
2.1.2 The Implications of the Decision-Making Approach t:or
Organisational Power and Politics.
In essence, the aim of Simon has been to construct a set of
categories which is capable of describing what goes on in organisations,
where this behaviour may be understood in terms of a process of
decision-making (e.g. Simon, 1957a, pp.xlv - xlvi). His theory has a
logical coherent structure with at least a surface plausibility.
However, in the context of the present thesis, his arguments need to
be examined in depth to ascertain the extent to which they account for
decision-making as a political process. In critically inves~igating
four facets of his approach - viz. the concepts of 'decision',
'authority', 'rationality' and 'conflict' - I shall attempt to draw
out the effective conception of power and politics which permeates his
"theory.
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(a) The Concept and Process of Decision
Simon grounds his theory of organisation upon a very broad
definition of decision, which, for his purposes, is inseparable from,
and used interchangeably with, the idea of choice itself (Simon,
1957a, pp.3-4). A theory of organisational decision-making, like
any theory of human behaviour, must examine choice processes. Such
interest in the idea of choice - which is also at the heart of the
present effort - is to be commended, since organisational analysis has
tended to focus upon deterministic external constraints. However, a
closer examination of what Simon effectively proposes, reveals that
the premise regarding human choice is purely philosophical in substance;
his analysis of the organisational decision process indicates a
quite transparent concept of human choice which plays no effective role.
The notion of choice or decision is from the start defined in
individualistic terms, being concerned with the mechanism whereby
behavioural alternatives are narrowed down, and the process of choice,
by referring to the wayan individual copes with the problem of finding
an acceptable solution, is a psycho~ogical affair.15 This psychological
concept of decision itself reinforces the general psychologistic
orientation which permeates the total theory, hence confirming its
coherence. While the internal consistency of the theory is not in
doubt, I believe that Simon's concepts of choice and decision process
suffer from significant theoretical and sociological -'leaknesses.
Theoretically, Simon defines the notion of choice so broadly
that the relationship between choice and behaviour becomes indefinable.
In this broad notion, Simon includes both thoughtful reflection and
unthoughtful reflex, and human choice becomes more or less equivalent
to human behaviour. With such an all-inclusive meaning, the concept
of choice cannot elucidate the analysis of human action. The notion
of decision-making (as so defined) is sociologically naive because of
the implications of Simon's attachment to "learning theory,,~6with its
"stimulus-response" connotations that become evident in his behavioural
notions, and to a psychological concept of choice. These sociological
weaknesses are two-fold: he fails to examine choice in terms of
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subjective meaning, and he neglects social influences on the process
of organisational decision-making.
With respect to the first of these sociological shortcomings,
Simon's concept of human choice involves little sense of social action
in Weberian or phenomenological terms, because it incorporates no idea
of subjective meaning, and because decision-making must be studied
as behaviour. Among sociologists, interest in choice behaviour has
emerged because such activities allow the theorist to build into a
framework a more realistic image of the social actor - as someone who,
with others, actually creates and maintains social reality. If,
however, choice behaviour includes the reflex action of the typist
(Simon, 1957a, p.3), and can be understood more generally as a response
simply evoked by stimuli in the 'psychological environment', Simon's
propositions provide a very restricted conception of how people parti-
cipate in, and influence the process of organisational decision-making.
At one level the stimulus-response approach abstracts from the
creativity of human choice behaviour, but defining the idea of
'decision process' in terms of the reactions of the individual decision-
maker, also limits to a minimum the analysis of sociological influences
on decision-making.17 That organisational decision-making is a social
activity which takes place in a social situation receives little theor-
etical acknowledgement, and the few contextual factors receiving
systemat:_c attention (of which "authority" is the major example) operate
more by default than by intent (see below) • Simon's general psychol-
ogical orientation predisposes him towards analysing the cognitive and
informational influences on decision-making, and as such he fails to
perceive that human decisions are not only constrained by the rational
possibilities of the decision in question and the psychological charac-
teristics of human learning, but also by the social and political
characteristics of the decisional context.
As a general statement, Simon's concept of choice appears to
be unsatisfactory because, paradoxically, its meaning is co-extensive
with the concept of human behaviour, and the psychologistic view
developed by Simon conceives of behaviour in a type of 'stimulus-
response' fashion. In short, his concept of choice behaviour is
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effectively (i.e. in terms of how it actually operates within the
theoretical framework) indistinguishable from behaviour which is
externally determined or constrained. This general paradox can be
illustrated by pre-empting our examination of his concept of authority;
authority is the only well-developed social or political factor in his
theory of organisational decision-making, and it is informative to see
how it influences human choice.
"In joining the organisation he [the employee]
accepts an authority relation •.. Acceptance of
authority by the employee gives the organisation
a powerful means of influencing him - more powerful
than persuasion, and comparable to the evoking
processes that call forth a whole programme of
behaviour in response to a stimulus".
Simon, 1958, p.90).
(March and
When a command is given, the employee withholds his critical faculties
and behaves as if responding to a stimulus of authority. But, in
Simon's broad psychological sense, the employee has still chosen to
behave as he does. It is clear that the notion of constraint is sub-
sumed under the label of human choice, for the employee chooses to be
constrained (because of an assumed past decision to accept, within
limits, organisational authority) in the same sense as the typist
"chooses" to exhibit a reflex action (cf, Simon, 1957a, p.3). Barnard,
in his discussion of authority from which Simon derived his concept,
quotes with enthusiasm a passage from a Major-General James G. Harbard;
this passage appears to take this paradoxical notion of human choice
to its absurd extreme :
"A democratic president had forgotten that the greatest
of all democracies is the Army. Discipline and morale
influence the inarticulate vote that is instantly taken
by masses of men when the order comes to move forward .:
a variant of crowd psychology that inclines it to follow
a leader, but the Army does not move forward until the
motion is 'carried'. 'Unanimous consent' only follows
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co-operation between the individuaZ men in the ranks."
(Harbard, The American Army in France, 1936, quoted
in Barnard, 1938, p.164).
This quotation reveals much about the shared notion of authority and
its prescriptive and ideological implications, but for the purposes
of this section, it demonstrates the problem with Simon's concept of
human choice, which is far too extensive in its definition. The para-
dox of constrained choice can be simply resolved by recognising that
Simon employs the notion of 'choice' in an unconventional sense, and
by failing to be deceived by its recurrent usage. A problem remains,
however, because the continued use of the concept does have consequences
of an ideological kind - with subsequent implications for the image of
organisational politics - for, in our culture, individual choice and
democracy are interwoven, and if employees choose to "accept" commands
without question, the organisation appears to be 'democratic' and
'cooperative' in its operation, possibly in spite of the reality.
Through an inadequate and confusing conceptualisation of human .
choice, Simon overemphasises the psychological aspects of his topic of
enquiry and fails to develop a realistic analysis of the social process
of decision. As we shall se~ his examination of socia-political
influences on the process of organisational decision dissolv~into a
set of self-reinforcing but unsatisfactory, formalistic assertions about
the nature and processe~ of authority.
(b) The Operation of Organisational Authority
Bearing in mind the problems related to the process of human
choice in the organisation, I shall now proceed to an investigation of
Simon's analysis of the role of authority in organisational decision-
making. The concept of authority plays a key contextual role in the
explanation of the process of decision-making, and Simon's propositions
constitute a coherent system of ideas which appears to provide a simple
way of understanding how the organisation operates. A deeper analysis
of his concept of authority and the resulting .image of the organisation
suggests that the theory works because of a number of explicit and
implicit assumptions and omissions, and that its surface plausibility
is built upon formalistic, prescriptive, even tautological premises.
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For Simon, with his behavioural conception, authority exists
only in its acceptance, and acceptance is represented by the sub-
ordinate's act of obedience, in which his willingness to withhold
his critical faculties is realised. Such an "objective and behav-
iouristic" definition is clearly intended to simplify the process of
empirical research by making it ab initio operational. This empirical
concern as expressed in the definition of authority, however genuine,
has distinct theoretical consequences.IS Simon's analysis of
organisational decision-making depends on the subordinate's acceptance
of superiors' decision-premises as defining his focus and scope of
interest, and a close examination reveals that the concept of authority
fulfils this analytical function by empirically unsatisfactory means.
Four main reasons appear to account for the success of authority in
securing a trouble-free compli~Dce with organisational demands, i.e.
in accomplishing organisational order.
First, the acceptance of "authority" is made a matter of
definition - non-acceptance of co~~ands is ruled as not a case of
authority, thereby not part of the formal structure of the organis-
ation and (presumably) outwith the remit of the organisation theorist.
It is therefore not surprising to find that very little attention is
devoted to occasions when "authority" fails. Although the theory
allows for the possibility of 'disobedience' by including reference
to an "area of acceptance", there is no systematic analysis of the
social and c'.llturaldeterminants of tre "zone", and, further, it is
expected that organisational demands will anyway "normally" fall within
it. The first reason why authority works in Simon's theory is
because the definition biases the researcher against studying cases
where disobedience occurs.
Second, Simon rationalises this assertion that authority will
be obeyed, by formalistic assumption that the :
" employment contract results in the creation of a
continuing authority relation between the organisation
and the employee". (Simon, 1957a, p.116).
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In this way, he argues that acceptance may be normally expected
because the employee has taken the decision to participate, thus
reinforcing the assumed momentous nature of this particular choice.
While the employment contract might influence some aspects of
organisational behaviour, it is blatantly unrealistic to assume that
it determines the everyday activities of the employee. It might be
argued that formal contractual obligations influence some employees
more than others, such as a "new recruit" or a "bureaucratic
personality". However, one could suggest that the contract becomes
less significant as the employees work out its effective limits, viz.
occasions when employers do not or would not invoke its rules. Older
and more experienced workers are most likely to have an operational
definition of contractual obligations. From my angle, it is more
interesting to consider the influence of groups on limiting the
relevance of formal factors. It is inevitable that, given Simon's
psychologistic approach, authority (as conceptualised institutionally)
is seen in terms of the individual response to this stimulus, and that
the influence of social groups on employee's behaviour (and by
inference on his definition of "what is acceptable") is neglected.
Employees may indeed accept the decision-premises of superiors for
any number of reasons, but it is sociologically unsound to assume
that this will happen simply because a formal contract is signed.
The latter itself may be subject to varying interpretations and
responses.
Third, authority plays its theoretical role successfully and
without strain on the system because the definition of authority does
not allow for a distinction between different reasons for obedience.
Authority may be recognised, according to Simon, by the fact that
subordinates obey commands. However there are different reasons why
obedience may be forthcoming, and these different "forms" of obedience
might well be sociologically significant in their consequences for the
political process of the organisation. Following Weber, 'authority'
may be seen as referring to a form of compliance based on moral or
normative agreement with the command i.e. as a form of legitimate power,
where legitimacy is attributed to the command by the subordinate, not
by the observer.19 Simon's behavioural conception of authority fails
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to distinguish between a power relationship in which 'obedience'
occurs through moral commitment to a command and one in which fear
of reprisals is sufficient to ensure compliance. Using Etzioni's
terminology (Etzioni, 1975), Simon conflates bases of compliance,
so that the analyst cannot distinguish coercive from remunerative
power, nor, to a lesser extent, these forms of power from normative
20power. The problem is not merely one of conceptual nicety, since
the social consequences (in terms of organisational stability,
efficienCy, and politics) of each form of power are likely to be
d· ff t' .. 11 . .f . 211 eren ln emp1r1ca y slgnl lcant ways.
Finally, and further to the previous paragraph, although
Simon's concept of authority does not necessarily relate to socially
legitimate power, since he equates 'obedience' with 'acceptance', the
concept tends to have impZicit overtones of legitimacy. This is
another example of a terminological confusion which has unintended
consequences, in that it provides a facade of legitimacy where there
. '1 221S not necessarl y any. The concept derives an air of legitimacy
also from two sources other than this conceptual muddle. First, the
acceptance of authority, through the theory of how the organisation
works, as a decision-making unit, is organisationally rational
behaviour, and rationality connotes legitimacy. Second, because
employees choose to accept authority, again because of Simon's confusing
notion of choice (see above), this form of influence is given a further
tacit, ideological promotion.
In summary, it can be seen that Simon's theory of authority
works because of his circular definition of authority, the assumptions
made with respect to its operation, and the neglect of the 'non-
acceptance' and 'non-obedience' as distinct behavioural possibilities.
These weaknesses, and Simon's confusing terminology, render the theory
unsatisfactory as a basis for understanding decision-making in organ-
isations, its plausibility resting on unrealistic references to
formalism and implicit and invalid appeals to the legitimacy of the
concept.
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(c) The Theory of Organisational Rationality
Simon's concepts of 'bounded rationality' and of 'satisficing
man' are clearly advances on the unrealistic assumptions of conventional
micro-economics, but I would argue that the pervasive psychologism
and formalism, noted elsewhere in this chapter, prevent him from
developing the analysis of organisational rationality to a level where
it would provide an adequate foundation for an understanding of
decision-making. Simon's position possesses at least three weaknesses,
from the angle of the 'organisational politics' thesis.
First, because of the arguments that have been presented in
previous sections, his theoretical framework has an in-built strain
towards organisational order and rationality, such that the way the
rest of the theoretical system works leads to an expectation that
organisational decision-making will be rational (in the bounded sense) •
Just as the analysis of organisational rationality gives the concept
of authority a sense of legitimacy to which it is not necessarily en-
titled, so also the opposite is true: viz. the formalistic analysis
of authority imbues the notion of organisational rationality with an
unwarranted sense of inevitability. This relationship between the
idea of a means-ends chain of decisions and decision-premises, the
acceptance of authority, and the rationality of organisational
behaviour is central to Simon's theoretical system. Indeed organis-
ational rationality is so bound up with authority, that Simon goes as
far as to argue that when orders are obeyed/accepted, one need seek
no explanation beyond the invoking of rationality - rationality is a
sufficient explanation of obedience (Simon, 1957a, pp.l49-150).
By extension, the acceptance of formal authority is organisationally
rational behaviour, which can only mean that it accords with the wishes
of the top decision-makers who set the goals. Consequently the
unproblematic nature of authority in Simon's framework which is
accomplished by a combination of formalistic assumptions, circular
definition and analytical omission (see above), becomes reflected in
the apparent inexorability of organisational rationality and order.
The result is that the real theoretical problem of how 'organisational
rationality' is actually achieved by participants is glossed over,
and escapes systematic attention.
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A second weakness stems from his persistent concern with
organisational rationality, albeit of a bounded kind. This concern
is so central to his arguments that at many stages of his discussion,
his analysis seems to be more prescriptive than descriptive, although
he denies such an interest (e.g. Simon, 1957a, p.220). However,
Simon would be the first to concede that organisational rationality
really reflects the values of the "ultimate controlling body" (1957
a., pp.ll2-113), and that rationality in organisational behaviour
is, as elsewhere, a relative phenomenon (Simon, 1957a, pp.75-77;
March and Simon, 1958, pp.138-139). What is distressing, is that
this insight remains peripheral to his theory, and therefore the
psychologistic emphasis of the analysis of decision-making .is re-
inforced. The failure to develop rationality as a social category,
means that it enters the theory of organisational decision-making only
as a characteristic of the psychological process of choice. To
conceive of the rationality as a characteristic which many conflicting
social groups attribute to their own behaviour opens up a whole new
vista of possibilities for studying decision-making as a political
23process.
Not only does Simon neglect the social and political impli-
cations of rationality as a professed characteristic of the decision-
making process, but he also fails to consider the fact that organis-
ational rationality (as he defines it) is boundep by factors other than
the purely psychological. The decision-making process is influenced
by a number of factors which are social and political in character.
For example, ident~fication may occur either at the level of the
organisation or at the level of constituent sub-groups, but it is not
sLmpIy a psychological mechanism which binds the individual into the
collectivity in question. It also imposes social and normative
commitments on the individual, influencing both the way he (and his
colleagues) perceives a problem and analyses it, and the types of
solution which will be accepted as satisfactory. Only at this stage
of analysis is it possible to understand how individuals actually take
decisions in the organisational context. In short, a more realistic
understanding of organisational rationality can be achieved by investi-
gating its socio-political boundaries, thus raising the level of
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analysis beyond psychology.
The neglect of social, cultural and political aspects of
organisational decision-making must be considered as one of the major
shortcomings of Simon's theory, and this is nowhere else more obvious
than in his attempt to understand the notion of organisational
rationality. Only by overcoming prescriptive temptations and
psychologistic predispositions, and pursuing the sociological signi-
ficance of 'rationality' as a relative concept, socially and
structurally grounded, will the decision-making approach reach a
level of theoretical adequacy.
(d) Consideration of Organisational Conflict
It would be unfair to assert that Simon gives no consideration
to the phenomenon of organisational conflict, for, in spite of an
almost total neglect in the first two volumes under scrutiny,
Organisations, in line with its greater awareness of social factors,
devotes a whole chapter to the topic. However, the treatment of
conflict is not convincing, and I shall argue that the weaknesses of
the approach to the topic is very much related to the assumptions
that are made about its existence, to the general psycho logistic
orientation of the authors, and finally to the bias which was built
into the theory as it had been developed before 'conflict' was given
due recognition.
First, the consequences of Simon's psychologism may be
examined. The bulk of his consideration of organisational conflict
either relates directly to problems of "intraindividual" and "inter-
individual" conflict or analyses "intergroup" conflict by direct or
indirect analogy with the psychological approach to conflict. Of the
three types of conflict,24 the "intraindividual" kind is inescapably
an issue which the individual himself is left to resolve as a
psychological problem, and "interindividual" conflict, approached
from the psychological viewpoint rather thana social perspective,
is not elaborated beyond the minimum. While the inclusion of a
discussion on intergroup conflict in itself indicates a larger degree
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of sociological awareness than in other works, nevertheless the
arguments progress with more help from analogies with learning
experiments and reinforcement systems than from the social causes
and consequences of the process of intergroup conflict. The concern
with the individual dilemma of taking decisions in circumstances per-
ceived as conflicting is valid at one level, but failure to raise the
sights beyond psychology leads to the underdevelopment of the
political relevance of social conflict in the organisational process,
with a subsequent weakening of the total theory.
The second weakness derives from the assumptions underpinning
the analysis of conflict. It is argued, with conviction, that the
very nature of formal organisation itself may lead to conflict, since
specialisation invariably results in some differences in attitude
between specialisms. However, having made this point,. the resulting
conflict is also treated as if it were purely rational and formal.
For example, 'interindividual' conflict arises from:
n differences between the choices made by
different individuals in the organisation. In
this case, the individual participants are not in
conflict, but the organisation as a whole is."
(March and Simon, 1958, p.118; .my emphasis) .
Quite apcrt from the sticky problem of reification this s~atement
appears to take the very guts out of organisational conflict, which
loses its sociological significance through the directly drawn
inference that participants do not invest emotional and intellectual
capital in the pursuit of preferred outcomes. The assertion that
conflict between individuals and groups is strictly organisational,
implies that it is merely a technical problem attributable to some
fault in the formal system (e.g. a communication block). I am not
denying that conflict is, or can be, structurally induced (see
Chapter Seven), but to make it impersonal or 'rational' in some neutral,
impartial sense, loses sight of the fact that conflict is a social
process, created and sustained by human effort (see 3.2.3).
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This purely technical approach to conflict is further re-
inforced by the assumption than the organisation is a self-
equilibrating system. Although conflict is seen as stemming from
the formal system itself, it is assumed:
" that internal conflict is not a stable condition
for an organisation and that effort is consciously
directed towards resolving both individual and inter-
group conflict." (March and Simon, 1958, p.129).
As such, any evidence of conflict will automatically produce an organ-
isational reaction with an end of solving the problem and reinstating
a stable balance. In part related to the notion of 'stimulus-
response' at the level of the organisation, the idea of a 'neutral'
organisational reaction overlooks the fact that any such reaction is
inevitably instigated by a specific sub-group in the organisation25,
and, far from being neutral or rational in some organisational sense,
will be supportive (and seen by the disputants as being supportive)
of the interests of that sub-group (presumably the "controlling body") .
The notion of automatic conflict~resolution by the organisation, and
the related view that conflict is a short-term condition, further
detract from conflict as a socio-political phenomenon, and support
the formalistic view of conflict as a technical problem. (cf. Mouzelis,
The third weakness arises from the inadequate analysis of the
relationship of politics to organisational conflict. One form of
"organisational reaction" to the instability introduced by conflict
1975, pp.14l-142).
is labelled "politics". March and Simon suggest that intergroup
conflict may have overtly political consequences, since the organis-
ation, in order to reinstate equilibrium, is likely to respond by
bargaining or political procedures (March and Simon, 1958, pp.129-131).
This view is obviously an advance on Simon's previous work, but is not
satisfactory. Social conflict, as a technical problem, is seen as
having a causal role by placing fl ••• strains on the status and power
systems in the organisation" (March and Simon, 1958, p.13l). This
simple relationship (i.e. conflict produces political behaviour)
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emerges only from the equilibrating assumption about the organisation
which accords political and bargaining processes a transient,
remedial, conflict-resolution function, such processes (presumably)
disappearing as the conflict is resolved, and as stability and
normality are reinstated. However it is empirically naive to assume
that political behaviour is merely a temporary response to a conflict
situation; it is far more realistic to see political behaviour as
constituting an ongoing process, dialectically related to organis-
ational conflict and order. Social conflict, as an enduring feature
of the organisation, is as likely to rejtect the political groupings
and alliances of the organisational situation, as to influence the
future political process.
In spite of the explicit attention given to organisational
conflict, the effective analysis of this phenomenon unavoidably
reflects the general prevailing spirit of the established theory.
Previous discussion has demonstrated that the framework tends, both
intentionally and unintentionally, to overemphasise organisational
consensus and cooperation. In recent years, Parsonian systems theory
has been heavily criticised because it is based upon an inadequate
analysis of power and a misleading conception of voluntarism in social
action, which, with other central features, lead to a view of social
life as more or less balanced and consensual. Simon's decision-
making theory similarly fails to consider the problems of legitimacy
(by tautology and assumption) and disobedience (by omission), and
cannot satisfactorily examine choice and constraint. If peorle choose
to be constrained by authority and thereby necessarily cooperate; if
conflict is an impe~sonal and technical problem of the system; if
the organisation by assumption operates as a self-adjusting equili-
brating system; if these statements are a fair reflection of Simon's
effective view of organisational life (including power and politics),
his theory is inevitably conducive to organisational order, which is
rendered unproblematic and predictable more by theoretical fiat thanby
explanation.
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2.2 Organisational Control and Compliance
Although addressing "power" and "control" rather than
authority, and in spite of deriving from entirely different theoret-
ical traditions, various· approaches to the analysis of organisational
control and compliance share important features with Simon's decision-
making theory. Of particular importance is their common concern with
the hierarchical aspects of organisational power and with the problem
of order.
The association of the concept of power with the notion of
organisational control suggests a natural link between the analytical
aims of sociology and the prescriptive ends of management approaches.
The managerial and administrative wings of organisation theory (e.g.
Fayol, 1949) have normally defined 'control' in a very narrow way to
indicate the 'checking' functions necessary for adequate organis-
ational performance :
"Control in this sense is limited to monitoring the
outcomes of activities, reviewing feedback infor-
mation about this outcome and if necessary taking
corrective action". (Kynaston Reeves and Woodward,
1970, p.38).
While power in some general sense will en:':erinto this organisational
activity (as it will into most), to concentrate on such a narrow
operation is undoubtedly to neglect aspects of organisational life
which are germane to the sociological study of power.
With the spread of sociological interest into the domain of
organisational control has some conceptions of increasing breadth.
As we shall see below, Etzioni (1975, 1965) sees control as referring
to the formal allocation of means for the effective achievement of
organisational goals, and Woodward (1970) proposes a similar view in
her work on control systems, which she suggests can involve personal
and impersonal constraints on human activity; Etzioni defines these
personal applications of the means of control as power (see below) .•
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The notion of organisational control has been further "sociologised"
by Millham et al. (1972), who dismiss the argument that control is
simply the limitation of behaviour by the use of power (cf.
Tannenbaum, 1968, and immediately below) or the imposition of
technical constraints on organisational meIDbers, by adapting the
Parsonian view of 'social control' to the organisational situation.2:6
In their generalist conception, social control in organisations is
" a process by which individuals are socialised
and oriented towards norms" (Millham et al., 1972,
pAlO) .
In their application of this structural approach to organisational'
control, Millham et al. distinguish five types of control process
which intentionally or unintentionally direct behaviour towards
organisational goals. Although prior to Millham et als.' contri-
bution, Warner (1971) has effectively applied this reformulation of
the concept of organisational control in the context of the tele-
vision newsroom. (See also the general discussion of Bowen, 1976).
2.2.1 Tannenbaum Organisational Control and Organisational Order
The most impressive contribution to the empirical aspects of
organisation control as a form of power, is certainly that of
Tannenbaum and his colleagues (1968). My concern is only indirectly
with their empirical work, to the extent that their solution to the
problem of operationalising the concept of control actually changes
the meaning and scope of that concept. As with the other studies in
Part One, the emphasis is on discovering the effective conception of
power that emerges from the theoretical and empirical work of the
authors.
Tannenbaum's research task is two-pronged: first, he needs to
conceptualise control and then make it workable; second, he wants
to use his control variable(s) to explain other aspects of organis-
ational structure and functioning by meanS of a comparative method.
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"It is the function of control to bring about
conformance to organisational requirements and
achievement of the ultimate purposes of the
organisation ••• [It creates] co-ordination and
order ••. out of diverse interests and
potentially diffuse behaviours of members
(Tannenbaum, 1968, p.3).
"
This notion goes beyond the strictly managerial idea of 'monitoring',
but falls short of the 'social control' views proposed by Millharo et
al. Tannenbaum effectively equates control with power, and links
his central concept to the problem of organisational order :
"We shall use the term ~ontro~ .•• to refer to
any process in which a person or group of persons
or organisation of persons determines, that is,
intentionally affects, the behaviour of another
person, group or organisation". (1968, p.S).
Following Dahl, dontrol ,therefore becomes an instance of social
causation, and is located in a 'control cycle' which constitutes a
basic unit of organisational structure.
"If a cycle breaks down at any point, for whatever
reason, control cannot be said to exist".
(Tannenbaum, 1968, p.?).
It is clear that Tannenbaum is suggesting a behavioural definition
of control, since it is said to exist only in its exercise, and we
acknowledge that existence only when influence attempts are success-
ful. The sociological implications of this sort of definition, as
we shall elaborate below, are not in the definition itself which
obviously aids the empirical study of control, but in the fact that
it defines by inference the study of unsuccessful influence attempts
out of the theory of organisational power. To put the same point
in another way, the idea of control, and by association that of
power, is defined in terms of compliance with or conformity to
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organisational goals. Control therefore is heedless of the range
of possible subordinate interpretations of and reactions to it.
Given this behavioural conception of power, it is somewhat
surprising that Tannenbaum constructs the major control variables
(incorporated in the 'control graph') using a reputational method.27
He uses questionnaire responses from repre"sentatives of various
(pre-defined) levels of the organisational hierarchy to develop
measures of the distribution and amount of control wielded in the
organisation. Even assuming that the respondents answered in a full
awareness of Tannenbaum's definition of control and that they there-
fore were all talking about the same phenomenon - which is dubious
given the difficulties which supposed experts have in so doing - it
is doubtful whether the results tell us a great deal about 'organis-
ational power' as an "objective" category. They should tell us
quite a lot about people's perceptions of control at various formal
levels of the organisation, which most certainly provide important
clues as to the political process of organisation life, but it is a
gross misuse of such data to assume that if you add ~~e responses
together and average them out (1968, p.24), you can obtain valid and"
reliable measures of
.. who or what hierarchically defined groups
exercise control over the affairs of the
organisation •..•[and] how much control i:-;exer-
cised within the organisation from all sources."
"(Tannenbaum, 1968, p.33).
In summary, the effective conception of power in Tannenbaum's work
is somewhat confused. Starting from an essentially behavioural
definition, Tannenbaum builds control variables by manipulating
in methodologically suspect ways data which are irreconcilable with
his conceptual work. Nevertheless, using the control graph as his
explanatory variable, Tannenbaum proceeds to examine its relation-
ship to such factors .as organisational effectiveness, communications,
consensus, morale and satisfaction etc. He claims to discover
patterns in the data, but at the sociological level such findings
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must remain a mystery since it would appear to be virtually impossible
to understand how the phenomenon which the control graph reflects, if
it reflects any real social phenomenon at all, articulates with the
other factors. This is an example of how certain researchers with
an empiricist mentality (Gurvitch, 1955, has coined the phrase
"quantomania"; see also Blumer, 1956) become so obsessed with the
problem of measurement that they neglect the problem of meaning.
2.2.2 Etzioni The Theory of Organisational Compliance
Dissatisfaction with Tannenbaum's theoretical clumsiness leads
uS to consider the compliance approach of Etzioni (1975, 1965) which
takes up the same line of argument and develops it in a theoretically
superior way. The work of Amitai Etzioni has proved a considerable
stimulus to the study of organisational power, although the central
concept in the framework is 'compliance'. This notion may be seen
as "the organisational equivalent of social order" (1975, p.xvii), and
" refers to both a relation in which an actor
behaves in accordance with a directive supported
by another actor's powe r , and to the orientation
of the subordinated actor to the power applied"
(Etzioni, 1975, p.3).
Etzioni's programme of action is similar to Tannenbaum's, the first
task, the fruits of which will be the focus of my search for his
effective conception of power, requiring a conceptual elaboration
of types of compliance based upon the development of typologies of
power and involvement, and the second task being a theoretical investi-
gation of the relationships between compliance and other organisational
factors using the comparative method. I shall argue that in Etzioni's
view power is the dominant aspect of compliance, and so arguments
about compliance are also, by inference, arguments about power; and
that tying 'power' to 'compliance' inevitably restricts his view of
politics to the problem of organisational order.
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First, what does Etzioni effectively mean by power,
involvement and compliance?
Power itself is given a general, relational definition
"Power is an actor's ability to induce or influence
another actor to carry out his directives or any
other norms he supports". (Etzioni, 1975, p.4).
In the context of organisational analysis, it takes on two importfu~t
limiting characteristics : firstly, power is associated with the
formal structure, or hierarchy, of the organisation, since it is
the possession of the 'higher participants', 'organisational
representatives' or 'organisational elites'. (Etzioni, 1975, p.5) i
secondly, because it involves the "•.. use of various kinds of means
for control purposes .••" (Etzioni, 1965, p.651) where these 'means'
are formally distributed to facilitate the attainment of 'organis-
ational goals', power is functional in its use. The organisation
makes available for control purposes different kinds of resource or
means, and associated with each kind of means, physical, mqterial or
symbolic, is type of power, coercive, remunerative and normative.28
"InvoZ.vement refers to the cathectic-evaluative
orientation of an actor to an object, character-
ised in terms of intensity and direction".
(Etzioni, 1975, p.9).
The general notion of involvement refers to an attitudinal dimension,
and the direction and intensity of a person's feelings may be shaped
by any number of experiences (Etzioni, 1975, p.231ff.). In the
organisational situation and with reference to the notion of
compliance, however, the major determinant of the subordinate's
orientation is the type of organisational power which he encounters
(Etzioni, 1975, p.3 and p.ll) . A threefold typology of involvement
in the organisation (alienative, calculative and moral) results from
matching general categories of orientation to the type of 'power
system' that predominates.
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The conception of compliance (and a third typology) is
dependent upon the nature of the relationship between power and
involvement. It is never qUite discernible whether the latter
notions are simply descriptive of a state of compliance (i.e.
another way of referring to that state) or whether the inter-
action between power and involvement are held in some way to
cause the state of compliance.29 It is more rewarding and
of greater sociological interest to choose the latter interpret-
ation, and if we do this, the fact that power is the dominant
factor in its analytical relationship with involvement (for a
direct statement on this, see Etzioni, 1965, p.65l) means that
a statement about the theoretical status of compliance is, by
inference, also about power.
The cross-tabulation of the typologies of power and
involvement provide nine types of compliance, three of which are
30said to be 'congruent' , and the others 'incongruent'. Most of
Etzioni's analysis is concerned with the 'congruent' types of
compliance - coercive, utilitarian and normative - and since most
organisations exhibit a dominant pattern (1975, p.23) (the
'primacy' assumption), they too are classifiable. Why does
Etzioni restrict his analysis to congruent types of compliance?
Two related rationales are offered: first because congruent
cases are more frequent, and this is so because
" congruence is more effective, and organ-
isations are social units under external
and internal pressure to be effective."
(Etzioni, 1975, p.13);
Second, because incongruence is a transient state, again because
of the postulate of effectiveness. (1975, p.14).
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The establishment of a typology of organisations related to
the congruent types of compliance provides the conceptual basis for
his comparative study of compliance structures and their association
with other organisational variables (e.g. type of goal, degree of
effectiveness, type of elite structure etc.)
It should be evident that the theoretical interests of
Tannenbaum and Etzioni overlap to a large degree, and their concept-
ual analyses exhibits a number of similarities. The two theories
of control/power and conformity/compliance in frameworks which stress
the hierarchical nature of organisational power are factors which
unite these authors with Simon in their common concern for organis-
ational order. In the next few pages I shall examine the logic of
Etzioni's approach in order to discover his effective conception of
power as it relates to organisational order.
Why and how does Etzioni's theory of compliance account for
the state of organisational order? The obvious answer is that the
study of compliance concentrates on the problem of order and as such
will inevitably overlook aspects of organisational power which
disturb the 'order'; in short, it is a matter of theoretical strategy.
This surely is part of the explanation, but I suggest that reasons
also lie in the logic of his framework, because any theory which
informs about compliance shouZd also say something about the
d" f l' d fl' 31con ~t~cns 0 non-comp ~ance an con ~ct.
One reason why Etzioni says very little about the relation-
ship between organisational power and conflict is rooted in the very
definition of compliance. The latter refers to the relationship
between a certain type of behaviour (power) and a set of related
attitudes (or orientation) towards that behaviour. Compliance
presumably refers to a state of behaviouraZ stability amongst organ-
isational participants, and yet the concept takes no cognisance of
the behaviour of subordinates. Briefly, Etzioni defines a behaviour-
al concept, for surely to "comply" is to act in a certain way, in
terms of subordinates' "cathectic-evaluative orientation" to power
(1975, p.9). Etzioni finds it a sufficient condition for a stable
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organisational order that there exists a (socio)logical compati-
bility between type of power used and the type of subordinate orien-
tation towards that power. By taking this view, he effectively
divests subordinates of their part in creating a state of organis-
ational order, and in rendering them passive, the stability of the
organisation is ensured.
The sociological implications of this conception are most
emphatically spelled out by considering the case most pertinent to
the problem of conflict viz. the coercive organisation.
"Coercive organisations are organisations in which
coercion i's the maj or means of control over lower
participants and high alienation characterises
the orientation of most lower participants in the
organisation". (Etzioni, 1975, p.27).
In concentration camps and custodial prisons and institutions, one
might expect that organisational order would be of a highly
precarious nature, but for Etzioni, to the extent that type of power
matches type of involvement, compliance is expected to be a long-
term state. There will normally exist hostile feelings among
subordinates, but while Etzioni allows men to think negatively,
they are not permitted to act in such a way, because their behaviour
is ruled irrelevant to the nature of compliance. N:m-compliance,
and even conflict, are highly feasible reactions to coercive means
of organisational control, but Etzioni is satisfied with noting
the congruence between power and involvement, and thus ensures a
state of order where sociologically one might expect, at least
. 11 th . 32potent~a y, e oppos~te.
Even if we accept this inadequate definition of compliance,
it is still necessary to examine the sociological implications of
Etzioni's major condition for long-term stability of organisational
power structures i.e. the existence of compatibility or congruence
between type of power and type of involvement. Congruent cases are
most frequent and persistent because they are organisationally most
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effective (Etzioni, 1975, pp.12-13) and incongruent cases show an
inevitable tendency towards congruence because of the pressures on
" t" b ff" 33 1" th 1organlsa lons to ecome e ectlve. Under ylng e postu ate
of organisational effectiveness - a system 'need' - is the implicit
notion of equilibrium, for organisations which possess incongruent
compliance structures undergo a process of accommodation between
the dominant type of power and that of involvement.
In assuming that such accommodation occurs, Etzioni fails
to provide the sociological links between the organisational 'need'
to be effective and the accommodation process, which relationship is
critical to the attainment of long-term organisational order. What,
in terms of his analysis, are the sociological implications of
postulating 'effectiveness' as a causal influence on the relationship
between power and involvement? Since we reject as sociologically
unhelpful the deus ex m,y_chinanotion of a self-equilibrating system,
the above argument must imply : first that social actors within the
organisation, intentionally or unintentionally act so as to sponsor
the cause of organisational effectiveness; second, their actions
must in effect mean either a change in the type of power applied and/
or a change in the type of involvement elicited.
Organisational elites may choose to alter the mode of power
in recognition of the fact that it would improve effectiveness, but
this assumes that higher participants share a common definition of
both 'organisational' goals and what constitutes 'effectiveness',
problems which neither Etzioni nor Tannenbaum confront. More
seriously in the light of the increasing supply of evidence on
management behaviour and management 'bias' (see 9.3.2 below), it
aSSumes that managers are actively concerned with the "collective
good". Etzioni's deliberate choice of the phrase "organisational
representatives" (1975, p.8) to refer to power-holders probably
indicates his subscription to the consensual view.
As we have seen, however, Etzioni argues that power is the
dominant factor in the relationship, since he explicitly defines
type of organisational involvement as the attitudinal response to
acts of organisational power. As such, where moral involvement is
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paired with coercive power it is by definition an anomaly which has
presumably arisen because orientations to the organisation derive
from sources in addition to the direct experience of power
(Etzioni, 1975, Chapter IX) . It could be argued that where sub-
ordinate orientations have strong roots outside the organisation,
as in certain cases where incongruence occurs, there is no a priori
expectation that type of involvement will shift unless, improbably,
subordinates permit it to do so through a direct or indirect
allegiance to organisational 'needs'.
It is now possible to summarise the implications of Etzioni's
implicit assumption of equilibrium. Type of power responds to
'needs' in a situation of inco~uence only if it is assumed to be
merely an orga~isational resource consciously tied to the achievement
of organisational goals, and to be in the hands of higher participants
who mutually agree to use it for collective ends. For this theory
to work, managers and controllers in the organisational el.ite become
neutral and passive social actors whose behaviour need not be
consulted in order to understand organisational power. Alternatively,
if the orientation of lower participants is to change in response to
the demand for effectiveness, t.l-teymust either subscribe to and agree
on organisational goals directly, or be subjected to indirect pressures
(presumably through acts of power) with the same consequence. The
former possibility is improbable and involves an implicit consensual
view, while the latter possibility needs. substantial reformulation
before it has any value.
I have shown that Etzioni's explanation of organisational
order depends upon a peculiar definition, an implicit theory of
organisational equilibrium and an unsubstantiated postulate of
organisational effectiveness. Although it might be considered sur-
prising in a theory where the subordinates' orientation to power is
so crucial, it may lastly be argued that, in his view, power is
essentially uncontested, formally legitimate and hierarchical. It
is uncontested because, as we have seen, Etzioni's conceptual work
has ruled out of court non-compliance or conflict as feasible
strategies for lower participants - they have to obey, and this may
be rationalised, for example, in terms of consensus. It is formally
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legitimate because of its association with control and organis-
ational goals (see Etzioni, 1965, p.650ff.).
because
It is hierarchical
"PoUJer positions are positions whose incumbents
regularly have access to the means of power i.e.
[control] In the following analysis we focus
on power relations in organisations between those
higher and those lower in rank". (Etzioni, 1975,
p.5) •
Those who wield power are those participants to whom the
'organisation' has formally entrusted the problem of organisational
control, and the conception of power, from the viewpoint of the
problem of legitimacy, may be likened to the institutional conception
of authority and to the systems view of po~er.34 Power is analyse~
in terms of its contribution to organisational goals (needs) and that
power formally allocated is used. for such ends is never in doubt.
Although these authors conceive of power as a capacity used by
individuals and groups, rather than in a generalised form, through a
kind of tautology they effectively dispose of the human element by
various definitional devices which guarantee compliance, and reinforce
the theoretical commitment to it.
2.3 The Analysis of Organisational Authority
In 1.2.2 above, I examined the broad context of the problem
of legitimacy and its relation to the concept of power. In 2.1
and 2.2 the problem was heeded in the discussion of some approaches
to organisational power, and it was argued that in general these
approaches have not dealt adequately with it as an explicit concern
of theorising. In the above views, legitimacy tends to be ascribed
to organisational power by fiat, by implication or by neglect, but
now I shall look more closely.at those studies directly concerned
with organisational authority, and its conceptualisation, in order
to assess the prevailing view and to help derive relevant conclusions
about the role of authority and legitimacy in a theory of organis-
ational politics. Organisational authority may be seen as being
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'vertical' or 'lateral', although, as we might expect, the cultural
association of authority and hierarchy tends to leave consideration
of its horizontal aspects very under-developed. It may be noted
from the start, that the following examination will tend to support
the overall picture that has emerged above viz. that organisational
authority has been primarily conceptualised as being formal or
institutional in its legitimation and application, and as being
hierarchical in its allocation.
Much of the work in this area is alleged to have its
conceptual and inspirational roots in Weber's classic analysis of
bureaucratic authority, and especially of the ideal type of bureau-
cracy (1964), and yet this "Weberian" tradition has developed in a
way that more or less disavows the sociological premises and
methodological principles upon which Weber himself constructed his
organisational sociology. The view still persists, indeed prevails,
that Weber conceived of bureaucracies as :
" power structures operating in a quasi-judicial
fashion rational values legitimate them, trained
experts rlli!them, and the principle of hierarchy,
prescribing a positive relation between the rank
of a unit and its power, define its shape".
(Hopkins, 1969, p.170: see also, for example,
Litwak's (1961) 'Weberian model' of bureaucracy).
Such a view is only tenable if the rationale of the 'ideal type'
method (Weber, 1949, especially p.89ff.) is neglected and if Weber's
analysis of bureaucratic authority is isolated from his broader
commitment to an "interpretive sociology" (cf. Silverman, 1970,
p.74; Clegg, 1975, p.57ff.).
2.3.1 Hierarchical Authority and Formal Legitimacy
If we follow up Hopkins' (1969) analysis of bureaucratic
authority, which intends to reconcile the apparently divergent views
of Weber and Barnard (1938),we find a typical example of how Weber's
66
work has been misinterpreted to support a purely 'institutional'
conception. His institutional conception of authority develops
from an initial behavioural definition:
"The exercise of authority consists of one person
issuing a command and a second complying with it •••"
(Hopkins, 1969, p.179).
As with Simon, Tannenbaum and Etzioni, authority and non-compliance
are incompatible notions, and such a view is clearly grounded in
Barnard's work (which also influenced Simon) • To serve his
conciliatory aims, Hopkins misleadingly attributes this view also
35to Weber.
Hopkins seeks a rationale for the inevitability of conformity
as a response to an exercise of authority by turning to the notion of
legitimacy which he correctly ascribes to Weber. When Weber's ideas
are placed in the wider context of his interpretive sociology,
'legitimacy' is a social category assigned to a social order (in
general) by those subjected to it; in the case of organisational
authority, Weber suggests, subordinates are most likely to legitimate
it because they hold a belief in the rationality of the formal
structure. It is possible that the formal authority structure may
not be seen as 'rational' and/or 'legitimate' for various reasons
(cf. Gonldner, 1954 and 1965; below 2.3.2). However H'Jpkins
makes the unjustifiable theoretical leap from stating the existence
of a formal authority structure, to asserting that it has therefore
by virtue of its existence been validated socially.
" a system of authority has the property of
legitimacy to the extent that the statuses and
roles are institutionalised" (Hopkins, 1969,
p.173) •
The process of institutionalisation weaves rules and obligations into
organisational statuses and roles, making some "commanding" roles and
others "complying" roles, and these interlocking formal roles, with
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their definitions of "appropriate" behaviour, provide evidence for
both the existence of a stable (and effective) authority system and
the rationale for its accept.ance by superordinates and subordinates
alike (cf. Jackson, 1964). In short, the formal structure and its
institutional authority become 'self-validating', thus relieving
subordinates of their social duties in the legitimation process,
and as a consequence rendering unproblematic the orderly accomplish-
ment of organisational tasks and goals.
Hopkins is evidently apprehensive about the institutional
conception he has created, because he attempts to rationalise it by
arguing that organisational members share values and norms that
justify and define the authority system (Hopkins, 1969, p.180i cf.
Bierstedt, 1974b) - an assertion about the social legitimacy of
authoritative behaviour. This is not to say that everybody holds
such values :
"Not all who occupy statuses in an authority system,
however, need be members of the group whose values
legitimate it. Aliens are not 'members' (citizens)
of the country they are visiting, but they neverthe-
less occupy a definite status in relation to those
who enforce the law. (Hopkins, 1969, p.180).
This comparison provides t~1e insights necessary to unxave l, this new
argument. Those in an organisation who do not consider the exer-
cise of authority to be legitimate are not really "members" of the
organisation at all, so there is no need to consult their opinions.
Only those who belong to a group whose values legitimate the
authority system are full participants, and they by definition
subscribe to its validity. What of· those "aliens" who do not
legitimate bureaucratic authority? Since they are not "members"
their views do not affect the system's legitimacy, but they neverthe-
less comply with authority because it is defined that they do so.36
The empirical possibility and consequences of non-compliance are
avoided as skilfully as Simon, Etzioni and Tannenbaum have done.
68
It is a sufficient condition for legitimacy that
" the ruling group and the administrative staff
alone comprise the membership of the group whose
values legitimate the authority system. (Hopkins,
1969, p.180).
By discounting the opinions and actions of those who do not consider
the regime legitimate, Hopkins achieves an unhappy union of formal
legitimacy with social legitimacy and of insti~utional authority
with normative authority. If 'social legitimacy' is not to have
its meaning devalued, Hopkins' effective conception of authority
must be seen as institutional.
Hopkins' view shares much with that of Bierstadt (1974a and
1974b), who ties authority directly to formaZ organisation:
"It is in the formal organisation of associations
that social power is institutionalised and trans-
formed into authority. If social interaction
proceeded wholly in accordance with the norms
of its formal organisation, and if norms were
always clear, the power would be dissolved without
residue into authority".
p.232).
(Bierstedt, 1974a,
Both the formalism and. the emphasis on compliance with formal
commands as a recognition of authority are present, but, more
interestingly, both authors find themselves driven by the logic
of their arguments into sociologically untenable positions. Their
various manoeuvres to disguise their institutional conceptions in
ex post facto sociological rationalisations suggest that they are
at least aware of some theoretical dilemma.
In contradistinction, other theories have employed the notion
of authority in a pureZy formal capacity without pretension to a
causal role in organisational life. Rationalisation is neither
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offered nor necessary since the term 'authority' is restricted
to a formally prescribed right or capacity. Pfiffner and
Sherwood (1960) propose an institutional conception of authority,
and argue that the "real power", associated with the actual
capacity rather than the official right, to decide and supervise
cannot be assumed to bear a close relationship to the formal hier-
archy. This theoretical position has been put into operation in
a number of sociological studies3~, and may be seen as constituting
the empirical basis of the sociological critique of the conventional
view of the role of institutional authority in the organisational
process.
In his comparative study of the "authorised" and "real
power" structures of two U.S.A.F. operational units (wings), Thompson
(1956) defined authority as :
" that type of power which goes with position and
is legitimated by the official norms." (Thompson,
1956, p.290).
Authority, in this perspective, is only a significant sociological
factor to the extent that it becomes power and can potentially or
actually influence people's behaviour. It does not pretend or
aspire to be socially legitimate because it is only a 'real'
phenomenon when commands issued from form~l statuses in line with
official norms shape subordinates' actions, irrespective of the
actual basis of that power. First and foremost, authority belongs
to the organisation as it hangs on the manager's wall, not as it
operates in everyday life.
Thompson's research data compare the formal authority
structures and the 'perceived power' structures in the two airforce
units, and his interpretation confirms the expectation that purely
institutional authority has little directly to do with the sociology
of organisational power. The hypothesis :
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" that the real power structures in both wings
would deviate from the more limited authority
structures •.• can be accepted without reservation .••
It was also hypothesised that the real power
structures of the two wings would differ from each
other [Ln spite of sharing the same formal set-up] •
This can also be accepted without reservation."
(Thompson, 1956, p.297).
From a slightly different angle, Coser (1958) performs a similar
comparative analysis of the formally prescribed authority structures
and the "••• de facto lines of decision-making .••" (Coser, 1958,
p.S7) in two hospital wards.
This second variant of institutionalism is generally uncon-
troversial, because, with the sharp distinction between the formal
(authority) and the actual (power), there is no attempt to broach
the question of social legitimacy. The adequacy of these analyses
therefore depends not on their conception of organisational authority,
but on their view of organisational power.
A third institutional variant differs from the first two,
which identify authority entirely with its formal origins in the
organisational hierarchy, by extending the analysis of authority
beyond its formal sources to other factors that condition it in the
organisational situation. Formal authority has a sociological role
to play, because it structures ongoing interpersonal relations
(Presthus (1960, p.86), and proponants of this viewpoint, Presthus
(1960) and Peabody (1961/62), are concerned with how authority becomes
accepted by subordinates.
Presthus pursues this problem by constructing a typology of
the bases of legitimation (~ la Weber), in which 'formal position'
is the prime, elemental basis that is a necessary though not
sufficient condition of effective organisational authority. In order
to control and channel the behavioural alternatives of participants,
authority is formally allocated to positions which also carry
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differential amounts of status, income and other perquisites that
act as "••. signals [which] define and reinforce authority."
(Presthus, 1960, p.88)38. A second basis of legitimation - a
"generalised deference to authority" - relates to a socially-
induced personality factor whereby subordinates tend to comply
with positional authority "as a rule". It appears to be approp-
riate to treat this factor as being merely one side of the coin
on the other side of which is legitimacy by position - cf. Peabody's
analysis (1961/62, p.468) of authorities of 'position' and of
'legitimacy' as being "inextricably fused" bases of formal authority.
Although formal position provides the primary basis of legit-
imation, it cannot be taken for granted as creating compliance
"Authority seems more likely to be a contingent grant,
received initially as part of formal position, but
requiring nourishment from other kinds of legiti-
mation as well" (Presthus, 1960, p.88).
The bases of the additional "nourish..ment"are legitimation by
technical expertise and "rapport" with subordinates (i.e. human
relations skills), which factors provide the sources of "functional
authority" in Peabody's typology (1961/62).
Peabody begins from the same vision of organisational
authority as Presthus, being "initially based" on formal position
and its trappings but subject to modification by "several additional
factors" (Peabody, 1961/62, p.465). Their agreement that formal
position and associated factors are "initial" or prior to other
sources leads to my classification of their view as "primarily
institutional". The initial quota of (formal) authority has two
interrelated bases, somewhat ambiguously called 'legitimacy' (in a
narrower sense than Weber's or Presthus') and 'position'.
'Authority of position' is fairly clear, referring to that influence
which derives from the office or formal status of the superior.
'Authority of legitimacy' emanates from the "legally established
order", as Weber has expressed it.
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Two problems arise from this distinction. First, the
general confusion surrounding the term 'legitimacy' is not helped
by Peabody's treatment of formal and social legitimacy as equi-
valent. This latter point emerges only in his empirical
consideration of the 'types,.39 It seems probable, however,
that Peabody is essentially talking about formal legitimacy, since
it does not make sociological sense, without a crass assumption about
organisational consensus, to treat social legitimacy as a taken-for-
granted "given" of institutional authority. The second problem is
not so readily resolved; it is doubtful whether there is any sub-
stance in the distinction between authority of position and authority
of legitimacy, since formal statuses and roles are defined with
respect to the same rules, norms and values as those which one would
expect to constitute the 'legal order'.
'Functional authority' includes 'authority ot competence'
and 'authority of person', and their sources are respectively
technical/professional skills and social skills that presumably refer
to factors "beyond the call of duty" which thereby can secure greater
support for institutional authority (Peabody, 1961/62, p.470). This
secondary form of organisational authority cannot be based upon formal
legitimacy because it would then be covered by rules and not be
"additional" to institutional authority. By deduction, therefore,
functional authority must reflect a social legitimacy, but, while there
is scant recognition of this, neitherPresthus nor Peabody develop the
analysis towards a genuine sociology of authority. It is notable
that the theme of social legitimacy is most developed where they
speak of pools of specialist competence and experience, the problems
of professionals, conflicts between functional areas, and the dilemmas
these horizontal problems pose for hierarchical - i.e. institutional
authority (Presthus, 1970, pp.88-89; Peabody, 1961/62, pp.470-471).
It is evident that theorists find it easier to develop a meaningful
sociology of organisational power on the lateral dimension - the
sacrosanctity of hierarchical authority as a formal category of
organisational life remains unviolated.
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2.3.2 Hierarchical Authority and Social Legitimacy
There are very few studies Ox organisational authority which
manage to shake off the prior linguistic commitment to formalism.
Gouldner's (1954 and 1965) research on the effects of bureaucrat-
isation on the organisation of a gypsum mine remains unchallenged
as studies of the relationship between organisational authority
and social legitimation. Gouldner commences from functionalist
premises but, by virtue of this research method, provides important
clues about organisational power.
In the mine, workers and supervisors had developed a
mutually-agreed set of social norms regarding the application of
formal rules (the "indulgency pattern") of which leniency was the
dominant feature. A newly-appointed manager, concerned at the low
productivity of the mine, took formal action, resting upon his
official status in the Drganisational hierarchy, to end the indulgency
pattern and to ensure strict enforcement of the formal rules.
Although officially based, some of his actions were explicitly
political, such as replacing the 'old guard' managers and supervisors
.who overtly supported the lenient application of rules, with new men
who would 'tow' his formalist line (Gouldner, 1954, p.89ff.).
The resulting campaign to enforce the rules, an exercise in
institutionally authoritative behaviour, attacked the socially-
legitimate indulgency pattern and allowed, in return, no direct
organisationally-constitutional course of action for protesting miners.
The theorists above might theorise that exercise of institutional
authority elicits compliance, but Gouldner's study suggests no such
behaviour can be taken for granted. The latent conflict, created
by the sociaZZy non-legitimate behaviour of the manager, was
channelled into the only formally acceptable form of expression
a wage issue - and failure to reach a satisfactory settlement
eventually led to a socially legitimated response: a widcat strike
(Gouldner, 1965, p.37).
74
variety of grounds. It was denied ••• because
"Legitimacy was denied the new management on a
the oZd foremen's removal was considered illeg-
itimate ••• [For the workers] a legitimate super-
visor is one who conforms to the indulgency
pattern ••• For those reasons ••• E<nd other
similar ones] the new management was not con-
ceived of as legitimate, and workers' motivations
to give it consent and obedience were further
undermined". (Gouldner, 1965, pp.79-80).
In this way Gouldner points up the distinction between
institutional authority and normative authority, and its relevance
to the analysis of organisational power, conflict and politics is
.. AOshown ~n vary~ng degrees.
2.3.3 Nonhierarchical Authority
The problem of organisational authority has generally been
seen as a set of questions relating to organisational hierarchy.
This is specifically because most writers, not having distinguished
formal from social legitimacy, have for various reasons and in
varying degrees identified authority with the institutional concept-
ion. More generally, however, they fail to consider the possibility
that authority is anything other than hierarchical i.e. it tends tv
be defined in terms of hierarchy (e.g. Downs, 1967, p.52; contrast
Miller's (1955) analysis of the cultural meanings of authority).
Because 'hierarchy' itself, in an organisational context, carries
the formal overtones inherited from everyday usage of the term,
these two matters reinforce each other.
Despite the prevalent association, of authority with organis-
ational hierarchy, some authors have proposed that it be applied to
the lateral aspects of organisational structure. It is unfortunate
that such approaches have tended to confirm the institutionalist
position, rather than exploit the liberation of the concept from its
hierarchical shackles by exploring the normative conception.
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Landsberger (1961/62) is concerned with the study of
relationships between horizontal groups in the organisation, and his
aim is to show that their
" determinants ••• are to be found in the
nature of organisations themselves •••"
(Landsberger, 1961/62, pp.302-303).
H is aims lead him to investigate the causal role of 'objective'
(or 'reality') factors rather than "organisational traditions and
'politics'" (1961/62, p.312), and his appreciation of organisational
power and authority is thereby limited, for my purposes. Lands-
berger proposes no difference between horizontal and hierarchical
authority as we have examined it above :
" the whole concept of ~uthority and its many
subsidiary concepts [can] be applied systematically
to horizontal relationships with suggestive modi-
fications" (Landsberger, 1961/62, p.308):
Acceptance of horizontal authority is facilitated by those same
factors that legitimate vertical authority viz. rules, competence
and 'organisational logic' (1961/62, p.309),and these 'reality'
factors largely explain the pattern of authority between groups.
Authority on both dimensions has to be "institutionalised" (ibid.)
i.e. allocated to positions and legitimated with reference to
rules.
Thompson's (1960/61) concerns are much broader than Lands-
berger's, examining how the two structural dimensions of organis-
ation (hierarchy and specialisation) interact to produce unavoidable
conflict. Hierarchy is seen as the "principal system of authority
in organisations" (Thompson, 1960/61, p.499), and authority is
defined in purely institutional terms. Although institutional,
compliance is unproblematic and authority is rendered socially legit-
imate by unexplicated sociological generalisations :
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" the roles of subordinate and superior ••• are
learned cultural patterns of behaviour trans-
mitted from generation to generation ••• The rights
associated with hierarchical positions are cultural
givens •••" (Thompson, 1960/61, p.486 and 488).
'Nonhierarchical authority' is created by the delegation of formal
rights and duties to specialisms, according to the needs of the
technical side of organisational reality. Although the formal
rights to approve or "legitimate" decisions taken by delegates
remain with the hierarchical superior, such decisions are often
so technical that the superior is in no position to assess them.
In such a situation a genuine non-hierarchical authority is estab-
lished, effectively independent of hierarchical scrutiny, and
legitimated with reference to those standards shared by members of
the specialism in question. Unfortunately Thompson does not
develop his theory to elaborate the relevance of these 'pools' of
normative authority for a sociology of organisational power.
Indeed the key defining characteristic of such authority is not
the process whereby it is legitimated and accepted within the hori-
zontal groups, but the fact that it has been formally devolved from
the principal system of institutional authority.
The work of Landsberger and Thompson indicates once more
the prinr commitment that theorists have to the institutional, hier-
archical notion. Independent of approach, with a few notable.
exceptions, the question of legitimation remains a formal one, and
the process of acceptance is unexamined. In short, in spite of
all the writing, the problem of organisational authority remains a
sociological mystery, and the available conceptions reflect the
"myths" of formal authority because they fail to comprehend how
authority inspires the compliance which the notion itself presumes.
2.4 The "Unitary" Approach to Organisational Power and Politics
The rationale underlying this chapter is that, since the
study of power and authority is inextricably linked to an under-
77
standing of politics, the topic of this thesis must benefit from
an examination of the available knowledge in the area of organ is-
ational 'power' (to use the word in inverted commas to serve as an
umbrella term covering both power and authority.) Throughout the
foregoing discussion it has become apparent that those contributors
to the theory of organisational 'power' as it relates to the problem
of order, have tended to develop, implicitly or explicitly, a
(quasi-)systems conception of power or an institutional conception
of authority. Ultimately, even behavioural definitions have dis-
solved into one of these two conceptions.
In this final section I shall examine some of the impli-
cations of these effective conceptions. I shall propose that the
systems conception of power and the institutional conception of
authority share certain features which make them logically compat-
ible, and further that the way in which the conceptions have been
employed theoretically renders them virtually indistinguishable
from each other. In short, we are not talking about two cardinal
conceptions but one dominant political approach to organisational
order, viz. a "unitary" approach. I··shall also argue that the
internal logic of this dominant view precludes the meaningful study
of organisational power and politics.
2.4.1 Organisational 'Fower' and the Formally Rational Achievement
of Order
I shall compare on four points the systems conception of
power and the institutional conception of authority, thereby indi-
cating that these two conceptions, as used in 'hierarchical'
theories, work in the same way to ensure that the problem of organis-
ational order is resolved inadequately - the solution being
formalistic, rationalistic and socially unmediated.
The first point is that both conceptions share the view that
'power' is allocated according to the needs/goals of the organisation,
and the survival and/or effectiveness of organisational performance
is bound up with the appropriate distribution of 'power'. Neither
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view provides a sociological explanation of this allocation process
(see the third point of comparison), thus inviting the criticism of
reification, but they claim for 'power' an organisationally (i.e.
formally) legitimate status based upon the "functionality" of its
source, as reflected in its circumscription by the rules.
The second point of comparison is complementary to the first.
The systems and institutional views involve, implicitly or
explicitly, an assumption that 'power' is used to promote organis-
ational order and fulfil the organisational needs which determine
its functional allocation. Formal legitimacy is therefore further
attributed to 'power' through the "functionality" of its use. The
exponents of these conceptions do not distinguish between these two
modes of ascribing legitimacy to organisational 'power', but it is
noticeable that those with a sociological conscience have attempted
to introduce by theoretical fiat a notion of social legitimacy e.g.
by assuming or asserting a state of organisational consensus.
The successful introduction of an adequate notion of social
legitimation has been inhibited by a third common characteristic of
these two conceptions, viz. L~at they tend to abstract organisational
'power' from the concrete behaviour of social actors. We have
already seen how these views divest organisational participants of
the ability to allocate power, but this is merely a specific example
of how social actors a.re deprived of an active role in the organis-
ation's power system. For example, it has been pointed out that
'power' tends to be defined in behavioural terms so that compliance
to formal commands becomes guaranteed; there exists further the
tendency to assume that the organisational goals are the collective
goals ot the members, and that it is "rational" for lower partici-
pants to conform to the demands of 'power' holders (given also that
'power' is related to organisational goals by the functionality of
its source and of its use). Both of these tendencies are features
of the·way these conceptions deal with the "impersonality" of
'power'. The institutional view envisages a structure of 'power'
being established through the crystallisation of authority grants
into formal positions or offices governed by organisational
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regulations. Similarly the systems conception portrays 'power'
as being attached to "generalised" social roles which are organis-
ationally prescribed patterns of behaviour related to the needs
of the system by the 'rational' process of structural different-
iation and the formal process of institutionalisation. By agreeing
that 'power' is attached to 'roles' or 'offices', both conceptions
stress that "impersonality" and impartiality of organisational
'power' • 'Power'-wielding and obedience to it are role expect-
ations and obligations of the superior and subordinate, so that
people can perform such actions without prejudice to their standing
as human beings - both the "rational" use of and the "rational"
response to 'power' is thereby ensured. But "impersonal" has a
second meaning in the context of the theory of organisational power
viz. that the explanation of 'power' relations, and ultimately that
of organisational order, becomes a matter which can be theoretically
accounted for without recourse to the concrete actions of 'persons'.
This "impersonality" ensures that 'power' behaviour in organisations
proceeds without the interference of social actors, whose assumed
compliance (their possible non-compliance falls outwith the remit
of the approaches that adopt these conceptions) therefore confirms
(and legitimates) what is already known about organisational 'power'
from 'objective' categories like formal roles, rules, goals etc.
The depersonalising of the world of organisational power at
the same time justifies and is justified by an 'objectivist'
methodology the final point of comparison. The predominance of a
"variable mentality" in certain schools of sociology has concerned a
number of sociologists (e.g. Blumer, 1956), and the application or
recommendation of a methodological strategy which seeks ffiatistical
relationships between 'objective', often a-sociological, variables
heszebeen the hallmarks of studies of organisational 'power' using the
systemic and institutional conceptions. The concentration on
objective variables, just as the formalist and structuralist frame-
works which encourage it, leads to the neglect of the sociologist's
task of understanding the social process which produces relationships
between variables. The analysis consequently omits reference to
power as a form of meaningful social action and reinforces the ration-
ality of the theoretical strategy that recommended this omission.
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The above four points together indicate that an internally
consistent way of conceiving organisational 'power' derives more
or less equally from both the systems and the institutional
conceptions. In order to examine its potential contribution to
the study of political process we need to understand the theoretical
role that power has within this dominant approach. By defining
power as a formal grant from the organisation, the approach either
neglects other possible sources of 'power' within an organisation
(cf. Mechanic, 1962) or relegates them to a level of secondary
importance, merely modifying the formal distribution (e.g. Presthus,
1960) • The significance of other bases of power is disregarded
because of their lack of formal legitimacy, while the empirical
possibility that power may work for other reasons (e.g. social
legitimacy, or threats and promises of an unconstitutional type)
and to other ends is discounted because such behaviour contravenes
"what we know arid recognise" as the typical features of formal organ-
isation. To legislate that 'power' is only functionally/formally
acquired and that its use is socially-neutral and organisationally-
rational (and is therefore accepted), is at the same time to define
. 1· . 41 Th f 1organisat~onal po ~t~cs out of existence. e same orma ism that
rules on the problem of legitimacy, that makes comprehensible organ-
isational conflict (non-compliance) theoretically uninteresting and
that encourages the static "variable mentality", turns organisational
'power' into a technical problem, not a political one.
Following Fox's numerous discussions of managerial ideology,
the view of organisational power and politics implicit in the theories
investigated above may be accurately described as "unitary" :
"A unitary system has one source of authority and
one focus of loyalty, which is why it suggests the
team analogy .•. We expect ..• ~embersJ to strive
jointly towards a common objective, each pulling his
weight to the best of his ability. Each accepts his
place and his function gladly, following the leader-
ship of the one so appointed. There are no
oppositionary groups or factions, and therefore no
rival leaders within the team." (Fox, 1966, p.3).
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According to Fox, many man.agers still theorise their organisational
'power' and lives in unitary terms; because the academic social
scientists in this chapter have also theorised organisations and
organisational 'power' as rational, neutral, authoritative and, when
pushed, consensual - leaving aside the ideological implications of
this compatibility between academic and everyday theorising - I shall
in future refer to their theories as constituting the unitary
approach to organisational power and politics.
2.4 .2 The Socio-Political Accomplishment of Organisational Order
To conclude this chapter, a few comments need to be made with
respect to a number of issues which are raised by the foregoing dis-
cussion, and which bear fairly directly upon the political aspects
of organisational order. Three matters seem especially to inhibit
the development of a full awareness of the role of 'power' in the
political process, but the first of these - the tendency to omit
adequate reference to power as social action meaningfully constructed
in relation to participants' goals -need not delay us; being a
fundamental theme of the thesis, its case has been sufficiently
promoted in Chapter One.
The second issue concerns the interrelationship of 'power'
and politics in the context of the problem of organisational order.
It will have become evident by now that the above litera':::'ureon organ-
isational 'power' shows a consistent relationship between 'order'
and the hierarchical dimension of organisation. (In Chapter Three,
I shall examine the complementary relationship between 'conflict'
and the horizontal dimension). This association between 'power',
hierarchy and organisational order has been highly resistant to any
possible analysis in terms of political behaviour. There would
appear to be two reasons for this resistance: the first, more
obvious one, is the failure to associate hierarchy with social
conflict; the second reason refers to the inability to consider
that organisational order is itself a political accomplishment.
82
It is not of course necessary for there to be observable
social conflict in order that political forces may exist (although
it helps!) . Where there is overt opposition between groups, as
between Crozier's (1964) maintenance and production workers or
between Goldner's (1970) I.R. and operations personnel (see 3.1),
the existence of sectional interests and use of power for those
interests become axiomatic theoretical adjuncts. This, after all,
is the essential condition underpinning the role of power in Dahl's
behavioural political theory (cf. Lukes, 1974,pp.ll - 15). However
as we shall see in Chapter Three, even those approaches which other-
wise recognise and develop a theory of organisational power and
conflict, fail to extend the propositions to hierarchy (cf. Lammers,
1969), the social condition of which thus becomes inexorably one of
order. It would appear that the cultural implications of 'hier-
archy' have become part of the sociology of organisations.
As mentioned apove, conflict should not be considered as a
sine qua non for a political notion of 'power'. Nevertheless the
association of hierarchical 'power' with organisational order has
become so taken-for-granted that this relationship has not been
treated as a socio-political process. If order exists, the typical
sociological reaction has been to asswne that 'power' has worked as
.it should, as is formally prescribed; the corollary being that only
when something ~~toward or unexpected occurs (i.e. when 'power'
obviously did not work as ~rescribed) does the link ~etween 'power'
and organisational order become subject to critical sociological
examination. A sociology of organisational 'power' cannot un-
critically accept the surface phenomenon of order, by assuming that
this order results from the realisation of prescribed 'power'.
Organisational order therefore needs to be understood as a socio-
political accomplishment, which is either negotiated in some
fashion (cf. Strauss et al., 1963) or imposed by 'power'-holders
in various (subtle or not) ways. An· examination of organisational
order through its relationships with social action and the structural
context of that action, makes the notions of power and authority
available for a political treatment of orderly states.
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The third issue deserving attention in these concluding
paragraphs about the relationship of 'power' and politics is that
which arises from the language of everyday organisational life.
In several places above, I have argued that in terms of a sociology
of organisational power formal categories tend to restrict under-
standing, and that knowledge about the determinants and effects of
'power' in organisational life only becomes sociological where
'social' categories are used; this has been most obvious in the
analysis of 'power' and legitimation. It has been noted, however,
that such recommendations have not been heeded by the majority of
theorists, whose predispositions towards the analysis of organis-
ational life in terms of order, hierarchy and general formalism, have
led to important shortcomings in their sociological vision. The
reasons why this bias has occurred have emerged during the course of
the chapter and they suggest fundamental lessons for the analysis
of political process.
It is apparent that the academic theorising of organisational
'power' has relied tacitly upon the language of everyday organis-
ational life, and, in doing so, has borrowed from this source formaZ
categories and their rationaZes of use, which have been unreflectively
introduced into its conceptual framework. In that sociology studies
everyday life, it is impossible not to draw upon its language, but
these loans have not been raisedrto the level of critical awareness.
As a consequence, the 30ciologist's conceptions of organisational
power, authority and legitimacy, especially with respect to hierarchy,
resemble the views of those lay participants from whom the termin-
ology was borrowed. In a sense, such lli~consciousreliance leads to
a sociological theory of organisational power which merely repli-
cates the common-sense theorising and idealising of certain members
of the organisation - in most cases the organisational designers or
the holders of institutional authority. Explanations of hier-
archical power, legitimacy and organisational order reproduce lay
knowledge, including the "myths" and "folklore" of organisational
life.
The language of everyday organisational life is an important
aspect in theorising organisational power and politics because it is
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informative of the organisation's folklore, of what different groups
at different levels "know" about their situations. However it
not only reflects the political life of the organisation, it is
also a part of that political life. The questions of whether the
"myths" contained in formal categories are "true" or "false", and
of how these "myths" differ from group to group, are· relevant matters
for a sociology of organisational power which does not unquestioningly
import into its conceptual framework the categories and their
rationales of use. It is a task for such a sociology to understand
the "ideological service" (Krohn, 1971, p.130) that these "myths"
perform in the political process, how they are used by various groups
as a basis for defending or pursuing their interests. In short,
the close relationships between organisational language and ideology,
and between ideology and power, makes the unitary language of
formalism, with its appeals to legitimacy and hierarchy that we have
seen unreflectively reproduced in the aforementioned organisational
theorising about 'power', a significant feature of the political
process in organisations.
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Chapter Two
NOTES
1. The extensiveness and diversity of the literature in this
area is indicated in some of the more remarkable attempts
to survey the decision-making scene, e.g. Gore and
Silander (1959) and Feldman and Kanter (1965).
2. This core of work comprises Administrative Behaviour
(first published 1947); Second Edition 1957)i Models of
Man (a collection of previously published articlesi 1957);
Organisations (with J.G. Marchi 1958).
It is of interest that Simon's work shows some distinct
lines of development, such that (for example) social factors
receive more attention in the latter contribution cited
above. In the 1960's his team of researchers gave the
theory of decision-making a mathematical approach, very
much reflecting Simon's other earlier interests in quanti-
tative methodology (cf. almosT any article reprinted in
Models of Man) .
3. Some of the theoretical contributions of Cyert and
particularly March are considered in Chapter Three below,
since their treatment of the business organisation is
explicitly political.
4. As Simon readily acknowledges throughout his theoretical
works, this conception originates (for the purposes of
administrative theory) with Barnard (1938) :
" ••• acts of decision are characteristic of organis-
ation behaviour as contrasted with individual
behaviour, and ••• the d~scription of the processes
of decision are relatively more important to the
understanding of organisation behaviour than in the
case of individuals". (Barnard, 1938, pp.186-187).
5. It must be understood that micro-economists themselves have
subjected the conventional theory of the firm to much
scrutiny, and have attempted to develop more appropriate
theories. Under pressure for greater·realism (e.g.
Machlup, 1946; Papandreou,1952; Baumol, 1959), the
postulate of profit maximisation has undergone several
metamorphoses - is the organisational goal 'profit', or
is this only one of the several/many? (cf. Scitovsky,
1943; Cyert and March, 1963; Shubik, 1964). Is 'utility'
a more useful or valid notion, and should it be imposed or
inferred from behaviour? (cf. Samuelson, 1938). What are
the difficulties in creating a "subjective utility index"
as the organisational goal? (cf. Feather, 1964; Arrow,
1951; Little, 1957). Can such arguments about 'utility'
actually explain the behaviour of organisational partici-
pants? (cf. Downs, 1967).
86
PAGE
NUMBERING
AS ORIGINAL
5. (cont'd)
Mathematical game theory(Von.Neumann and Morgernstern,
1947; also Shubik, 1964) has also come to the aid of
economists attempting to understand organisational
decision-making as a conflict-resolution process without
surrendering either the accepted economic wisdoms about
rationality or the analytical power of closely-defined
mathematical models. Social psychologists have attempted
to analyse economic organisational behaviour in terms
both of motivation theory (cf. Katona, 1951) and of
coalition theory. Concerning the latter, Simmel's classic
analysis of triadic relations (Wolff (ed.), 1950, Part II)
started a rush of experiments in the 1950's and 1960's -
e.g. Mills, 1953, 1954; Caplow, 1956, 1959; Vinacke and
Ackoff, 1957; GamsQ~,196l, 1962-3, 1964).
6. In a somewhat broader context, Pelz has called this the
'problem of social consciousness' (Pelz, 1974, p.lff).
7. There is nothing remarkable about this analysis of the
'internal' psychological process of decision-making. For
example, Lundberg (1964) sees three stages to such a
process - "problem recognition", "using information" and
"choice". The literature abounds with similar but alterna-
tive formulations e.g. Drucker (1955);· Litchfield (1956);
Gore (1956); March and Simon (1958); Morell (1958);
Griffiths (1959).
8. It is important to note that, in Simon's analysis of organ-
isational influence, obedience to and acceptance of authority
are not separable phenomena. The consequences of this
confusion are examined.in 2.1.2.
9. This is related to Barnard's argument about a participant's
"dual personality" in the organisation. Where ne accepts
the organisation's goal as his own, Barnard argues for the
presence of an "organisation personality", in contradistinct-
ion to his "individual personality". (Barnard, 1938, p.88).
10. This is possibly tied up with Simon's increasing mathematical
interests in his developing organisation theory, paired with
the inevitable cultural predispositions.
11. I shall not consider directly the theory of inducements/
contributions in 2.1.2 below. This theory suffers from the
same problem as many balance or exchange theories, in that
it is difficult to give it any explanatory significance
because in its general formulation it tends to be truistic.
In a very real sense, the possibility that a person will
leave an organisation if he feels that he derives more from
the organisation than he gives to it borders on meaningless-
ness. It might be argued that.he would do so if another
89
11. (cont'd)
organisation offers an even greater favourable balance;
but such an offer would then influence the balance of
contributions/inducements in the first organisation as
perceived by the person in question, such that the net
balance would be seen as unfavourable.
Whichever way the case is argued, the principle of balance
is unhelpful. If a person may leave with a net favourable
balance, as a 'participation criterion', it is empirically
unsound. If to stay in an organisation necessarily means
that there is a favourable net balance, and that to leave
is anyway indicative of an unfavourable net balance, the
'theory' does not explain anything - it must work.
12. Although these reasons may be seen sociologically as
empirical propositions, open to investigation, within the
framework of Simon's total theory, they are the status of
unquestioned assumptions.
13. It is his insights in this area that have formed the basis
of his unremitting criticism of the conventi0nal micro-
economic theory of the firm. (See Simon, 1957a, Ch.5;
1957b, Ch.lO and pp.196-206; March and Simon, 1958, Ch.6).
14. From a different perspective, Lindblom has investigated
rather more fully the difference between objective rationality
in decision-making, and what actually happens. The
"maximising" position, called the "Rational-Comprehensive
Method" (Lindblom, 1,964), or the "Synoptic Ideal"
(Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963) is argued to be not only
humanly impossible (except in special circumstances, s.ee
Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963, pp.78-79) but also unrelated
to the reality of the decision-making process. The more
realistic view which Lindblom has most developed, he calls
the "Method of SucL!essiveLimited Comparisond" (Lindblom,
1964) or "Disjointed Incrementalism" (Braybrooke and Lindblom,
1963), and may be seen as giving some support to the "satis-
ficing" concept. It is interesting to note that Lindblom
sees decision-making as a social activity to a larger extent
than does Simon.
15. Simon would not deny that his theory is mostly derived from
psychology, but it is argued here that there is an over-
dependence on this level of analysis, so that even phenomena
which are clearly not psychological are reduced to the study
of the individual, or to asslli~ptionsabout the individual.
16. This is especially developed after the first edition of
Administrative Behaviour. For example, 1957b, Chs. 14 and
15; (Harch and Simon, 1958, Ch.3).
17. Whilst the conceptualisation of decision process necessarily
constrains the explanatory role of social factors in the
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17. (cont'd)
total theory, Simon did choose to develop a general
psychological approach, with a comparable neglect of
sociology. His attitude towards sociology, made clear
in his observations in the Preface to the Second Edition
of Administrative Behaviour' appears to be unfavourable,
so the subsequent bias is not surprising.
18.For a different but related analysis of the theoretical
consequences of a behavioural version of "operationalism",
see Clegg's discussion (1975, p.20ff) of Dahl's approach.
19. This distinction refers back to arguments put forward in
1.2.2.
20. I write "to a lesser extent", because Simon's notion of
"identification" partly covers "normative power".
21. This argument is developed further in Chapters Eight and
Nine below.
22. In doing so, thIs confusion over the meaning of "legitimacy"
(is it 'formal' or 'social'?) lends a fictional support to
the image of the organisation as a cooperative system with
little conflict. (see also 2.4 below) .
23. The idea of the organisation as compr~s~ng a plurality of
interacting rationalities is now new. Roethlisberger and
Dickson (1939) distinguish between the "logics" of manage-
ment and worker behaviour and their idea is taken up and
developed in ROY'S classic participant observation studies
(especially 1969).
24. A fourth type, "interorganisational" conflict, is omitted
from our analysis here, since it.relates only indirectly to
the internal p:.:ocessof the organisation.
25. Unless the orgw~isation is reified, and Simon vehemently
denies this in a variety of places (e.g. 1957a, p.17 and
p.107) .
26. Parsons, as we have seen in 1.2.1, associated 'power' with
his 'political' or 'goal attainment' subsystem, so that he
would clearly distinguish between 'power' and 'social
control'. Millham et al (1972) do not take up this
distinction.
27. This would be anathema to Dahl and his behavioural political
scientists.
28. In 1965, Etzioni placed different labels on the latter two
types (utilitarian and identitive), but does not indicate
that this affects his earlier work.
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29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
~;:.-~
This arnbiguity even exists on the same page e.g. 19~6:1,
p.12, in which power and involvement are said to "consti-
tute" the compliance relationship (this word itself could
refer to a creative act, or to the descriptive form of
compliance), whereas the ensuing discussion implies that
compliance emerges from a given relationship between power
and involvement.
This 'congruence' occurs as a matter of definition, since
types of organisational involvement are defined with
reference to types of power, so it should be clearly recog-
nised that the distinction between congruent and incongruent
types of compliance is not a theoretical discovery.
This is the nub of Cohen's simple logical defense in function-
alism against the criticism that by concentrating on social
order it cannot explain social change. (1968, pp.57-8).
This neglect of subordinate's behaviour by focusing upon
their attitudes only, leads to an effective conception of
power similar to both Tannenbaum's and Simon's - although the
latter theorists accomplish unqueat.Lcned compliance / conform-
ity/acceptance through their behavioural definitions.
Ultimately, the empirical relevance of the postulate of
organisational effectiveness becomes a necessary condition
for the explanatory value of Etzioni's theory. Many manager-
ial theories of organisational behaviour are also underpinned
by a postulate of effectiveness, e.g. Lawrence and Lorsch's
(1967) and Wood\vard IS (1965) theories only have explanatory
value for "successful" firms.
34. In section 2.4 below, I suggest that the systems conception
of power and the institutional conception of authority are
essentially compatible.
35. This attribution occurs through sume rather unethical manipu-
lations of Weber's writings :
"For Weber, authority of any
given order is obeyed, when
'follows in essentials such
of the command may be taken
of action for its own sake'"
quoting Weber, 1964, p.327).
kind is exercised when a .
the recipient's action
a course that the content.
to have become the basis
(Hopkins, p.171;
Hopkins fails to clarify that Weber's quotation refers to a
definition of 'obedience', and in no way relates to an
assertion that authority necessarily involves compliance.
As we saw in Chapter Orie Weber defines authority in terms
of the (social) legitimacy to which subordinates orient their
action (~'1eber,1964, p. 324ff), and to orient one's action
towards the legitimacy of authority by no means ensures
conformity with its prescriptions (Weber, 1964, p.125).
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36. It might make sociological sense to describe the "aliens'"
relationship to "authority" as one of 'power', but an
institutional view with a behavioural definition is insensi-
tive to such a distinction.
37. The distinction between formal authority and the "actual
ability to influence" has also been fundamental to social
psychological and human relations approaches to organisational
leadership, e.g. Bennis et al., 1958, p.144.
38. It is informative to contrast this with V. Thompson's
(1960/1, p.509) view. For the latter, the same trappings of
authority that Presthus sees as validating its positional
legitimacy, Thompson argues constitute a frequent source of
conflict. These respective viewpoints may be seen as
reflecting an organisational equivalent to the famous debate
on the functionalist theory of social stratification.
39. The following interviewee's responses are both taken to reflect
'authority of legitimacy'
a) "Authority to me is something you ':rebound to respect.
It's something I respect."
b) "A lot of authority is in the manual - it's the law".
The first statement is typical of 'social legitimacy', and is
not necessarily bound to formal position. Conversely, the
second statement smacks of 'institutional authority', and
implies no respect for or agreement with "the manual".
40. ROY's (1969) study of the reactions of shopfloor groups to
formally imposed systems of rules demonstrates the same kinds
of issue, although the problem of organisational authority is
not broached directly.
41. For Parsons, of course, polit~cal behaviour is socially
neutral and organisationally rational, for it concerns the
attainment of goals. The effect of using the term 'politics'
to refer to such behaviour is also to make politics in my
sense theoretically unavailable.
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CHAPTER .THREE
ORGANISATIONAL CONFLICT POWER AND POLITICS
~he dominant way in which organisational order has been
academically theorised - whether in the consideration of decision-
making, control, compliance or authority - has been through a
unitary type of approach that stresses power as a formal, rational
organisational resource allocated hierarchically and used function-
ally. In the present chapter I shall be examining two variants
of a general type of approach which theorises, explicitly or im-
plicitly, the political aspects of organisational life by investi-
gating the causes of the "actual" power structure and the latter's
relationship to the most obvious manifestation of politics - viz.
social co~flict. Very broadly, this type of approach, which in
3.3 I shall liken to Fox's "pluralist" frame of reference, is
concerned with the relationship between power and conflict as they
are grounded in the structural and functional interdependence of
organisational process. These aims lead to the view that the
important power...;holdersare not hierarchical statuses but structural
and functional units, and, since power differences can thus exist
between formal equals, the theory of "horizontal" power has impli-
cations for the study of organisational conflict.
The first variant of this approach to horizontal power
relationships - the study of interdepartmental power - includes as
representatives the works of Crozier (1964), Goldner (1970), Perrow
(1970b) and Hickson et al. (1971). The second variant is distinct-
"ive because it brings together a number of diverse theories which
overtly claim to examine the organisation as a "political" unit. As
in Chapter Two, the aim is to conduct a critical examination of these
theories in order to ascertain the strengths and weaknesses of their
effective conceptions of organisational power and politics. I shall
conclude the chapter by sketching a picture of this type of approach.
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3.1 Interdepartmental Power and Organisational Conflict
Although the following approaches share structural-functional
premises, it is fruitful to distinguish between studies according to
the research methods used or advocated. From the viewpoint of
general relevance to this thesis, those studies using "qualitative"
methods have produced data of greater worth than the "quantitative"
studies of power, and the reasons for this will become evident as we
progress. Crozier (1964) and Goldner (1970) are examples of the
former, and Perrow (1970b) and Hickson et al. (1971) exemplify the
latter approach.
3.1.1 The Qualitative Approach
Crozier's study (1964) of power relationships within an
industrial tobacco monopoly is not only important in its own right,
but may be seen as the intellectual predecessor of the other studies
in this tradition. The organisation is conceived as a formal
setting in which the coexistence of a number of occupational groups
is a major problem, and whose interdependence is built into the logic
of the organisational process. Crozier appeals to a 'neo-rational-
ist' analysis of organisational power and conflict (1964, p.149ff.)
in order to overcome the "sentimentalist", "non-rational" arguments
of the human relations tradition.
"Subordinates can be considered as free agents, who
can discuss their own problems and bargain about them,
who do not only submit to a power structure but also
participate in that structure. Of course, their degree
of freedom is not very great, and their conduct, when
viewed from the outside, may seem to a large extent to
be determined by non-rational motivations. But one
must never forget that to them it is rational i.e.
adaptive." (Crozier, 1964, p.150; my emphasis).
Organisational participants, by virtue of their membership of occu-
pational (i.e. horizontal) groupings, hold describable positions in
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the organisation and face the fundamental problem of 'adapting' to
the circumstances (including the structures of power, status and
work) they experience. 'Neo-rationalist' analysis needs to answer
a quasi-ethnomethodological. question how do different groupings
make sense of and learn to live with their own position and the
problems it poses?
Crozier suggests that each group develops rational techniques
or modes of adaptation to their specific situation, and these
'strategies,l being related to the daily needs of particular occupat-
ional groups, delineate the orientation of their members to other
groups in the organisation. Differences in the amount of control
one has over one's own daily life - the organisation's power structure
constitute a significant parameter of one's problematic organisational
experiences.
What is power and what are its organisational sources?
Although Crozier directly cites Dahl's (1957) overworked definition
(Crozier, 1964, pp.156-l57) there is no doubt that his analysis of
organisational power is not behaviourist.2 Crozier develops his
view by introducing what he believes are two critical power-related
notions - 'uncertainty' and 'dependence'. Degrees of dependence
between groups are inherent in the structural-functional nature of
organisational reality, but the notion of prior significance is
'uncertainty' •
uncertainty may enter the organisational process from a variety
. . 3of sources both internal and external to the organ~sat~on, but, what-
ever its source, it poses a major functionaZ problem for the controlling
elite - it must be "coped with" (Thompson, 1967, p.13) at a minimal
level. In Crozier's industrial monopoly, the main source of uncertainty
in an organisation otherwise characterised by routine and predictability
was the technical system, which for unknown reasons, was persistently
breaking down. By virtue of their skills and ability to cope with
technological problems, the maintenance workers found themselves in a
key position from which they could derive immense strength.
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Key position is converted into organisational power because
it alters the formally equal state of interdependence amongst
groups; in short, it allows a group to achieve greater autonomy
from the organisational constraints whilst increasing other groups'
4dependence on them. When organisationally-created uncertainties
reshape the formal pattern of interdependence, each group must adapt
to the reality of horizontal power relations and they do so by
developing 'strategies' as outlined above.
is a hybrid systems/exchange notion. Power certainly has systemic,
The conception of power that emerges from Crozier's analysis
though not formal, origins, since it is attributed to groups of
greatest 'functional importance' (cf. Dubin,1960, p.506ff.) in the
service of organisational goals - those groups which "cope with" un-
certainty. Although it is grounded abstractly in the logic of the
organisation, the actual distribution of power reflects the
structural state of exchange between groupings - power accrues to
that group which can maximise independence from others whilst simul-
taneously making others dependent on it (cf. Blau,1964, p.118).
The major sociological impact of Crozier's approach is that
organisational conflict - "dominant patterns of opposition" (1964,
p.118) - is seen as an inevitable' characteristic of horizontal power
relationships.
"In the presence of a balance of power peculiar to this
organisation, the opposition between maintenance and
production ••• is at the root of our main conflict."
(Crozier, 1964, p.140).
Conflict, in spite of its central importance to Crozier's arguments,
remains a fairly intuitive concept, the major indicators of which are
signs of tension, personal criticisms and aggressive tones of voice.
Such factors may, of course, reflect a situation of conflict, both
latent and manifest, but the concept of conflict itself is largely
underdeveloped. Crozier explains even less adequately the nature of
the relationship between power and conflict. At one stage he states
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"At the root of all the conflicts we have analysed,
there is clearly some kind of fight for power"
(Crozier, 1964, p.139).
But the link between power and conflict is crucial in the sociol-
ogical theory Crozier is proposing, and, although a rationale could
be constructed using his own concepts, this link remains unarticul-
ated.
Goldner (1970) starts from the proposition that organis-
ational power should be seen as being rooted in the operational
relationships and issues that inevitably develop between functional
units in the organisation's division of labour. This concern with
horizontal power relations and the use of qualitative data ties
Goldner to the same general themes as Crozier had examined. Taking
the Industrial Relations (IR) unit of a company as the focal point of
analysis, Goldner investigates its relations with other functional
groups, especially Operations Management (OM). Like Crozier he
develops a systems/exchange conception of power, in which IR's power
in the organisation derives from its ability to control ambiguities
and uncertainties, and at the same time maintain relative independence
from the organisational control structure. In addition; Goldner
explicates a concept of conflict, also grounded in organisational
structure and functioning, and elaborates its association with power.
The organisational power of IR results from its role in the
'organisation of uncertainty', and the organisational circumstances
which allow it to rise above the formal state of functional inter-
dependence. Goldner's analysis provides comprehensive documentation
of this process.
"Industrial Relations' most important tasks were those
dealing with the unions : negotiating union-management
agreements, handling worker grievances ..• and the day-
to-day interpretation of all issues covered in the
agreement". (Goldner, 1970, pp.99-100).
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In its relationship with OM, its power depended upon its "expertise"
in knowing and especiaZly interpreting union agreements.
II mere possession of knowledge is not enough.
It must be augmented by control over the appli-
cation of this knowledge. Time and again the
IR personnel attempted to convince others that
clauses were not to be taken literally. The
union-management agreement had to be interpreted
to be understood" (Goldner, 1970, pp.126-127).
It was onZy IR personnel who could clarify the esoteric nature of
the agreement - it could thus handle the uncertainties created by
unionisation of ~~e labour force.
that sectors of the organisation became dependent on it. Because
Due to organisational circumstances, its work not only was
relatively autonomous of organisational' controls, but also ensured
the IR unit was only a local branch of a centralised function,
operating in an otherwise decentralised company, it was not subject
to the normal internal system of authority: furthermore, unlike
other departments, its productivity and efficiency was not open to
direct assessment (Goldner, 1970, pp.127-128 and 130-132). At the
same time as promoting autonomy~ IR's functions placed it in key
intermediary structural positions, being the only means 0: access to
the union, as well as mediating between certain departments (Goldner,
1970, pp.125-126 and 128-130); thus other departments could only
function adequately with IR's aid.
Goldner's analysis supports Crozier's interpretation of the
causes of organisational power. He goes further by relating con-
flict to power, not as one being conditional of the other, but
because they are both derivable from the structural and functional
conditions of the organisation.
Conflict may occur where ambiguities exist over functional
responsibilities, such that each group perceives a task to be its
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own, with the result that the "other" group is trespassing.
Trespass of this sort is likely to lead to more conflict where one
group has historically suffered a rapid loss of self control. The
relationship between IR and OM illustrates such circumstances, in
which conflict was exacerbated by historical factors. In this
situation, power and conflict are both created by organisational
circumstances and they interact together within the context of
functional relationships.
3.1.2 The "Quantitative" Approach
Within a quantitative tradition, Perrow's study of depart-
mental power in twelve industrial firms (1970b), deals with the
power relationships of four functional groupings sales, production,
R&D and "staff services". Data are obtained by the use of self-
filling questionnaires, and his measure of power, like Tannenbaum's
(1968), is reputational. The collation of the various individual
rankings of the different functional groups produces group measures,
from the comparison of which is inferred a "pattern of group
their own lay interpretations cf. Thompson, 1970b, p.91), although
dominance" . As with Tannenbaum, Perrow is therefore really providing
information about perceptions of the power structure (that is, assuming
his participants responded to a common notion of 'power' rather than
he treats these 'perceptions I as if t.hey were simple reflections of
'reality,.5
Perrow's results indicate a pattern of "sales-domination",
which he largely attributes to the sales departments' key role in
dealing with the major problems facing industrial firms in the U.S. -
those problems deriving from the nation's market economy:
"As a link between the customer and the producer,
it [i.e. sales] absorbs most of the uncertainty
about the diffuse and changing environment of
customers." (Perrow, 1970b, p.65).
In short, sales acquires its power because it performs the more
"critical function" for the organisation (1970b, p.66) - power is
functionally and systematically allocated.
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Perrow's quantitative approach does not allow him to offer
information about the power relationships between departments or
how uncertainty absorption is "converted" into organisational power.6
Instead his attention is drawn to a comparative study of his data
in search of those organisational variables which might predict
variation in the degree of sales-domination. This investigation
reflects Perrow's subscription to the structuralist 'task analysis'
approach (Perrow, 1967), seeking statistical relationships among
contemporaneous non-social factors (cf. Thompson, 1970b, p.90), such
as technology and task-related variables, rather than looking at how
power is used and maintained by social actors in the organisational
situation. It is in such affairs that the crucial difference between
Crozier and Perrow is highlighted.
The horizontal approach to organisational power finds its
most formal theoretical statement in the exposition of a "strategic
contingencies' theory" of intraorganisational power by Hickson et al.
(1971; see also Hinings et al., 1974). Of the four major works in
this tradition, this is the only purely theoretical approach, but
with its obvious concern with measurement of variables it is best
classified alongside Perrow's work. Hickson et al. look at the
structural and functional sources of power, and, with Perrow,
deliberately abstract from the role of social actors :
" when organ~_sations are treated as in":erdepartmental
systems, the division of labour becomes the ultimate
source of intraorganisational power, and power is
explained by variables that are elements of each sub-
unit's task, its functioning, and its links with the
activities of other subunits." (Hickson et al.,
1971, p.217).
The elaboration of the now-familiar basic logic takes the form of a
highly formalised framework for a strictly structural analysis of
organisational power.
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At various stages of the exposition, the authors invoke
each of th~ three conceptions of power outlined in Chapter One.
They commence from Dahl's (1957) behavioural conception, proposing
with Tannenbaum (1968) the "power is social causat.Lon" thesis (cf.
Martin, 1971, p.241), which they place within a functionalist frame-
work in order to elucidate its sources within the organisational
for the, organisation and its other subunits. Such a subunit will
context. Power is distributed in accordance with the functional
contributions of a subunit with respect to reducing uncertainties
acquire all the more power if it is central to the organisation, and
makes itself irreplaceable.7 In order to progress to the explan-
ation of the pattern of power relationships, Hickson et al. enlist
the help of the exchange notion with its associated idea of
dependence.
'Contingencies' are defined as the operational requirements
of any subunit that is affected by another subunit (which, given the
premise of functional interdependence, must be so). Contingencies
are strategic when they become controlled by some subunit whose
actions/services are, to some unspecified degree, difficult to re-
place, and whose position in the organisation is, to an equally
unspecified degree, central. At this stage, the. raw behavioural
conception of power, which took on a functional guise in the search
for the organisational conditions of power, becomes an exchange
concept for the purposP. of determining a horizontal pecking-order
" subunits can be seen as exchanging control of
strategic contingencies one for the other under
the normative regulation of the encompassing system
social system, and acquiring power in the system
through the exchange" (Hickson et al., 1971, p.222).
The accumulation of net credits in the abstract exchange process
presumably accounts for the differentiation of power, but how the
exchange analogy (for that is all it can be) works, and what its
theoretical status is, remains unexp1icated.
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The formal theory, stripped of its elaborate rationales, is
quite simple :
.. differential subunit powers ~s explaine~ by
dependence on contingencies ensuing from various
combinations of coping with uncertainty, substit-
utability, and centrality". (Hickson et a1.,
1971, p.227).
Those last three factors (the independent variables) are themselves
a (mathematical) function of the goals, outputs, technologies and
markets of organisations (ibid) - a similar set of factors to those
proposed by Perrow (1970b).
3.1. 3 Organisational 'Power', Conflict and Order
I have examined two types of approach to the question of
interdepartmental power, both of which use the same basic logic,
share the same types of concepts, and employ a mixture of function-
alist and exchange conceptions of power. Both approaches argue that
power is grounded in the operational needs or logic of the organis-
ation and is allocated to structural units for their part in handling
or reducing uncertainty. In this view power is not fixed by formal
dictate, but, as in the primitive exchange conception, is more or
less emergent as structural units compete to maintain states of
dependence and independence. In spite of these shared qualities,
the contributions of the two types of approach to understanding the
role of power in organisational life differ in importance mainly
because of the different modes of enquiry adopted or recommended.
For Perrow and Hickson et al., the theory of organisational power
is largely a formal conjunction of 'objective' variables, to be
measured and prepared for statistical analysis. They are structural
in the sense of abstracting totally from the meaningful activities of
social actors. As a result, their contributions are more or less
technical exercises, not sociological analyses. They would agree
that power is a social phenomenon; but they concentrate on
'objective' factors which cannot by themseZves explain (sociologically)
a social phenomenon without untenable assumptions about the passivity
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of homo sapiens. The interview/observation methods of Crozier
and Goldner ensure that man is not rendered impotent by fiat, and
both provide fine illustrations of how individuals and groups
handle 'power' to serve their own, but more especially their group's
interests.
Taking the two variants of this approach together, it is
important to understand the limitations they impose on the develop-
ment of a realistic image of organisational power and politics.
I shall briefly look at their (often implicit) views of power,
politics, authority, conflict and order.
These theorists provide a conception of organisational power
which is superior, from the perspective of understanding political
behaviour, to that supplied through the hierarchical approach. By
avoiding the assumption that power, however created, is used for
collective aims, it becomes possible to admit into the framework the
notion of sectional interests - in Crozier's work this is represented
by group strategies, while Perrow speaks of departmental perspectives.
This in turn serves as a basis of a theory of organisational conflict.
All representatives of the horizontal viewpoint, however, cling to
the proposition that departmental or group power has functional
sources and is functionally allocated. This stance prevents a
deeper understanding of the role of power in organisational politics
and, paradoxically,arguments and evi~ence from the researchers them-
selves provide fuel for a more flexible interpretation. Perrow
(1970, p.67) speaks of a "distortion thesis" whereby groups manipulate
areas and degrees of uncertainty so as to create or maintain power
independently of the "naturally" or "technologically" induced
problems of the organisation. Both Crozier and Goldner cite
instances of just such distortion without developing the implications
for their view of power and politics.
The theorists' stress on the horizontal dimension and
functional power rather than prescribed power tends to overshadow any
analysis of authority, and yet when they do need to resort to the
vertical aspects of organisation their arguments reflect the traditional
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formalist notions associated with hierarchy. Hickson et al.
(1971, p.218), for example, define authority as 'positional
power' (cf. Presthus, 1960; Peabody, 1961/62; see above 2.3.1)
and argue that it is legitimate because it is :
" normatively expected by some selection of
role definers". (Hickson et aL, , 1971, p.218).
Since at the same time authority, for subunits, would define
" the formally specified range of activities that
they are officially required to undertake, and,
therefore, to decide upon". (ibid.),
they provide a good example of an institutional conception.8
attainment of organisation's overall goals. Power struggles between
Crozier (1964, p.165 ff.) conceives of the organisational
hierarchy as providing some of the major constraints acting on hori-
zontal power relationships which might otherwise threaten the
functional groups must be kept within limits, and therefore :
.. certain individuals must be given enough freedom
of action to be able to adjust conflicting aims and
to impose decisions about general development .•• In
order to obtain the necessary freedom of action, the
manager will have to have a power over his subordin-
ates, formal power to make decisions as a last
recourse, and informal power to bargain with each
individual and each group to persuade them to accept
his decisions". (Crozier, 1964, P .163) .
Both the formal power and the informal power derive their strength
from the making and application of 'institutionalised' rules, as it
is evident that the hierarchical role is one of imposing discipline
on and arbitrating between conflicting claims of functional groups.
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Whereas power on the horizontal dimension is derived from the
(possibly changing) operational needs of the organisation,
employed within the context of group strategies and associated
with struggle and conflict, hierarchical power reflects formal
prescriptions, is used for the furtherance of organisational
ends, and thus is tied to notions of harmony and conflict-
resolution.
,It is not clear why Crozier and Hickson et al. should see
organisational power in the vertical aspects as being radically
different from its interdepartmental manifestations, except that
this view reflects our cultural predisposition to associate hier-
archy with authority, and authority with impartiality, impersonality
and formality (cf. Miller, 1955) but nevertheless the resulting view
is of management (i.e. hierarchical roles) as co-ordinators of "key
organisational bargains" (Rico, 1969, p.655).
This image of many groups competing under the impartial
auspices of management has wider implications for the development of
a theory of organisational politics. If the range and scope of
organisational power relationships and conflict are circumscribed
by the (assumed) arbitrating, neutral actions of formally prescribed
power holders and other more general social forces (Crozier, 1964,
p.176 ff), we not only have a very restrictive view of managerial
behaviour (no doubt a view to which managers themselves would
subscribe, and one to which they may appeal for social legitimacy),
but also a conception of the organisation which approximates to
pluralism (with its own ideological appeal). Crozier's formu-
lation, for example, shares many of the major features of the
conventional pluralistic approach to power systems. The tendency
to define power relations in terms of conflict either for concept-
ual reasons (cf. Blumer, 1954, p.235) or for purposes of identifi-
cation (cf. Dahl, 1971, p.358-359; see also Lukes, 1974, p.13);
the tendency to see conflicting groups as essentially defensive or
protective of their own poSitions or privileges (cf. Riesman,
1953; see also Kornhauser, 1966); third the presumption that the
organisation maintains a state of order by virtue of the opposition
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of groups, as present in Crozier's notion of a "conflictive
equilibrium". Further analysis of this connection, and of its
implications for a theory of organisational power and politics,
takes place in ~.3. below.
As we have seen, in Crozier's case, organisational order
is ultimately maintained by the actions of the hierarchy, but how
the operation of hierarchical power operates to maintain such a
state of order is never explained - its operation is simply assumed.
It is not in question that there may exist inbuilt strains towards
order from the hierarchy - call it the "mobilisation of bias" (cf.
Bachrach and Baratz, 1971) or a deep "structure of dominancy" (cf.
Clegg, 1975, p.61 ff.; see 4.2) - but attempts to impose theoretic-
ally or conceptually a state of order on the organisation, without
adequate sociological rationales behind them,.must be resisted.
Collectively these theorists employ unsatisfactory assumptions or
assertions in order to rationalise the accomplishment of a
"conflictive equilibrium" e.g. the ro.ethodological eradication of
social actors; Crozier's assumed 'organisational loyalties' of
managers, in spite of such an assumption running contrary to his
argument about group strategies; the abstract proposition that the
framework of the "normative regulation of an encompassing social
system" (Hickson et al, 1971, p.222).
To summarise, ~hese authors have effectively imported into
their developed horizontal theory of organisational conflict, some
of the major weaknesses of the hierarchical theory of organisational
order. As a result their approach acquires a vertical organis-
ational dimension of 'power', albeit by ad hoc conceptual grafting
rather than by sociological theorising (cf. Clegg, 1977, p.26)i
they also discover a way of reconciling their interest in conflict
with their functionalist premises and predilections viz. "the hier-
archy", and the formal concepts and reasoning of everyday organis-
ational life with which it is impregnated, provide the impartial
means whereby organisational activities may be ultimately tied to
organisational order ("balance") in spite of interdepartmental
squabbles. Conflict and change of any consequence are ruled out.
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3.2 Political Models of the Organisation
A recurring point of wonder throughout this thesis is that,
in the conventional literature, social scientists have shown a
remarkable degree of resistance to conceiving the organisation in
explicitly poZiticaZ terms. Long, in a now classic statement of
the problem, suggests :
"people will readily admit that governments are
organisations. The converse - that organisations
are governments - is equally true but rarely
considered" (Long, 1962, p.llO)_
Long argues that this view is prevalent amongst students of public
and private administration, but believes, incorrectly, that sociol-
ogists and economists are more likely to characterise the organis-
ation politically_ It has been noted that even those sociologists
who develop a theory of organisational power do not in general move
beyond a structural/static view of power relations to examine the
implications of how power is used. This latter task constitutes
the significant first step into the realm of organisational
politics.
In spite of this general neglect of the topic, however,
there have been a few specific attempts to portray the organisation
in political terms, and it is the purpose of this present section
to investigate and evaluate these attempts. The political aspects
of organisational behaviour have been analysed within a number of
broader theoretical frameworks, and the majority may be understood
as attempts to develop those approaches considered to date.
As this section unfolds, it will become increasingly apparent that
these political models tend to resemble, in significant respects,
the interdepartmental power approach, and that these two approaches
can, for the purposes of this thesis, be considered as variations
on one major - pluralist - theme.
The four parts of this section are concerned with the explan-
ation and critical discussion of distinct and explicitly 'political'
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approaches to the study of organisations. In each case, the first
part of the section is devoted to outlining these approaches as
they relate to the topic of this thesis; the second part of each
section involves an examination and evaluation of the image and
theory of organisational power and politics which are located with
the framework in question.
3.2.1 Politics and the Organisational Sub-system
recent times. Among these was the 'systems' conception of power
(a) In Chapter One, I spoke of the dominant conceptions
of power which have informed the sociology of organisations in
which was abstracted from the works of Talcott Parsons. This view
of power, when placed in an organisational context, carries with it
a view of organisational politics as an analytical sub-system of the
organisation qua social system.
The Parsonian conception of political behaviour in organis-
ation derives from his analysis of the four functional problems that
confront any system, and the political sub-system arises in response
to the need for the organisation to attain its goal(s). Parsons
describes a number of concrete activities/functions which constitute
the political sub-system, but there is
" an important sense in which the focus of all
these functions is the process ordinarily called
'decision-making'" (Parsons, 1956, p.75).
Organisational decision-making can be considered as comprising three
sets of decisions, concerning the establishment of policies, the
allocating of resources to implement policies and co-ordination and
integration of the organisational effort (ibid. p.75 ff.), each of
which is closely tied to the organisational goals; furthermore,
these activities of concrete individuals and sub-units are bound to
this systemic logic by their commitment to the authority and
legitimacy of the value-system. As mentioned in Chapter One, power
is the currency of the political sub-system (Parsons, 1967), and,
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as an organisational resource tied (by definition) to the achieve-
ment of organisational goals, the use of power to mobilise
resources (i.e. politics) is uncontentious, neutral, rational,
and both formally and socially legitimate.
Within the context of the present thesis, th~ view of organ-
isational politics offered by Parsons is unhelpful as it conceals
many of the nuances of such behaviour by a number of highly
restrictive assumptions. However, the analytical advantages of
the systems approach in general has attracted sociologists to
persist, and Zald (1970) in particular has developed the systems
conception of organisational politics with his so-called 'Political-
Economy' framework.
"Starting from analogies to the nation-state and
national economies, the political-economy frQIDe-
work focuses on the intersection of the polity
structure and political life in organisations
with the economy and economic life within organ-
isations". (Zald, 1970, p.221).
Relative to Parsons, Zald may be seen as expanding the analysis of
the functional problems of goal-attainment and adaptation and
considering all other problems (including Parsons' problems of
integrat.ion and latency) only in their relation to these instru-
9mental matters.
Zald's framework stresses the political and economic aspects
of the organisation as they interconnect and as they relate to the
political and economic aspects of the environment. It is these
two concerns with the analytical distinction between, first,
political and economic life, and, second, the organisation and its
environment, which primarily allies Zald to the systems approach,
and his major theoretical goal is to unravel the systemic relation-
ships between the internal and external, political and economic
structures and processes.
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Zald's analysis of organisational politics as such is most
easily abstracted from his more comprehensive view by examining
his theoretical insights in a number of stages. First, he makes
several propositions about the internal political syste~ and its
operation within the normative order of the organisation; from
these propositions it is possible to discern the essential charac-
teristics of organisational politics. Second, it is necessary to
investigate the nature of the relationship between political life
and economic life in the organisation, for the credibility of the
political-economy perspective on organisational politics depends
crucially upon this interaction. Third, and most broadly, we need
to look at Zald's analysis of the relationship between external
factors and internal political behaviour.
Zald commences from the conventional systems view that the
polity refers
" only to those groups or positions having an
active and somewhat organised influence in the
process of decision-making". (Zald, 1970, p.229,
n.l) •
The political system is thereby a 'power system' relating to the
making of organisational decisions, but his analysis is certainly
less restrictive than the r.onventional Parsonian vi~v because, in
addition to the "institutionalised and authoritative patterns of
decision control", it also examines
" the less regular and even 'illegitimate', but
systematic, influence processes". (Zald, 1970, p.230).
Organisational power is no longer authoritative by definition, and
may be used to pursue personal ends as well as collective ones
(Zald, 1970, p.237), but the political-economy approach views power
only in a (formal) decision-making context, being wielded by
organised, active interest groups.
III
This last image is further elaborated in Zald's analysis
of the central feature of organisational politics, viz. the process
of 'demand-aggregation'. Zald stresses the idea that the organ-
isations political system acts as an institutionalised mechanism for
reconciling disparate demands from competing sub-groups (cf.
Easton, 1965; Pettigrew, 1973, 3.2.4 below)
"Through politics, individuals and groups attempt
to change both individual and collective rewards.
In this approach the distinctive feature of
politics is that people who have grievances attempt
to redress them not directly ••• but through demands
on authoritative officeholders". (Zald, 1970, p.242).
Political behaviour emerges from dissatisfaction with some organis-
ational state among certain participants, whose demands are vOiced,
aggregated and impressed upon organisational authorities. The
(re)actions of the latter with respect to the demands then either
remove the causes of dissatisfaction, or manage (but not resolve)
the conflicts by referring them to various institutionalised
mechanisms such as committees, review procedures, appeal boards etc.
For Zald, then, organisational politics are, at one and the same
time, a process of demand-aggregation, a method of conflict resol-
ution and a means for organisational adaptation.
The scope of organisational politics, however, is further
restricted by the socially constraining operation of the 'constit-
ution'.
"An organisation's constitution is its fundamental
normative structure. The constitution of an
organisation ... is a set of agreements and under-
standings which define the limits and goals of the
group (collectivity) as well as the responsibilities
and rights of participants standing in different
relations to it". (Zald, 1970, p.225).
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I mentioned above that Zald's view of organisational politics
derives its strength from a notion of power which is not tied
directly to organisational ends per se, and the benefit of this
non-Parsonian definition is visible in the conflict conception
of political behaviour. However, in the concept of an organis-
ational constitution - a "historic and conceptually defined norma-
tive order" (Zald, 1970, p.226) - Zald appears to be presenting a
basic and constant referent of organisational analysis, not far
removed from Parsons' central value-system, from the managerial-
ists' view of the formal structure, or, indeed, from Simon's
ultimate 'value-premise'. The organisational constitution con-
strains and penetrates the internal political system, defining
directly and iro.irectly the scope of organisational politics as
concept and as reality.
It defines for example the formal distribution of decision-
making influence, these authority-holders retaining a position
somehow independent and transcendent of the process of organis-
ational politics qua demand-generation. It is the job of these
decision-makers to respond to expressed dissatisfaction from organ-
ised groups which 'lobby' them (cf. March's executive as a 'political
broker', 1962, p.672. See Section 3.2.2 below). The constit-
ution also defines the general structural form of authority relation-
ships, and the latter in turn determines the probable form of
organisational politics (Zald, 1970, pp.213-244). Institutional
mechanisms for the handling of enduring conflicts are also
constitutionally defined.
So far, I have been concerned solely with Zald's conception
of organisational politics, and how he sees the latter process as
being constrained by constitutional norms. As a theory of political
behaviour in organisations, however, Zald examines two other
significant influences viz. those emanating from the internal economy,
and those deriving from environmental sources.
The economy of the organisation is its "productive-exchange
system"
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"Economies are systems for producing and exchanging
goods. Basic to any economy ••• are considerations
of specialisation, role differentiation and division
of labour". (Zald, 1970, p,249).
Division of labour, initially created for economic purposes,
becomes the focus of social and political differentiation (cf.
Goldner, 1970) and the power of subunits relates directly to the
economic power (functional and budgetary) which they possess.
A further political element is the issue of "organisational
choice" which arises once the economic and technological aspects
of production systems are perceived as flexible rather than as
organisational givens. (cf.Child,1972; 1973). The allocation of
resources for incentive as well as productive or administrative
purposes clearly has implications for the levels of dissatisfaction/
satisfaction, for their perception as conflict issues and for their
pursuit as demands. Zald lastly raises the important question of
'information systems', such as budgets and accounting systems,
which concern the collection of data purporting to provide economic
measures of how the organisation is or should be functioning, and
comprise a set of rules concerning which data are relevant to such
measures and how they should be organised.
"Like the sociologist of medicine who never questions
the doctor's diagnosis, t~e sociologist of organis-
ation has tended to accept accounting systems as
given - as professionally and abstractly dictated".
(Zald, 1970, p.253).
Although there have been important exceptions, Zald points to very
important political questions deriving from apparently neutral
information systems. That the latter place constraints of organ-
isational decision-making activities is a conventional managerial
wisdom, but that they are also used and manipulated to support
demands on the system is an essentially political insight. (see
9.3) •
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The efficacy of this type of analysis clearly depends
upon the meaningfulness of the distinction between 'economic'
life and 'political' life but Zald's theory of organisational
politics is equally dependent upon the analytical separation of
the organisation from its environment. This latter distinction
is intrinsic to the systems approach, and although this perspective
assumes that organisation and environment are mutually-impinging,
at least in the short run the environment is more or less a set of
constraints. External political relations concern attempts to
or buying its factors of production. This aspect of Zald's frame-
influence organisational goals, whilst the external economy of the
organisation involves market relationships for selling its product
work is least developed, so that his analysis of the economic
environment barely exists, while his view of the political environ-
ment is more or less an extension of the conception of 'internal
polity' ~o include
" the tangled web of external supporters,
competitors, and enemies, and focusing on the
alliances, co~~itments and structural mechanisms
through which organisations relate to the power
mode, of their environment". (Zald, 1970,
pp.233-234).
zald does not explain why he considers his approach based upon this
analytical distinction to be any better than, for example, that
of the Carnegie Institute, which broadens the definition of the
org.anisation to include many of these I external' interests (e.g.
Simon, 1957, p.16; Cyert & March, 1959, p.78).
In this section so far, I have attempted to abstract a
theory of (internal) organisational politics from Zald's political-
economy approach. The political sub-system of the organisation is
seen to be associated with the theoretical problems of decision-
making and organisational change, the central processes of which are
those of demand-aggregation, and, by aSSOCiation, of conflict
resolution. These processes are circumscribed by the organis-
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ational constitution defining the binding aspects of the normative
order, by the internal economy and the politico-economic environ-
menta As a theory of political life in organisations, Zald's
approach encourages the study of power-conflict relations and
processes, and the use of power for both sectional and collective
ends.
(b) The major problem with Zald's conception of
organisational politics is that, in a number of ways, it provides
a severely limited view of its topic. This is partly connected
with the systems tradition in which he writes and which he other-
wise advances, and partly because the view reflects his dominant
concern with the conflict aspects of organisational power.
Zald's notion of the political sub-system is defined in a
number of ways at various stages of the paper in question, but
four characteristics appear to be especially important in
delineating the scope of the conception: first, the polity as a
'power system'; second, the polity as the formal decision-making
system; third, the polity as a mechanism for stimulating change
and resolving conflict; fourth, the political relevance of
explicitly economic activities. Each characteristic of political
behaviour has crucial repercussions for the effective conception
of organisational power and politics encouraged by the political-
economy approach.
Zald views the internal polity as synonomous with the
'operating power system' (Zald, 1970, p.229), which refers to the
"patterned use of social influence". (ibid.) His broad definition
of power to include both authoritative (i.e. constitutional) and
"illegitimate" (i.e. unconstitutional) actions to pursue both
sectional and collective goals takes the scope of the political
system far beyond the boundaries set out by Parsons.
However, this first feature of the polity refers only to
the dominant resource of the sub-system (i.e. power), and Zald
further pins down the conception of politics to the problem of
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organisational decision-making, i.e. the organised use of power
(constitutional or not) to influence organisational decisions.
(Zald, 1970, p.229, n.l). This restricts Zald's view of
organisational politics to the context of formal decisions, and,
indirectly, to the overt ("active") influence attempts. It is
certain that the decision-making process is politicised, but it
is unnecessary to restrict the political aspects of organisations
to the visible use of power in a decisional context. Not only
is the notion of politics relevant to other arenas of activity
(e.g. the defensive or positive control of status or work,cf.
Pettigrew's computer programmes, 1973; or Roy's machine-
operations, 1969), but also politics is very much concerned with
what Bachrach and Baratz (1963) call nondecision-making (see
Chapter Four). This latter point relates also to the politics of
organisational order, Zald's neglect of which I now turn to.
In addition to the power and decision-making characteris-
tics of political behaviour, Zald develops the notion of politics
as a social process in the context of organisational conflict and
change. The initial point to be made is that he treats political
behaviour as being both structural and processual, and in doing so
appears to confuse the nature of politics. He develops a
structural- functional analysis of power sources in a similar
fashion to the approaches ex&~ined in 3.1, and from this analysis
there emerges a p.Lct.uro of the organisation's political (i.e.
power) structure. Having established this static image of the
"political" structure, Zald seems content to treat it as an
'adequate' political theory of organisational order (Zald, 1970,
p.242). Whereas the structural view of power and politics is
tied to the problem of order, the "processual" conception is
developed mainly with respect to organisational conflict and
adaptation (Zald, 1970, pp.242-243). As will become clear below,
this relationship of political process to conflict (sometimes
almost as a matter of definition) haunts all the political con-
ceptions reviewed in this chapter, and it is not sufficient, as
Zald implies, to solve the problem of organisational order in a
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structural analysis of political behaviour. In the latter view,
order is artificially created by a static analysis, whereas a
more adequate theory of organisational order would perceive this
state as being politically (i.e. processually) accomplished. By
defining the notion of politics as a social process, one avoids
the age-old problem of the systems approach that associates a
description or analysis of social (power) structure with a theory
of social order.
As mentioned above, Zald's theory of political process is
a political-conflict model of organisational adaptation or change.
The central feature of politics is the process of demand-aggregation,
in which people endeavour to redress grievances by voicing demands
and, by collecting support, to lobby the formal authority-holders
with an aim of influencing their decisions on the causes of dis-
satisfaction. The process of demand-aggregation, if successful,
performs two important functions for the organisation~ first, it
encourages organisational change in a situation which is clearly
out of equilibrium; second, and as a by-product, this political
process functions to resolve or.reduce conflicts.
emerge from this particular remedial view of politics. With
As I have suggested above, to restrict the processual
analysis of politi<::;albehaviour to the more visible aspects of
conflict and change is unnecessary in itself, but other weaknesses
respect to the relationship between politics and conflict/change,
it would have been possible to examine the process from the social
actors'viewpoints (see 3.2.3 below), but Zald's systemic predilect-
ions leads him to focus upon politics from the organisation's
. 10perspect~ve. As a result, zald's approach ensures that power
becomes a utilised resource in the decision-making process (i.e.
that the decision-making arena is 'politicised'); but at the same
time the systemic orientation stresses politics as an abstract,
adaptive mechanism for achieving change and resolving conflict (or,
in terms closer to Zald's, alleviating dissatisfaction), to the
virtual neglect of how power is used. It is an important step
to acknowledge that power, in zald's broad sense, is used, but if
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the systems framework predisposes the researcher towards its
functions rather than towards the (socio)logic of the process
itself, much of what is 'political' about the use of power (i.e.
the 'how's' and 'why's' of its usage) is omitted. The logical
extreme of this position is to view politics as a passive re-
action to 'dissatisfaction', rather than as the active and
strategic pursuit of goals. In short, the treatment of the topic
as a systemic mechanism effectively strips the organisational
actors bftheir political role, which remains unexamined.
Some of the more important advantages of Zald's systemic
view derive from its contribution to the understanding of the
relationship between economic and political aspects of organis-
ational life. It could be argued that the analytical distinction
between the political and the economic is empirically misleading,
because political activity is not so much a type of activity (as
is economic behaviour) as a quality which may pertain to any
activity, independent of type (cf. Burns, 1961, p.259). In this
view, to tie the notion of politics to concrete decision-making
behaviour is conceptually limiting. However, while Zald COmes
dangerously close to forgetting that the political/economic distinct-
ion is only analytical he never actually falls into the trap of
1· d 1 btl 1 f th . 1 ab . 11unexp lcate eaps e ween eve s 0 eoretlca stractlon.
lndeed, Zald uses the polity/economy distinction to great effect
in his analysis of how the most technical of 'economic' actions
e.g. the selection and use of accounting or budget information, or
the choice of accounting rules or budgeting procedures - can
become politicised. Such concrete examples demonstrate the in-
herent fuzziness of the analytical distinction, and may be seen as
illustrating the appropriateness of the 'quality' definition of
politics over the 'type' definition; but their chief contribution
is to indicate the relevance and necessity of questioning the most
"innocuous" and "neutral" of organisational actions, when the topic
is organisational politics.
Unfortunately Zald does not heed this recommendation derived
from his very important insights into the political implications of
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economic activities. The economy may be politicised, but other
central aspects of the organisation qua 'political-economy' are not.
Nowhere is this weakness more significant than in his analysis of
the organisational constitution, which plays such a central role in
Zald's approach. The failure to treat the constitution as
politically relevant reintroduces the old Parsonian problem of
consensus that the political-conflict model appears, on the surface,
to resolve. The fundamental normative order of the organisation
is defined by its constitution, which is explicitly or implicitly
agreed upon by the participants whose activities it constrains.
However, the constitution is political in the sense that it incor-
porates a "mobilisation of bias" (see 4.1) lending political
leverage in one direction rather than another. As with any organis-
ational factor, the constitution may become politicised either
because it can be used intentionally by one social actor to further
his interests, or, relatedly, because it can itself become the focus
of political support or dispute.12 It is theoretically absurd, not
to say naive, to suppose that the constitution is somehow "above"
such actions, while information systems are not.
It is especially important to understand the constitution in
this way, because it plays such an important theoretical role in
Zald's framework, defining rules, procedures and obligations in all
arenas of organisational life. If the constitution is consensually-
establi<hed and neutral in its operation, so too are all the
institutionalised activities and factors. Organisational decision-
makers respond "aut."loritatively" to aggregated demands, according to
13the nature of the political (i.e. formal authority) structure;
institutional mechanisms such as procedures and committees im-
partially handle enduring conflicts (Zald, 1970, p.245); the problem
of managerial succession resolves itself according to institutional-
ised selection procedures and constitutionally-valid career patterns
14 -of candidates (Zaid, 1970, p.245 ff.); etc. These organisational
matters, amongst the more politically sensitive of issues, are all
treated by Zald in a non-political fashion, because, one suspects,
of his consensual, a-political notion of a constitution which renders
organisational order/equilibrium unproblematic.
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In summary, Zald's political-conflict model of the organis-
ation highlights the political aspects of economic behaviour, but
fails to extend the same logic to other organisational factors and
activities. This theoretical blindness is induced by his special
emphasis on the relationship between the political and economic
aspects of the organisation, and the corresponding relative de-
emphasis on other spheres; and by his unnecessary consensual view
of the organisation (and its constitution) which renders many highly
,
pertinent factors and activities politically uninteresting.
3.2.2 The Organisation as a Political Coalition
(a) In much the same way as the political-economy
approach emerges from systems theorising, the conceptualisation of
the organisation as a 'political coalition' is grounded in the
decision-making approach that was explored in 2.1. Having examined
Simon's approach to organisational decision-making, it was demon-
strated that the topic was treated in a rationalistic and psychologis-
tic manner, this in turn reinforcing the tradition of administrative
formalism of which Simon himself was so critical. To the extent
that he touched upon the political aspects of his topic, they were
treated as a residual category of dubious morality and of insignifi-
cant theoretical utility.
Cyert and March's view of organisational decision-making owes
much to their mentor, Simon. However, they have developed an
explicitly political conception of the organisation that has subse-
quently permeated the literature on decision-making as an established
fact. The works of Harvey and Mills (1970) and Pettigrew (1973)
owe much to Cyert and March, and each, in their own ways, contribute
further to the political aspects of decision-making in organisations.
In this section, I shall concentrate on investigating the
contribution of Cyert and March's 'political coalition' view to the
increasing "spirit of political realism" (Loasby, 1968, p.355) in
the decision-making field of research. In 3.2.4 below, I shall
assess Pettigrew's study of this same organisational topic - the
reasons for this separation will become apparent later.
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Cyert and March (1959, 1963; also March, 1962) inherit
their major theoretical goals and assumptions from Simon's frame-
work, but they elaborate an approach of greater complexity and
refinement. With the development of computer simulation techniques,
they argue that the major defence of the naive profit-maximising
entrepreneurial model of economic decisions - its analytical simpli-
city - is no longer tenable. They claim to be on the threshold of
a more realistic model, the necessary complexity of which is well
within the grasp of computer models. After Simon, they accept
decision-making as the central process of economic organisations,
and the understanding of how the process actually works is their
major goal. The political aspects of their view of organisations
emerges from their major premise that the business firm should be
seen as the basic unit of analysis :
"Organisations make decisions. They make decisions
in the same sense in which individuals make
decisions •.•" (Cyert and March, 1959, p.76).
It is in their attempt to make theoretical sense of this assumption _
for they are only too aware of the problem of reification - that the
issue of political behaviour arises.
The issue arises specifically in their consideration of the
concept of organisational goals, because if organisations are to make
decisions like individuals they must have objectives. For both
Simon and the conventional micro-economist, the notion of 'organis-
ational goal' is theoretically both significant and unproblematic.
However, Cyert and March correctly observe that if the concept of
organisational goal is to be theoretically realistic and meaningful
(as opposed to assumed) they must construct a theory of organisational
objectives which relates goal-formation to the behaviour of groups
and individuals in the organisation. Once these goals are socially
ed b . . d ,IS th b t b . t· 7'creat and '0 ]ectifle ey may e seen 0 e organ~sa ~onav ln
that they become independent of their creators.
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It is this process of 'goal-formation' which Cyert and March
see as explicitly political. Jointly, they write :
"Let us conceive the organisation as a coalition.
It is a coalition of individuals, some of them
organised into sub-coalitions". (Cyert and March,
1959, p.78).
More overtly, March claims that
" a business firm is a political coalition and •••
the executive in the firm is a political broker".
(March, 1962, p.672).
An organisation comprises individuals and groups who have different
interests in it, who make different demands on it and whose parti-
cipation differs in terms of intensity or activity (Cyert and March,
1959, p.81). Those actors most intensely involved will endeavour
to realise their interests, and, in doing so, they will form
coalitions with each other. Objectives are created as coalition
"It is primarily through bargaining within this
active group that what we call organisational
members bargain with each other in attempts to sort out differences
and reach consensus or compromise.
objectives arise". (Cyert and March, 1959, p.81).
During the process of bargaining, the act::"vemembers of the coaliti:>n
offer and exchange "side-payments" in order to persuade each other to
shift ground in one direction or another. Side-payments may be in a
material form, but, with respect to the problem of goal-formation,
the most important side-payments take the form of policy-commitments.
In return for support on a present issue, members offer future
support on issues of greater relevance to their political colleagues.
This mutual exchange and accommodation process leads to the formation
of broadly defined, consensual policies (cf. Abell, 197516).
As mentioned so far, this 'political' process of coalition
formation is simultaneously a process of bargaining and of goal-
formation. It is also a process of conflict-resolution - a theme
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which March develops in his paper on the business firm as a
political coalition (March, 1962). Business organisations
abide by the basic postulates of a conflict-system, and an
empirically valid theory of conflict-resolution requires a
"process-oriented political" approach (March, 1962, p.671).
The 'political coalition' approach to conflict-resolution in
organisations emerges from the fact that organisations have to
process and reconcile diverse demands from different partici-
pants, these demands being mutually inconsistent and organis-
ationally unrealisable in full (cf. Abell's "initial preference
outcomes", 1975, p.16). This approach acquires its theoretical
legitimacy by reference to the dominant theories in political
science - indeed; one suspects that it is this association that
persuades March to re-label the 'organisational coalition' of his
work with Cyert, a 'political coalition'. In essence, the con-
ception of the political coalition of the business firm, and its
attendant theory, shows marked similarities to the "interest
group theory of political decision-making" (reference to Truman's
approach, 1958): the system with its "active" politicians
pursuing representative interests, with its peripheral citizens
setting loose constraints on policy-formation, with bargaining
between relative equals (under the guidance of the executive)
within the institutionalised rules of the game.
1963, p.32ff.i March, 1962, pp.673-5).
(Cyert and March,
To summarise, the model of the organisation created by
Cyert and March is that of a 'political-conflict system' (March,
1962, p.677). The assumption that the organisation is a conflict
system, which, for more general reasons needs to possess a goal,
leads to the development of 'political' concepts about coalition
behaviour. Within objective limitations (Cyert and March, 1963,
p.39i also see Abell, 1975, p.114ff.), the organisational coalition
emerges from a bargaining process during which commitments are made
concerning present and future broadly-defined objectives.
(b) The general consensus amongst critics has been
favourable, attributing to Cyert and March's theory of coalition-
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formation and its associated concepts an air of greater political
realism. A fuller examination of their approach as a theory of
organisationaZ power and poZitics reveals that this is a surface
realism residing more in the terminology employed, than in the
deeper semantics of that terminology. As a theory of organis-
ational politics, Cyert and March's approach has four general
weaknesses. First the central notion of the organisational
"
conceptualised.
(political) coalition is largely undeveloped, and ambiguously
Its political quality is further limited by a
second problem, viz. the rationalism of the framework and of the
mode of explanation employed. Third because of their lack of
commitment to the study of the political process as a topic in
itself, their approach ultimately dissolves into a type of organ-
isational formalism which is a weakness they themselves seek to
criticise in others, and which simultaneously deprives their approach
of any theoretical depth in the area of organisational politics
(cf. Burns, 1969, p.236ff.). Finally, it can be argued that these
authors fail to avoid the problem of reification by strategically
conceiving the organisation as a political coalition, and, in
insisting on the organisation as the necessary unit of analYSis,
they present a paradoxical view of decision-making.
I shall consider, first, the meaning of the concept of
organisational coalition, Showing that it is conceptually both
ambiguous and lacking depth. As indicated earlier, for Cyert and
March the organisation is a coalition of individuals and sub-
coalitions, but as their ideas develop it becomes clear that not
all organisational participants are 'coalition members' in the
strict sense of influencing goals. Two major constraints reduce
the membership of the effective coalition and range of possible
coalitions.
First, participants differ in the interests they hold in
the organisation, in the demands they make on it, and, importantly,
in the intensity of their participation in the organisational
coalition. Cyert and March thus distinguish between 'internal'
and 'external' members of the coalition according to the degree
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of passivity they exhibit. It is the small number of active
'internal' members who determine organisational goals, and the
majority of coalition "members" remain of the periphery because
" the payment demands they make are of such a
character that they can be met rather easily"
(Cyert and March, 1963, p.30).
Were their demands not easily met, these members, motivated by
their dissatisfaction, would presumably be free to make demands
on the organisational executive (March's 'political brokers')
through coalition behaviour.
The political coalition is also limited by objective
factors. Cyert and March assert that the organisation's environment
imposes certain constraints on the possible "classes of combinations
of members" that are "viable" (1963, p.39). Only those coalitions
satisfying externally-imposed criteria may perform the goal-setting
function. Cyert and March's own arguments, then, suggest that
their definition of the organisation as a coalition is highly mis-
leading, since the effective - one might say "dominant" - coalition
consists of a minority of the actual organisational membership, and
is only one out of a set of "viable coalitions", the latter being
one class of possible coalitions.
While it is misleading to refer to this "dominant" coalition
as the organisational coalition, this equation serves to direct
theoretical attention from issues of central importance to a
conflict theory of coalition politics. The broad view of an
'organisational coalition' leads Cyert and March to a complete
neglect of the membership of the dominant coalition. This neglect
derives from a failure to relate explicitly coalitional membership
to the structure of the organisation, and results in an almost
randomised view of organisational politics (cf. Pettigrew, 1973,
p.22) • Since Cyert and March do not locate political behaviour
in power relationships (a point to be taken up below), the image of
coalition politics is a purely voluntaristic one, organisational
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participants being freely able to engage in coalitional behaviour
and bargaining. Subject only to the environmental constraints
17mentioned above, . the main factor determining whether a parti-
cipant will become an active member of the dominant coalition
appears to be the amount of dissatisfaction he feels with organis-
ational "payments" - this is a return to the inducements - contri-
butions theory of Simon and Barnard. This apparent organis-
ational freedom is reminiscent of the pluralistic-cum-interest
group theories to which March (1962, p.671) pays tribute, but
totally neglects the fact that access to organisational politics
is differentially distributed.
Cyert and March's theory omits the explicit examination of
who constitutes the political coalition, and provides a naively
voluntaristic view of how participants become coalitional members.
But accepting the existence of a dominant coalition, two further
questions present themselves for consideration, and both of them are
neglected. Cyert and March do not attempt to explain how coal-
itions work, or how they operate internally. Such internal
dynamics are central aspects of the politics of coalitional
behaviour, and to reduce them to rational exchanges of side-payments
in a bargaining process (see also below) is to do a grave injustice
to the complexities of organisational life.
successful coalitions? Cyert and March's conception rules that
What happens to non-coalition members and to members of un-
the former are passive, and by inference satisfied since they would
otherwise be active in coalitional behaviour.18 However, it would
seem to be a rather crass asslli~ptionthat non-coalition members are
therefore content, or that their passivity is self-imposed, or indeed
that they do not exhibit political behaviour other than at the level
of organisational goal-setting. This latter point, of course,
simply reflects the narrowness of this view of organisational poli-
tics. The case of the members of unsuccessful coalitions is more
interesting, as it appears to be another reflection of the concept-
ual ambiguity referred to above. Since the 'political coalition'
emerges as dominant from amongst an unspecified number of other
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coalitions ("viable" or not), it is clear even within Cyert and
March's rationalistic conception of the bargaining process, that
some organisational participants will be "losers". These losers
are especially significant because they were "politically" in-
vol ved and hence diss'atisfied in some general sense. In Cyert
and March's account, these losers somehow withdraw from the
political scene, either agreeing with matters decided by the
dominant coalition - presumably the "rational" thing to do - or
anyway accepting them. However, one might suspect from everyday
organisational experiences that rapid conversion or detached fore-
bearance are hardly the characteristics normally associated with
political defeat.
So far I have shown how Cyert and March's conception of the
organisational coalition conc@lssome of the most important
political issues requiring theoretical attention. In explaining
the weakness of this political conception, I have referred in passing
to the rationalism of Cyert and March's approach. In Chapter Two,
I criticised Simon's decision-making approach as rationalistic,
claiming that a political view of his topic might correct this bias.
The explicitly political concerns of Cyert and March, writing within
Simon's own tradition, have been seen by many theorists as indicating
a movement away from the rationality model of decision-making.
However, for Cyert and March, organisational politics is a pre-
eminently rationaZ process.
The rationality of the approach arises for a number of
reasons. As with Simon, Cyert and March see the organisation as a
(boundedly) rational instrument for achievement collective goals,
and the computer-simulation methodology further constrains their
analysis of organisational matters. Within this theoretical and
methodological context of rationalism, the conception of coalitional
behaviour serves an expressly theoretical function, viz. to per-
suade the reader that the notion of organisational goal does not
constitute a reification. To this extent, it might be argued that
Cyert and March resort to the study of organisational politics more
as a 'rational' technique than as an area of theoretical interest.
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Given these broader considerations it is possibly not
surprising that organisational politics are themselves analysed
as a quasi-rational process. In spite of the political realism
attributed to the conception of the organisational coalition, in
their joint works there is no discussion of 'politics' at alIi
even in March's paper (1962), where the 'political' label is
attached to the coalition, there is only one passing reference
to the concept of 'power'. Such an omission must make anybody
who wishes to develop a theory of organisational politics deeply
suspicious of the meaning and depth of the framework (cf. Petti-
grew, 1973, p.22).
The political dimension of cyert and March's model in-
volves a bargaining process in which general objectives are framed
and agreed upon, however bargaining is not conceived as a strategic
18power phenomenon, but as a rational process whereby individuals
make Side-payments to each other in terms of monetary rewards and
policy-commitments. Members are seen in terms of their potential
"value" to different combinations of members, the aim of coalescing
being to achieve the necessary "total value" to hold effective sway.
Side-payments made to individuals hence reflect the "marginal value"
(March, 1962, p.673) of them to a potential coalition. The notion
of "value" in "this argument reflects a suitable language of the
computer methodology advocated by Cyert and March, as well as
helping to bridge the gap between pol:i.ticalscience and economics.
One might also suppose that it is used as some equivalent to 'power',
but the notion of 'value' effectively abstracts from the political
dimension of coalitions by implying that coalitions form and
bargaining proceeds according to rational criteria observable and
measurable, i.e. having a clear value.
ambiguities of the topic of organisational politics. Cyert and
The apparent (i.e. superficial) neatness and precision of
the verbage should not be allowed to conceal the difficulties and
March argue that knowledge of the demands and values of coalition
members, of the relative costs and returns of different coalitions,
and of the supply of side-payments (given the environmental
constraints), renders the bargaining (i.e. political) process
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comprehensible. At one level, such a proposition may be truistic.
However, at deeper level, it solves by fiat the very questions
which a sociological view of organisational politics seeks to ask.
Cyert and March, for example, do not ask how participants acquire
'value' or 'marginal value', or indeed how they use their 'value'
or knowledge of 'values' in the political process. Their
. 1· 20 thrat10na 1sm us prevents the examination of basic political
questions concerning the coalitional process. To give participants
'values' as a heuristic device for predicting agre:ements is a valid
task, but in depriving participants of 'power' to pursue (or being
prevented from pursuing) their aims Cyert and March surely deny
themselves access to the political reality they so earnestly seek.
It has been noted above that the coalition concept appears
to be a theoretical strategy for avoiding the allegation of reifi-
cation, and there are a number of indications in Cyert and March's
treatment of the concept that supports this rather cynical view.
As with Zald's approach (see 3.2.1) organisational politics emerges
from Cyert and March's view as a mechanism for setting goals and
resolving conflict, and their interests in the topic beyond this are
severely restricted. The agreements arrived at through coalition
behaviour become the fodder for a number of formal structural
devices, constructed for the elaboration of objectives, and through
such devices (e.g. the budget; the organisation chart)
II the coalition agreements of today are
institutionalised into semi-permanent arrange-
ments". (Cyert and March, 1963, p.34).
Earlier it was noted that Cyert and March have no theory of coal-
ition membership or coalition activity, .so the agreements, which
are produced by a rational process of bargaining and which become
uncontroversial and uncontested once created, undergo an equally
uncontroversial and uncontested institutionalisation process.
Being formal, and "largely self-confirming" (ibid.) these devices
are unpoliticised in their operation even though they perform the
essential allocational tasks of the organisation. Almost
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magically, without reference to any real political process, this
approach createsasmble, consensual set of formal objectives to
guide the organisation in its decision-making activity.
Cyert and March go further by suggesting that certain
"operational" goals are effectively outside the influence of "many
21parts" (Cyert and March, 1963, p.40) of the political coalition.
They list five such goals, including a profit goal, which they had
earlier suggested possessed no logical priority over the goals of
lower participants. These five goals bear a startling resemblance
to those kinds of goals which micro-economists had previously chosen
as superordinate goals (cf. March, 1962, p.666ff.). It would appear
that, after all the theorising and conceptual fuss made about
coalitions, Cyert and March resort to an image of organisational
goals imposed by themselves, not created by coalitional behaviour.
Furthermore, in the models of organisational decision-making which
they present in the later part of their book, they
" restrict attention to this list of goals •.•"
(Cyert and March, 1963, p.43).
I have shown that their approach about organisational politics in
coalitions is weak, but can these arguments be forgotten quite so
easily? In the face of this reassertion of organisational goals,
and of the neutrality of stabilising devices, Cyert and March re-
introduce a formalism which detracts from the search for realism
they advocate and which, as Burns (1969, p.235 ff.) argues,
jeopardises any chance of developing a sense of politics within
their rationality model.
In spite of Cyert and March's persistent attempts to justify
the treatment of organisations as decision-makers by resort, as we
have seen, to a coalitional viewpoint on goal-formation, it can be
argued that Cyert and March do not avoid the reification problem.
This is partly on theoretical grounds - all the arguments above
suggest that the theory of coalition behaviour is itself based on
unrealistic assumptions, and crude propositions - and partly because
the problem of decision-making organisations simply contravenes our
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knowledge of how the world works. As Loasby bluntly asserts, in
parody of Cyert and March (see quote p.122 above)
"Organisations do not make decisions.
Decisions are made by people".
(Loasby, 1968, p.352).
A few paragraphs ago, I showed that in the end Cyert and March
select the orgoanisational goals which they examine independently
of the political coalition - such an imposition is typical of the
micro-economists they criticise as being unrealistic. Cyert and
March (following Simon) also eloquently dismiss the micro-economists'
omniscient decision-making entrepreneur as unrealistic, but their
alternative is not distantly related. Instead of assuming that the
decision maker is an actual, though non-existent, person, they assume
that role to be played by a "fictitious person" - the organisation
itself. And this assumption is at the very heart of the problem of
reification. For heuristic purposes, of course, it is permissable
(although I personally believe it theoretically undesirable) to make
such an assumption, but Cyert and March simply do not provide an
adequate and acceptable theory of micro-processes to justify the
reified view of the organisation to be held Simultaneously with their
expressed desire for descriptive realism.
Cyert and Marcr.'s total enterprise becomes the more absurd
because they posit two theories of organisational decision-making.
Their main purpose is to explain decision-making as the predictable
consequence of four sub-theories concerning the actions and goals of
organisations (Cyert and March, 1963, p.21), but they also outline
the theory of the political coalition to rationalise how goals arise
from micro processes. However, there is a real sense in which the
goals produced within the bargaining process are decisions, and it
is a simple logical extension of this almost peripheral theory of
coalitional behaviour to suggest that all deciSion-making occurs in
this way. Such an approach shortcircuits the need for a reified
view of organisational decision-making, is theoretically neater,
conceptually more parsimonious and does not run counter to common-
sense.
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3.2.3 Political Action in Organisations
(a) The theoretical and empirical works of Dalton.
(1959) and of Burns (1955, 1961, 1969, 1977, and with Stalker 1961)
were conducted apparently independently of each other (there being
no cross-references), with different theoretical purposes, and with
different conceptual apparatus; and yet they reveal major simil-
arities, and continuities with respect to the problem of organis~
ational politics. Their common theme, which makes it possible to
consider them together, is that they insist that political process
b 1 d . . 22e ana yse from the participants' own viewpolnts. In part
this theoretical injunction emerges from the inescapable demands of
a chosen research method and the data which the latter unearths,
but, as will become clear, the similarities in perspective provide a
relatively coherent view of organisational politics, with a very
different slant to those already examined.
In this section, I shall first set the theoretical scenes
in which these two sociologists developed their contributions, then
abstract the thematic similarities present in the two approaches
with respect to a theory of political behaviour in organisations,
and finally review the conception of organisational power and
politics that their approaches encourage.
ial behaviour in industrial organisations. Based upon an intensive
Dalton's contributions have been mainly empirical, culmin-
ating in the publication of his important report (1959) on manager-
study over a period of ten years, much of which was spent as a
participant observer, the major research purpose was firmly rooted
in the sociologicai and organisational environment of the late
1940's and 1950's viz. to clarify the theoretical significance of
the informal/formal distinction that had dominated research since
the Hawthorne Studies first challenged classical management theory.
Dalton does not refer to the actions of his managers as 'political',
but his interviewees and informants do apply the vocabulary of
politics to describe (and to evaluate) many types of unofficial
behaviour. It might be said, therefore, that Dalton's view of
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organisational politics emanates from an insistent informalism,
which may well be a sourc~ of acute irritation to present-day
readers but arguably constitutes an essential step in the study
23of the topic. (cf. Burns, 1969, p.235).
managerial behaviour in the electronics industry. This report of
Burn's contribution to the theory of organisational politics
also finds its main source in his research (with Stalker, 1961) of
the management of innovation is often cited in the literature, but
almost always with respect to the distinction between mechanistic
and organic systems of management and the 'suitability' of these
systems to different states of environmental condition. The second
half of this report, and a number of papers that precede and follow
it (1955, 1961 and 1969), which are explicitly concerned with
political aspects of the industrial organisation, remain relatively
unexamined. For Burns, organisational politics - a form of concrete
social action - constitute an unavoidable reference point in the
understanding of how the environment influences the management of
industri~l enterprises.
The theory of organisational politics which can be abstracted
from Burns' and Dalton's work hinges upon four important, shared
characteristics. First, organisational politics are characterised
as a type of social action, in the WeDerian sense - it is the impli-
cations of this feature that most sharply distinguish this approach
from those political approaches above. Secondr this approach
represents political behaviour as a conflict phenomenon. The third
distinctive emphasis on the processual aspects of the topic is, with
the second point, held in common with the other theories above.
Last, both Burns and Dalton see political activities as being
associated with informally established groupings.
Tom Burns provides the most explicit theoretical statement
on political action, arguing that organisational change - his
particular interest - cannot be explained as an inevitable
"objective" reaction to structural/environmental factors. To make
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such an assumption is to overlook entirely the problems surrounding
the accomplishment of that change by social actors within the
organisational process.
"Political action is a necessary instrument for the
accomplishment of internal change •.• which to the
outsider is the inevitable consequence of a new
situation". (Burns, 1961, p.266).
resisted within a political process. This view rejects the neutral,
In short, change does not simply "happen", but is promoted and
passive conception of Cyert and March, and the 'type' definition of
politics proffered by the systems approach. Politics refer to
'partial' behaviour, and to the quality or "colour" (Burns, 1961,
p.259) .of those behaviours rather than to any specific activity.
Political behaviour is a "mode of doing" (ibid.) and therefore
always reflects the results of human effort fired by emotional attach-
ments and interpretations (Burns and Stalker, 1961, p.143). It. is
the fact that rationalist and structuralist approaches abstract from
these central features of 'effort' and 'doing' that makes them
singularly inappropriate to the study of politics.
Although Dalton does not attend to the notion of politics
from a conceptual or definitional viewpoint, and his purposes are
distant from Burns', there exist close similarities tihr-ouqhhis
concern with understanding
" the gap between official and unofficial ways of
doing things, and ••. the emotional splits and name-
calling among associates devoted to one general
approach or the other". (Dalton, 1959, p.3).
organisational resources to pursue partial ends. Burns (1961,
Many of these unofficial "ways of doing things" are recognised as
24'politics' by the participants themselves f apparently on the
grounds that they involve the use of personal relationships and
p.263ff.) conceptual discussion of how political action requires
the use of human resources for promoting interests appears to place
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Dalton's empirical observations within a neater theoretical frame-
work. With less explicit conceptual clarity, Dalton directs the
reader to the phenomenon of organisational politics by allowing
his informants and interviewees to demonstrate their own insight-
ful awareness of it.
I have shown above how the systems and decision-making
approaches develop a 'political-conflict' model of the organisation.
The 'action' approach displays a similar view of the topic. Dalton
perceives the organisation as :
" an existing system of conflict. That is, in
the relations among various departments, ranks,
official bodies, etc., there were already ongoing
collisions between purpose and surroundings that
interfered with direct approaches to goals."
(Dalton, 1959, p.51).
Within this continuing set of conflict relationships, which emerged
inevitably from an organisational process relying upon the co-
existence and co-operation of specialised subgroups with different
subgroups, were introduced new issues and problems that nourished
and sustained the existing patterns of opposition. At the heart of
the political process is the persistent interlocking of actions and
counteractions (Dalton, 19S9, p.218ff.) as allparti8s in the organ-
isation seek to
" loosen controls on themselves and tighten them
on others". (Dalton, 1959, p.19; see also Roy,
1969).
In the short run anyway, a successful loosening or tightening of
such controls means a parallel loss of control or discretion for
other groupings, and such actions are supported or resisted in a
veritable 'power struggle'.
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Burns' analysis follows a similar path, albeit in his own
characteristically more theoretical manner :
" members of a corporation are at one and the
same time co-operators in a common enterprise
and rivals for the material and intangible re-
wards of successful competition with each other"
(Burns, 1961, p.261).
The organisation in action is conceived as an "interpretive process"
(Burns and Stalker, 1961, p.77ff. and pp.155-6) through which the
diversity of languages and meanings of the constituent specialist
subgroups are expressed. These different professional perspectives
(cf. Bucher, 1970, p.13ff) are germane to the understanding of
political-conflict relations between subgroups, either through such
'cultural differences' being a cause or source of conflict and
rivalry, or because they reflect conflict relations, reinforcing
. 25them in the manner of an J..deology.
"The political system of a business concern is the
product of the various demands, either actually or
potentially conflicting, which are made on the total
resources of the concern." (Burns and Stalker, 1961,
p.144) •
Between Burns and Dalton, there exists a fundamental agreement that
politics are conflict phenomena actively created by different sub-
groups in the organisation.
Burns provides the most sophisticated theoretical rationale
for conceptualising politics in processual terms. In his dismissal
of the structuralist approach to political behaviour, he makes the
case very succinctly
" structural models of institutions and modes of
political activity are abstractions from the
activities which they are intended to explain and
13}
forms, not of processes". (Burns, 1961, p.259).
guide ••• They are.representations of static
The understanding of political behaviour, as defined both by Burns
and (implicitly) by Dalton, requires the empirical examination of
the sequences in which they occur and the 'internal' reasons why
they follow the sequences observed. To do otherwise - to para-
phrase the above statement - is to neglect the very meaning of the
activities underview as politics i.e. to overlook the important
details of effort,emotion, and purpose. In a proposition of
equal importance, Dalton states the following
"Organisation is not seen as a chiselled entity,
but as a shifting set of contained and ongoing
counter phases of action". (Dalton, 1959, p.4i
also p.218 ff.).
Bucher (1970) comes to the same conclusion by reversing the argument
instead of starting from the problem of politics and arguing that
this topic is essentially processual, she begins with the processual
problem of "how this organisation runs" and recommends that
" in order to describe and understand the flow of
events in the organisation, it is necessary to use
political concepts". (Bucher, 1970, p.25).
Either way, in this approach politics and process are inextricably
intertwined as concept and reality.
The relation between politics and conflict/process is
relatively uncontentious - both the systems and the decision-making
traditions encourage such a view, although for different reasons.
However, the 'political action' framework proposes a range of
concepts that aim to unravel the sociological mystery unsolved by
the alternative approaches viz. how do organisational participants
accomplish what is recognisably (to themselves and to the inter-
pretive theorist) politics? At one level the solution offered by
Burns and Dalton consists of a set of propositions about the
activities of political groups.
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It is true that individuals may act alone in the political
arena, but the individual
" may be, and often is, able to increase his
personal power by attaching himself to parties or
sections of people who represent the same kind of
resource and wish to enhance its exchange value,
or to cabals who seek to control or influence
the exercise of patronage in the organisation.
Such formations have to do with what are
commonly, and rightly, regarded as the 'internal
politics' o:f;organisations" (Burns, 1969,
pp.233-234) •
Politics concern the actions of distinct groupings (cf. Dalton,
1959, p.57), and in ~~other, earlier paper26, Burns (1955)
distinguishes between two basic types of group - the 'clique'
and the 'cabal'. He sees the clique as a grouping established
to provide defensive support and reassurance for members who per-
ceive that their domain of control and their status are being
threatened (Burns, 1955, p.472ff.), while, conversely, the cabal
is an active, power-seeking group (Burns, 1955, p.480).
In ~ similar manner, Dalton pcovides the concept of a
clique27 to denote "••• a small exclusive group of persons with a
common interest •.•" (Dalton, 1959, p.52). He develops a typology
of cliques as "horizontal" and "vertical" (a dimension not examined
by Burns), and, more importantly, as "defensive" and "aggressive"
(Dalton, 1959, pp.6l-63). The defensive and aggressive cliques
of Dalton more or ~ess correspond respectively to Burns' cliques
and cabals, and neither political grouping is likely to be partic-
ularly permanent. (Burns, 1955, p.479 and p.481; Dalton,1959,p.61).
probably the most important feature of political action
within cliques and cabals is that, unlike the previous approaches
examined above, it is not tied to the goals of the organisation nor
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conducted legitimately within the organisational constitution.
Cliques and cabals are not 'interest-groups' in the sense defined
by March (1962; cf. Burns, 1955, p.473). From his many examples
of clique behaviour, it is quite clear that for Dalton cliques
are informal, unofficial groups par excellence, their activities
being of a "morally questionable" (from tl;leparticipants' view-
point) type. Burns shares this view :
"It is the peculiarity of the clique and of the cabal
that membership is not legitimate, or not quite
legitimate; that their existence and participation
in them are, to however a mild degree, infractions
of the rules and of the order prevailing in a
particular milieu". (Burns, 1955, pp.473-474).
To summarise, I have argued that Burns and Dalton, from
different starting points, develop a political framework around
such similar central concepts and propositions that they may be
treated, in general terms, as one approach. This approach attends
to the internal dynamics of political-conflict processes, the focal
points of which are non-legitimate political groupings.
(b) In the context of this thesis, of the definition of
its scope and its assumptions, the work of Burns and Dalton must be
welcomeQ as an advance on the other political approaches above.
Neither Dalton nor Burns have received the acclaim worthy of their
theoretical contribution to the topic of organisational politics,
although theorists draw heavily upon Men Who Manage for examples
of the use of power. Dalton's work has been received as a "real
landmark" (Crozier, 1964, p.106) and as providing a "powerful
insight" (Mouzelis, 1975, p.159), but has been only lightly treated
as a theory of organisational politics. Burns' papers have been
consulted by British sociologists with interests in this area of
study, but their aim has generally not been to evaluate his theor-
etical contribution. In order to amend this failure to build upon
what I have called the 'action' approach, I shall briefly comment
upon the more specific issues arising from Burns' and Dalton's
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research - I shall return to more general matters in 3.3 below,
and extend the important arguments in Chapter Six, in preparation
for Part Three.
It would appear to me that the theoretical significance
of the Burns-Dalton framework to the study of the political process
stems from one dominant feature viz. its "insistent informalism".
More broadly, this demand that we look at the actual practices used
by participants, and thus be wary of accepting the formal chart and
its mechanisms as "how things work", may be seen as both a theoret-
ical and a methodological injunction which, when followed, reveals
for consideration a range of actions 'internally' defined and
accepted as 'political'. The post-Dalton demise of the informal!
formal distinction (cf. Mouzelis, 1977, p.147ff) has generally been
advantageous to the development of the sociology of organisations,
but, as Burns points out, this progression can only be theoretically
progressive if, as a result, we resist any attempt
" to re-establish the conception of organisations
as monolithic, or at least homogeneous, structures".
(Burns, 1969, p.235).
I have argued above, with different but as important points as those
raised by Burns, that the systems and decision-making approaches
have tended by inference to re-establish such a conception, and th2t
it was partly this formalism and rationalism that deprives them of
a deeper political realism.
The spirit of informalism, updated by Burns (1969) in his
analytical division of the three systems28 of the business enter-
prise, has had at least two important consequences as· far as a
theory of organisational politics is concerned: first it detaches,
as a matter of definition, the notion of political behaviour from
organisational goals and the formal or working organisation;
second, it focuses attention on politics as a concrete process of
social actions held together by an internal logic. It is such
consequences that allow political action to be seen as a form of
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social energy that, in its expression, plays such an important
organisational role i.e. it is a way of getting things done.
However, while both these consequences provide for the substantial
advantages of this framework over the others so far delineated, at
the same time it is necessary to examine them critically in order
to establish the direction in which they point, and the weak points
which need attention.
Regarding the repercussions of the first consequence of
this approach, the detachment of the 'political' from the 'formal'
aspects of organisation, explicit in both Daltonis and Burns' work,
may serve as a necessary device to release for theoretical scrutiny
the topic of organisational power and politics. However, much care
is needed in order to avoid oversimplifying the political dimension.
By conceiving of politics in informal, quasi-illegitimate terms,
and in distinguishing political action from the formal or working
organisation there is a real danger of misunderstanding, or under-
emphasising the interplay between the political and the formal.
While acknowledging that a sociological view of politics is only
possible by untying political behaviour from organisational goals
and organisational decision-making as a formal activity, it must be
carefully made clear that these formal arenas are politicised, or
at least 'politicisable'. Dalton's official/unofficial distinct-
ion, and Burns' 'tri-systemic' conception (Burns, 1969) can lead to
a compartmentalised view of politics, especially if the organis-
ation is seen to possess a distinctly 'political system'. But if
politics is a 'colour' with which activities are imbued, this must
include formal activities as well. If we accept that formal acti-
vities can be 'political' in hue, the neat distinctions between
formal and informal, legitimate and non-legitimate may serve to
confuse rather than to clarify the tasks of theorising and empirical
research.
The danger of analysing political action out of the context
of the formal or working organisation raises a much broader
theoretical issue introduced in Chapter One, viz. the structuralist
criticism of interpretive sociology that the latter, in ignoring
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the external 'objective' constraints on organisational participants,
tend to give a free-floating view of organisation life which is
plainly unrealistic. A study of organisational power and politics
which de-emphasises the formal-structural aspects of the organis-
ation at the same time overemphasises what it is possible for
participants to achieve. .Crozier (1964) certainly bel~eves that
Dalton has committed such an error
"Dalton is so haunted by the fear ·of being misled
by the formal structure and the formal definitions
of the roles that ••• he reports only irregularities,
backdoor deals, and subtle blackmail ... He forgets
the rational side of the organisation and the series
of social controls that prevent people from taking
too much advantage of their own strategic situation"
(Crozier, 1964, p.106).
Crozier thus criticises the political action view precisely for its
conceptual liberation from the formal/rational constraints of goals,
rules and structure. Mouzelis (1975, pp.158-159), by implication
of his general thesis, similarly decries the apparent freedom of
political activities from broader structural considerations. Both
critics point to a real theoretical problem - viz. that political
actions cannot be divorced from the rules, 'goals', and other
contextual constraints of the formal organisation - but they appear
determined to re-establish 'constraint' by theoretical definition
(structuralist, rationalist or formalist), which solution cannot
take the study of political process beyond the models outlined
earlier.
Such a criticism may. have some credibility in Dalton's case,
but in various articles and books, Burns demonstrates the immense
potential of the political action view when politics are seen as a
social force in a structural and historical context. For example,
Burns and Stalker (1961) analyse the articulation of political
actions and interactions with the technical and market forces which
circlli~scribe managerial life in electronics firms (see also the
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recent examination of the B.B.C., Burns, 1977).
In general, the political action approach may provide a
certain image of an unconstrained political process in organisations,
but this image is not a necessary characteristic of its conceptual
framework. Such an image arises because both Burns and Crozier
identify and investigate politics as conftict. If political
action occurs solely in the context of organisational conflict,
illustrations of politics so-conceived will tend to stress their
'overt change' or 'open resistance' aspects. There is also the
tendency to report political behaviour which successfully 'changed'
or 'resisted', thus underlining the apparent freedom of political
action from the constraints of the organisation's formal and social
structure. What is needed, to combat this image, is an interpretive
sociological analysis which gives constraint and structure a clear
theoretical role, but one which is compatible with the postulate of
voluntarism. Instead of retreating from a 'political action'
approach, as is implied by Crozier (1964) and Mouzelis (1975), such
an approach needs extending and strengthening to incorporate an
explicit image of the impossibilities of political action. This in
turn leads to the necessity of dealing with the politics of organis-
ational order, as well as of conflict (see Chapters Five and Six) .
This latter point points to another possible weakness in the political
action view.
The second consequence of this view, that politics is a
concrete process of social actions, also needs critical examination.
The political action approach provides a dynamic view of the organis-
ation as conflict-ridden and subject to changes internally created
by cliques and cabals. While Burns and Dalton suggest that
politics must necessarily be seen as a continual process whose dynamo
is the energy and effort of interested individuals and groups,
Mouzelis appears to suggest that this view is at the same time both
too dynamic and too concrete.
.. the organisational image which finally emerges
from Dalton's analysis, is a bewildering mosaic of
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swiftly changing and conflicting cliques .••"
(Mouzelis, 1975, p.159).
What is "bewildering" is presumably the shifting unstable
impression of political process that Dalton's research (but not
29It is not quite clear why the mosaic analogy is used, but Mouzelis
appears to have doubts about the processual image which Dalton
portrays.
Burns') provides. At one level Mouzelis' criticism is without
substance, because Dalton certainly does not merely concentrate on
"incessant intricacies and petty struggles" (Mouzelis, 1975., p.159)
at the expense of larger conflicts and power struggles - indeed the
"petty struggles" etc. are clearly treated by Dalton as concrete
examples of action within recurring problem areas and "larger
antagonisms" (see, for example, Dalton, 1959, p.4). However, the
above quotation from Mouzelis (1975) points towards the more serious
omission suggested above, viz. the failure to conceive of the organ-
isation as a politically accomplished order, as well as a conflict
arena and an ongoing process of change. Much of the theorising in
Part Three of my thesis is concerned with correcting this imbalance
of theoretical interest.
Instead of regressing to an externally-defined view of
politics in terms of p~wer structure or formal decision-making, as
Crozier (1964) and Mouzelis (1975) would appear to recommend theoret-
ically, I suggest that a fuller examination of the internal forces
at work within the political process is required. It is necessary,
for example, to develop the analysis of political strategy, not
merely as an adaptive mechanism to help participants adjust to
structural conditions (cf. Crozier, 1964), but as active componants
of political action (cf. Strauss, 1964; Martin and Sims, 1964).
Political strategies are important links between political action
and organisational structure and rationality.
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The political action framework provides for the study of
organisational conflict in terms of a process of clique behaviour
and shifting alliances. In pursuing this line of analysis it
is necessary to avoid oversimplifying the relationships between
politics as informal, non-legitimate behaviour and the formal
structure as a set of organisational constraints and between the
concrete processual and the abstract structural aspects of power
and conflict. Furthermore, since it is not sufficient to explain
the state of organisational order by assuming the influence of
stable structural constraints, we must apply the insights of Burns
and Dalton - who attend to politics as an internally sustained
process - to the problem of understanding order as well as conflict
as a political accomplishment.
Organisational Politics The Eclectic Approach3.2.4
(a) In the last three sections I have suggested that the
topic of organisational politics has been explicitly approached from
three different perspectives viz. the systems approach, the decision-
making approach, and the interpretive/action approach. Each approach
is distinctive in style and conceptual apparatus, although the first
two have in common general structuralist premises about and formalist
consequences for the theory of political behaviour. Other approaches
are less distinctive and more eclectic in their theoretical frame-
works, but most have focused on decision-making as the arena to be
studied 'politically', and have started from the 'coalition'
conception of Cyert and March. In this section I shall briefly
consider the most important example of eclecticism, viz. Pettigrew
(1973) .30.
The political model used by Pettigrew (1973) builds upon
most of the frameworks examined in the last two chapters. His
theory of organisational politics is ostensibly limited to the
process of decision-making, although he actually offers empirical
and theoretical insights far beyond that in scope. Pettigrew places
his research in the context of Simon, Cyert and March, but he is far
from happy with the
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" partial nature of the March and Simon ••• and
Cyert and March •.• theories". (Pettigrew, 1973,
p.273) .
His intention is to extend and complement these theories, and he
does this by drawing upon the structural-functionalism of the hori-
zontal power approach with its facets of exchange theory, as well
as the interpretive-sociological view just examined. More generally
still, the study involves the ad hoc usage of concepts and ideas
from all disciplines in the social sciences. The amazingly eclectic
framework that results has a plausibility which rests upon the appeal
to a multitude of traditions and upon a highly politicised theoret-
ical language. Given the breadth of theoretical and conceptual
language I think that it is both useful and necessary, if sense is
to be made of the framework, to distinguish between the 'theoretical
core' of the approach, and its 'theoretical and conceptual periphery'.
The former includes the conceptualisation and theory of the political
process whf.ch is embodied especially in his Chapter 2, while the
latter refers to those theories and concepts derived from various
sources just to add weight and legitimacy to an interpretation of
evidence. I shall be concentrating only on the theoretical core.
The focal point of Pettigrew's study is an "innovative"
decision to purchase a new computer, and the decision making process
unfolds through the behaviour of thrAe main groups of actors: the
technical specialists (computer programmers and systems analysts)
of Brian Michaels (the purchasing organisation), the same company's
board of directors, and the representatives of the competing computer
firms. In fact, Pettigrew effectively restricts his analysis to
the historico-structural conflicts between the political activities
of ·the technical specialists, who, through their authoritative
representatives, attempt to influence the decision.
The theoretical core of the study comprises an analysis of
organisational politics within the decision-making process as
comprising two interrelated processes: first, the generation and
processing of demands which arise from organisational subunits;
147
second, the generation of support for expressed demands, and the
application of this support to those responsible for taking the
decision.
Behaviour is political when it involves an attempt to
influence the "authoritative allocation" (after Easton, 1965) of
resources. Pettigrew starts from a structural-functional view
of the organisation as a set of interrelated subunits which, having
developed sectional identifications and interests, pursue their
interests by making claims (or demands) on the organisation's
resource-system. Since insufficient resources are available to
meet claims, subunits are pitched into conflict relations, but un-
like Cyert and March, this conflict situation is not resolved by
rationalistic devices. Subunits attempt to impress their wishes
upon organisational authorities, and thus upon their decisions, by
using the power they can amass to further their own ends and block
their rivals' ends.
The notion of power-mobilisation relates directly to the
second political process - the seeking, building and application of
support. The central concern in this process is with the strategic
use of power in support of demands, and this may be seen as a
considerable advance over the other approaches reviewed above.
Power derives from the structural-functional character of the organ-
isation, and accumulates through the possession of important
resources and the creation of dependency relationships; but such an
analysis of the sources of power is purely static, and it stops
short of an understanding of political process :
"Knowing what resources a group possesses does not
tell uS how it uses them. How a group uses its
resources, and with what consequences, will be a
major issue" (Pettigrew, 1973, p.139).
The central issue in politics is thus the active use and manipulation
of organisational resources and position to pursue sectional
interests.
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In summary, Pettigrew's theoretical framework is a
political-conflict model, and political actions are partly
determined by their historical context, partly by their structural
context, and partly by the purposive strategies of contesting
parties as they each deploy power resources to impress their will
upon those formally charged with making decisions with allocative
implications.
(b) Since Pettigrew's study is one of the very few
theoretical attempts in the literature to analyse the organisation
expressly in political terms for its own sake,31 and because it is
recent enough to have benefited from the approaches mentioned
above, it is worL~while assessing its contribution to the theory
of organisational politics.
It is firstly worth nothing that Pettigrew, ~n his analysis
of the power-and-conflict processes leading to the computer
purchase, takes decision-making theory beyond the rationalism of
Cyert and March; in his analysis of concrete informal processes
takes the study of organisational power and conflict beyond the
statics and rigidity of the structural-functionalist and systems
approaches; and in his analysis of the strategic use of power
within the political process, makes a substantial theoretical
advance on those rather undeveloped aspects of the political action
approach. Without wanti~g to criticise Pettigrew unfairly for his
perfectly acceptable choice of topic - which obviously needed to be
relatively narrowly-defined to aid research - I feel that this
topic, his conceptual and theoretical scope, his actual empirical
work and his general eclectic 'philosophy' tend to leave a number
of important questions unanswered. The six points that follow
should not be seen as detracting from the considerable advance made
by Pettigrew's efforts, but rather as abstracting from his research
some important matters that need elaboration in Part Three of this
thesis. First, the study is more-or-less restricted to 'horizontal'
politics; second, the theory is once again a political-conflict
model; third, the approach directs attention to the narrow field
of formal decisions; fourth, it is not clear how the notion of
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organisational politics is supposed to apply to other organis-
ational arenas; fifth, Pettigrew tends to reduce politics to
individual behaviour in his empirical work; and finally, it is
necessary to understand tile theoretical implications ofeclecti-
cism as a philosophy.
With regard to the first point, Pettigrew's analysis,
being dependent of an initial structural-functional view of organ-
isational power (see 3.1), reveals an image of political action as
being almost entirely between horizontal subunits. The conflict
between programmers and analysts constitutes the historico-
structural context for politics and little attention is given to
conflict and co-operation on the vertical dimension. This
approach reveals the bias examined above, but one can point to
Dalton's analysis of vertical cliques (Dalton, 1959, pp.58-60) to
illustrate the relevance of the hierarchy as a source of politics.
Pettigrew fails to examine the political relationships between
'head of department' level of the hierarchy and the levels above -
the board of directors - and those below - the programmers and
analysts themselves. This weakness is built into the theoretical
framework, where the board of directors (to take the most obvious
example) is given an almost independent, neutral role as authorit-
ative decision-makers who are to be lobbied, persuaded and cajoled
into supporting one demand or another. As a passive reflection
of the balance of power below, rather than as politically active,
partial participants who may themselves join political alliances
with powerful groups below them, the board of directors is detached
from the politics of decision-making - it appears that they make the
decisions, whilst the lower echelons manoeuvre politically. The
horizontal political behaviour of the department heads simply
reflects the two key processes of demand- and support-generation
and the possibility of interpreting a support-relationship (e.g.
Kenny-Brewster) as itself a political relationship, hence introducing
a vertical dimension of politics, is beyond the scope of the theory.
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The second pOint concerns the narrowness of building a
con~ict model of politics, a problem which has recurred in all
the approaches that have been examined. I shall be discussing
the implications of this in 3.3 and 4.1 below.
The problem of analysing politics purely in a formal
context has also been fully discussed above, especially in 3.2.3.
It need only be repeated that it is unduly stifling to restrict
politics to the study of formal decisions, such as a computer-
purchase decision. Furthermore the view of decision-making as
occurring within a neutral authoritative body to be democratically
lobbied by political contestants acting more-or-less within rules
acknowledging that body's rights and prerogatives, may be a neat
reflection of pluralistic political ideology (see 3.3), but for a
theory of organisational politics (or national politics) it can
hardly be held as a rigid assumption.
The non-political role of the board of directors in this
approach points to one organisational arena which, in Pettigrew's
theory, remains more-or-less unpoliticised; furthermore Pettigrew
only explicitly builds a theory of organisational politics that
relates to the formal deciSion-making arena. These two observations
lead to the fourth point of discussion viz. Pettigrew does not
clarify the extent of application to organisational life of a theory
of political process. He certainly limit~ the scope of the
conception of politics to the horizontal dimension, and to the
conflict phenomenon: but does he only see the process leading up
to the taking of formal organisational decisions as political? It
is important to extend the action of politics to other less
grandiose, but still significant arenas of organisational life.
Maybe Pettigrew does have a broader view than his study implies,
since, in his Preface, he makes the following observation :
"A visit to any factory tea-break, office lunch gathering,
or faculty meeting would seem to indicate that we are
all familiar with shop-floor or office politics and
bureaucratic gamesmanship" (Pettigrew, 1973, p.xv).
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The implication is clearly that one need not look to the highest
echelons of the organisation to study politics. Neither the
shop-floor, nOr the office have attracted much attention as
political arenas.
The fifth point concerns the individualism that enters
into Pettigrew's framework. Having been so critical of the
tendency for March and Simon and Cyert and March to 'psychologise'
decision-making processes (Pettigrew, 1973, p.22), it is somewhat
paradoxical that, once he has set the structural scene of power
and conflict, Pettigrew reduces the study of politics per se to
the level of individual behaviour. This amply illustrates
Pettigrew's eclectic ability to change theoretical horses mid-
stream (see the sixth point below), abandoning structuralism once
it has served its purpose, in order to give
"Particular emphasis .•• to the part played by
individuals in the structuring of social action
over time". (Pettigrew, 1973, p.31).
Pettigrew's 'political' analysis becomes essentially the study of
the computer-purchase decision as the outcome of the relationships
between three individuals "representing" the technical subunits.
Demands will of course tend to be expressed by individual represent-
atives, but Pettigrew does not analyse the political relationships
between these individuals and their 'constituents'. He considers
it necessary to refer to the triad's subordinates in the preliminary
analysis of the structure of power and conflict, but apparently
they played no part in the political process itself. We saw above
that the triad's superiors - specifically the board of directors -
were inert in the political process, their decision-making by
inference reflecting the patterns of dominance amongst the depart-
mental heads. Effectively, and in spite of the theory that
stressed the importance of acquiring political support in the organ-
isation, power to influence the decision was more or less concen-
trated in the hands of a few strategic individuals.
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It is pertinent to ask why Pettigrew ultimately locates
the political process in the triadic behaviour of three individuals.
At one level, of course, it is in the nature of field research to
perceive behaviour as emanating specifically from individuals, as
indeed it ultimately must do. Such a tendency however should be
resisted, as a sociological theory of organisational politics must
see its topic in its broader social context.
A second possible rationalisation of Pettigrew's resort to
individual behaviour derives from his research method of participant
observation. One of the important characteristics of political
conflict is that social actors tend to perceive and interpret
factors contributing to a political-conflict situation in personal
and emotional terms. Burns (Burns and Stalker, 1961, p.143 and
p.197), for example, notes the tendency for participants to
individualise or even psychologise broader conflicts. and problems.
Might it be that Pettigrew, as an accepted member of the Management
Services Department, simply reflected the commonly-held views (in
personalised form) of the political process? This line of enquiry
might be logically extended to answer another important question
left unanswered, viz. why does Pettigrew see his particular three
individuals as being at the heart of the political process, rather
than others? It is of course possible that Pettigrew's triad were
at the centre of political leverage with regard to the decision, but
it is also true that Pettigrew's position of observatioil actually
predisposed him to collect data mainly about his three main
characters. Possibly, had he concentrated on the subordinate groups
or the board of directors, they too could have been interpreted as
conducting active political manoeuvres. This point feeds back into
a number of queries raised earlier: it would seem that the nature
and scope of politics very much depends upon the organisational arena
observed, and it would appear foolhardy to presume that political
process belongs only to one arena, or one level of the hierarchy,
and so on; second, if the political quality of actions depends
on the ability of the researcher to focus clearly upon them from his
point of observation (both in terms of proximity to the actions and
in terms of the insights of his politically-involved informants), it
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is not surprising that the board of directors remained unpoliticised
as a decision-making arena.
At a theoretical level, the legitimacy of Pettigrew's resort
to the "individualisation" of organisational politics lies in his
explicitly eclectic approach, whereby it is not only seen as un-
problematic but also as a distinct advantage to draw upon concepts
and propositions from such widely varying approaches as inter-
pretive sociology and structural-functionalism. The broader impli-
cations of theoretical eclecticism need a brief comment, and this
constitutes the sixth and final pOint of discussion in this section.
An eclectic approach has a number of apparent advantages over
the various particular, often conflicting theories which prevail
within an area of research. First and foremost, the eclectic
clarify or elaborate observations of his own. This allows the
theorist can claim an academic legitimacy for his work by drawing
upon diverse traditions and receiving partial acclaim on all sides.32
An equally important benefit derives from the eclectic's ability to
invoke ideas and propositions from competing theories in order to
development of a broadly-based theoretical language that provides
both realism and support within the eclectic framework. Both the
academic legitimacy and the theoretical plausibility that accrue to
Pettigrew's approach are in a sense superficial, because he fails
to perform the theoretical work necessary to integrate the ideas he
borrows into a distinct, unified framework.
The superficial advantages of linguistic realism and theor-.
etical plausibility must be weighed against the more profound weak-
ness of Pettigrew's approach viz. he borrows concepts and propositions
from many traditions but fails to recognise that these concepts and
propositions carry with them assumptions and connotations that cannot
simply be overlooked. The strength of eclecticism lies in the
theoretical integration of diverse ideas; but quite often ideas and
traditions are merely combined or placed in conjunction with each
other rather than their underlying assumptions and rationales being
considered, assimilated and reconciled within the philosophical
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boundaries of a new and distinct framework. Pettigrew's eclect-
icism seems to reflect the former strategy which effectively sacri-
fices theoretical depth for the surface plausibility of linguistic
realism. Instead of providing a genuinely eclectic (i.e. inte-
grative) approach, Pettigrew creates a language of organisational
politics which has a certain casual elegance that simultaneously
conceals problems of a more profound theoretical nature.
Nowhere is this surface plausibility more explicit than in
the unrationalised combination of structural-functionalism and inter-
pretive sociology that I mentioned above. There is little attempt
to reconcile these approaches by reasoned argument under the auspices
of a clear set of premises; instead "integration" is accomplished
by keeping the different theoretical viewpoints apart. structural-
functionalism is applied to the examination of the sources of power,
and the interpretive approach is restricted to the uses of structurally-
based power. This "mosaic eclecticism", which accomplishes inte-
gration by separation, undermines the rational foundation of the
theoretical enterprise, and makes rather hollow Pettig~ew's
criticism of the 'political coalition' conception, that
" while smacking of realism, it lacks depth of
presentation". (pettigrew, 1973, p.22).
In short, a theory of ~rganisational politics must go beyond a
language of organisational politics, if it is to acquire a deeper
sense of empirical realism and theoretical validity.
3.3 The "Pluralist" Approach to Organisational Power and Politics
In Chapter Two, I argued that the theories of organisational
power and authority examined therein, which focused attention of
hierarchical power relations and the problem of order, could be
understood, in a general sense, as being mutually supportive and
compatible in the unitary conception of organisational power and
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politics. I am now in the position to abstract the view of
organisational power and politics theorised in the above
approaches, with their general concentration on the horizontal
dimension of power and their broad consensus about the 'political-
conflict' nature of organisational life. In this section I shall
briefly investigate links between this political-conflict view and
pluralism.
3.3.1 The Pluralist Image of Politics
The theoretical development that has emerged during the
last two chapters, from static models in which political order is
conceptually imposed or formally/constitutionally assumed, to
processual models providing a conflict image of politics is not
unique to the sociology of organisations. The change from the
static-order model to the processual-conflict model of politics
reflects a theoretical dynamic that is part of history in the three
larger arenas of social life - those of national politics, of
community politics, and of "industrial politics". In political
science, the abandoning of descriptive constitutional work in
favour of the analytical study of conflicting or competing interest
groups was largely accomplished in the 1950's (cf. Truman, 1958, for
the classic statement on interest group politics in the national
arena). The vogue for studies of community politics during the
1950's in many ways predated (in theoretical terms) the national
studies, and the development is not so clear because of the lack
of interest traditionally shown in this area. However, the con-
clusions of such studies, often emphasising the apparent wide
diffusion of power amongst conflicting interests in the community,
fed directly into the theory of the national political system.
This 'pluralistic' conception of the sociopolitical system proposed
a situation
" in which the power of the state is shared with a
large number of private groups, interest organis-
ations, and individuals represented by such organis-
ations". (Presthus, 1971, p.331; see also for
example, Dahl, 1961; Polsby, 1960).
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Accompanying the development of pluralism in the study of
the national and community political arenas, was its application
to the industrial sphere. Nowhere has this been clearer than in
industrial relations theory. The association of pluralism and
the industrial relations system has a fairly long history in the U.S.
(where, indeed, its strongest general proponants work) with the
work of Dubin (1954) and Kerr (1954, 1964) being overtly "liberal-
pluralist" (cf. Eldridge, 1973). Before 1960, 'industrial
relations' in Britain was more-or-less historical and constitutional-
descriptive in its scope. Partly because British work in this area
suffered a general lack of 'theory' (cf. Wood and Elliott, 1977,
p.l06), itself related to a feeling that the practical area of
33industrial relations should r61-nainfirmly "on the ground" , the
advocacy of a general framework only emerged in the 1960's. The
accepted framework was explicitly pluralist, the best-known statement
of which belongs to Fox (1966).
Although his interests are firmly rooted in the broader
industrial sphere of employer-employee relations, and the purposes
of his article is to propose a realistic 'frame of reference' for
management, the general elements of the political-conflict model that
has emerged in this chapter are clearly recognisable in Fox's plural-
istic view of the industrial enterprise
" an industrial organisation is made up of
sectional groups with divergent interests •••"
(FOX, 1966, p.4)
"The participation of organised labour [for our
purposes, subunitsJ in decision-making means that
managerial prerogatives are thereby curbed."
(FOX, 1966, p.7).
" management has to face the fact that there are
other sources of leadership, other focuses of
loyalty, within the system it governs, and that it
is with these that management must share its
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decision-making ••• It follows from this that
conflict is endemic to industrial organis-
ation" (Fox, 1966, p.8).
" [The acceptance of this pluralistic reality
allows] ••• for the development of more sophis-
ticated bargaining techniques designed to recon-
cile management and work-group interests at a
higher level of mutual advantage". (Fox, 1966,
p.10).
It would appear that the theory of organisational politics, based
upon a political-conflict model, more-or-less reflects the plural-
istic image of political systems.
3.3.2 Pluralism and Political-Conflict Models
It is immensely naive to speak of pluralism as one frame-
work, since it inevitably involves a number of variants according
to the assumptions upon which it is based (cf. Playford, 1971,
p.365ff.). Similarly, while all the approaches to organisational
politics as outlined above do share a concern for the politics of
conflict relationships, they differ in other significant aspects.
In the ~ollowing pages I intend to treat the 'political ~oalition'
conception, the 'political subsystem" conception and the 'eclectic'
conception as if they formed a "dominant" political-conflict model
i.e. explicitly or implicitly, as theories of organisational
politics which they generate are in certain essentials equivalent.
Furthermore I shall argue that they constitute a variant of the
general theme of pluralism. The 'political action' view, which
differs in certain significant respects (e.g. the non-legitimacy
of cliques and clique behaviour) may be treated as a less restrictive
variant of pluralism.
The dominant political-conflict model as a variant of
pluralism may be formulated as having several characteristics.
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The first of these characteristics is frequently taken as the
defining feature of pluralism viz. that the organisation creates
by its very logic a system of conflicting power groups each pur-
suing its own sectionalist interests and together resulting in a
balance of power (cf. Fox, 1966, p.4; Fox, 1973, p.192 ff.;
Presthus, 1971, p.335; Playford, 1971, p.365 ff.; Eldridge, 1973,
p.159; Miliband, 1973b, p.5). The structural-functional analysis
of power and dependence and of conflict and differentiation leads
directly to a view of conflicting functional groupings (cf. Zald,
1970, p.242; Pettigrew, 1973, p.17; Hickson et al., 1971, p.2l7;
Abell, 1975, pp.11-12), whereas Cyert and March's non-structural
theory of coalition formation is equally explicit (March, 1962,
pp.672-673) •
Second, there exists the direct concern with formal decision-
making, and the stress on "key" decisions (cf. Dahl, 1971, p.359;
see Lukes, 1974, p.13) which is reflected in the dominant political-
conflict model, with its focus of organisational decisions and goals
of a formal kind (see 3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.2.4 above). Third, the
parties who participate ,do so within the generally agreed set of
rules and procedures which provide a formal arena for conflict
resolution and decision-making. This acceptance of the constit-
utional rules and procedures (cf. Fox, 1973, pp.196-197; Playford,
1971, p.364; Presthus, 1971, pp.335-336; Zald, 1970, p.225ff.;
Cyert and March, 1959, p.E4; Abell, 1975, p.17) Lezds to the
consideration of interest groups as legitimate within that frame-
work of rules (cf. Playford, 1971, p.368, and his quotation from
Dahl, same page). Within the organisational sphere, legitimacy
(and, by the way, rationality) is attributed to groups according to
their functional position. This acceptance of the constitutional
framework reflects a desire on the part of all interest groups to
ensure mutual survival (Fox, 1966, p.4; Wood and Elliott, 1977,
p.110 ff.; Crozier, 1964, p.107).
The last of the characteristics of the dominant political-
conflict model would appear to be the least general, and points to
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a particular variant of pluralism. In this variant there exists
a top echelon of management or administration, but while
" those in high places may appear to have
great power ••• in reality they are only
mediators among conflicting interests for
whose power and support they must continually
bargain" • (Presthus, 1971, p.332).
Whereas Pres thus speaks of this top level as "disinterested
umpires" (ibid.), Playford proposes an analogous "referee version"
of pluralism (Playford, 1971, PP.369-371).34 In the dominant
political-conflict model, Cyert and March's executives as 'political
brokers', Zald's "authoritative office holders" (Zald, 1970,
p.243), and Pettigrew's board of directors play this neutral role
(cf. also Crozier, 1964, p.163), which Miliband describes for the
national level as follows :
holds up to itself". (Miliband, 1973b, p.6).
" the state is only the mirror which society
In brief, the dominant political-conflict model suggests a version
of pluralism in which conflicting functional subunits compete within
an accepted framework of rules in order to influence the decision-
making body by a p.roceus akin to political lobbying.
In Chapters Two and Three I have examined the politics-
related literature on organisations by considering in detail how
social scientists have academically theorised organisational power
and politics. Two major types of approach have emerged, cate-
gorised as "unitary" and "pluralist", each concentrating on
theorising the topic in terms, respectively, of political order
and of political conflict. In Chapter Six and in Part Three, I
shall be developing this order-conflict distinction as one concept-
ual theme that can inform the interpretive analysis of organisational
power and politics. In Chapter Four, the emphasis will be on extra-
polating a second conceptual theme based upon Bachrach and Baratz's
(1971) distinction between the "two faces of power".
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NOTES
Chapter Three
1. In Chapter Nine I shall develop a concept of political
strategy, but its role is not restricted to being
adaptive to organisational circumstances.
2. In this context Clegg (1975, p.50ff.) has certainly mis-
represented Crozier, who does not "thoughtlessly deploy"
Dahl's concept. It is doubtful whether this reference
to Dahl is any more than the casual obligatory acknowledge-
ment of Dahl's work. Crozier might borrow Dahl's defin-
ition as a starting point, but his effective conception
of power is somewhat different. This is not to say
that there is 'Ul.derlying unity' of Crozier's and Dahl's
views in some other more abstract sense - such a unity
assuredly does not stem from the former's use of the
latter's definition (see 4.2).
3. This has become a key proposition of that organisational
approach called "contingency thecry" in the U.S. and "task
analysis" in the U.K. cf . Thompson (1967); Lawrence and
Lorsch (1967); Perrow (1967); Perrow (1970a); Woodward
(1970) • Abell (1975) has attempted to develop a power
approach to organisations from this base _. see 3.2.2.
4. The thesis relating power to dependence has been developed
by Emerson (1962, 1964) and has become incorporated in
exchange theory as a general criterion for the emergence
of power (Blau, 1964, p.118ff.). See 1.2.1 above. On
functional autonomy, see the classic paper by Gouldner
(1975) •
5. Peterson (1970, pp.92-93), in his comments on Perrow's
paper, rhetorically asks whether the results of a reput-
ational study of power would correspond to those of some
other (say, behavioural) study. In a recent methodolog-
ical note, pennings (1973/4), on the related topic of
organisation structure, performs a comparison of 'objective'
and 'subjective' methods. He concludes that there do arise
discrepancies between the pictures of the organisation which
throw serious doubts upon the comparability of different
methods.
6. Perrow does make an intuitive statement about how groups
can use their position and power to sustain that power
independent of "natural" causes - a so-called "distortion
thesis" - but this interesting insight is entirely without
theoretical status in his approach (1970, p.67).
7. There appears to be a very close relationship between this
formulation and the classic functional conception of power
as expressed by Dubin (1960, pp.506-507). The idea of
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7. (cont'd)
irreplaceability ('substitutability' in Hickson et al.,
1971, pp.220-221) is clearly related to Dubin's dimension
of 'exclusiveness', and 'centrality' has its parallel in
Dubin's 'importance' of a function.
8. As a corollary, it could be noted that a hint of social
legitimacy is provided by the reference to "some selection
of role definers". Since the only members of an organis-
ation who would almost by definition subscribe unproblem-
atically to the (social) legitimacy of institutional
authority, are organisational designers and those top
decision-makers whose positions are underpinned by such
authority, we may conclude that these 'role definers' are
a minority group and their legitimation cannot be assumed
to indicate a normative authority.
9. Zald effectively argues that the political and economic
aspects of the organisation enjoy some kind of theoretical
priority over other aspects, which makes the concentration
on them more efficient and illuminating (1970, p.255).
Such a narrowing of focus overcomes the diffuseness of the
general systems approach. It is distinctly probable that
Parsons would agree with this focus in the case of formal
organisations, which, after all, by his own recommendation,
are characterised by a "••• primacy of orientation to the
attainment of a specific goal" (1956, p.64).
10. Cahill and Goldstein (1964) develop a similar view of the
political process, but choose to focus on the individual's
relationship to it.
11. The systems approach seems to be especially prone to this
sort of problem because it purports to account for social
life at all levels of analysis. Parsons has frequently
been accused of slipping unconsciously between analytical
and concrete statements, as when he apparently USes inter-
changeably"the notions of 'social system' and 'society';
or when he tr~ats his four functional areas as units of
concrete behaviour.
12. Gouldner (1954), in his discussion of the theoretical impli-
cations of his gypsum mine study, distinguishes be tween
types of bureaucracy, according to the interests served by
different patterns of rules. His 'punishment-centred.
bureaucracy', based on formal rules which serve one party's
interests at the expense of another's, would appear to be
a pertinent example of how an apparently neutral pattern of
rules can become the focus of overt dispute, as well as
political leverage (see also 9.3).
13. Zald (1970, p.245) misleadingly refers to the internal
political structure. It is patently clear from his
discussion of centralised and decentralised structures
(pp.243-4) that he is referring to constitutionally-
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13. (cont'd)
defined power structures, i.e.' institutional authority.
14. Burns (1969) and Dalton (1959, Chapter 6) - see 3.2.3
below - conceive the career structure of the organisation
as being an important sOurce of political motivation.
Equally, both of these theorists see the problem of
managerial succession as raising essentially political
questions, rather than following formally-established
procedures unproblematically. (cf. Burns and Stalker,
1961, p.221).
15. The logic of this approach is sociologically investigated
in the broader societal context by Berger and Luckmann
(1971,78ff.). These authors refer to three "moments"
of the social process, internalisation, externalisation
and objectivation. Cyert and March imply that organis-
ational goals are created by participants' interaction
(externalisation) and these goals then take on a semi-
permanent character as they are objectified by processes
of institutionalisation (Cyert and March, 1963, pp.32ff.).
'Objectified' goals may then be considered as relatively
independent of the actors who created them, hence possessing
a truly organisational character.
16. Abell's work on organisations as "influence and bargaining
systems" (1975) shows some similarities to Cyert and March's
model of collective decision-making. Derived from Wood-
ward's "task analysis approach", Abell develops a model of
intraorganisational power based upon similar theoretical and
methodological assumptions to those of Cyert and March.
Thus, bargaining power is a conflict phenomenon (Abell,
1975, p.ll) concerning a "dominant coalition" (ibid.) of
influential actors who participate in a plurality of inter-
secting, normatively constrained, bargaining zones (Abell,
1975, p.33). Through a process of influence, b~rgaining
and compromise, they shift (accommodate) their beliefs (Le.
"preferred outcomes") and move unproblematically towards
consensual collective decisions. These theoretical simil-
arities are complemented by Abell's "operationalist"
(globalist and empiricist) philosophy which recommends a
methodology similar to Cyert and March's (and Simon's)
behaviourism (cf. Abell, 1975, p.13ff.).
Since general structuralism and operationalism are well
represented in Part One, little is added to the arguments
by a detailed consideration of Abell's work. As will be
apparent from the brief sketch above, his arguments fit well
into the pluralist type of approach.
17. Incidentally, Cyert and March fail to explain how environ-
mental constraints operate on the political process of
organisations to permit "viable" coalitions but prevent
others.
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18. This is again a consequence of behaviourist assumptions,
whereby inaction is taken to indicate "satisfaction",
"legitimacy", and "positive" acceptance. See 2.1.3.
19. A similar sort of rationalism permeates Abell's (1975)
operationalist account of influence and bargaining power.
It is remarkable, to say the least, that political inter-
actions in "... complex - very complex [Sic] - decision-
making structures ..• " (Abell, 1975, Preface) may be
rendered as follows :
"••• the MPOs[i.e. modd.fLed preferred outcomes]
are a linear additive function of the multi-
plicative interaction between IPOs [i.e. initial
preferred outcomes] and the subjective saliencies".
(Abell, 1975, p.19).
Such, it appears, is the "very complex" richness -
algebraic convenience? - of political life.
20. The rationalism of this approach finds its logical extreme
in the example that Cyert and March use to illustrate
coalition behaviour i.e. the selection by a nine-man committee
of a painting for the village hall (1963, p.31). This
decision is reached by rationally collating expressed
preferences (see also Cahill and Goldstein, 1964, p.364ff.).
In this example, as in their theory of the organisational
coalition, Cyert and March fail to analyse how fairly
obvious political matters may influence the choice process
e.g. preferences may not be constant but subject to influence
by other more powerful members; or the decision process may
be influenced by historico-emotional factors influencing
alliances.
21. Cyert and March do not explain what this means, or who the
"few" parts are, or what distinguishes the few from the
many in terms of the organisation, or in terms of their
political behaviour.
22. Because of this focus, I see these approaches as studying
politics as organisational actiOn, in the Weberian sense.
23. We have noticed in Part One so far, how the inability to
distinguish power from institutional (formal) authority has
often led to a rigidity of conception that deprives the
theorist of many political aspects of the organisational
process.
25. Burns himself rejects the argument that cultural differences
are a causal influence, suggesting that they are created as
subgroups attempt to rationalise a conflict situation by
attributing attitudinal and cultural differences to rivals
24. See, for example, Geiger's comments (Dalton, 1959,
pp.78-79.
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25. (cont'd)
(Burns and Stalker,1961, pp.139-140). On a priori
grounds, one might suspect that both propositions are
partially correct.
26. It should be noted that the 1955 paper is not explicitly
written in a political context, but it is not very distant
in theoretical terms from the later work.
27. Gore (1956, p.289) also conceives of a 'clique' in a quasi-
political sense. Bucher (1970, p.34) resorts to the notion
of a 'coalition' but conceives of it in terms of a "shifting
alliance" - very reminiscent of Dalton's political
conception.
28. It could be argued that Burns' analysis of the organisation
as a plurality of systems (1969), by stressing politics as
belonging to a distinct 'system', contradicts his insight
that politics should be seen as the 'colour' of a piece of
action, and hence places the theory back in a systems frame-
work. However in treating systems a 'social Gestalten'
(1969, p.247), Jr an interpretive system, Burns renews
his action orientation.
29. This mosaic analogy would seem to imply a static "bitty"
or compartmentalised view of the organisation, whereas
Dalton provides (and this is what Mouzelis sees as Dalton's
contribution) a very dynamic, highly interrelated or
'criss-cross' image of shifting alliances and of clique
membership.
30. Another example of such eclecticism is the work of Harvey
and Mills (1970). They combine the insights of Cyert and
March's approach, with a structural analysis reminiscent of
Perrow (1970b) and Hickson et al. (1971).
31. More empirical approaches have focused upon organisational
(e.g. "factory") politics, and these will be drawn into my
arguments in Part Three. I am thinking particularly of
Beynon, 1973; Nichols and Armstrong, 1976; Nichols and
Beynon, 1977.
32. It does, of course, work the other way as well, when a
theorist of one persuasion finds his ideas in conjunction
with those which he may consider to be alien.
33. For a lucid exposition of the fallacies underlying this view
of the relationship between pragmatism and theory, see
Eldridge, 1975.
34. Another variant treats the state (or government) as just one
of the many interest groups competing with each other.
This would appear to be a general theme in the pluralistic
approach to industrial relations (cf. FOx, 1966).
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CHAPTER FOUR
ORGANISATIONAL POWER ITS NEGLECTED FACE
4.1. Beyond Pluralism and Political-Conflict
4.1.1 Political Order and Political Conflict as Organisational
Orthodoxy
In Chapters Two and Three, I investigated in depth a number
of approaches which, by virtue of the topics they address and the
concepts with which they operate, appeared to have something to say
about organisational power and politics. In these contributions to
the literature I have discerned two types of approach which together
seem to constitute a conventional orthodoxy. The "unitary" and
"pluralist" types of approach in turn produce one major conceptual
theme - of order and conflict as political phenomena - which requires
development in Part Three. In the present chapter I shall be
examining the main thrust against the organisational orthodoxy, this
thrust being embodied in what can be seen as a "radical" critique
of the pluralist view of politics. I shall first be introducing the
general lines of critical argument, and, in 4.2 and 4.3 below, looking
at the one piece of research to apply the critique systematically to
the organisational field, viz. Clegg (1975; 1977). In the final
section 4.4) I shall abstract from the discussion a second conceptual
theme - symbolised by the so-called "two faces of power" - which will
be carried forward into Part Three as a basis for theoretical develop-
ment.
The organisational orthodoxy referred to above incorporates
the 'hierarchical' theories of political order (Chapter Two) and
the 'horizontal' theQries of political conflict (Chapter Three).
The former approach provides an implicit view of organisational power
and politics in terms of a static, given state of order and consensus.
In this view, knowledge of the formal aspects of the organisation
(goals, rules, institutional authority etc.) is sufficient to under-
stand how the organisation achieves a (rational) state of order.
Seeing the organisation as possessing
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" a unified authority and loyalty structure,
with managerial prerogative being legitimised by
all members of the organisation" (Fox, 1973, p.186)
these theories share with Fox's famous concept of managerial ideol-
ogy, unitary assumptions about organisational behaviour, the conse-
quence of which is to de-emphasise conflict, or, indeed, its possi-
bility. By imposing order by assumption or neglect, it further fails
to see stability and consensus as processual, socially created,
phenomena.
The horizontal theories of organisational power and politics
see Chapter Three - allow and encourage a view of their topic in
explicitly conflict terms. During the last chapter it was evident
that the 'political-conflict' model of the organisation has become
rather an academic consensus among those theorists who have concerned
themselves with the politics of organisational life. Although not
reducible to one theory, the contributions in question share certain
characteristics - e.g. conflict as politics; study of concrete
decision-making; equilibrium assumptions - that group them together
as variants of 'pluralism'.
At the end of Chapter Three, I related this development of
organisational order and conflict approaches to the theoretical move-
ment in the political analYSis of broader social arenas. This
movement from 'unitary' to 'pluralist' views of power and politics
reflects a change not only in the dominant ideology of organisational
control - Fox's concern - but also in the dominant mode of academic
theorising about organisational control.
4.1.2 The 'Radical' Critique of Pluralism
While the analysis of political behaviour in organisations
has become increasingly based upon pluralist assumptions about organ-
isational reality, this same set of assumptions regarding the
political arena at the national, community and industrial levels has
more recently been subjected to an extremely cogent and pervasive
critique.
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The critique of pluralism, which emerged historically in
the pluralist versus elitist dispute (cf. Dahl, 1971; Mills,
1956), finds its most articulate expression in the 'two faces of
power' thesis of Bachrach and Baratz (1971; 1963; other critics
such as Wolff (1965), Miliband (1973b) and Lukes (1974), extend the
basic critique in various ways) • Just as this critique was reaching
its most sophisticated level of statement with respect to national
and community politics, British sociologists of industrial relations
were becoming unhappy with the (by then) orthodoxy of Fox's
pluralism. Fox himself (1973; 1974a) has led the way by arguing
that the apparently greater realism of the pluralistic view is in
fact only a surface realism, and goes on to propose that a more
"radical" view with greater depth of argument and less dependence
1on "what we know" culturally is an essential precondition to under-
. . 2stand~ng the reality of industrial relat~ons (see also Eldridge,
1973; Goldthorpe, 1974). However, the intellectual and emotional
commitments that the postulate of pluralism has created amongst
political scientists, political sociologists, and industrial relations
theorists, have not much permeated organisational sociology.
The general critique has operated at two levels - of
It is true that these two aspects of
pluralism cannot be treated in isolation of each other, since the
ideology and of reality.
"
creation of myths as powerful symbols or the
ability to use them as between conflicting parties
is part of the warp and woof of industrial relations
[in our context, organisational l:i,.feJII (Eldridge,
1975, p.10).
However I shall be mostly concerned with assessing pluralism as a
rea~istic theory of organisational politics.
The political-conflict or pluralist approach does provide a
more realistic and more plausible (sociologica~ly) view of organis-
ational politics than the static 'u~itary' view, which assumes more
than it explains, but it does not go far enough. Its realism and
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plausibility still rests on a number of assumptions which overlook
more profound issues of central significance to understanding the
shape and nature of politics in organisations in Western industrial
society. It has become fashionable to refer to critiques of
pluralism, and the alternative view of politics which they offer
as "radical" (cf. Fox, 1973; Lukes, 1974; Wood and Elliott, 1977),
both because the political-evaluative connotations of the arguments
reflect basically Marxist premises, and because they attack the
theoretical roots of the prevailing orthodoxy.
Before moving to the only attempt to apply this radical
critique to organisational studies of power and politics, I shall
briefly consider the nature of its theoretical rebuttal of pluralism.
The essence of the argument is that the focus of pluralism upon
expressed conflict amongst interest (functional) groups neglects the
inherent structural and cultural forces underpinning, and indeed
defining, the political arena, and in so neglecting inevitably (i.e.
by virtue of its own theoretical and methodological logic/bias) en-
capsulates only the superficial politics of the system and simul-
taneously reflects and reinforces the dominant ideology of the status
quo. Power is wielded, in other words, through theinbuilt character-
istics - structural and cultural - of the political arena, because
any organisation, with its institutionalised procedures, mechanisms
and principles, is biased towards its own perpetuity. This is the
central issue raised by' Schdttschneider's famous 'mobilisation of
bias' concept, which Bachrach and Baratz (1971, p.380) have used so
effectively in the community power debate. This conservative bias,
which is part of the "organisation" and can be studied as the
second - and neglected - face of power, is partly why the powers-that-
be rarely need to make a concrete show of strength, thereby contri-
buting to the pluralistic, competitive image of politics :
" [one] •.• reason why the powerful rarely need to make
their power visible and obvious is that all the
social institutions which it is essential for
them to have accepted and legitimised are accepted
and legitimised already and COme under no serious
threat". (FOX, 1973, p.209).
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The issue of the (social) legitimacy3 of these institutions
raises cultural and ideological questions about the foundations of
the politics of order and consensus. People acquire their atti-
tudes and values towards politics and organisational participation
through their experiences of society and its institutions, and
education, the mass media and other socialising agents are themselves
subject to the same bias. As Fox again argues,
" their [i.e. the powerful's] very power affords
them the facilities for creating and maintaining
social attitudes and values favourable to that
acceptance". (ibid. )
This problem requires a critical analysis of how institutions influence
members of society such as to maintain the "ideological predominance"
of the pO\'lerful (Miliband, 1973b, p.162 et passim) - and how
" the dominant values and political myths, rituals
and institutions ••. favour the vested interests of
one or more groups, relative to others" (Bachrach
and Baratz, 1971, p.382).
It also opens us the rather delicate issue, inherited from Marx,
concerning the distinction between 'false' and 'true' consciousness.
The problem of the power of ideology, and its self-fulfilling
properties, feeds back into the radical assessment of pluralism it-
self, which in reflecting the surface appearance of power and
political-conflict, reinforces both the myth (from which it
partially derives) and the 'reality' which it purports to describe
(and must so describe because of its own theoretical and methodolog-
. 1 .) 4~ca prem~ses •
In some ways, the 'radical' critique of pluralism directs
attention back to the issues of the 'pre-pluralist' era, by stressing
the forces of social and organisational order which inhere in the
(socially legitimate) constitutional framework of rules and duties.
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The major difference is that the radical view encourages a depth
analysis of the socio-political processes whereby order and con-
sensus are achieved, whereas the unitary view establishes order
and consensus either by fiat or by default. This concern for
order can, however, lead to a neglect of manifest social conflict,
which is frequently dismissed (by implication) as illusory or in-
significant by virtue of it having no tangible effect on the power
and social structure of the society or organisation. Needless to
say, this does not constitute a sufficient reason, sociologicallYl
for omitting reference to manifestations of political conflict, it
merely serves to warn against unreflectively giving the latter
significance and qualities it might not possess.
Another problem with the radical view of power and politics
as it has developed to date, is the confusion between personal power
and structural constraint. This dilemma haunts many radical
theorists and finds its most lucid expression in the Miliband-
5Poulantzas debate. Given the postulate of voluntarism - the
inviolable premise of this thesis - it is essential for the develop-
ment of an interpretive sociological analysis of organisational
politics to reject with Miliband (1973a) what he has called
II 1 • • ,,6structura~ superdeterm~nlsm • Equally, care must be taken not
to retreat into a form of idealism - a theory of organisational
politics without a notion of constraint is as meaningless as one
whose actors are the
II merest functionaries and executants of
policies imposed upon them by 'the system'"
(Miliband, 1973a, p.31l).
To accept this latter state is effectively to have turned the full
circle from a 'unitary' theory, to 'pluralism', and back to 'unitary'
theory - albeit underpinned by a politically radical critique.
The radical critique of pluralism needs to be examined in
an organisatinal context, and Clegg's recent theoretical and empirical
study of organisational power on a building-site (Clegg, 1975) allows
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such a critical evaluation to have an academic focus. His approach
is particularly apposite because of his expressed interpretive
sociological interests.
4.2 Clegg's "Critical Understanding" of Organisational Power
4.2.1 Introductory Remarks
In this and the following section I shall be specifically
interested in explaining and assessing Stewart Clegg's "critical"
approach to organisational power (1975; 1977), which embodies the
burden of the radical critique of pluralism. Clegg's contribution
to the analysis of organisational power is profoundly important not
only because of his specific incorporation of the radical critique,
but also because he generally raises in the organisational context
social scientific issues and debates that have hitherto been
avoided by researchers in this field. In considering one particular
strand of academic theorising about organisational power - what I
have called "interdepartmental power" - Clegg (1977, p.27) comments
with some surprise on the isolation of such an approach from the commun-
ity power debate.
"One consequence of this has been the uncritical
application of a concept of 'power' which has been
subject to extensive crit.icism" (ibid.) •
In this quotation, Clegg is referring to the oversight of Bachrach
and Baratz's "two faces of power" thesis (1971, 1963; see also Lukes,
1974) . His theoretical and empirical aim is to present a view of
organisational power which delves beneath the superficial description
of political conflict normally associated with the pluralist approach,
in order to discover the "second", "deep", "structural" face of power
that has been neglected by conventional "vulgar" organisation theory
(Clegg, 1977, p.31).
In the following pages I shall be arguing that Clegg's
contribution to the study of organisational power and politics revolves
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around the nature of the issues he raises rather than in the
solutions he recommends; further, in Chapter Six, I shall suggest
that these issues may be construed as being generally complementary
to those raised by the Burns/Dalton political action approach.
In order to understand Clegg's view of organisational power (and
politics), it is necessary - as it has been for all theories
investigated in Part One - to reveal the ways in which the concept
has been effectively deployed in his theorising.
One's academic theorising is, in part at least, a dialogue
with one's own "theoretic form of life" (Clegg, 1975, p.36 ff.);
however, as one might expect from a sociologist claiming a
phenomenological disposition (Clegg, 1975, p.viii) but having a
veritable structuralist task, the traditions which constitute
Clegg's theoretic form of life are quite diverse. It is his read:i.:ng
of Bachrach and Baratz, Wittgenstein,ethnomethodology and Weber
that informs his arguments on organisational power, and these various
strands are held together by a common thread - a depth analogy.
4.2.2 The Depth Analogy and the Critique of Pluralism
In spite of taking a different line of argument, Clegg's
analysis of interdepartmental studies of power suggests, as does
my own, that their implicit view of their topic shows a startling
resemblance to that promulgated by pluralists - in particular,
pluralists in Dahl's behavioural tradition. Clegg argues that such
researchers (e.g. Crozier, 1964; Hickson et al., 1971) have been
misled by their concentration on surface behavioural displays of
power in conflict relationships into overlooking the deep structural
grounds which make those displays possible in the first place.
Following Bachrach and Baratz (1971), Clegg seeks to study organis-
ational life - or at least, excepts from it - in order to reveal
those structural principles which enable the exercise of power.
This is a concern, not with concrete displays of power - its first
face as reflected in studies of interdepartmental power and conflict -
but with the second, hitherto neglected face of organisational power:
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"••• [Bachrach and Baratz' ~ critiqU~ demands an account
of the 'rationality' of power in whatever scene is
under study, a rationality under whose domination
issues become a transparently 'ruled' phenomenon.
Such a perspective would not propose that the power
displayed in anyone exchange was a chance.outcome
of that exchange alone, but would instead look at its
possibility" (Clegg, 1975, p.54).
This argument - that the variety of surface behavioural
displays urges explanation in terms of a deep structure (rationality)
which allows for such displays while simultaneously ruling out a
wide range of never-displayed, never-considered behaviour - exempli-
fies a number of traditions in structuralism from anthropology to
linguistics, and Clegg intends to apply its logic to his topic in
order to represent the 'two faces of power' thesis. Instead of
implicitly conceiving power in organisations as a series of apparently
ungrounded (i.e. free-floating or structurally 'random') games of
managerial influence, Clegg suggests that organisational power -
the capacity to exercise which is structurally governed - is
exerted over issues routinely and unreflectively ruled 'proper'
and 'significant' by virtue of their rationality in terms of the
organisation's raison d'etre. Some issues simply are not raised
as matters for political debate and competition, and such 'non issues',
and the 'nondecision-makins' which leads to their ab~ence, are part
of organisational politics in spite of their behavioural invisibility
(cf. Bachrach and Baratz, 1971; 1963; also Frey, 1971).
Clegg enlists Wittgenstein in order to help resolve two
problems in his thesis : first, in the assessment of academic
theories of organisational power, and their relative status vis-a-vis
the reality they purport to understand; second, in the analysis of
his empirical conversational data (i.e. 'lay' theorising) from which
he attempts to abstract a picture of structural power. Again,
it is the depth analogy, applied to Wittgenstein's concepts of
"language-games" and "form of life" which attaches the philosopher
to Clegg's cause.
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Theorising, whether academic or lay, may be understood as
a language-garne, ruled and patterned by communally accepted
conventions ('grammar') which render acts of theorising sensible
and coherent (Clegg, 1975, p.32 ff.). Theorising qua language
game - like power displays and other concrete acts - cannot be
understood as the creation of the occasion (as many ethnomethodol-
ogists recommend), but must make reference to those community rules,
conventions and customs (academic traditions, for the social
SCientist) which ma~e observed acts of theorising possible (and
others impossible)
"Theoretically, we can constitute both our own
theoretic endeavours, and those of everyday
theorisers, as language garnes of a possible
society which attain their rationality from
an organising iconic form of life". (Clegg,
1975, p.38).
In other words, the deep structural principles which enable language
games to be as they are, belong to Wittgenstein's concept of "form
of life". The latter is normally so routine, so mundane and taken-
for-granted, that its enabling characteristics - like the second face
of power - has been neglected by all methodologies which insist on
comprehending theory and talk as surface displays of action.
With this understanding, Clegg examines the first problem
referred to above, viz. how to assess 'competing' academic theories
(and concepts) of power. He identifies an underlying unity between
academic theorising about organisational power and pluralism in
general (Clegg, 1975, p.50). This arises because such theorising
constitutes a variety of moves in a language game which is unified,
not necessarily by a visibly common set of categories, but by being
groundedin the same tradition, the same unreflective ways of 'doing'
organisation theory, the same theoretic form of life.
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"The differences of the [organisation] texts, the
variables deployed, the arguments used, these are
only explicable as moves in a language game whose
implicit differences are rooted in a deep sameness
of one tradition of discourse, that of positive,
positivist speaking and writing" (Clegg, 1977, p.28).
The theoretic form of life gives the diverse acts of theorising a
rationality which binds them together for a common pOint and
puxpose - the form is life is thus "iconic".
existence of deeper structural vari~e. Clegg goes to great lengths
Having said this, the real differences in theorising that
occur, as in the hotly disputed community power debate, suggest the
with unbelievable complexities of conceptual discussion to show
the fairly simple point that the controversy of the pluralist/
elitist struggle lies in conflicting traditions and rationalities
(forms of life), which deploy different grammars and apply different
criteria for ascribing truth.
Possibly more important is the way Clegg uses Wittgenstein's
terminology to suggest a method for retrieving a picture of the
neglected face of power from the recorded conversations of organis-
ational participants. In his interpretation of Bachrach and
Baratz (see above) and of ~'1eber(see 4.2.3), Clegg suggests that
power is grounded in a rationality with which the dominant 'form of
life' of the organisation is imbued; as we have seen, lay or every-
day talk/theorising also, unthinkingly, reflects the point and
purpose (form of life) of participants' existence in that organis-
ation. It is subsequently possible to examine conversational data
in order to discover the ratinality, the icon of organisational
life, which underlies the actions of participants. This rationality
not only gives pOint and purpose to 'talk' in organisations, but also
determines 'significant' issues and distributes the prior capacity to
exercise power i.e. it reflects the second face of power.
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Only one problem remains, if this argument is valid - how
to bring to the surface of language games that which is "bed-
rock", taken-for-granted? Ethnomethodologists have built their
discipline upon the study of the routine, unquestioned occurrences,
and they recommend that the "background expectancies" which sustain
the 'normal' flow of social events may be examined by interrupting
the latter. Following this advice, Clegg exploits a 'natural'
fracture of organisational life, whereby participants perceived
the organisation as a "failure". By investigating the nature of
this 'failing' Clegg abstracts from talk about it, an image of what
the organisation should be. Such a culturally shared image of what
a "good", "rational" organisation is, may thus be seen as the organ-
isation's iconic form of life, which provides the structural/rational
grounds for both power, and theorising about power.
To theorise organisational power further, Clegg develops an
interpretation of Weber's analysis of power and bureaucracy within
the framework of his depth model. We now come to the theoretical
core of his critical approach, the "trinity" of concepts - power, rule
and domination.
4.2.3 Power and Domination The Two Faces of Organisational Power
I am not conce~ned with the validity of Clegg's interpretation
of Weber's typology of power, but with his use of weberian concepts
to support the depth structuralist view of power. Clegg distinguishes
between the concrete exercise of power and the prior structural
capacity to exercise it, the former belonging to the first face of
"power", and the latter to its second face i.e. "domination".
Power is therefore a form of social action which takes place at
the observable surface of organisational behaviour, but, as with
language-games, its exercise is not a free floating, random act that
is the outcome of the specific occasion of its use. This latter
image emerges from interdepartmental studies, and makes organisational
life look
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" rather like an ongoing game of chess in which
the pieces gain their power through their current
position, rather than gaining that current position
through the power to make moves according to the
rules of the game." (Clegg, 1975, p.49).
Power is not an apparently arbitrary social action, because its
exercise is a "ruled enactment" (Clegg, 1977, p.32).
What power enacts in a 'ruled' purposeful manner is a
capacity already allocated to various positions in the organisation
in relation to the realisation of the organisation's raison d'etre,
its form of life. This prior structure of capacities may thus be
seen as the grounding, the very possibility of power in the first
face (Clegg, 1977, p.32) - it refers to what Weber has called the
"structure of dominancy" which provides the order governing the way
the organisation works (Clegg, 1975, p.60).
That which gives an organisational 'order' its point and
purpose is its societal context and institutional location. For
7industrial organisations in capitalist society, the principles
which determine the network of prior capacity reflect the economic
foundation of the organisation's very existence. The economic
power of the "icon of capitalism" - its market system, its ideal
of profitability (Clegg, 1975, p.119ff.) - makes rational a certain
distribution of power capacities within the organisation, so that
the structure of dominancy is "economically conditioned" (Clegg,
1977, p.32). Domination is the political form of life of the
organisation, embodying the aforementioned economic power, and
towards which organisational participants "ultimately" orient their
action Le. in terms of which they make sense of or "iconically
theorise" their everyday existence (Clegg, 1975, p.90).
4.2.4 The Mediating Concept(s) of 'Rule'
Clegg's interest in the second face of power as a deep-
lying stzuct.ure of dominancy is, on the face of. it, difficult to
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reconcile with a prior commitment to a phenomenological perspective.
In fact, the credibility of Clegg's approach, if we assume that
Clegg accepts the postulate of voluntarism, depends overwhelmingly
on his analysis of how actors theorise their organisational lives
in the context of "domination" (see 4.3.2). This in turn, as
Clegg recognises, relies "crucially" and "decisively" on the
concept of "rule" in his framework :
" the concept of 'rule' provides a crucial
link between the structural concept of 'domin-
ation' and the action concept of 'power' ••.
[It] is the decisive link between the person's
social action of power, and the 'authorisations'
of domination". (Clegg, 1975, p.67).
In Clegg's thesis (1975), there appear to be three concepts
of 'rule': as 'formal codification' and social convention; as
the political action "to rule", as monarchs traditionally do; as
the interpretive procedures with which actors make sense of their
social experiences. These meanings do, of course, overlap, but,
although they are not identical, Clegg fails to distinguish between
ation of how 'domination' influences 'power'; whereas the inter-
them. Somewhat artificially, it may be most useful to consider
the first two concepts as being closely related to Clegg's explan-
pretive concept, being mostly concerned with how people comprehend
'power' and 'domination', is more related to his explanation of
acceptance or obedience (see Figure 4.1 below) •
The first two concepts of rule - the 'formal' and the
'political' - derive from Weber's work on power. In order to
clarify the confusion over interpreting Weber's terminology, Clegg
suggests that Herrschaft be rendered by the notion o£ rule. In
this political sense, 'rule' is the act or process of exercising
power over other people. The concept of rule as 'formal'/social
convention is abstracted from Weber's analysis of bureaucracy, in
which 'rules' are part of the organisational order, external to
social actors, but oriented to by them. Rules in this latter
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formal/conventional sense are constituted and made rational
by the structure of dominancy, which defines the structural
capacity to exercise power. Concrete enactments of organis-
ational power may be seen as "commands" which
" would be what we might call 'authored' by
the 'rule'. They would be what we might call
'authoritative' commands." (Clegg, 1975, p.62).
Organisational power arising through and legitimated by formal/
conventional rules may thus be seen as 'political' rule (Herrschaft)
- the exercise of a 'rule' (formal/conventional), or 'authority'.
"Authority refers to the 'exercise' of a 'rule'
located in a 'structure of domination', in which
resides the 'capacity' to 'exercise' that 'rule'
more or less authoritatively". (ibid.) .
Power (authority) is exercised within the arena "defined"
(Clegg, 1975, p.67) or structured by domination as a form of life,
and is about the pursuit of organisational rationality, viz. the
ideal of profitability :
" power relations are only the visible tip of the
structure of control, rule· and domination which
maintains its effectiveness not so much through overt
action, as through its ability to appear to be the
natural convention. It is only when taken-for-
grantedness fails, routines lapse, and 'problems'
appear, that the overt exercise of power is necessary.
And this is exerted to reassert control-". (Clegg,
1977, p.35i my emphasis).
Power is about rationality, control and the establishment of organis-
ational order, which is accomplished both routinely, through
conventions, rules and procedures - the second face of power - and,
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if that fails, through the political and authorised exercise by
managers of such conventions, rules and procedures.
At this juncture, the third concept of rule - the 'inter-
pretive' one - is particularly important as a means of "softening"
the so-far deterministic image of domination. Participants are
affected by the structure of dominancy because they orient their
actions towards it i.e. because the organisational order is
subjectively meaningful. Rules and conventions may be the basis
of authority (Clegg, 1975, p.65) and of the impersonal order, but
"how one orients towards [the ordex] is problematic" (Clegg, 1975,
p.61)
"'Domination' underlies the surface appearance of
power-exchanges, mediated by members' interpretive
rules with which they orient their behaviour towards
the 'icon' of domination". (Clegg, 1975, p.77).
Being the form of life of all participants, (the icon of) domination
has an irrepressible presence that must be theorised and thereby
influence organisational life in its political dimension. Managers
theorise their place in the process of organisation for profitability
a rationality which endows them with political capacity - and others
orient to the same organisational order to acquire their sense of
work. Both organisational power itself, and theorising about power _
using "commonly held" (Clegg, 1975, p.67) and "collectively recog-
nised and publicly available" (Clegg, 1977, p.31) interpretive rules
for perceiving and evaluating power are made possible and
structured by participants' shared, normally taken-for-granted, form
of life.
are normally submitted to without thought. Both power and its
For Clegg, theoretically and empirically (Clegg, 1975, p.87f),
power is authoritatively exercised by managers, and such Commands
acceptance occur routinely, because power is exercised within the
structure of dominancy for "obviously" rational control purposes.
181
Order is accomplished through 'domination' (and power) because
it is "the natural convention" - the organisation's unquestioned
form of life.
The organisation's form of life accounts for power/
authority through making the latter possible; it is biased
towards the accomplishment of organisational order because it, and
its rationality, is known by participants, without their conscious
realisation, as normal and natural.
" we may be so embedded within the iconic
theorising power of a particular form of life,
a particular form of domination, that an un-
thinking, unthought consensus reigns supreme
in our daily life [Th~ security of the
ruling corrverrt.Lon and interest is rarely
disturbed". (Clegg, 1977, p.21).
4.2.5 Summary Power and Submission
Clegg's arguments are long-winded and often tortuous, and
the above dissection of his work serves as a foundation for the
critical examination to follow. Before proceeding, I think that
it will prove helpful to summarise the themes of Clegg's argument,
and hence pull the various strands together. Figure 4.1 serves
to illustrate my understanding of Clegg's theory.
The starting pOint of Clegg's analysis is the second face
of power - domination - which, reflecting the organisation's
material form of life, is given, unquestioned by wielders (managers)
and recipients (others) of power alike. Because of its iconic, ideal
qualities for those whose lives are enmeshed in the way the organis-
ation works, this form of life gives rise to formal rules/social
conventions which usually succeed in obtaining order because they are
taken-for-granted. Where routine submission is not forthcoming, the
rules are exercised by managers.
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Figure 4.1 The Two Faces of Organisational Power (and
Theorising) as a Depth Model
SURFACE
DISPLAYS
OF
BEHAVIOUR
'POWER' 'THEORISING'
Enactment of under-
standings within
political order
(Precognitive consensus)
~~ - - - -'[- - - - - - - - - - - ,- - -~ - - - - - - -
Enactment of Differential
Distribution of Prior
Capacities over "issues"
(Exercise of rules)
DEEP Rules of Organisational Interpretive Rules
STRUCTURE "Game" (Formal/ (Iconic theorising)
~~LES conventio~nal) ~
~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - -.~ - - - - - - - - - -
FORM OF
LIFE
(Bedrock)
STRUCTURE OF DOMINANCY
(Biases towards order)
MATERIAL FORM OF LIFE
The same material form of life which makes possible the hier-
archicical, managerial exercise of power (left-hand column in
Figure 4.1) is the focus of the iconic theorising of all participants.
By orienting to the structure of dominancy managers develop differential
understandings of 'significant' issues, e.nd lower participants un-
thinkingly adopt the organisation's domination of their existence.
Interpretive rules may differ from manager to manager and from
manager to worker, but they all start from what is "obvious", from
what is accepted communally before its apprehension i.e. precognitively.
The enactment of power capacities (i.e. the realisation of
structural biases towards order) and the precognitive acceptance of
domination, leads to a form of "hegemonic order" within organisational
life.
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4.3 Domination as Structural Constraint and Organisational Order
This detailed examination of Clegg's academic theorising of
organisational life allows me to probe critically the answers he
provides for his theoretical questioning of the second face of power.
His approach raises issues of immense theoretical importance for the
understanding of organisational power and politics, but, as often
happens when theorists attempt to correct an imbalance of attention in
the literature, Clegg tends to overstate his case. His arguments
serve as a timely reminder to organisational orthodoxy of the pluralist
variety that power is hierarchical, formal, structural, constraining
and conducive to order; but at the same time Clegg defines as insig-
nificant, and unworthy of examination, 'power' which is horizontal,
informal, active, providing opportunity and conducive to conflict.
In general, my arguments will be that Clegg provides basic insights
into the second face of power - domination - but, because of a failure
to develop an interpretive sociological understanding of everyday organ-
isational theorising, he overlooks the significance of power, and
variations in it, at the first face. Further that, largely because of
the same failure, domination is presented effeetively as structural
constraints which favour only stability and order. From another angle,
such a bias arises because Clegg is not 'radical' enough, neglecting the
fundamental insights of the Marxist tradition in organisational analysis
(cf. Eldridge and Crombie, 1974, p.136ff.).
In 4.2 (particularly4.2.5), I suggested that Clegg's theory
of domination (as a form of life) really operated in two ways first,
to explain the distribution and functioning of organisational power as
it is exercised; second, to explain how participants, through their
precognitive commitment to the domination as a form of their lives,
come to accept domination as inevitable, and the exercise of power as
legitimate. In order to clarify Clegg's conception of organisational
power and politics, I shall look at these "explanations" of 'power'
and 'acceptance'. It will then be possible to see in what ways such
a conception needs to be extended in the interpretive SOCiological frame-
work. Because, in my opinion, Clegg's weaknesses mostly arise through
his failure to study the significance of variations in how participants
theorise power and politics, I shall deal first with his explanation of
acceptance.
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burden of his argument would be structural. For a sociologist
4.3.1 The "unthinking, Unthought Consensus"
It is clear from Clegg's declared intention to study the
neglected face of power using a depth analogy, that the main
with a commitment to phenomenology, it is incumbent upon him to
reconcile this structural focus with the postulate of voluntarism
a duty which Clegg appears to realise by providing the concept of
interpretive rule with a mediatory role, and by seeing the sociol-
ogical relevance of domination in its social interpretation by
organisational participants. While the centrality of an adequate
theory of this interpretive process to a meaningful understanding
of organisational power and politics is thus uncontended, Clegg's
account of the topic stresses the ways in which actors are con-
strained by their form of life to "unthoughtfully submit" to its
"iconic rlomination" (Clegg, 1975, p.155). Through such submission,
the deep structure and surface exercise of power are not only
'obeyed', but also "accepted", "authorised" and "legitimised"
(Clegg, 1975, p.77).
Unthoughtful submission to and consequent legitimation of
organisational power is an empirical possibility if Clegg is
correct, it occurred on his building-site, or at least in manage-
ment site-meetings, in 1972/3. However, I would suggest that his
theory (and empirical research), with its assumptions, definitions
and omissions, effectively allows no other feasible conclusion to
be drawn from observation i.e. as a theory, it forecloses on other
empirical possibilities by not providing a way to observe and
examine them as significant social ~ccurrences. In what follows,
I shall look at the definitions and assumptions which restrict the
theory of organisational power and politics to one of hegemonic
order, and indicate a number of theoretical omissions failure to
conceive structural conflict or important variations in the every-
day organisational theorising of power and politics - which demand
remedying. I shall end the section by illustrating how Clegg's
view is reinforced by his interpretation of conversational data.
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Although Clegg argues that the way organisational order
is oriented to is problematic, by theoretical argument he reduces
the possible variations in orientation to those falling within
one dominant mode; that which (iconically) comprehends organis-
ational life in terms of the organisation's material form of life.
r am not questioning the theory of the relationship between
'theorising' (language game) and a 'form of life', becaus.e it
seems entirely reasonable to suppose that actors' interpretive
work takes place and is rational in the context of their 'normal'
mode of existence. However it is problematic to assume, subse-
quently, that participants consistentZy theorise under one icon -
that reflecting the organisation's rationality. Of course parti-
cipants will inevitably and necessarily take account of organis-
ational rationality, but, as r shall argue below, it is myopic to
consider its theorising power to be monopolistic, or indeed
internally consistent. Clegg's conclusions about: the structure
of dominancy being a deep force in the service of order, and being
the subject of a general precognitive consensus, depend crucially
upon assumptions built into his conceptual framework.
Precognitive consensus arises through the assumption that
the structure of dominancy is a bedrock 'form of life' for both
'organisation' and individual participants, because the very
definition of domination in 'form of life' terms presupposes that
it is 'accepted' without r~flection (Clegg, 1975, p.34ff.). Where
the deep structure of power is routinely submitted to and where it
is plainly foolish or suspicious to question it (Clegg, 1975,
p.84) - i.e. where it is 'bedrock' - participants' interpretive
work will tacitly confirm domination, control and rationality.
There will, in short, be an "unthinking, unthought consensus"
(Clegg, 1977, p.3l) about organisational order.
Such implicit domination of participants' thinking and
theorising - i.e. hegemony - is a very important means of accomplish-
ing organisational order and control through the very presence of a
prevailing rationality (ideology) and structure. However, Clegg has
omitted to provide for the examination of two important aspects of
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political life, which make less secure and more precarious the
structure of dominancy: first, the analysis of formes) of life and
social rationalities should reveal the structural possibility of
conflict as well as order; second, the analysis of interpretive
rules - theorising - based upon underlying forms of life should
uncover the social possibility of varying degrees of acceptance
and rejection of organisational order. Such possibilities need
to be available within a theoretical framework, not grafted on when
examples are empirically encountered.8
I shall consider the first omission and its consequences
for understanding power in organisations. The focus on domination
as a prior structure of power capacities is obviously essential in
a thesis aimed at redressing its neglect, but it is surprising that
Clegg should tie it so unreservedly to the problem of organisational
order. As mentioned above, the arguments that participants are
entrapped by the rationality of formal organisation and that,
therefore, there is one clear, unambiguous form of life with
respect to which they can make sense of their work, seem to contra-
vene much of what we know about organisational life in industrial
society. It is possible for the raison d'etre of work to vary
considerably from group to group, and for participants to orient
towards organisational order in a similarly divergent manner.
Adapting Clegg's arguments, theorising may be underlain by diverse
forms of life, for example, located in extra-work spheres like the
family, politics ~~d religion. In such a case, there may still be
precognitive acceptance of the form of life - as is a defining
characteristic of the latter - but there is also the possibility of
its rationality conflicting with that prescribed by the organis-
ation's material form of life. Conflicting forms of life -
structural conflicts - may influence the process of organisational
politics, disturbing Clegg's hegemonic order, in diverse ways
9through the interpretive activities of participants (see also
discussion of the second "omission").
Structural conflict arises not only between forms of life,
but also within the material form of life of the organisation. In
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spite of his later references to Marx, Clegg (1977) continues to
assume tacitly that the economically conditioned structure of
dominancy (Clegg, 1977, p.32) may be seen as internally coherent in
its bias towards organisational order and control. Marx's
analysis of the internal contradictions of the structure of
capitalism, intensified Or nullified according to changes in the
economic conditions, suggests that the second face of organisational
power would be better conceptualised to reflect both structural order
and conflict (see 7.4) - with further repercussions for the nature of
lay theorising (see Chapter Eight) •
"My answer has been that what maintains the order
of this society [i.e. organisation] is its members'
unthoughtful (and thus willing) submission to the
Clegg's second theoretical omission which lends support to
his hegemonic view by neglect concerns his analysis of the inter-
pretive activities of organisational participants:
iconic domination of a form of life in which the
ideal of profitability is King Harvest - it must
be reaped" (Clegg, 1975, pp.155-156; my emphasis).
By reducing variation in everyday organisational theorising of power
to the "willing acceptance" of the icon of capitalism and its
associated rationality, Clegg restricts theoretically - i.e.
artificially - the empirical possibilities of conflict and change.
To extend this argument, consider what Clegg can mean by
"willing" "submission". Organisational participants "accept" the
deep structure of power because it is their (presumed) material form
of life. They accept it mostly without thinking about it, because
it is - and herein lies its great power - "the natural convention" •.
Submission as a political act is iconically theorised, and, within
his framework, Clegg offers lower participants very little alterna-
tive but to submit. His analysis is largely insensitive to
different modes of everyday theorising, and to degrees of acceptance
(or of rejection) . Acceptance, obedience and submission occur
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because they, like the exercise of power, are underlain by rule
and domination, and as a consequence, their very occurrence is
taken to indicate the social legitimacy of the organisational
10order.
In Chapter Eight, I shall be proposing that organisational
order may be theorised and accepted in various ways, from moral
acceptance, associated with social legitimacy, to begrudging prag-
matism, without any such association. In the latter case
obedience, and the political order itself, can become highly
precarious under certain circumstances. It is just such a possi-
bility that Clegg's blanket equations of 'power' and 'authority' and
and of 'acceptance' as 'willing legitimation' are too obtuse to
acknowledge. Overlooking power as 'coercive rule' - in spite of
referring to it (Clegg, 1975, p.59) - leaves Clegg's theory of
organisational order as "deeply" consEmsual and hegemonic, and he
neglects the possibility - explicit for example in Gramsci's concept
of 'domination', as opposed to hegemony (see 7.5) - that under
certain conditions, order must be forced by the powers-that-be,
thereby creating the structural potential for conflict, disorder and
change.
If Clegg's analysis oversimplifies the politics of order
by neglecting 'shades' of acceptance, his approach overlooks alto-
gether the ~ossibility of rejection - and the relationship, hinted
in the previous sentence, between theorised acceptance and rejection.
I have shown that 'conflict' is relegated to the first face of
power as an 'insignificant' matter, and is not considered at the
deep structural level. Only in a short parenthesised comment does
Clegg speak of the possibility of "subverting" the structure of
power, which can only occur
" through a rejection of the dominant icon as has
happened - as a temporary aberration - during factory
occupations which have occurred after the icon has
been shattered by the facts of bankruptcy and the
subsequent loss of jobs" (Clegg, 1975, p.124).
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Rejection does occur "temporarily" under certain economic-structural
circumstances, and, presumably couZd happen on a permanent basis.
However, the analysis of power as domination, of domination as
structural order, and of theorised submission as hegemony, can
explain neither the structural nor the social possibility of these
events - nor, even more importantly, their social dynamics. On
rejection, resistance, challenge and change Clegg is strangely silent.
The restrictive view of everyday organisational theorising is
further reinforced by Clegg's empirical research. First, and most
obviously, the concentration of the research on managers may be
expected to be supportive of his arguments on acceptance. Managers
and executives would seem, on a priori grounds, to be the most
probable groups to submit their organisational lives to the "iconic
theorising power" of the material form of life (see 8.4.1). Second,
Clegg's treaL~ent of conversational data seems to be especially
likely to produce an image of a socially defined order.
Rightly eschewing the representational model which assumes a
one-to-one relationship between linguistic image and reality (Clegg,
1975, p.8ff.), Clegg's strategy is to construct a picture on a 'good'
'rational' organisation from participants' talk of the 'failing'
organisation. Since participants perceive a 'good' organisation
as hierarchically controlled, disciplined, profitable etc., this
image i, assumed to be an icon in terms of which particirants theorise
their organisational existence, and to which they willingly submit.
I would argue that the links between 'talk', 'iconic
theorising' and 'willing submission' are rather more complex than
this, although I have not the space to discuss them fully. However,
the major problem is that Clegg treats 'talk' as if it is
theorising', whereas it is certain that the oral use of language
even if we assume that participants are consistent theorists (see
8.6) - is but one expression of an actor's theory or theories. One
utterance, or even many utterances in one situation, may be
congruent with a large number of possible theories.ll The
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economics and politics of organisational life are part of our
culture, embedded in the very language - its categories and
grammar - which make up 'talk', so to treat talk as theorising
can be highly misleading. The shop steward and manager, Marxist
and Conservative, who share the same culture and language, can
"agree" on what is "wrong" with British industry because they use
the dominant means of expression - but their apparently similar
'talk' cannot be taken to indicate an "unthinking unthought
consensus" .
If organisational power and politics are to be understood
without implicitly depending on power as structural constraint,
it is critical to develop a framework of concepts and propositions
which provides an adequate understanding of how participants them-
selves theorise their organisational lives. Clegg fails to do so.
4.3.2 The Critical View of Organisational Power and Poli.tics
I have argued that Clegg's account of 'acceptance' of or
'submission' to power and domination is unsatisfactory in that it
fails to analyse the process of social interpretation - i.e. of the
human mediation of structural forces in a way that can other than
reinforce the organisational order. In the present section I shall
be concluding the examination of Clegg's thesis by discussing the
overall view of organisational power and politics which emerges from
his theoretical and empirical work. Bearing in mind what has been
suggested in 4.3.1, I shall look at power and domination and at what
this means for the political behaviour of managers and other
participants. The results will affirm my contention that, for
Clegg, organisational power as domination - the neglected face -
acts effectively like structural constraint, which more-or-less
reinforces the prevailing state of order.
Domination, as an iconic form of life for academics and
lay participants alike (Clegg, 1975, p.113ff.), is a structure of
power (capacity) which provides the means whereby the ideal of
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profitability is rationally accomplished. This rationality
operates first to determine those issues which are organis-
ationally "critical" or "significant" and second to distribute
hierarchically the capacity to exercise power in its service.
for the organisation (which implies the
corollaries of non-criticality and non-issues)
••• I suggest that a critical issue will be one
which affects the ideal of profitability as it
is manifested in the organisation's model(s) of
"Given that power, when it is exercised, is
exerted over 'issues', then the crucial point
would be to determine which issues are critical
rationality". (Clegg, 1977, p.35; also Clegg,
1975, pp.123-124).
(
Power in organisations is therefore exercised over
(understandings of) 'issues' which are 'critical' in the above
sense, as participants with the prior capacity to do so, attempt
to enforce their particular views of the ideal of profitability
. 12mirrored in such lssues. Power is exercised within the arena
defined by rationality (domination) and the organisation's material
form of life (which "grants" the power - Clegg, 1975, p.124).
It is not surprising, given this 'rational' notion of
power, that the capacity is hierarchically distributed to higher
positions (e.g. Clegg, 1977, p.35) so that, while the capacity
to exercise power is ultimately structurally determined, but its
actual exercise is exclusively in the hands of managers.
building site,
On his
" the exercise of power •.• ~oncern~
concerning ••• [the organisation'~ mode
negotiations
of
rationality, negotiations which are managed by the
Project Manager, and which occur within his willing
submission to the structural power of his form of
life, as willing cog and cypher". (Clegg, 1975, p.100).
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Power, which is formal, hierarchical and involves the authoritative
use of rules to further profitability and order, is inevitably
managerial, in spite of being underlain by domination and rule.
I have shown in 4.3.1 above how Clegg argues for the un-
questioning, hegemonic acceptance of the structure of dominancy,
but what does this view of power and acceptance imply about
political behaviour first, among managers, and second among "lower
participants"? Clegg's theoretically-based decision to study
managers - because domination "grants" them power - tends to re-
inforce his ideas about acceptance. On a priori grounds, he is
probably correct to argue that managers and executives may theorise
organisational order in terms of its (normative) rectitude (see
8.4.1), but is it right to assume that, in their "willing submission"
to structural power, they only use their power capacity to further
organisational rationality - the "collective good"? If we
conceive of managers as politicians, it is possible that they would
attempt to claim legitimacy for "partial" acts on grounds of the
common good, or, more technically, within the terms formally
established for control purposes. Such claims will manifest them-
selves in public 'talk' and appear as willing submission to the
organisation's 'form of life'. In reality, the structural
capacity to exercise power may be enacted - or even avoided - in
order to pursue sectional goals which are made accountable in
terms of the ideal of ~rofitability. The power of managers may
usually be grounded in their orientation to domination,but,
without detailed study of that orientation - "willing submission
as ••• cog and cypher" is but one ext.reme mode of theorising - the
socia-political realisation of the prior deep structure of power
must remain problematic.
Clegg (1977, pp.26-27) takes Hickson et al (1971) to task
for reifying departmental power by assuming that the manager's
voice speaks and his behaviour acts for all his subordinates.
However, such a criticism is equally applicable to his own approach~
The exercise of organisational power ~s managerial power, and the
political role of lower participants is to "unthoughtfully submit"
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and hence legitimate such power. For Clegg, lower participants
do not exercise power, because it is not rational for them to
have that structural capacity. Where they do "influence" organ-
isational affairs (because it is not 'power' by definition), that
influence, not being grounded in rule and domination, is insigni-
ficant - such are the surface displays that have deceived
1 I" 13p ura J.sts.
I have already suggested that the everyday organisational
theorising of participants might be located in forms of life which
differ from, or even oppose, the organisation's structure of
dominancy, with associated implications for their interpretation
of organisational life. Similarly, the power of participants
i.e. non-managers and managers in certain circumstances - may
extend beyond the formal hierarchical distribution of capacities
recommended by organisational 'rationality'. Clegg, in his
limitation of power to the latter context, is only capable of
theorising a pure Gramscian 'moment' of hegemony - the latter may
have existed on his building-site, but it does not constitute a
theory of organisational power. If a normative identification
with organisational order is seen as but one empirical possibility,
it follows that participants at all levels may ground their 'power'
in other rationalities which oppose, challenge or resist (in
varying degrees) the extant form of domination. Orienting to
differing forms of life will make differe~t 'issues' critical for
the theorists, and may provide other structural sources of power
which cannot be condemned as "marginal". By ruling such political
possibilities out of his theoretical framework, through a set of
mutually-reinforcing conceptual definitions, Clegg constructs not
only a "closed" academic theory of organisational power (see 5.1.1),
but also an ideological support for political order, seen as self-
sustaining and hegemonic in spite of its real precariousness.
In surr®ary, I believe that it is unnecessarily restrictive,
and highly undesirable sociologically, to attach by definition the
conception of organisational power to 'order', to 'control', to
'hierarchy', to 'management', and to 'organisational rationality'.
194
The result, when linked to the lack of an adequate interpretive
approach (which partly gjves rise to and reinforces that conception),
effectively provides an image of organisational power as structural
constraint14, and overemphasises the impossibilities of social-
political action. Clegg rightly stresses the need to study the
second face of power, but his structural solution of constraint and
order cannot by itself provide a foundation for the interpretive
sociological understanding of organisational power and politics.
Unless power also 'endows' participants with social opportunities
backed by the 'emotion' and 'energy' of politics, organisational
conflict and change will always have to be explained by theoretical
'grafting'.
I shall end this discussion of Clegg with Figure 4.2,
which replicates Figure 4.1, and adds the various possible extensions,
which have been discussed, and which will require further elaboration
in Part Three.
195
Figure 4.2 'Possible Theoretical 'Extensions within Clegg's
Depth Model
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1. Clegg's view of organisational power and politics.
2. Suggested extensions of Clegg's view.
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power and politics. The depth of this examination was required
4.4SummaryofPartOne
In the previous three chapters I have conducted detailed
and critical analyses of the main theories of organisational
by the need, explained in Chapter One, to discover how the various
theories effectively conceptualised the topic in question.
I have first argued that the theories of organisational
power can be meaningfully grouped within three general types of
approach. Those researchers who have focused upon the vertical
aspects of 'power' in organisations and the problem of order
provide a view of the topic which may be classified as "unitary";
those whose work has concerned the horizontal dimension of power
and the problem of conflict, offer a basically "pluralist" approach;
Clegg's thesis which reflects in many ways the radical critique of
pluralism, I have categorised as "critical". Each type of approach
has a distinctive conception of organisational power and politics.
From the discussion in Part One, there has emerged two
15important conceptual themes - those of order/conflict and of first
face/second face of power. The first theme is especially relevant
in understanding the differences between the unitary and pluralist
types of approach, but all conceptions of power and politics at
least imply some treatment of the two ideas. The r~dical critique
of pluralism, on the other hand, embodies the second conceptual
theme. Clegg's approach, as the only developed example in the
field of organisations, distinguishes between the concrete exercise
of power (what I have been calling 'politics') and the 'power' of
structures which bias or predispose such exercises.
In their treatment of the topic of the present thesis, I
have been particularly impressed by the ways in which two theories
handle the conceptual themes in question. The 'political action'
framework of Burns and Dalton, and the 'critical' approach of
Clegg seem to provide fundamental insights into the question of
organisational power and politics. Each looks at the question in
197
very different ways and highlights different aspects of the topic;
as I shall argue in Chapter Six, their respective strengths and
weaknesses appear to complement rather than overlap. Part Three
unfolds around the themes outlined and the conceptions implicit in
each type of approach, and serves to develop and extend theoretic-
ally those themes and conceptions within the parameters outlined in
Chapter One.
Before commencing the latter task, it is important to
establish more clearly the methodological and theoretical basis of
an interpretive sociological analysis of organisational power and
politics. The starting points of this groundwork, which occupies
Part Two, are a methodological anxiety about circular arguments in
the above literature, and the theoretical problem of reconciling
the postulates of voluntarism and of constraint.
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Chapter Four
L
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
NOTES
I have already used a similar kind of argument against
the 'linguistic' realism of Pettigrew's study (3.2.4).
In a recent paper, Wood and Elliott (1977) argue that
Fox's 'radicalism' is in fact still underpinned by
pluralist-like assumptions, reflected in the concept of
'trust' and his continued attachment to reformism in
Beyond Contract (1974a).
The failure to be 'radical' enough has also been levelled
against Bachrach and Baratz (1971) by Lukes (1974).
Lukes argues that Bachrach and Baratz do not break from
the essential pluralist (behavioural) premises which they
themselves criticise.
It is debatable as to what extent 'social legitimacy' or
mere 'passive acceptance' as unalterable of what exists,
accounts for the manner in which political order is sus-
tained (see Mann, 1970; also 8.4).
This circulari·ty reflects the 'resource/topic' debate
initiated by ethnomethodologists to make a similar
'radical' paint viz. that, in their vLew , conventional
sociology did not probe beneath the surface of social
reality in order to attain a deeper knowledge of the
principles of social life.
Reprinted in Urry and Wakefield (1973).
It is interesting to note that Poulantzas' conception of
power is at once both similar to the Parsonian view and
the direct opposite. Both theorists conceive of power as
a property of systems or structures, but Parsons argues
its 'positive' resource or functional aspects, whilst
Poulantzas sees power as a negative (though functional)
constraint.
Clegg restricts his analysis to organisations in the
institutional area of industry, although the form of argu-
ment may address other types of organisation (see Clegg,
1977, note 8). In Part Three I shall make a similar
restriction for the purposes of illustrating theoretical
arguments.
Chapters Six, Seven, Eight and Nine follow up these
arguments. Concerning the restrictive nature of Wittgen-
stein's notion of form of life for sociological analysis,
see Giddens, 1976, p.17 and p.51. Gidden's discussion
is largely in the context of Winch's (1958) interpretation
of Wittgenstein.
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10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
9. For example, the privatised worker attaches a meaning to
work and the organisation which is often at odds with
the 'traditional' worker (cf. Lockwood, 1966; Goldthorpe
et al., 1968), and we may understand these differences in
terms of their orientation towards different forms of
life. Such variation in theorising, grounded in differing
forms of life, may have similar or contrasting consequences
for organisational power and politics e.g. privatised
workers may be more "volatile" in their industrial
relations, and such surges in industrial conflict may
result from conflicting forms of life.
This insensitivity to degrees of acceptance; and the
latter's variable relationship to legitimacy, is reminiscent
of Simon's behavioural concept of authority (see 2.1.2).
For example, Clegg finds it ironical that joiners may locate
the organisational failing in being 'overstaffed', thereby
" ••• theorising the legitimacy of their own dismissal"
(Clegg, 1975, p.91). However it is perfectly rational to
say such a thing - given the facts of organisational life on
a building-site - without being committed to any ideological/
the:>retical vd.ewpo.i.nt;about how to remedy the "problem".
Indeed, such talk may be geared to Clegg's questioning,
expressed in the terminology of management (and of students
who spend time with management) . Having expressed this
view, the joiners could still fight tooth and nail to prevent
dismissals on either practical, personal or ideological
grounds.
It is not clear what happens to matters (non-issues?) which
are "non-critical" and which presumably are not raised to
the level of political action. Clegg's definition implies
that non-issues, being non-critical, do not "affect" "the
ideal of profitability"; it would be surprising if this
were so, since one might want to argue that it is precisely
'non-issues' (as in Bachrach and Baratz's (1963) or Frey's
(1971) sense of being safely decided outside the political
arena) which appear to relate crucially to matters of profit,
market logic etc.
For example, Clegg (1977, p.26) calls the power of Crozier's
maintenance men "marginal and discretionary", as if that were
sufficient to deny its sociological significance.
Such a deterministic image is underscored by the depth
analogy, with its own connotations of external constraint -
connotations apparently recognised by Clegg (1975, p.74) in
his comments on Cicourel(l973).
The third conceptual theme of possibilities and impossibilities
is also implied in my investigation of these approaches, but
it becomes more explicit in the theoretical work of Chapter
Five below.
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PART TWO
A METHODOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL BRIDGE
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·CHAPTER FIVE
METHODOLOGICAL ·AND· THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR THE· ANALYSIS
OF· ORGANISATIONAL· ·POWER AND POLITICS
This thesis is entirely theoretical, but the ideas produced
are intended to be of empirical and of scientific use. It would
appear that a great deal of academic sociology takes the form of
a priori theorising, this being seen as a primary research activity
under the auspices of the 'hypothetico-deductive' method of enquiry.
Given the significant amount of a priori theorising that takes place,
it is surprising that so few of the participants in this activity have
given explicit consideration in their written works to its scope,
method and function (cf. Baldamus, 1976). This thesis is not -
indeed, could not be - profoundly methodological, but it seems to me
that it is "healthier" to indulge explicitly in a shcrt philosophical
diversion than to leave such matters implicit and unacknowledged.
The impetus behind this decision comes from a distinct
feeling of unease, gained from the reading of purely or mostly
theoretical treatises. Many of the theoretical works reviewed in
Part One seem to share the characteristics that they are eminently
sensible, completely internally consistent, and invariably worked.
This latter feature would not have been so disheartening, except that
some of these theories lead to some quite absurd, implicit,
conclusions about the social and organisational world. To cut a long
story short, since I do not want my theorising to have the last
characteristic, it is necessary to examine what is "wrong" with the
prevailing style of academic theorising and to plot an alternative
course. Section 5.1 is concerned specifically with this problem,
and the exploration of an alternative methodology, which reassesses
the function and process of a priori theorising with the particular
aim of making the latter sensitive to the variations in and possi-
bilities of empirical reality.
The theme of possibilities also dominates 5.2 which revolves
around an important theoretical problem in interpretive sociology -
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that of constraint. This thesis commences from the theoretical
assumption of voluntarism, which is taken to be inviolable. As
mentioned in 1.1, a common criticism of the interpretive approach
has been that it cannot incorporate an effective notion of constraint,
a proposition which, if true, would nullify any attempt to study
power and politics from an interpretive sociological viewpoint.
Section 5.2 sketches out one solution to this problem, using the
concept of 'social possibilities' in a mediatory role; these argu-
ments in turn lead to the formulation of a third conceptual theme for
Part Three.
Both sections are wz Ltten around key issues and the line of
argument used for each issue follows the same pattern and logic,
based upon the notion of possibilities. The methodological and
theoretical strategies formulated in response to these issues form
the foundations for the analysis of organisational politics in Part
Three.
5.1 Methodology and Possibilities
5.1.1 The Problem of Theoretical Circularity
Few sociologists would dispute that the critical defining
characteristic of their discipline as a science involves the
relationship between theory and evidence and that the former, if it
is to be 'scientific', must be responsive to the latter. In short,
and to state the obvious, sociological explanations must say some-
thing about the subject matter to be explained. It appears to me
that one of the major problems in current sociological theory is
precisely its failure to relate to and allow for the possibilities
of the social world, and this problem, examples of which we have
already encountered, owes much to one prevailing style of academic
1theorising which lY'.J.lls(1970) has dubbed "grand theory". Grand
theory is typified by a preoccupation with high levels of abstraction,
formal definitional treatises and the construction of typologies, and
involves the
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.. withdrawal into systematic work on conceptions
[whiCh] should be only a formal moment within the
work of social science" (Mills, 1970, p.58).
It is especially important to be aware of the implications of such
a withdrawal when one is writing a theoretical thesis.
ing. Parsonian grand theory is at such a level of abstraction that
Under the label of 'grand theory', Mills discusses the
archetypal work of Talcott Parsons, but he represents only one
'wing' - albeit an extreme one - of a much broader style of theoris-
it apparently has no pretensions of relating to the problems of
empirical research. Such theorising creates a self-contained model
of the world without resort to studying the latter. A second form
of grand theorising is much more pervasive and yet, as I shall show,
equally dangerous. This second form has empirical intentions and
yet still tends to create a self-contained model of social reality.
It would appear, and I shall elaborate immediately below, that
despite intentions to implicate the empirical world in theorising,
the latter activity remains relatively oblivious to its subject-
matter, and to possible variations in the latter.
It will become clearer as this section unfolds that it is
important to employ a methodological strategy which insists upon the
theorist engaging with the real world, and that it is only by having
a conception of a 'theory' as being open to empirical possibilities
that the dilemma of grand theorising is avoidable.
exactly is this dilemma?
But what more
I would like to pose the aforementioned problem as one of
"theoretical circularity" Le. a theory becomes so highly defined
and so internally complete that it constitutes a conceptual world of
its own, independent of the empirical world it purports to describe
and explain. A problem like this may arise whenever a researcher
constructs a set of formal definitions and propositions about the
social world without ongoing empirical reference to the latter. In
Part One above, we have already encountered such formal (grand)
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theorising from,.for example, Simon, Etzioni, Cyert and March,
and, to a lesser·extent, from Clegg.
These theorists have constructed theoretical edifices
which are internally stable and consistent to such a degree that
they cannot be faulted except by pointing out the logical absurdities
of, and weaknesses in, their conceptions of organisational life - in
particular, of power and politics. Their theories work, not
necessarily because they explain something in the world, but because
the concepts are defined and the propositions are constructed such
that they cannot fail to work. As soon as one accepts Etzioni's
formal definition of 'involvement' or Simon's formal definition of
'authority' (as examples taken from the earlier discussion in Part
One) - and according to their own methodology they have the right to
define their concepts ab initio - one has also to accept the conse-
quences of those concepts as they relate to others. The theory
works because of itself; it is irremediably circular; it is closed
to the possibilities of the very social world it intends to explain.
The self-contained theoretical worlds of Etzioni and Simon
are illustrative (in the present context) and symptomatic of a style
of theorising prescribed by the prevailing methodology in sociology
(cf. Baldamus, 1976, p.103ff.). Theoretical circularity is a
consequence of a set of rules governing theorising, but in order to
appreciate more fully this problem, and so that an alternative may be
constructed, it is necessary to examine a number of methodological
points regarding 'open' and 'closed' theories. The alternative
methodology called, after Blumer (1970a, 1970b), a "sensitising"
methodology which I shall be advocating is one which encourages
theoretical openness and does not emphasise the formal definitions
and abstract conceptualisation that typify grand theory and lead
to a theoretical circularity which isolates the scientific activity
of theorising from its subject-matter. In the next two sub-sections
I shall be going back to first principles to illustrate that the
sensitising methodology proposed not only provides for a happier
relationship between the theoretical and empirical aspects of
sociology but also abides by accepted philosophical argument.
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5.1.2 The Conjectural 'Nature 'of Knowledge
Before investigating the role of theory, its concepts and
propositions, especially regarding a theoretical thesis which intends
to be part of scientific endeavour, it is necessary to know exactly
what can be expected of 'theory'; i.e. given an adequate relation-
ship to the real world (the nature of this relationship is examined
below), what sort of 'knowledge' can 'theory' provide for us? This
brief discussion of the scope of (social) scientific theory is not
intended to demonstrate any profound philosphical points, but simply
to establish an epistemological starting point for sociological
methodology.
The ideal of the scientific co~munity has long been the con-
struction of propositions of a 'law-like' character which reflect or
represent 'objective reality' by identifying an 'existing' pattern of
causation. This one-to-one relationship between scientific images
of reality in the form of empirically or experientially validated
causal laws and the reality itself reveals an "empiricist"
epistemology that proposes that absolute or perfect knowledge is
possible by adhering to strict, sCientifically-defined criteria of
observing reality and "putting that reality on paper" (so to speak).
This form of empiricism, which finds its sociological equivalent in
positivist methodology, is based upon what Popper (1969, p.Sff.)
calls ar- "optimistic epistemology". At the heart of this episte-
mology, traceable to Bacon and Descartes, is the doctrine that "truth
is manifest" (ibid) i.e. that truth or knowledge is clearly available
to those who will see.
However, the ultimate source of knowledge cannot be simply
located in the reality it purports to know, because 'what we know'
is the only indicator of that reality and cannot be allowed to
validate itself. Our theories and propositions are not grounded in
unambiguous observation of "facts", but in the traditions which we
adopt (cf. Clegg, 1975, p.lOff.), and in our past experiences of
reality, both of which furnish us with a certain ability to guess
about how the world works. Our propositions are not inductively
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produced inevitably reflecting the 'reality' observed, but are
always and unavoidably built upon conjectures (Popper, .1969)
which acquire greater status as 'knowledge' as they stand up to
criticism. Knowledge is therefore never absolute, but always
conjectural, subject to revision, amendment and correction as
observations (empirical and theoretical) render necessary.
Empiricism would not be so offended by this notion of
conjectural knowledge if the propositions could ultimately acquire
the status of the "laws" in the optimistic epistemology. Popper's
classic analyses of the status of universal laws make it quite clear
however L~at propositions (conjectures) are never verifiable in a
strong sense. This leaves scientific knowledge in a limbo of un-
certainty, progress in science not being possible in the way
advocated by positivists - viz. of continually building up and
adding to a system of verified universal laws - but only by refutation,
criticism and the ongoing revisability of (conjectural) 'knowledge'.
If knowledge can only be conjectural, and thus theories are
inevitably amendable, the purposes of science are furthered by en-
suring that theory is "open" and subjectable to empirical possi-
bilities.
"A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable
event is non-scientific. Irrefutability is not a
virtue of a theory (as people often think) but is
a vice". (Popper, 1969, p.36).
The problem of theoretical circularity occurs precisely because of
the effort that social scientists expend in making their conceptual
structures "watertight". The construction of "open" theories
requires refutable propositions, amendable concepts and a channel
whereby discourse with the 'real world' is possible.
If scientific knowledge is conjectural, and if 'objective'
truth is unava.ilable as an absolute, the major task of a priori
theorising takes on a character which is essentially different from
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the prevailing view in the 'grand theory' style. Social
theorists have devoted much time and energy on the construction
of large self-contained theoretical and conceptual edifices which
defy refutation and amendment. Their methodology presumes that
theories may be constructed according to the rule that the truth
can be reflected unambiguously in relationships between concepts
and propositions. Following from this rule, the aim of a priori
theorising is to ponder upon problems of conceptualisation, working,
in the end, to a formal definition of some part of reality - the
definition thus concretising a formal concept.
Of course, concepts are a crucial part of the scientific
effort, but a danger lies in the process of abstract conceptual
discussions which formalise and concretise concepts within formal
theoretical frameworks. concepts and propositions can onZy be
(revisable) conjectures about reality, but a number of factors in
this style of theorising collude to objectify such conjectures into
a framework impervious to empirical testing. First, as has already
been mentioned, conceptualisation always takes place within a
theoretical tradition, the rationales of which colour all concepts
consistency of meaning. Resulting from these factors, each concept
in a common hue. In addition to such general themes with which
concepts are underlain, there exists a formal, deliberate inter-
dependence created by the theorist himself as he seeks internal
becomes "impregnated" \lith other concepts leading to a theoretical
unity which has been achieved independently of empirical reference.2
In its extreme, such a comprehensive unity becomes a theoretical
circularity which, because of its closed character, cannot be broken.
If a priori theorising (and theory-construction in general)
is to abide by the limits imposed by the conjectural nature of
knowledge, empirical concepts and propositions must be corrigible.
This requires a different view of sociological concepts from that
described above. Just as I have argued above that the alternative
methodology which is needed to resolve the problem of theoretical
circularity is based upon a more realistic philosophical view of the
possibilities of knowledge derived from Popper's analysis, so too is
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5.1. 3 The '''Open-'Texture''of Empirical Concepts
the alternative notion 0;1; a sociological concept bound up with
general arguments concerning the scope and function of concepts
in general and particularly in social science.
The rationale behind the 'grand theory' style of academic
theorising is that it is possible to develop concepts by abstract
discussion and clarification leading to an end-product - the formal
definition. The problem, as we have seen, is precisely that this
style of theorising forecloses on what exists or may exist by tying
such end-products into a logical circle. Clearly if theorising is
to be open to empirical possibilities, concepts themselves must be
sensitive to reality. That concepts should be continually subject
to revision, amendment or elaboration should not surprise us -
first, this is demanded by the fact that scientific knowledge is
conjectural; second, such is itself a feature of sCientific/
empirical concepts.
by Waismann (1960).
The latter line of argument has been suggested
An empirical concept is one which is created in order to
reference or describe some cluster of sense-data, and may be dis-
tinguished from non-empirical or purely logical concepts (e.g. the
notion of 'function' in mathematics). Although positivists, with
their optimistic epistemology, argue that verification of a concept
resides in the identification of the sense-data that entail that
concept, it has been suggested above that much sociological
theorising in the 'grand theory' style either fails to introduce
such empirical testing, or only entertains 'confirming' instances,
thereby reducing intendedly empirical concepts to a purely logical
status i.e. their meaning is derived internally in terms of their
relations with other concepts and of the tradition in which theorising
is located. Waismann argues that empirical concepts should not
be regarded as end-results at any stage of the scientific process
because almost' invariably they possess an "open texture" (Waismann,
1960, p.119). This proposition complements and extends the
Popperian line of argument concerning the impossibility of scientific
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verifiability
"The fact that in many cases there is no such
thing as a conclusive vertification is connected
with the fact that most of our empirical concepts
are not delimited in all possible directions"
(Waismann, 1960, pp.119-120).
This assertion applies not only to intendedly empirical concepts
developed on a theoretical plane - as in the 'grand theory' style
but also to those empirical concepts inducted from sense-data.
Even notions which have been apparently defined with the absolute
degree of precision (Waismann cites 'gold' as an example) are
essentially open-textured :
" we can never exclude altogether the possibility
of some unforeseen situations arising in which we
shall have to modify our definition" (ibid.).
To behave ot.herwf.sewould leave to a scientific authoritaranism,
since theory would exceed its authority to describe or explain the
. 3world (cf. Mills, 1970, p.49) through a faulty eplstemology.
'Open-texture' should not be confused with 'vagueness'
(see 5.1.4), since the latter, in Wai3mann's sense (1960, p.120),
may be remedied by greater precision or accuracy in rules for
identification. 'Open-texture' is a "fundamental" characteristic
of most empirical concepts and simply has to be lived with.
Intendedly empirical concepts must not be treated as if they were
closed end-products, because generally (perhaps aLway s in social
science) they possess an open texture.
"An alternative way of stating this would be to
say that definitions. of open terms are alhlays
corrigible or emendable". (Waismann, 1960,
p.120; emphasis in original) .
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Given that open texture is an inescapable quality of empirical
4sociological concepts, .we.return to the need for a methodological
strategy that recognises them for what they are, and that allocates
to them a theoretical role which they are logically capable of fu1-
filling. If empirical concepts are open-textured, a priori
theorising should not deprive them of the possibility of being
"corrected" or "emended" by future events.
5.1.4 The 'Vagueness' of Sociological Concepts
While Waismann suggests that empirical concepts are open-
textured, Blumer (1970a) argues that social scientific concepts in
particular are unavoidably vague or ambiguous.S This in itself
is barely surprising, since the 'open-texture' of concepts creates
the possibility of vagueness (Waismann, 1960, 120) because the greater
the number of possible lines of conceptual extension that remain un-
extended, the more likely is that concept to appear ambiguous or
maldefined. Furthermore, Waismann bases the importance of his
notion of open-texture upon the contingent nature of reality, and,
since social reality is arguably "more contingent" than 'natural'
reality because of the intervening interpretive activities of social
actors (cf. Clarke, 1975, pp.173ff; Giddens, 1976, p.7S; and 5.2
below), one would expect sociological concepts to be especially
prone to ambiguity. Blumer argues that :
"Careful scrutinising of our ~ocial sCientificj
concepts forces one to recognise that they rest
on vague sense and not on precise specification
of attributes" (Blumer, 1970a, p.S4).
Blumer continues by suggesting - in a similar vein to that above
that much of the present malaise with social theory is that it
assumes, wrongly, that concepts can be preCisely specified, and
that formal definitions can thus be attained.
Since ambiguity is an inevitable quality of sociological
concepts, we require a strategy to cope as best as we can with this
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unfortunate fact of social theory. Blumer thus rejects the
positivistic strategy that treats concepts as "definitive".
"A definitive concept refers precisely to what;
is common to a class of objects by the aid of
a clear definition in terms of attributes or
fixed bench marks" (Blumer,1970a, p.S7).
The possession of such a concept allegedly permits the identifi-
cation of all instances referenced by the concept by matching the
attributes observed with those delineated in the definition. I
have already commented that ambiguity and vagueness are features
of our social world, since empirical instances of a concept rarely
if ever are identical in all definable attributes. Given this
fact, it makes little sense to start from a closely-defined concept
and limit our attention to only those instances which share the
defined attributes or ignore other attributes which an instance
may possess because they do not conform to our definitive concept.
To do so would be to present the social world as.it is not - or
more seriously to magic its "significant" characteristics into
existence through our theorising. Either way results in a
scientific authoritaranism (as indicated above), since reality is
described or explained (in a sense, scientifically constituted and
reified) by theoretical fiat rather than by reference to reality
itself.
Once again, we are forced to a position where it becomes
necessary to build into Our methodology those epistemological and
methodological factors that have been discussed. Closed theory
and definitive concepts are not congruent with the conjectural
nature of knowledge and the open-texture and 'vagueness' of
sociological concepts; a priori theorising needs to proceed along
different lines.
5.1.5 A Sensitising Methodology
In order to build a theory which is open to the possibilities
of social reality we need a methodology which makes theory sensitive
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to variation and change in the latter. Following Blumer (1970a)
our concepts need to be "sensitising" to the social world rather
than "definitive" of it
"A sensitising concept lacks such specification of
attributes or bench marks [possessed by definitive
concept~ and consequently it does not enable the
user to move directly to the instance and its
relevant content. Instead it gives the user a
general scope of reference and guidance in
approaching empirical instances" (Blumer, 1970a,
pp.57-58).
In other words, if the arguments so far are correct, a sensitising
concept merely does what an empirical concept is capable of doing.
Of course, a definitive concept guides one's attention to certain
do not form part of the definition. A sensitising concept is
aspects of the real world; its inadequacy lies in its inflexibility
and insensitiveness to those aspects of empirical instances which
utilised with a different set of theoretical expectations viz. that
it is likely to need amendment or extension in the face of that to which
it refers. Such concepts presuppose their own revisability and
corrigibility, and this leads to a completely different relationship
between academic theorising and empirical research. To the extent
that the 'grand theory' style involves empirical research at all
and this of course raises new problems regarding the purpose of
theoretical sociology - the use of definitive concepts tends to set
up theoretical circularity in which the conceptual structure
necessarily incorporates successfully all the evidence it invokes.
Theory guided by sensitising methodology, on the other hand, is
responsive to evidence - disconfirming as well as confirming - and
this not only conforms to the epistemological and methodological
arguments set out above, but also does justice to the uniqueness,
ambiguity and contingency which prevail in the social world.
summarises this point
Blumer
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"One moves.out from the concept to the concrete
distinctiveness of the instance instead of
embracing the instance in the abstract frame-
work of the concept" (Blumer, 1970a, p.59).
So sensitising concepts guide the theorist's attention to aspects
of social reality and are sensitive to the latter in that they
possess a revisable character.
Just as sociological concepts perform a sensitising function,
so too do theoretical propositions. Generalisations in sociology
which attempt to relate different characteristics of the social
world by proposing some causal connection cannot be regarded as
"laws" or "law-like" in the sense that 'epistemological optimists'
would have us believe. This is true of the natural sciences,
given the general arguments concerning the conjectural nature of
scientific knowledge, but, as Clarke (1975) argues, sociological
propositions cannot be regarded as law-like because of the postulate
of voluntarism :
"[The genera~ facts about social life •.• are that
human beings are the only moving agents in history
••• and that what human beings do depends upon how
they interpret the world around them, and not upon
universa:ly operative law-like principles ••• The
assumption of human voluntarism implies that
relationships between structural properties are
contingent. The effects of anyone property,
including the other properties to which it leads,
will depend on how the former is perceived, which
aspects of it are relevant to those whom it
confronts, and so on." (Clarke, 1975, pp.173-
1974; cf. Giddens, 1976, p.102).
The 'facts' about the scope of human knowledge and about the nature
of human social life means that propositions about the empirical
social world or
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" so-called social laws can have only a
ogical explanation" (ibid.) •
sensitising function in the process of sociol-
As with sociological concepts, theoretical propositions function
to suggest lines of argument or, more specifically, where in the
social world to find explanations of the empirical cases under
scrutiny.
What does this mean for the nature of theory in sociological
methodology? The arguments above have suggested the inadequacies
of 'grand theory' with its large conceptual structures and resulting
theoretical Circularity. The necessary alternative, and one which
is congruent with the arguments detailed above, is an open or
"emergent" theory. Using concepts and propositions as sensitising
agents which are themselves responsive or adaptive to the empirical
reality they point to, academic theorising enters into a close and
continuous relationship with the social world and does not attempt
to legislate for or rule the world it attempts to describe and
explain. As propositions and concepts come into contact with
empirical instances, the latter reshape and revise the former.
Theory becomes continually reformulated to account for new or
different experiences, and, over time, gradually "emerges"; it can
never become a body of absolute laws for Popper ian reasons and
because of the essentially contingent nature of the social world.
Sensitising methodology involves a "pragmatic" view of
academic theorising, since it defines the flexible relationship of
concepts and propositions to the empirical world. 'Knowledge' is
hence dependent upon this close, adjustive relationship of theoris-
ing and evidence. Huber, (1973), in noting the relationship
between sensitising methodology and philosophical pragmatism,
completely misunderstands the significance of this insight. She
confuses the possession and use of concepts as sensitising agents
as indicating a "lack of prior theoretical formulation" (Huber,
1973, p.28l), subsequently criticising the methods on the following
grounds :
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" the prior construction of logically-related
propositions is important in science because it
gives the researcher a chance to lose the game"
(Huber ,1973, P ;282) .
Huber finds the flexibility of emergent theory worrying because
it cannot be rejected in toto i.e. because it adapts to reality.
We have, however, already seen that a sensitising methodology does
involve a priori theorising, conceptualising and proposition-
formulation - it simply does not treat them as end-results. She
misses the major point in her claim that only definitive concepts
and law-like propositions can lead to refutation, because the kind
of a priori theoretical formulations of which she apparently
approves, dOes court the ever-present danger of theoretical circu-
larity; and the examples of this approach encountered .in Part One
have been se~n to lead to a theoretical absolutism which does not
,adequately reflect the epistemological, methodological or sociol-
ogical injunctions discussed.6
Pragmatism in sociological methodology appears to abide
by those injunctions, and suggests a notion of a priori theorising
which enjoys a scientifically healthier relationship with its
subject-matter. If concepts or propositions are useful and accurate
in understanding the "concrete distinctiveness" and "contingency"
which characterises social life, then they remain intact; if they
fail in their task, they must be revised or amended. Pragmatism
offers a chance to develop "open theory" SO that 'knowledge' is
shaped by what exists or happens, not SOlely by what we think (or
like to think) exists or happens. Herein lies the promise of a
sensitising methodology which, after all, merely reflects what theory,
concepts and propositions are capable of doing and being.
5.2 Interpretive Sociology and the Analysis of Social Possibilities
5.2.1 The Problem of Constraint
My aim in this chapter has been to prepare the methodological
and theoretical ground in which to cultivate ideas and propositions
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concerning the specific topic of this thesis - that of organisational
power and politics. The methodological work has been completed, and
it remains to consider some major theoretical problems, and their
solutions, before applying the resulting ideas in the chapters that
follow.
In 5.1 above, I advocated a sensitising methodology which
is cognisant of the philosophical scope of social science and which
maintains the empirical possibilities of the subject matter. The
notions of theory, concept and proposition which constitute the
sensitising methodology may be seen as describing, prescribing and
circumscribing the appropriate behaviour of the social scientist at
work. It builds upon the view of sociology as the interpretive
activities of a special kind of human being who attempts to create
a disciplined study of his fellow participants in the social world.
It would be a strange sociological theory that overlooks the fact
that sociologists are themselves social actors performing specific
types of action, so if sociologists are "active interpreters"
7(Atkinson, 1972, p.270) of their social world - a proposition which
underlies the sensitising methodology it is only consistent to
conceive of everyday social action in the same terms.
The positivist methodology, best represented by the conven-
tional structuralist approach in sociology, also prescribes and
purportedly describes the activities of the social scientist. I
have argued that this methodology is based upon false philosophical
premises, since the scientific ideals it recommends are first not
pursued in scientific practice, and second not possible to achieve.
However, this methodology does lead to a consistent structuralist
theory of social action, albeit inadequate by the criteria used here.
The social scientist is seen as neutrally reporting the "facts" as
they manifest themselves to him (or anyone else), and explains them
by neutral techniques (e.g. statistical) which leave the "facts"
intact and unblemished. He is thus normatively constrained by the
scientific ethos, and practically constrained by the "facts" as they
present themselves to him. .The social possibilities of scientific
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action are duly extremely limited. The structuralists' explan-
ation of the everyday social world, as is now well-documented,
leans heavily upon the same causal notion of constraint, this time
attributed to structural properties, which renders an account of the
interpretive activities of social actors unnecessary.
While the positivist methodology and the structuralist mode
social 'explanation' are inadequate because they contravene the
initial premises of my position, their contrast with the sensitising
methodology and the interpretive mode of explanation does highlight
a very important issue which requires theoretical attention before I
can return to the topic of organisational power and politics in Part
Three.
In considering their respective methodologic~l positions or
their assumptions about the 'facts' of social action, it transpires
that the positivist/structuralist viewpoint implies determinism and
constraint as opposed to the sensitising/interpretive approach which
involves contingency and voluntarism. The methodological impli-
cations of determinism versus contingency occupied us in 5.1,
but the theoretical issue of constraint versus voluntarism demands
discussion and resolution, as suggested in Chapter One.
A multitude of sociologists have explicitly constructed
their respective theses upon the structuralist/interpretive or
system/action distinction (e.g. Goldstein, 1963; Cohen, 1968;
Silverman, 1970; Atkinson, 1972; Corrigan, 1975; Clarke, 1975,
Giddens, 1976; and notably Dawe, 1970), and ideal types of sociol-
ogical approach have been drawn up as though they were battle-lines.
The issue that is commonly cited as the crucial one is whether man is
externally constrained to behave as he does, or whether he chooses
his own fate. Dawe summarises the distinction
"There are, then, two sociologies: a sociology
of social system and a sociology of social action •.•
They posit antithetical views of human nature, of
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society and of the relationship between the
social and the individual. The first asserts
the paramount necessity, for societal and indi-
vidual well-being, of external constraint;
hence the notion of a social system ontologically
and methodologically prior to its participants.
The key notion of the second is that of autono-
mous man ••• Society thus is the creation of its
members; the product of their construction of
meaning ..." (Dawe, 1970, p.214).
In short, it is a debate between a postulate of external constraint
(determinism) and one of voluntarism (contingency), and it is
usually presented as a mutually-exclusive choice of sociological
strategy. The constraint/voluntarism debate merges into the much
broader question concerning the objective and subjective dimension
of social reality, so that structuralist proponants of constraint
have become dubbed as "objectivist", whereas interpretive approaches
based upon the postulate of voluntarism receive the somewhat
lesser ("scientific") status by being called "subjectivist". In
fact, as I shall demonstrate later, the extension of the constraint
vs voluntarism debate into the objective-subjective one is not only
unhelpful but also invalid (see 5.2.3 below) •
The constraint/voluntarism dichotomy has been subjected to
a number of extensive treatises to demonstrate their compatibility
or incompatibility (e.g. Parsons, 1965 (originally, 1937) 1951;
Berger and Luckmann, 1971; Atkinson, 1972). Although they have
met with differing degrees of success in reconciling these two
postulates concerning the nature of social life, a large number of
sociologists would agree with Rex (1974)
"We are faced with a •.. complex subject matter
which involves a dialectical interplay between
human striving and social constraint. We need
to do justice, that is to say, both to phenomenal
and noumenal man" (Rex, 1974, p.4).
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For reasons explored in Chapter One, the postulate of voluntarism,
as the primary premise of this thesis, is sacrosanct; yet no theory
of power and politics can merit serious attention unless it enter-
tains a strong concept of constraint. For my purposes, an organ-
isation is a social arena in which courses of action are socially
enabled or socially constrained by one's own or others' actions;
politics constitute an important aspect of this process. Given the
postulate of voluntarism, whereby sociological explanation can only
be achieved through the analysis of the subjective meaningfulness
of human behaviour, we are confronted with a genuine theoretical
problem, viz. how to introduce a notion of constraint without
surrendering the postulate of voluntarism.
One strategy for resolving this problem appears to emerge
from the analysis of social action in terms of social possibilities.
If it can be shown that the notion of constraint can be incorporated
into a consistent interpretive sociology, and if the relationship
between the objective and the subjective aspects of social life can
be adequately articulated by using the same line of approach - viz.
that of reformulating theoretical premises using the notion of social
possibilities - the stage will indeed be set for Part Three.
5.2.2. Social Possibilities, Voluntarism and Constraint
The social world is the creation of its human participants,
as they interact meaningfully together. Because of the voluntarism
that characterises social action, any sociological theory is necessary
contingent, adjusting to the concrete exigencies that it ~eets in
its probing of social life. Methodologically this means that theory
should not deprive the world of its empirical possibilities by fiat;
theoretically, this means that the social world should be examined in
terms of the social possibilities for action, as perceived by the
participants themselves. It is this latter point that needs
clarification at this stage.
Interpretive sociology is based upon the proposition that
social explanation must include reference to the way actors make
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sense of their situations and.subsequently choose the courses of
action which the researcher observes. The primary task of such
a sociological approach is therefore to acquire knowledge of the
meaning-systems of the actors under scrutiny, for this permits
the researcher to understand the aims and objectives of the parti-
cipants and thereby to construct an explanation of how the latter
action. The postulate 9f voluntarism thus underscores the need
confronted the question of choice between possible courses of
to explain choice behaviour, for it is only in the most simple
cases (e.g. "the-money-or-your-life" kind) that no choice exists.
Choice between possible courses of action depends upon a number of
factors, including the actual possibilities that exist and the
possibilities as perceived by the actor (to which I shall return
in 5.2.3); it may be made on a number of grounds ranging from
'rational' evaluation of the different courses available/perceived
where 'rational' means 'rational-to-the-actor' - to the habitual
response to a familiar situation.S
The process of social choice from the actor's perspective
constitutes the classic problem for interpretive sociology, and may
be analysed in terms of the selection of one course of social action
from the more or less broad range of 'social possibilities'.
However such an analysis of social action remains firmly entrenched
in the subjectivist world of human choice. In analysing action in
terms of choice between possible courses, this approach neglects one
of the major experiences of man in social life - that of not being
able to behave as one would prefer i.e. constraint. Furthermore,
this naive subjectivist analysis considers actors' possibilities
without reference to an objective social world which not only enables
behaviour but may also be unyielding to human efforts to manipulate
it. It has been the general line of critical argument from
structuralists and Marxists that interpretive sociology has not or
could not present an effective conception of social constraint9, and,
as mentioned earlier, this criticism has certainly not been
convincingly dealt with. The positivistic solutions to this problem
have tended to re-assert directly or indirectly, a Durkheimian-type
notion of external constraintlO, but fortunately it is not necessary
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to resort to determinative social structures in order to introduce
a meaningful concept of constraint.
At its simplest, the notion of constraint may be explored
in terms of social impossibilities, i.e. an actor is constrained
when certain courses of action are perceived as being closed off
to him. In a sense the postulate of voluntarism insists that
of the political and moral connotations. It is true that an act
actors "choose" their own fate, but in saying this it is clearly
necessary to strip the notion of "choice" and the act of "choosing"
of choice can be, and frequently is, paradoxically a self-imposed
constraint, as in the situation where a course of action, once
selected, immediately limits one's future choices. Such decisions
are indeed "fateful", but, more often, the process of choice
incorporates the conscious or unconscious examination of both
what is possible and hlhat is not. It is an important pOint to
note that just as the positive act of choosing between alternatives
may be based upon 'rational' grounds or may occur as a habit, at
some stage prior to this act certain courses of action will have
been rejected as "impossible-given-the-circumstances", and such
rejection may occur through a 'rational' process or may be
habitual i.e. they simply do not register as worthy of consider-
ation. This last matter, wherein the limits of one's own actions
become taken-for-granted, is one significant aspect of the politics
of orde~ or of consensus, reflecting the second face of ~ower or
Lukes' third dimension (1974).11
However, to take the logic of this exposition further,
social possibilities and impossibilities are not the creation of an
actor's mind - even though their role as explanatory sociological
factors must remain on the subjective level - but derive from the
actor's experiences and awareness of the "real world outside".
5.2.3 Subjective and Objective Possibilities
Opportunities and constraints are part of the everyday
knowledge of 'how the world works' that social actors bring with
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them to social situations.in which they participate. They are
part of the meaning systems or "interpretive schemes" which
constitute the "theories" that social actors employ in order to
categorise, explain and predict the social world and its reactions
to their efforts. I have noted the general failure to arrive at
an adequate solution to the problem of constraint, but the approach
advocated here does permit an alternative theoretical strategy to
integrate both constraint and choice and the objective and
subjective dimensions. This strategy involves a systematic
12study of the 'external' origins and logic of the everyday
theorising that is the immediate 'causal' factor in social action.
Only in this way is it possible to carry through the promise of the
interpretive approach without, first, undermining the latter's
philosophical foundations, or, second, withdrawing from the
"concretely existing world" (cf. Hindess, 1972, p.16ff.).13
In order to understand the source of the social possi-
bilities and impossibilities that respectively enable or constrain
participants' actions, it is necessary to examine the "everyday
theories" which the latter employ, and their role in linking the
subjective realm of consciousness with the objective "real" world.
It is no accident that this line of enquiry in part leads back to
the 'pragmatism' encountered in 5.1.
The source of the range of possible courses of action open
to and perceived by social actors clearly and indisputably resides
in the real social situations, past and present, which have been
experienced. Not all experiences in their full vivacity and rami-
fications are retained, and Schutz speaks of 'sedimentation' to
refer to the process whereby the significance or relevance of some
rather than other historical experiences, of some aspects of an
experience rather than other aspects, becomes part of the available
and usable stock of knowledge for the actor(s) in question (cf.
Schutz, 1972, p.7Sff.). This process of sedimentation, whereby
the 'objective' world enters, so to speak, the subjective
consciousness of social actors does not occur randomly, but in a
patterned way.
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At an~ given moment in histo~y( an actor will have at his
disposal, 'sedimented' from his experiences in social life, a set
of 'concepts' and 'propositions' which inform him about how future
situations are likely to react to his actions as he pursues his
objectives. Such a 'theory' (or, more realistically, a 'set of
theories') will help him to recognise situations, categorise them
and plan appropriate courses of action. It will, in my language,
inform him of his social possibilities, and his social impossi-
bilities - although much of this 'guidance' will be implicit,
resulting in (habitual) choices which previous experiences rendered
realistic, practical and not worthy of rethinking.
In order to understand how the 'objective' world relates
to 'subjective' experience, and consequently with social action, it
is important to realise how such 'theories' articulate with social
reality. People do not usually continue to act in accordance with
the prescriptions of their 'theories' if present social situations
do not 'react' as expected, or if they encounter new, unfamiliar
situations which cannot be expected to follow known patterns.
Neither is the social world experienced as possessing such an
orderly state that something new or unexpected leads to a "night-
mare" of anomie uncertainty, as one might think from the Durkheimian
14tradition of theorising.
Actors do not possess unchanging sets of normative expect-
ations or systems of typifications designed by society in its
institutional wisdom. 'Theories', as I have called them, derive
from actors' past experiences of society, just as the social
scientists' theories are based on traditions and experiences; but
just as the latter are revisable in the light of new experiences, so
15too with the former.
"The distinction between application of categories
and theories and their modification is crucial if
we wish to explain why people come to interpret
the world as they do. Only by locating the point
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o~ origin o~ concepts and beliefs can we
locate th.e theoretical or practical problems
which [an] innovation was required to remove
and which, in conjunction with the then
existing experience and knowledge of the
person concerned, forms the basis of the
explanation. The key to such an explanation,
put very briefly, is the plausibility of the
new concepts and ideas to the innovator as a
way of dealing with a problematic situation."
(Clarke, 1975, p.108).
In many aspects of their everyday life, social actors are necessarily
. 16pragmatlc. Sets of expectations do not endure in the moral
certainty and with the universal applicability that Parsons presumes,
because actors' everyday theories do not work all the time. As long
as they do work people will tend to muddle through unproblematically,
leading to the habitualisation of actions. As they continue to
work, people may even forget the original theories underlying their
behaviour. If they fail to work, the blame may initially be located
in the situation itself rather than theory, as with McHugh's (1968)
student respondents. In time, however, it will become clear that
the theory is no longer plausible, and 'theories', 'concepts' and
'propositions' require some attention - amendment, extension,
revision etc. The parallel with a sensiLising methodology is
complete.
The logic of this discussion now needs to be redrafted in
terms of the concept of possibilities in order to conclude this
argument. The social world is both enabling and constraining in the
sense that social actors, through experiences of 'living', become
aware of what they have done, might have done, could not do, or did
do but regretted for various reasons. Objective or "structural"
possibilities and impossibilities become incorporated in varying
degrees of 'accuracy', in their everyday theories of social life,
which then sensitise their users to the nature of the next situation
confronted. Actors may either overestimate the possibilities/
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impossibilities or underestimate them - i.e. the present social
situation may be more or less unyielding than their theory predicts.
In such circumstances, everyday theorising may become adjusted if
the actor behaves such as to become aware of the difference, or not
if the behaviour exhibited produces no such awareness. Informed
by more experience, confirming or adjusting the theory in question,
the pragmatic actor enters new situations with an appraisal of his
perceived social possibilities and impossibilities.
The relationship between the 'objective' structural network
of possibilities/constraints and the perceived social set of possi-
bilities/impossibilities is thus dynamic and cannot be expected to
be one-to-one. This type of approach has a number of theoretically
significant implications: first, since an actor's behaviour in a
situation depends upon 'theories' constructed and tested in previous
situations, It has an inevitable historical dimension; second, it
warns against the oversimple association of constraint with
'objective' reality. It is precisely this latter tendency - derived
from the Durkheimian tradition - that has created the difficulties
encountered in reconciliation of the postulates of voluntarism and
constraint.
5.2.4 Constraint, structure and Power
In the above theoretical construction, the objective social
world impinges upon a person's behaviour by entering into the
subjective process by which he shapes the course of action to pursue.
This occurs through a historical formulation of everyday theories which
inform him of his social possibilities and impossibilities17 - on
the practical assumption that the present situation will conform to
past experiences of similar situations - and by the contemporary
success or failure of his selected course of action, the latter
experience subsequently adding to his stock of knowledge with an
appropriate extension or revision of his present theories. Through
this dynamic relationship between the subjective and objective
dimensions, the notion social constraint - or the social barriers
to freedom of choice - is assimilated to the postulate of voluntarism.
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This view presupposes t.hat; the constraints on human freedom
originate in the. world that exists independently of; the particular
person or group whose actions are being examined. This objective
interactive process described. Far from leading away from an
world therefore presents opportunities and barriers which over a period
of time tend to become more or less known to its participants via the
analysis of the objective world, this interpretive approach requires
its investigation in order to account for the range of social
possibilities and impossibilities of the actors in question. In
theorising organisational power and politics, this need to understand
the scope of choice offered implies that a concept of 'social
structure' - or rather a concept with a similar point of reference -
becomes highly pertinent.
The social world in which actions take place and which they
collectively (re)create, is not a vacuum nor a randomly distributed
set of relationships with equal weight. Conflicting goals, unfore-
seen consequences of action etc. militate against the smoothly-working,
neatly-integrated social system, but the concretely-existing social
world does present its participants and creators with a structure of
sorts. This world 'possesses' a structure or network of possibilities
and impossibilities which may to a greater or lesser extent resemble
the actor's understanding of his potential courses of action.
'structure' is not determinative of social actions, but may be
considered as a framework within which social life is enacted. It
This
with possible courses of action denied to other actors. This new
is not reflected one-to-one in actors' definitions of the world of
18possibilities, and the same structure will present some actors
concept of 'structure' as a network of objective opportunities and
constraints, is an essential ingredient in sociological analysis,
and will require further detailed attention in Chapter Seven.
One further matter remains before this chapter ends, and
the outline of an approach to the topic of organisational politics
begins : how does 'power' fit into this reformulation of an inter-
pretive approach? The criticism of interpretive sociology that it
remains on the level of subjective consciousness, is "free-floating"
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or devoid o;f;social constraint, carries with it the corollary ~
noted more by Marxist theorists than conventional structuralists
that it can say nothing about power and politics.19 However,
once the interpretive approach takes into account the constraint
factor, it can by simple extension examine the role of power in
social life, because power is one of the foremost types of social
constraint. The easiest and most convenient distinction relates
to the intentionality of the constraints imposed on social actors.
Constraints may be intentionally or unintentionally imposed
by third parties, and, as a sensitising notion, power may usefully
be viewed as actions meaningfully deployed by one actor (or group)
to restrict (increase) the range of possibilities (impossibilities)
of a second actor or group of actors. Such power actions may be
sanctioned or prescribed by the rules and regulations in force in
the social arena being investigated, thus being descxibable as acts
of 'institutional authority'; or they may be perceived as socially
legitimate, hence describable as acts of 'normative authority'
(see Chapter One) • Whatever the label used to describe a particular
act whereby constraint is deliberately applied, this sensitising
notion of 'power' involves essentially social acts.
Other constraints may be applied to an actor without the
conscious, meaningful actions of a second person. This may occur
through two general factors: first, there are social factors or
mechanisms in the social world which effectively delimit the social
possibilities of actors independent of the deliberate willing of
individuals in the social situation in question. Rules and regu-
lations are a notable example of this in the formal organisational
context (cf. Gouldner's now classic analysis of rules, 1954).
Such mechanisms, as with any social factor, are of course the
creation of historic social actors, and are sustained by contemporary
ones, so that their constraining role is at times difficult to
distinguish from intentional political actions - in the case of
institutional authority, indeed, power becomes the social application
of rules etc. My purpose, however, is not to enter into a
prolonged conceptual monologue that Mills (1970) would call the
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Ufetishing of concepts", ;f;orthis would short-circuit the sensi-
tising function of concepts. My effective conception of power
and politics depends as much on the rest of my framework which is
the subject of Part Three.
The second main type of social constraint not imposed
through the intentional actions of social actors relates to a
very important phenomenon which has been too much neglected in
this short chapter, viz. the unintended consequences of social
20actions.
consequences which escalate, so affecting
existing situations on which new meanings
are imposed" (Atkinson, 1972, p.264).
"The intentional activity of individuals and
classes creates the intended and unintended
I have already suggested that actors inevitably constrain themselves
by choosing courses of action which necessarily exclude future
possibilities, but I am specifically interested here in the unintended
consequences of social interactions en masse. The pursuit of
divergent goals or the acting-out of conflicting intentions create
situational exigencies which few or none of the participants intend,
but nevertheless shape the structural possibilities and impossibilities
in future social situaLions.
The interpretive sociological analysis of politics does not
concern itself solely with acts of power, because the latter are
"only" (nevertheless important) what Clegg (1975) would call surface
displays of the 'power' or the political phenomenon. To comprehend
such displays it is important to know the 'objective' structure of
possibilities within which historical and contemporary framework,
intentional activities become manifest. Knowledge of this structure,
including the 'non-intentional' constraints which are patterned and
differentially applied - so that rules are not in general unrealistic,
impartial mechanisms, but favour one party's interests over another's -
help the sociologist to identify the mobilisation of bias in the
social arena, and ~onsequently belong without question to the political
realm.
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In this chapter J: have.per;t;orroedsome of the groundwork
necessary for; Part Three. Starting ;from the principle that the
social world is a contingent rather than adeterroinative.set of
relationships, about which it is only possible to obtain
conjectural knowledge, I have discussed the methodological and
theoretical implications for an interpretive sociology. Above
all, I have argued for asensitising methodology that safeguards
the empirical possibilities of social reality, and a theory of
social possibilities which enables an interpretive sociology to
entertain a strong concept of constraint. Before moving to
Part Three and the consideration of this approach to the topic of
organisational power and politics, I shall present in Chapter Six
a summary of the analysis to date, and prepare the conceptual
themes that have emerged for theoretical exploration.
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Chapter·Five
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
A second "style" of sociology, which Mills calls
"abstracted empiricism", equally violates the relation-
ship between theory and its subject matter by an
immersion in "facts" and a neglect of theory. For
reasons already explained, my interests lie in the
"grand theory" style.
In Chapter One and throughout Part One, I have distinguished
'concept' from 'effective conception' in order to take
account of this process whereby concepts take on meaning
beyond their formal definitions because of their relation-
ship with other concepts and with the prevailing theoretical
tradition.
Popper (1969, pp.8-9 and elsewhere) describes one of the
dangers of the optimistic epistemology as "epistemological
authoritarianism", because its pronouncements on knowledge
(and ori the possibilities of knowledge) exceed the authority
it possesses to rule on 'truth-value'. This happens because
of the faulty doctrine that "truth is manifest".
This proposition is specifically argued below.
In a somewhat different context, Baldamus (1976, p~18ff.)
speaks of the 'vagueness' of sociological vocabularies. The
term 'vagueness' itself is probably unfortunate, since it
carries connotations of purposeful lack of precision, which
arepatently not part of Blumer's arguments.
Huber also argues critically
"••• That the SI [symbolic interaction] tradition shares
with the philosophy of pragmatism, from which it
originates, an epistemology which makes it reflect the
social biases of the researcher and of the people whose
behaviour is observed". (Huber, 1973, p.275).
It is only a scientific positivist who could possibly. have
said this! The. 'critical' content of this statement lies
in the use of the word 'bias', otherwise it appears to be
a fairly accurate statement of the type of knowledge of
which a realistic (pragmatic?) sociology is capable.
Given the postulate of voluntarism, sociological theory
clearly must attempt to comprehend social life in terms
of the "biases" of the social actors themselves. This is
the essence of Gidden's conception of the "double
hermeneutic" (Giddens, 1976, p.79). Given the inade-
quacy of the doctrine that 'truth is manifest' - a faulty
epistemology that facts speak for themselves (Popper,
1969) - knowledge is indeed produced through the inter-
pretive powers ('biases') of the researcher. Huber's
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7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
statement could only appear to be controversially critical
to exponents of Popper's 'optimistic epistemology'.
See Mills' (1970, pp.215ff.) excellent appendix "On
Intellectual Craftsmanship". Also Baldamus (1976,
p.32ff.) on the "intuitive" methods of sociological
theorising.
On rationality and habit in social action, compare Weber,
1964, p.115ff.; Rationality as a sociological and philo-
sophical issue is far too complex to be tackled here. It
has, of course, been subject to intense debate in recent
years.
Although rather entangled in the subjective-objective
dispute - in its theoretical, philosophical and methodol-
ogical guise - the problem of constraint has received much
recent attention, e.g. Dreitzel (1970), Bryant (1970),
Hindess (1972), Fallding (1972), Bauman (1973a, 1973b),
Gorman (1975), Best (1975), Turner (1977).
Parsons commenced from a "voluntaristic" theory of social
action, and attemFted to reconcile it with rhe constraining
power of 'society' by proposing a mechanistic theory of
socialisation. Berger and Luckmann (1971) also argue that
the antithetical positions of Weber and Durkheim are recon-
cilable. Clarke (1975, Chapter 8) demonstrates the in-
adequacies of these two attempts.
Clegg (1975) might relate this taken-for-granted knowledge
of one's social possibilities/impossibilities to one's
"form of life".
Such a study is obviously beyond the scope of this thesis,
although the remaining pages of this chapter provide a broad
outline of it, and Part Three endeavours to illustrate it
with respect to tbe topic of organisational power and
politics.
Hindess (1972) criticises Schutz's social phenomenology
(1972) on the grounds that subjective meanings in his
approach remain a sociologically unexplicated factor :
"As far as the social world is concerned they (i.e.
subjective meanings] are determining but not
determined, in it but not of it in the way that all
other things are" (Hindess, 1972, p.17).
As Clarke (1975, p.l09) argues, this leads to a "mystical
view of the genesis of such meanings". It is precisely
such "mysticism" that has led to many of the sociological
doubts about interpretive approaches.
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14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
Berger and Luckmann argue :
"On the level of meaning, the institutional order
represents a shield against terror". (Berger and
Luckmann, 1971, p.119).
The implication that the objective world of institutions
provides protection against the alternative terrifying
state of meaninglessness, shows distinct parallels with
Parsons' world of a normative order to which actors
willingly conmit themselves through binding legitimation.
In both neo-Durkheimian worlds, 'society' provides order
and meaning for the social actor rather than the latter
making sense of his experiences to produce order and
meaning. Cf. Light's review (1969) of Berger and Luck-
mann.
Social actors do not all the time employ flexible, corrig-
ible theories. Indeed, some everyday 'theories' (e.g.
ideologies) are capable of accounting for all exigencies
in a manner disconcertingly similar to the circularity of
closed academic theories. See Chapter Eight.
Schutz proposed the thesis that actors, in their 'natural
attitude' to the social world, are characterised by a
'pragmatic motive' (e.g. Schutz, 1970, p.l02). While, as
a general statement, this certainly oversimplifies the
variable process of social interpretation, pragmatism
constitutes an important mode of everyday theorising. See
Chapter Eight.
To say that actors 'know' the real social world via their
everyday theories is not to say that they accept what they
'know' as morally or politically right. All actors have an
ultimate ability to act contrary to their theories - e.g. in
some radical cause - but they must "face the facts" of the
objective world, and they 'know' it!
Beynon (1973) provides a telling example of what I mean
"••• no matter how radical or well-intentioned the
men who become leaders of trade unions are, their
position within the union (and hence within capitalist
society) creates severe problems for them if they try
to put their intentions into practice ••• The radical
trade unionist fights by the rules of the system that
he hardly approves of, within an organisation that is
incapable of changing those rules". (Beynon, 1973,
pp.299-300) .
Tiryakian (1970) employs a concept of social structure which
is similar in appearan~e
"0 ••• l3ocial phenomena] are actualisations or manifest-
ations from an existential ground of possibilities, and
it is this ground which we refer to as social
structure". (Tiryakian, 1970, p.118).
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18.
19.
20.
(cont'd)
However, his aim is to renovate structural-functionalism
by giving it a historical dimension, and thus moves from
his concept of structure in the opposite direction to
that followed herein.
Hindess (1972, p.23), for example, rightly concludes that
there are no politics in a Schutz ian world. Dreitzel
(1970), responding to the phenomonology and ethnomethod-
ology, also makes the point that
" ••• the social world is not only structured by
language but also by the modes and forces of material
production and by the systems of domination".
(Dreitzel, 1970, p.xvii).
The unintended consequences of social (political) action
are not explicitly examined fully in Part Three either. As
explained in Chapter One, the burden of the thesis is in
understanding of politics as socially meaningful action,
but, in Chapter Nine it is not possible to discuss political
action and process without reference to 'unintentions'.
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CH.z;.PTERSIX
BRINGING FORWARD ·CONCEPTUAL ·THEMESFOR· THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
Remembering the strengths and weaknesses of the approaches
examined in Part One, and building upon the methodological and
theoretical premises established in Chapter Five, it is possible to
present a set of sensitising themes and propositions about the
nature of political life in an organisational context. In this
chapter, it seems appropriate to reconsider briefly the lines of
argument presented in Part One, and to discuss the basic form of the
conceptual themes which, emerging from the work so far, together
provide the clues to future theoretical development.
6.1 Outline of the Three Approaches to Organisational Power
In concluding Part One, I suggested that the three politics-
related approaches L~at had emerged within the organisational liter-
ature did not happen in an unrelated manner. Indeed the historical
development of approaches to organisational power and politics had
followed a similar pattern to that observable in the study of power
and politics in other fields. In discussing and evaluating a number
of relevant organisation theories, it was possible to discern three
general types of approach - the 'unitary', the 'political-conflict'
(pluralist) and the 'critical' - and some of the implications of the
approaches were detailed. In this section, I shall draw these
types of approach together in summary form for purposes of comparison.
At all times it should be remembered that in carrying out this
exercise, the particularities of each theory will be submerged in
the general type. Each type of approach is assessed according to
how it deals with certain major questions of (organisational)
politics, e.g. 'power', order, conflict, possibility (opportunity)
and impossibility (constraint).
The 'unitary' approach, under which label were included the
authority theorists, Simon's decision-making theory and Etzioni's
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compliance framework, projects the image of an organisation that
has a formally defined order established through the operation and
acceptance of rules and institutional authority. This focus upon
(formal) organisational order leads to a subsequent neglect of con-
flict since power (= authority) is a hierarchically-distributed
resource for achieving the organisation's goals or tasks, and the
problems of lateral relationships are not considered. Conflict is
thus neglected on the horizontal dimension and ruled out of court by
an institutional/behavioural notion of authority and a theoretically-
imposed state of consensus. In this static approach, order is un-
problematic and more-or-less rationalised with reference to normative
consent.
In contrast, although the political-conflict or pluralist
approach to power and politics shares an ultimate orientation to
organisational order, the latter is theorised in strictly conflict
terms. Order is seen to result as a balance or equilibrium from the
ongoing power-conflict interactions between horizontal groupings;
this balance either is a natural/coalitional achievement or is
achieved through the mediation of a neutral referee (e.g. general
management) . Although conflict is unavoidable - it is even un-
desirable to attempt to prevent it - it is also bounded because it
always takes place within rules mutually-accepted by the parties.
Power is essentially systemic, observable in conflict situations,
wielded according to specific issues and derived from functional/
structural sources.
In the critical approach advocated by Stewart Clegg, order
is neither formally established nor accomplished by some form of
coalitional behaviour. It is rather grounded in a deep-lying
structure of power which permeates the way people thinki for this
reason I conceive Clegg as providing a hegemonic theory of organis-
ational order. Since this structural bias is an all-pervasive
influence, conflict only occurs at the surface over issues which are
permitted and channelled by those (economic) principles that pattern
power and politics in the (industrial) organisation. Being bounded
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to the organisation's "form of life". The sociological essence
thus, conflict occurs only over issues of relative insignificance
of organisational 'power' turns on the nature of "domination" so
that power and authority (as surface phenomena) become indistinguish-
able. This static, ahistorical depth model of power in organis-
ations is founded upon a "pre-cognitive" consensus about the life-
form of the organisation in its (capitalist) societal context.
Figure 6.1 below intends to characterise these three types
of approach in general outline.
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Figure 6.1 General Characteristics of Three Types of
Approach to Organisational Power and Politics
Unitary Pluralist Critical
Exponents Simon, Etzioni, Crozier, Clegg
Authority Hickson et al.,
theorists Zald, Cyert and
March,
Pettigre\v
Burns, Dalton
Primary Order Conflict Order
Concern
Theoretical Prescriptive Descriptive Analytic
Orientation
Central Notions Systems/behaviour-:- Systems/ Domination
of 'Power' al power exchange power
Insti t.ut.Lona L Institutional
authority aut..hority
Theory of Formalist/ Balance
Political Order Rationalist (natural or Hegemonic
referee)
Theory of Conflict Limited/
Political None \vithin formal insignificant
Conflict rules conflict with-
in political
order
Organisational Vertical Horizontal Vertical
Dimension
"Face of Power" Neither First Second
Consensus Assumed; Assumed; 'Bedrock' j
formal normative precognitive
Change Static (via Processual Ahistorical
formalism) within stable static (via
structure depth analogy)
Main political Managers Managers Managers
actors
Basic None Burns/Dalton Clegg's version
Advantages approach stress- locates politics
es the richness within its
of politics as socio-economic
experienced by contextjstresses
actors; emphas- the limits to
ises the possi- and impossi-
bilities of bilities of
political action.
action.
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These types of approach more-or-less summarise the arguments
presented in Part One and should be understood as referring to
patterns or tendencies in the academic theorising of organisational
power and politics. The last two points of comparison in the
table - about the main political actors and the basic advantages
of the three approaches - need some expansion before considering
the emergent theories that will frame future discussion.
The first of these points can be dealt with fairly briefly.
The study of organisa'tional power, authority and politics has
usually been examined by observing the behaviour of members of
management. The unitary approach inevitably relates to managerial
actions because it locates power, authority and control'in the top
echelons of the organisation, and the lower participants' actions
are predictable responses to that 'power'. The critical approach
of Clegg also focuses theoretically on managers because it is their
power position which is structurally created and socially (pre-
cognitively) accepted as legitimate. Empirically, therefore,
Clegg studies the management of his building site, not the workers.
There is no theoretical reason for the political-conflict model's
concentration on management power and politics - indeed it
encourages the view that all groups in the organisation participate
in the power-conflict process - but the greater visibility of
politics amongst managers (including managers as "representatives"
of departments) appears to have encouraged such an empirical locus
Iof study.
In Chapter Five, I suggested that political action involved
two facets which both required analysis: first, politics concern
the striving of human beings to control their lives given the circum-
stances that confront them; they are also, about the inability of
men and women to effect such control for various ~easons. In
short, the study of organisational politics involves the under-
standing of the social possibilities and impossibilities of power
actions at various levels of the organisation. In Chapter Four, I
argued that the 'political action' variant of the political-conflict
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approach and Clegg's depth analysis of organisational power
together present us with themes and problems that can guide the
process of a priori theorising. The former approach stresses
the creative, voluntaristic facet of politics by demonstrating
how participants act within and outwith the 'formal' power
structure and use the latter informally to further organisational,
departmental and non-organisational goals. In contrast, Clegg
argues that opportunities for action are not as they appear on the
surface, and the observable conflicts created by active attempts to
influence the organisational process are insignificant when seen
in the deeper context of organisational power. Whereas the
promise of Burns' and Dalton's work lies in its concentration on
~
political conflict and the human striving to realise social possi-
bilities, Clegg's 'critical' approach offers theoretical insights
into the political nature of organisational order and how social
actions become thwarted by the structural existence and (tacit)
social awareness of impossibilities or barriers.
Having brought together these three types of approach and
compared them on certain points of significance for the study of
organisational politics, it is now necessary to abstract from the
previous analysis certain conceptual themes which are capable of
providing important analytical axes to further that study.
6.2 Co~ceptual Points of Referen~e
Most of the organisational approaches considered have more-
or-less exclusively focused on power and authority in the context
of managerial behaviour, so that it is hardly surprising that
politics have tended to reproduce common-sense wisdoms about the
functioning and location of authority or the competitive nature of
organisational (i.e. managerial) power. It is the purpose of
Part Three of the thesis to look behind these wisdoms, and this is
to be achieved by extending discussion beyond the assumptions and
propositions that characterise the types of approaches outlined.
It is, of course, not possible herein to elaborate all issues of
relevance to the political dimension of organisational life; but
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the critical arguments of Parts One and Two have suggested certain
conceptual themes which, if utilised with care and in conjunction,
may provide insightful points of reference for the development of
a sensitising framework for the analysis of that dimension. In
this section I shall introduce these themes and their inter-
relationships.
The three conceptual themes in question have emerged in
response to the needs to organise theoretical material and to
resolve basic problems in the literature. Following SOCiological
conventions, it is helpful to conceive each theme as a dichotomous
pair of concepts, pointing to important features of power and
politics; moreover, each theme, so conceived, may be treated
with reference to the other themes (cf. Baldamus, 1976). It is
also notable that these themes relate to ongoing debates that have
divided L~e social scientific establishment over the last twenty-
five years, viz. those on Community Power, order vs. conflict
theory and structural vs. interpretive sociology. The themes are
incorporated respectively in the conceptions of the first and
second faces of power, political order and political conflict, and
impossibility and possibility. The approach that develops around
these conceptual themes is therefore a conscious attempt to re-
establish contact between general SOCiological theory and organis-
ation theory (see Chapter One), but, on the other hand, does not
pretenn to be a detailed contribution to anyone of the debates
mentioned. At best, I hope to show that the substance of each
debate may be better appreciated if understood in the context of
the issues raised by the other debates. More specifically, I
believe that interrelating the three conceptual themes, followed
by a deeper analysis of the issues thus raised is one fruitful way
of illuminating the topic of organisational power and politics.
6.2.1 The Two Faces of Power
Possibly the most important contribution to the theory of
organisational power made by Clegg's depth structuralist approach
(1975), is the application of Bachrach and Baratz's (1971) famous
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argument to the organisational sphere. The distinction between
the two faces of power is analytical and differentiates between
the concrete, observable exercise of power, and the abstract logic
or structure in which all such exercises are rooted. Since overt
displays of power and subsequent decisions are dependent upon those
issues which are allowed to be raised by the "way the system works",
a full discussion of politics requires an understanding of the
abstract tendencies or biases of the structural framework of power.
(cf. Bachrach and Baratz, 1971; 1973; Balbus, 1971; Frey, 1971).
The analysis of the second face of power presupposes a
satisfactory theory of the way it relates to the first face. One
of the problems with advocates of the two faces thesis - and, I
believe, implicit in Clegg's more refined version - is the tendency
to introduce a greater or lesser degree of deterministic power
to the (deep) analytic structure of power. The postulate of
voluntarism, however, precludes giving such a quality to the
"structure of dominancy", and the resolution of this problem is
central to my position.
At this stage, I shall simply assert my belief that the
distinction (and the articulation) between the structural pre-
dispositions of power embedded in the institutional operation of
society and the overt displays of power visible in any particular
social arena, is indispen3able to the analysis of pJlitics in that
arena. The conceptual and theoretical implications of this theme
will occupy much attention in the following chapters.
6.2.2. Political Order and Political Conflict
In Part One it was helpful to distinguish between approaches
according to whether their major concern was to explain organis-
ational order or organisational conflict in terms of the uses or the·
patterns of power and authority. Some approaches took shape around
the problems of the political integration of the organisation while
others conceived of conflict as the major focus of political actions.
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Much professional capital and theoretical mileage have
been had from the order-conflict debate, and it is therefore in-
conceivable that there is much to be gained from either summar-
ising it or participating in it. Whether the approaches differ
as 'theories', 'perspectives' or 'ideologies', and whether they
are compatible or not for whatever reason remain interesting topics
for speculative discussion. I consider the notions as forming a
second conceptual theme which can perform a sensitising function for
the analysis of organisational power and politics. I shall be
employing the terms to refer to concepts rather than approaches
to refer, that is, to organisational states that provide the context
for particular exercises of power, and which the latter in turn
create, reinforce and change.
As a matter of definition, therefore, the framework to be
developed expects power to be implicated in both organisational
states.
6.2.3 Possibilities and Impossibilities
The third conceptual theme is based upon the proposition,
introduced explicitly in Chapter Five, that the analysis of organis-
ational politics must involve consideration of the two facets of
social action i.e. choice and constraint. It is essential to
examine those factors which give rise to the experience of what is
and what is not possible and how social actors act upon such
experience to produce the political process - conflictful or
orderly - which is part of everyday life at every level of the organ-
isation.
It is here argued that the theorising task is aided by
concepts of possibilities and impossibilities. Politics may refer
to the "art of the possible", but every politician's possibilities
are from the start restricted, and any success he may enjoy will
have intended and unintended repercussions for the possibilities of
others - these possibilities, that is, may only be realisable by
rendering impossible other participants goals (imposition of such
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constraint may of course be the aim of the first person).
'Impossibilities', then, stress the fact that social life
involves constraints, whereas 'possibilities' playa dual theoret-
ical role: first, of providing a conceptual device that insists,
in the end, on the analysis of politics as social action; second,
of including, in theoretical guise, the methodological injunction
to keep analysis open to empirical possibilities.
These conceptual themes stand independently of each other,
and, as unrelated themes bear directly upon the conceptual problems
involved in the analysis of organisational politics. However,
it is my contention that the anaZysis of the latter benefits more
significantly by seeing these themes in juxtaposition to each other.
The interrelationships between these themes produce points of
reference for the theoretical development of the thesis, so that,
in their interdependence, the three themes above maybe considered
as the "analytical axes" of the theoretical discussion in Chapters
Seven, Eight and Nine.
In order to organise this discussion, I have taken the "two
faces of power" theme as the main analytical axis which will provide
the central points of reference for the remaining chapters.- Taking
the "two faces of power" theme as the focus point, I can now present
the outline of the theoretical framework by relating the other twc
themes to it and tracing L~e theoretical problems to which they
point.
6.3 Images of Order and Conflict in the Two Faces of Power
The analysis of organisational power and politics may first
benefit from the cross-reference of these two analytical axes.
Power is conceived as involving concrete uses or exercises (politics)
and as being structurally grounded in the context of its use;
further, power and politics both reflect and reinforce or change
processes of order and conflict. While bearing in mind that such
dichotomous distinctions are oversimplifications of the conceptual
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problems encapsulated within them, we can nevertheless draw ~ome
interesting implications from their consideration. Figure 6.2
represents the interrelationship between these analytical axes.
Figure 6.2 Order and Conflict "in the Two Faces of Power
I Order Conflict
(1) ( 2)
Politics Politics of inte- Politics of
(first face) gration and resistance and
consensus struggle
(3) (4)
Structural Structural pre- Structural
framework of dispositions predispositions
power (second towards order towards conflict
face)
In this view order and conflict are conceived as characterising
power in both its faces. Without pre-empting discussion below
it is possible to indicate some of the theoretical implications
of this juxtaposition of analytical axes.
The critical examination of the literature pertinent to
organisational power revealed two approaches that are particularly
insightful - Clegg's critical approach and the Burns/Dalton
political action view. The former intentionally concentrates on
the "neglected" face of power and, in the ways described in
Chapter Four, produces an effective theory of political order based
upon precognitive consensus over the structure of dominancy. This
focus on the taken-for-granted state of order induced by deep-
lying structural principles relates power and its exercise (i.e.
politics) to the material form of life which constitutes the "
premises of industrial organisation in capitalist society, and
therefore speaks to the theoretical problem in cell 3 of Figure
6.2.
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The major contribution2 of the political action approach,
on the other hand, is to the understanding of the problem of cell
2. The analysis of the group-basis of organisational politics
and the study of the latter in terms of conflict and struggles
over issues of immediate concern to the actors in the organisation
restricts this approach, for the most part, to the understanding
of political conflict and its concrete social accomplishment. Both
approaches make fundamental inroads into the topic of organisational
power and politics, but each is limited to certain aspects and
tends to overlook what, on a priori grounds, appear to be problems
of potentially equal importance.3
Interestingly, there appears to be a recurrent tendency to
treat first conflict and the concrete exercise of power (its
"action" face) and second order and the structural framework of
power as almost-natural conceptual and theoretical allies. (cf.
Horton, 1966, p.703ff.). While they do constitute important
facets of and problems for the theoretical framework I am proposing,
Figure 6.2 suggests that they do not exhaust the possibilities.
A sole concern for the structural predispositions towards order
and stability inevitably directs attention away from the fact that
the same structural background of power may also be conducive to
the creation of conflict relationships to be enacted in the concrete
4political process. Marxist or 'radical' traditions have always
recognised the possibility (often expressed as an inevi~ability)
of structural predispositions towards conflict, with its impli-
cations for social change, but Clegg's neglect of this theoretical
problem renders his critical approach as partial as the political-
conflict view which he seeks to criticise. For diametrically-
opposed but logically-compatible reasons, by borrowing from and
reinforcing the conventional "affinities" referred to above, the
critical approach is subject to the same shortcoming as its
pluralist antagonists; both treat the "rules of the game" or the
"form of life" as necessarily internally consistent. When this
assumption is dropped, the possibility of structuraZ predispositions
towards conflict arises. This theoretical problem is indicated in
cell 4 of Figure 6.2.
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Just as the theoretical relationship between the structural
background of power and conflict in organisational relations needs
to be articulated, so too it is necessary to understand that the
political order of organisations is not pre-ordained either by a
structural-cum-cultural determinism (implicit in Clegg) or
through a convenient balance of pluralist forces. In fact, order
.is actively accomplished from within the organisational arena, so
that the politics of order (cellI) need to be treated as a distinct
theoretical problem of no less importance than the other previously-
mentioned problems. In this way it is possible to elaborate the
political aspects of both axes of analysis.
6.4 Possibilities and Impossibilities in the Two Faces of Power
A similar examination of the second pair of axes allows the
discovery of a number of further points of reference for theoretical
development below.
Figure 6.3 Impossibilities and Possibilities in the Two
Faces of Power.
Impossibilities Possibilities
I I IIPolitics Social Social
(First face) impossibilities possibilities.
III IV
Structural Structural Structural
]frameYlork of impossibilities possibilities
Power
(Second face)
In Chapter Five, power was seen in its relation to the
social and intentional exercise of constraint, and it was argued
that politics - the active pursuit of opportunities and attempts
to control the constraints (intentional or otherwise) imposed by
virtue of one's participation in the organisation - were related·
to the network of perceived social possibilities and impossibilities
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of action. Politics involve both social opportunity and social
constraint, and may create order and conflict in an organisation
through the enactment of intentions; furthermore intentions (and
processes of organisational conflict and order) may themselves
affect and be affected by the unanticipated consequences of
concrete actions (i.e. in the first face) .
Possibilities and impossibilities interrelate with
intentions and 'unintentions' to produce the social process of
organisational politics, but, if the analysis so far is accurate,
the argument needs to be extended beyond the "first face".
,n our acts do not intend to defeat themselves
and are not defeated merely or exclusively through
what they intend. They are defeated also through
the obduracy of nature and social reality"
(Lichtman, 1970, p.78).
Organisational politics, that is, are not free-floating, existing
in a social vacuum, but can only be fully understood with
reference to structural factors which act to delimit or facilit~
ate certain courses of internal action.
Figure 6.3 portrays the possible relationships between the
second pair of analytlcal axes. If we construe organisational
power and politics as requiring study at two "levels" of analysis
(i.e. as possessing a 'structrual' and an 'action' face), and if
they are further conceived as emerging from the possibilities and
impossibilities of organisational action, the conceptual framework
discloses four more theoretical problems. As with the discussion
of Figure 6.2 above, two of these problems have been attended to
by the two approaches already mentioned.
Clegg's structural analysis of power in organisations
allies the (second face) concept of domination with the production
of action impossibilities which are known but often unarticulated
because of their grounding in an unreflective "understanding" of
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'how organisations (should) work'. The structure of domination,
in rendering certain actions impossible or literally unthinkable,
creates a predisposition towards the (orderly) reproduction of
itself. In such circumstances we may speak of structural
impossibilities i.e. the structural context of power makes certain
types of project unobtainable whatever actors contrive to do.
The political action approach, on the other hand, places
particular emphasis upon politics as a means of pursuing perceived
possibilities. Remaining on the concrete level of the observation
and examination of organisational situations, actors are seen as
having distinct opportunities to control their own destinies
through their own, group-supported efforts. Such an analysis of
social possibilities - the pursuit of which generates organisational
conflict - provides a basis for understanding a second relevant
problem for a theory of organisational politics.
These approaches deal respectively with cells III and II in
Figure 6.3, and leave untouched two remaining problems. The first
of these problems (cell I) implies that the concrete social inter-
actions that are identifiable as politics need to be examined in
terms of not only perceived (social) possibilities but also
perceived (social) impossibilities. Political actors in organis-
ations, as in any other arena, develop an awareness of what projects
are open to them and what are closed (and probable degrees of oper.-
ness and closure) - a consciousness, that is, of the structural
framework of power which they face, for the most part, as unalter-
able facts of life.5 Needless to say, there is no a priori reason
to expect that actors' everyday theories will provide accurate
images of the real structural predispositions since it is possible
for image and reality to diverge significantly - indeed a person's
experiences of a structure may reinforce, not knowledgeable
acceptance of the latter's premises, but an alternative set of
premises. In such cases, however apparently pressing Or demanding
the structural framework of power, the courses of action followed
in an organisation can only be explained in terms of the 'theory'
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Or 'theories' which are.meaningfully applied by the actors them-
with such limited reference. This argument, to be elaborated in
selves. The latters' achievements, of course, are not explicable
Chapters Seven and Eight, thus stresses the importance of under-
standing how actors themselves perceive their social possibilities
and impossibilities.
The final problem to emerge from this discussion (cell IV)
concerns the opportunities for action which are structurally
predisposed. At the concrete level of analysis, social possi-
bilities are frequently negotiable and always require the energies
and efforts of actors to pursue them, but, quite often, opportunities
for action by members of the organisation are created by the
structural logic of society and the organisation. In such cases we
may refer to structural possibilities. For example, the career
structure and the allocation of discretion differentially offer
opportunities for individuals and groups to pursue. As with
structural impossibilities, such possibilities are not determinative
of socio-political actions, although they do establish predispositions
which, being perceived and enacted, may be realised by organisational
participants. Furthermore, the divergence between structural and
social possibilities exists as both a theoretical problem and en
empirical possibility.
In this chapter I have drawn from Parts One and Two three
important conceptual themes and, in relating them together, I have
outlined the bare bones of a framework within which academic
theorising about organisational power and politics may take place.
The more complex contours of this theoretical development will be
explored in Part Three. The simplifications involved in operating
with a set of dichotomous analytical axes are fairly clear - e.g.
structural predispositions possess different degrees of possibility
and impossibility for different actors in different positions at
different times on different issues, so that organisational politics
may take on a more-or-less open or a more-or-less closed character
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according to these contingencies. The ramifications of such
'grey'areas in these oversimple distinctions remain to be
examined.
So far I have hinted at the advantages of such a sensi-
tising theoretical framework which builds upon, and goes beyond,
the conventional conceptual affinities that relate political
action/conflict/possibility and structural-power/order/constraint.
It is my contention that a fuller understanding of organisational
power and politics - and one which allows for a wider range of
empirical possibilities - must consider the interrelated theoret-
ical issues which have been raised in this chapter.
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Chapter Six
NOTES
1. The main exception to this amongst the studies included
in this category is Crozier's investigation of work-
group conflict between maintenance and production
workers.
2. The reader's attention is once again drawn to the fact
that, while the works of Burns and Dalton show those
affinities outlined in Chapter Three that make it
possible to consider their approaches as being theoret-
ically similar, it would be inaccurate to treat both
sociologists as saying identical things on the subject
of organisational politics. Burns, for example, is
certainly not silent on the broader structural factors
involved in influencing the organisation's power
structure (cf. Burns and Stalker, 1961i Burns, 1961),
although his major contribution - as with Dalton's - is
best understood at the level of social acticn.
3. Their actual significance is of course an empirical
question, but, from the theoretical viewpoint, it is of
the utmost importance not to prejudge (and hence pre-
determine) the possibilities that the empirical world
contains. (See Chapter Five) .
4. In this context, 'radical' implies an analysis that goes
one step beyond a 'critical' approach such as Clegg's.
A radical viewpoint wou Ld incorporate the critical
appreciation of power and its operation, but extend the
analysis to comprehend what this appreciation means for
social change, i.e. in the terminology developed in
Chapter Five, it ~lould keep open empirical ?ossibilities
through theoretical devices.
5. Their consciousness or awareness may include, of course,
an intent to render alterable those "facts". See
Chapter Eight below.
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PART THREE
ORGANISATIONAL POWER AND POLITICS :
AN INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH.
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'CHAPTER' 'SEVEN
THE STRUcrURALFRAMEWORK' 'OF ORGANISATIONAL POWER
I have argued that political actions within formal organ-
isations cannot be adequately understood without reference to the
nature of the context in which they are located. To treat the
context as politically neutral or innocent is to overlook major
predispositions which objectively channel or shape the behaviour
of organisational participants as they attempt to control their
own work lives and, relatedly, those of others. Such purposive
actions involving strategies, tactics and the exercise of power
(i.e. politics) need to be explained with reference to the aims
and general theorising of actors themselves - this is the major
assumption underlying the thesis - but they cannot be understood
without prior knowledge of the structural and social contexts in
which these interpretive activities take place. In the present
chapter, which must be read in conjunction with Chapters Eight and
Nine, I shall examine the notion of a "structural framework" of
organisational power both as a general conception, for all social
arenas (organisational or otherwise) are "contextualised", and,
more specifically in relation to formal organisations. Further,
for the sake of discussion I shall focus more narrowly upon indus-
trial organisations in Britain (see 7.2). This exploration of
the conception of structural framework in such a specific context
does not constitute an exhaustive delineation of relevant issues,
but serves to illustrate the more abstract theoretical propositions
which are intended to sensitise the researcher to significant
aspects of the topic of organisational power and politics.
The uses of power which concern this thesis occur in organ-
isational arenas, and they may be structurally predisposed in two
ways. First, the organisational arena which envelops the process
of politics, is structured and ordered by procedures, mechanisms
and rationalities. Second, and more abstractly, organisations are
themselves embedded in a societal/institutional context which, in
its established structure, advocates and provides for certain ways
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aspects, and more localised organisational aspects; it is my
of "doing things" rather than other ways. The structural frame-
work of organisational power thus has both societal/institutional
contention that the initial task of any attempt to explain organ-
isational politics is the delineation of structural factors which
predispose the activities of participants. These factors db not
determine political actions, but they do impinge on actors' lives
directly and indirectly. Sociological explanation revolves
around understanding how actors make sense of (i.e. theorise) their
purposes within the set of circumstances which confronts them, and
which in general they do not choose.
To summarise, in Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine, I shall be
exploring concepts and propositions regarding three interrelated
phenomena: the process of organisational politics itself; the
structural framework in which that process is rooted; and the
interpretive activities of organisational participants which
mediate between political actions and their social and structural
contexts. As explained in Chapter One, my interest is particularly
in developing a sensitising framework in which the participants'
interpretive activities - their everyday theorising - is central.
Chapters Eight and Nine, the bulk of Part Three, reflect this over-
riding theoretical interest. However, political actions are not
free-floating, so, in the present chapter, I must examine their
structural context.l In limitinS:fattention at present to im-
personal, structural predispositions, and thereby more-or-less
ignoring social actors and their theorising, it should be borne in
mind that such a distinction is artificially created for the purposes
of clarification. As I shall show in the rest of Part Three,
the structural framework has no simple objective existence as many
structuralists are wont to assert. Readers interested in a
preview of the.arguments to come might like to consult Figure 9.2
(on p.386) •
In Section 7.1, I shall be examining the conception of
'structural framework' in abstract, and this notion will be elabor-
ated in Section 7.2 in the specific context of British industrial
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organisations. Sections 7.3 and 7.4 are devoted to a consider-
at ion of how the structural framework of industrial organisation
predisposes the potentiality to have and use power by bringing
into the argument the two analytical axes (structural possibilities/
impossibilities and structural order/conflict) introduced in Chapter
Six. Section 7.5 is rather like a post-script to the previous
three sections: in briefly looking at trade union organisation,
it serves both to extend the complement the analysis of the struct-
ural framework of industrial organisations, and to provide a second
illustration of how this major conception clarifies the structural
biases built into formally organised social actions.
7.1 The Conception of 'Structural Framework'
The history of the term 'social structure' is long and is
tied to the history of sociology itself, but its variation in use
and meaning is at least as notable as its historical significance.
It is.not appropriate here to conduct a survey of the concept and
. 2. h bits mean~ng , but ~n order to emp asise the distinction etween my
use and other available uses I shall refer to 'structural framework'
throughout the remaining chapters. As I shall argue in more
detail below, 'structural framework' - like conventional concepts
of social structure - refers to an 'objective' aspect of social
life, but, unlike the conventional usages, it does not possess any
direct (or implicit) powers of social determination. Instead of
being an 'entity' confronting actors with pre-ordained (normative
or typified) courses of action, 'structural framework' is conceived
as a set of predispositions or tendencies which favour certain
courses of action but whose effects can only be understood by
examining the interpretive work of social actors.
The notion of structural framework emerges from the need
to conceptualise the 'second face of power' without falling into
anyone of four traps. First, as already implied, the 'secorid
face of power' cannot have theoretical powers of determination,
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for this would contravene the postulate of voluntarism. Second,
the 'second face' must be kept analytically distinct from the
'first face' of politics, or the distinction loses much of its
theoretical strength. Third, the 'second face' should not be
restricted to a role of imposing constraints (or impossibilities)
on political actions. Finally, it should not be so conceptual-
ised as to deny empirically possible actions or states e.g. conflict,
change.
The 'two faces of power' thesis entered my theoretical
arguments via Clegg's interpretation (1975) of Weber's theory of
domination in terms of Bachrach and Baratz's important distinction
(1971, 1963), and yet nei~~er the latter nor Clegg satisfactorily
avoid the above traps. Since Clegg begins from explicitly inter-
pretive foundations, his pitfalls are particularly informative.
Clegg's interpretation of Weber's "structure of dominancy" has been
one of the most important influences on my theoretical argument,
but the use of the depth analogy and the failure to develop a
satisfactory theory of interpretive work in social action give his
structural concept connotations of determinism. Moreover, deter-
minism, lack of social action and a sole focus on organisational
order provide Clegg's critical approach with a highly restricted
view of organisational conflict (see 4.3).
Bachrach and Bara'Lz (1963, 1971), writing ill the context of
the Community Power Debate, initiated the 'two faces of power' line
of criticism of pluralist approaches by suggesting that the socio-
political machinery which guides the expression of power in
society, by virtue of its structure, favours certain ways of doing
things independently of the desires or purposes of individuals.
The bias which is incorporated in the organised framework of power
influences the course of politics by shaping the nature of issues
that may be subjected to the democratic process (e.g. Bachrach and
Baratz, 1971, p.378). The presumption of these authors, as with
Clegg, is that the biases of the second face of power favour only
stability, order and the generation of consensus. Also, in spite
of locating the second face of power at an abstract level, Bachrach
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and Baratz, unlike Clegg, misleadingly conceive such power in
terms of concrete exercises which they call "nondecision-making",
i.e.
" the practice of limiting the scope of actual
decision-making to 'safe' issues by manipulating
the dominant values, myths, and political
institutions and procedures" (Bachrach and
Baratz, 1963, p.632i my emphasis) •
"Nondecision-making" is very probably a significant feature of the
process of politics, but attributing 'concrete exercises' of power
to the second face of power can only weaken the importance of the
concept (see 9.2).
I hope to demonstrate that the conception of 'structural
framework' is helpful in incorporating into the study of organis-
ational politics the major themes of the 'second face of power',
while avoiding the pitfalls outlined above. For the sake of
explication, I shall treat the 'second face' as being analytically
independent of the first face, but the later discussion of concrete
processes will counteract this strategic analytical oversimplifi-
cation.
'structural framework' refers to a set of interrelated
predispositions in social action and social processes which are
grounded in the "way things work" in the society (community, organ-
isation) in question. These predispositions mayor may not be
realised - and the probability of realisation may itself vary in
different sets of historico-economic circumstances e.g. see
Section 7.4 - according to how social actors make sense of them in
concrete social arenas. A description of the structural biases of
a system is thus, by itself, not sufficient to explain the social and
political actions in any social situation so that how the biases
are perceived and enacted is clearly a significant theoretical
problem.
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The structural framework may.be understood as involving
two facets: first, an abstract 10gic3 or theory about the way
things are; and second, a set of concrete institutional arrange-
ments which embody that logic (or to put it another way, from
which that logic may be inferred). The latter concrete
procedures, mechanisms etc. are those "factual" aspects of social
(or organisational) life which social actors have to confront
directly as externally-given facts. The abstract logic, and the
assumptions from which it derives its 'rationality' may be seen as
the "dominant theory" of how the system works. At one level, the
logic is a descriptive theory, accounting reasonably accurately
for what the social world is like; additionally, however, the
logic has an ideological dimension, because the normal, taken-for-
granted, obvious nature of how things are easily transposes a
descriptive theory into normative theory - that this is how things
should be. The very existence of institutional procedures and
arrangements thereby confirms not only the descriptive aspects of
the dominant theory but also, indirectly or directly, its ideol-
ogical aspects.
One of the most important features of the "second face of
power" incorporated in the 'structural framework' conception, is
that it avoids the trap of personalising structural predispositions
in the operation of power , Westergaard and Resler (1976) capture
the importance, and the essence of the iMpersonality of the biases
of the structural framework :
"Many social scientists talk 'about power - or control,
influence, and so on - as if these necessarily
involve action by individuals or groups .•• [But]
that sort of approach, on its own, neglects the
point that individuals or groups may have the
effective benefits of 'power' without needing to
exercise it in positive action. We have more in
mind here than just the fact that some people are
able to pull strings behind the scenes: string-
pulling is still an active exercise of influence,
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even if it is difficult to detect. What we
have in mind is a passive enjoyment of advantage
and privilege, obtained merely because of 'the
way things work', and because those ways are not
exposed to serious challenge" (Westergaard and
Resler, 1976, p.142).
Nondecision-mal<.ing, for example, is a relevant "active exercise"
of power, but does not by itseZf illustrate or signify the biases
which are introduced into such concrete processes of power by virtue
of the structural context within which the latter take place.
"To put the point in general terms, there is power
inherent in anonymous social mechanisms and
assumptions - in 'sociaZ institutions' - not just
in individuals and groups" (ibid., p.143; my
emphasis) •
The anonymous, impersonal, patterned features of the "way the system
works", of the institutional logic of sOCiety in general, are
characteristic of what I am calling the structural framework of
(organisational) power.
One of the neatest ways to differentiate between the
anonymous inbuilt predispositions of power and politics, and the
"personalised", observable enactments of politics is to distinguish
between the 'system' and the 'social' levels of analysis. This
distinction, which Lockwood (1964) develops specifically in his
discussion of functionalist and conflict theories, reflects some
of the major aspects of the two faces of power :
"Whereas the problem of social integration focuses
attention upon the orderly or conflictful relation-
ships between the actors, the problem of system
integration focuses on the orderly or conflictful
relationships between the parts of a social system"
(Lockwood, 1964, p.245).
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In a political context, the problem of social integration in
organisations clearly relates to the first face of power, and
that of system integration to its second face.
The structural framework may be likened to the logic of
the 'system' (in Lockwood's sense) i.e. the way in which the
"institutional patterns" (ibid. p.245), as " 'depersonalised'
processes or parts" (Mouzelis, 1974, p.395), interrelate to make
the whole operational. The logic or 'dominant theory', which
underlies the structural framework, may be impersonal and abstract,
and, by itself, incapable of explaining social action, but by its
permeation of the basic machinery of society and the ideas which
are part of the available stock of knowledge, it becomes consciously
or unconsciously "known" to constitute some of the basic facts of
social and organisational life. The-system works in a certain way,
and its predispositions become stored up in those "uneventful
routines" (Westergaard and Resler, 1976, p.144) whose obviousness
constituted 'bedrock' for Clegg's building-site workers (1975,
p. 82ff.) • The 'normality', the 'banality', the anonymity of the
way the system works are for members of society
" part of the established landscape of a world
which is not of their making but which they have
to live in nevertheless" (Nichols and Beynon, 1977,
p.190) .
Indeed, as westergaard and Resler(1976) argue, part of the effective
power derived from such structural predispositions, ingrained in the
system, lies in its taken-for-granted and thus concealed nature (see
.also Clegg, 1975, e.g. p.119ff.).
From the anonymous, obvious characteristics of the ration-
ality which corresponds to the predispositions in the system,
emerges another feature of the structural framework viz. the
"obduracy of nature and social reality" (Lichtman, 1970, p.78) for
members of society whose lives are "structured by externally given
facts" (Nichols and Armstrong, 1976, p.31). It is in this sense
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that the structural ~ramework o~ organisational power stands
apart from organisational participants and is thus 'objective'.
Given their 'naturalness' and 'inevitability', the core assumptions
of the society and its logic become given system parameters,
confronting (but not necessarily recognised or accepted by) members
of that society in their various arenas of social action. How
members deal or cope with these externally given facts of life,
built into the structural framework of society and presented as
unalterable and normal, is the major sociological problem to which
I return in the following chapters.
So far I have presented the structural framework as the
logical and abstract framework of a society, which in its imperson-
alityand 'obviousness' assumes a greater or lesser degree of
objectivity for social actors. In an important sense, the
structural framework is independent of social actors as explained
above, but in an equally important sense it is wholly dependent
upon the latter who, through L~eir interpretive and social actions
sustain (or not) its 'existence' (i.e. its predispositional influence
on social life). The fact that assumptions may be questioned
and 'logics' supplanted - in short the fact of the ultimate con-
tingency of any social formation - must be continually borne in
mind if the theoretical framework is to remain sensitive to future
empirical possibilities rather than emphasise (and thus reinforce)
the 'power' inherent in the set of structural arran~ements in
operation at any given time.
The context of all social action is structured in such ways
as to establish for acting individuals and groups identifiable
possibilities and impossibilities (within the system assumptions) ,
and to predispose social life towards order or conflict in certain
circumstances. Possibilities and impossibilities, order and
conflict, are thus structurally predisposed. However social
actions occur not in abstract 'systems', nor in society in toto,
but in concrete social arenas. It is therefore imperative to
know how these structural predispositions and the institutional
premises and logic of the social system find expression in arenas
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of social action. By a simple extension to the conception of
structural framework, it is possible to incorporate the fact
that concrete arenas of social action are themselves structured.
Taking the relevant social arena as the organisation,
which provides the more 'localised' context for those social
actions which pertain to this thesis, the structural framework
of organisational pOhler may be seen as comprising two inter-
related levels. Mouzelis (1974) has much the same notion in
mind ~n his discussion of Crozier's research (1964)
" in order to understand such [poweS strategies,
institutional arrangements must be taken into
account .•. Both 'local' institutional arrange-
ments (e.g. rules elaborated and followed by
management or the workers) and. wider societal
ones (e.g. institutions of property, of
collective bargaining, of the labour contract,
the labour market, etc.) are relevant for under-
standing the actions and strategies of the various
groups" . (Mouzelis, 1974, p.398) •
The societal/institutional logic is thus complemented by a local
4organisational rationality; the latter is both a dominant theory
or ideology of how organisations in general do or should work, and,
being incorporated in organisational procedures and machinery, a
set of direct organisational facts which provide organisational
participants with distinct predispositions. This organisational
to the premises underpinning the organisation; second, an admin-
rationality may be understood as comprising two constituent
rationalities: first, an economic rationality which advocates
appropriate ways and criteria for allocating resources according
istrative rationality which concerns the appropriate ways of
controlling or managing the organisation. The two are, of course,
interrelated and best understood in terms of their mutual relation-
ship to the broader institutional logic.
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To summarise, the structural framework is conceptualised
as a set of historically~conditioned,anonymous, impersonal pre-
disposi tions for action, which eme.rges from the prevailing
institutional logic and organisational rationality, which in
turn infuses procedures, arrangements, techniques etc. with
'sense', 'reason', 'normality' and 'obviousness' - in other
words, it conceptualises the basic facts of organisational life.
In the next section, I shall seek to put some flesh upon these
conceptual bones.
7.2 The structural Framework of Power in Industrial Organisation
Politics are particular kinds of social action and organis-
ationaZ politics take place in a particular kind of social arena
with its own rationality i.e. its own ways of getting things done.
The analysis of organisational politics thus requires reference to
the structural framework in both its societal-institutional and
local-organisational senses, in such a way as to permit an under-
standing of those structural predispositions and biases which
constitute the given context within which power operates. These
structural predispositions towards the distribution and exercise of
power provide the framework for organisational politics, but do not
determine them - indeed the latter in certain circumstances may
well change in part or in whole the structural framework in which
they are set i.e. politics can challenge the very logic and premis2s
which predispose them in certain directions at any given time.
In order to aid clarification of theoretical issues, and
to illustrate the relevance of the conception of structural framework
to the understanding of organisational power, it is useful to
discuss the notion in more specific terms. There are many types
of organisation (e.g. religious, educational, mass media) and these
types will differ in their environments, problems, procedures etc.;
ultimately, within each type, particular organisations will face
their own set of structural arrangements. One of the problems of
empirical research is precisely to identify the predispositions
faced by specific organisations; however, it should be borne in
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mind that most organisations, to the extent that they operate
within a given society, or community, are subject to the same
general logic which permeates the institutional setting of that
operation. In Ll.Lust.zat.Lnq the structural framework of organ-
isational power, I have decided to pitch the discussion midway
between a completely abstract overview of structural predis-
positions facing all organisations (i.e. the societal-institutional
logic) and a highly fragmentary review of one specific organis-
ation, i.e. I have restricted my attention to industrial organis-
ations operating in Britain.
Such a limitation of scope is necessary for reasons of
space, but I could have chosen any type of organisation in any
society for explicatory purposes. However, because of existing
biases in organisational research much more information is
available about industrial organisation; and the selection of a
capitalist society - specifically Britain - reflects not only an
additional bias but also the fact that during the last five years
a number of particularly relevant pieces of documentary research
have been published.S I shall be using these same studies to
illustrate theoretical points both in this chapter and in the
following ones. By concentrating on industrial organisations
operating in British capitalist society I shall construct a view
of the ins~itutional logic and organisational rationality which
constitute the dominant theory of how such organisations (should)
work, and examine how such a theory is represented in those
mechanisms and procedures that circ~~scribe organisational power'
and control.
It is interesting to note that, however much theorists
disagree on its implications, its interpretation or its theoretical
role, 'conservative', 'liberal' and 'radical' sociologists accept
the central proposition that a capitalist society (or any other
type) is founded upon certain assumptions which give reason to the
institutional logic which can be abstracted from the way the system
(e.g. in the legal, political and economic systems), the fundamental
works. It might also be argued that in spite of small changes
264
Loqd.c of the system has. remained more or less intact over the
last century. ;Far example, the public.sector of.industrial
organisations has grown.substantially, aften due to socialising
philosaphies·and policies, but such organisations have to survive
in a national and international private enterprise framework so
that they are still subject to the same basic pressures associated
with the core assumptians of capitalism (cf. westergaard and
Resler, 1976, p.249ff.). In spite of their often fundamental
differences in approach and in interests, both Marx and Weber more
ar less agreEdin their general assessment of the demands that the
logic of capital makes on an economic and social system. The
major difference between their assessments of what I am calling the
structural framework of industrial organisatians is largely one af
focus, Marx being almost totally committed to. understanding the
logic of capital at a societal-institutional level, while Weber
carried the analysis further into. the realms of organisacional
rationality. Weber, however, certainly did not neglect the
broader tendencies inherent within capitalism. They shared the
key categories af private property, profit, 'free' commodity/labour
market and division of labour, which, as core assumptians of
capitalism, make rational certain modes of operating industrial
arganisation, while Simultaneously rendering impractical, ar
irrational all other structural frameworks.
These structural premises of capitalism, and their logical
implications for how to do things in organisations, establish an
identifiable type of framework with inbuilt predispositions, which
influence all levels of organisational life - the types af biases
which are mobilised by organisational forms within a capitalist
structural context thus become very important for understanding
the political interactions and processes in organisations. The
premises and logic which underlie organisational power are, at their
most abstract, economic and sacietal, but they find expression in
the rationality and forms of other institutional areas of society
(e.g. the legal, the political, the educational) as well as the
rationality and forms of complex organisations operating in all
institutianal areas. Thus any organisation (religious, industrial,
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Qr othe1;"w:i.seli.s subject to social, cultural and legal.demands
to.be both economi.cally rati.onal and administratively rational
the latter, called 'bureaucratic' by.Weber (1964), is also
recognised by him as being an organi.sational transformation of
the former.
In Britain it is possible to understand the societal-
institutional logic, with which organisations in general and
industrial organisations in particular, are infused and which make
'rational' their forms, procedures, mechanisms etc., primarily in
terms of the logic of capital, i.e. economic premises and logic.
"At the centre of the core assumptions of our
society, clearly, are the institutions of
property and maxket., and the working premises
which go with them" (Westergaard and Resler,
1976, p.249).
At the local-organisational level, for industriai organisations in
particular, this broader institutional logic is reflected in both
the economic rationality of the organisation, concerning the juxta-
position of profitability and market forces (cf. Clegg, 1975,
p.119); and the administrative rationality whereby human and
material resources are marshalled and controlled according to
these economic premises. The established facts of profit, market
and property rights give order to the way in which industrial
.organisations work and imbue with sense and rationality the
operating rules, the distribution of rewards and (institutional)
authority, accounting procedures etc. (cf. Martin, 1977, p.lOOff.)
In order to comprehend this reflection of institutional
premises and logic in the rationality of industrial organisations
and thereby to build up a more detailed picture of the latters'
structural context - I intend to concentrate on the organisational
'control system'. The control system comprises a set of principles,
procedures, practices, techniques, regulations etc. deliberately
designed to monitor organisational behaviour and to ensure that
such.behaviou;r: is ushe;r:edtowards.the.accomplishment of the
:6
designer's goals within ~ given stru,ctural framework .(cf.
Mills, 1967, or Bowen,1976,p.57fL) . This control system
has both personal and impersonal aspects, but, within
increasingly larger organisations, the.tendency is towards the
impersonal :
"To avoid the danger of losing control of the task,
management builds into the organisation impersonal
processes of control to influence and regulate the
work behaviour of those it employs ••• These
processes may be administrative, covering such
things as complex programmes for production
planning, measurement mechanisms and cost control
systems; or mechanical, as in the automatic control
of machine tools or continuous flow production
plant." (Kynaston Reeves and Woodward, 1970,
pp.44-45) .
Such mechanisms mayor may not succeed completely in their purpose,
but they do constitute certain facts of organisational life which
set up predispositions in the direction of establishing control -
i.e. co-ordinating, channeling and marshalling human resources in
the service of profitability within a market situation.
Resolving the problem of organisational control (for
economically rational ends) leads to an administratively rational
set of predispositions which indirectly present controllers and
controlled alike with the facts about how industrial organisations
within a capitalist structural context work (see 7.3). The
problem of control, in which the questions of economic and adminis-
trative rationality, and of institutional logic and organisational
rationality intersect for both organisational participants and
observers, is thus at the heart of the conception of structural
framework in relation to the analysis of organisational power and
politics (cL Nichols and Armstrong, 1976, p.25).
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TQ cQntinue with this line ot argument, I shall·examine
several elements of the o.rgan:i..sationalcontrol system ,,'lithrefer-
ence to the structural framework of industrial organisations.
Since the following points are illustrative of the previous
arguments - viz. that the structural framework o.f organisational
power at the 'local' level is revealed in the economic and admin-
istrative rationality of the control system - the discussion will
remain brief.
control system (e.g. Weber, 1964, p.331). Inherent in this
One of the most important features of o.rganisational
control and administrative rationality is the hierarchical allo.-
cation of (institutional) authority to the controllers of the.
conception of aUL~ority and its allocation is the manager's right
to' control, which remains a firmly established and fiercely
defended premise of organisational rationality (cf. Beynon, 1973,
p.183) • As Co.ates and Topham (1974) have explained, this fact
of organisational life is itself deeply embedded in the institutional
logic of capitalism:
"Managerial authority derives from above, from the
legal owners of the business, from rights of
property, fro.m the law of contract, and from the
economic power of the buyer of labour" (Coates and
Topham, 1974, p.60).
The administrative rationality of authority, its allo.cation and
rights, is not rational in its own terms, but in the context of the
institutional premises and logic of society - i.e. within the
broader structural framework of organisations. Thus the right
to control and organise materials and people is allocated to'
7participants in hierarchical positions.
Authority is more i~~ediately underpinned by formal rules
which provide another mechanism whereby the 'control system'
attempts to channel behaviour in a 'rational' way (rules, of
course, are the essence of weber's 'rational-legal' type of
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domina t.Lon). Although they nominally apply to everybody,
rules in general.represent and uphold the interests of the
participants who identify with those goals towards which they
(the rules) direct behaviour. The rules, in other words, are
rational strictly in terms of the interests or ends served
(cf. Gouldner, 1954, pp.20-21). .Again, on a priori. grounds,
one would expect the rationality of rules to.reflect and re-
inforce the broader institutional logic, because they provide
the organisation with "ways of doing things" that appeal to
cultural universalistic values while actually predisposing actions
towards the realisation of that logic.
The technology of an industrial organisation is a very
important part of its control system, delimiting the scope of work
behaviour and discretion required to complete a job and thereby
increasing the degree of rationality in the achievement of the task:
"At the unit end of the scale [Of technical
complexity], the nature of work is such that
the mechanisms of control are relatively simple
and unsophisticated. Control is exercised
through the personal hierarchy of authority
In continuous flow production, on the other
hand, a mechanical framework of discipline and
control is built in with the erection of the
plant or installation of equipment." (Woodward,
1970, p.xii see also Nicholls and Armstrong,
1976, p.68ff.).
Technology, and its organisation for control, is obviously not
. 8accidental, nor is it purely 'technlcal' - at least to treat it
as such is to miss its wider social implications :
production" .. (Nichols & Beynon, 1977, p.70).
"Technologies ••• are not developed or imposed
extra-socially, outside of a social mode of
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Technol.ogy relates to. the institutional logic of capitalism and
the control potential that can be built into the production system
reflects not only administrative rationality - in that it responds
to the basic problem of management ~ but also the economic
rationality of profitability.
Authority, and the more impersonal controls of rules and
technology, are three aspects of the control system of industrial
organisations whose operation is administratively and economically
rational in the ways I have discussed. They constitute pro-
cedures or mechanisms which predispose social actions in the
direction favoured by the core institutional assumptions and
logic and constitute basic facts of life for organisational
participants. However, as Weber argues, in a capitalist structural
framework industrial organisations achieve their highest degree of
(formal) rationality by developing procedures and practices in
which their calculability for control purposes is stressed (e.g.
Weber, 1964, p.184ff. and p.193) • Organisational rationality
is thus expressed in mechanisms which aim to measure organisational
states in order to subject behaviour to greater and more precise
control. Job evaluation/grading (e.g..Nichols and Armstrong,
1976, p.37ff.), work study (e.g. Beynon, 1973, p.135ff.), cost
and quality control measures, stock purchase and planning etc.
exemplify procedures intended to increase control by rendering
organisational behaviour calculable and hence 'rational' with an
objective degree of accuracy.
The quantitative control practice par excellence that was
recognised by Weber for its particular significance in capitalist
industrial organisation was Capital Accounting :
"Any system of economic activity oriented to profit-
making, no matter how strictly it is.regulated or
how stringently controlled by administrative staff,
presupposes effective prices, and thus capital
accounting as a basis of action" (Weber, 1964,
p.215) •
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namely, 'capital:accounting'. Capital accounting
"There is a :f;OlJllo:f;monetary accounting which is
.peculiar to· rational economic profit-maki.ng;
is the valuation and.verification of opportunities
for profit and of the success of profit-making
activity. It involves the valuation of the total
assets of the enterprise, wheL~er these consist in
goods in kind or in money, at the beginning of a
period of activity; and the comparison of this
with a similar evaluation of the assets. still
present or newly acquired, at the end of the
process". (Weber, 1964, pp.191-192) •
In short, capital accounting assesses the total condition of the
organisation with respect to the major premise which endows the
'way the sys·tem works' with its rationality, the profitability of
capital (cf. Clegg, 1975, p.119ff.). Accountancy provides the
archetype of 'formally rational' (i.e. calculable) control
practices which make available precise information about past
and expected future organisational states (cf. Tricker, 1967);
isation) • Accountancy in industrial organisations is a set of
that information permitting organisational behaviour to be more
closely monitored or directed with respect to the economic
rationality of the organisation (and, indirectly, the institutional
logic which provides the broader structural framework of the organ-
institutionalised practices for making behaviour accountable to
capital, and it therefore selects and organises information for
control purposes in accordance with those core institutional
assumptions that constitute its theoretical (and technical) base.
The production of 'formally rational' information - and management
accountancy is one component of a complex modern business information
technology (cf. Tricker, 1967, pp.99ff.) - is both structurally
predisposed and structurally predisposing. It is predisposed
because data are collected according to specific criteria and
. 9techniques for specific purposes of accounting to capltal; it
is predisposing because the (partial) 'knowledge' produced by
these practices becomes part of the control system and confronts
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work of organisational power is the reward system. As with the
Qrganisational participants as.externally-givenand objective
(in the.sense o~ absolute and true) ~acts of organisational life.
A last element o£ the managerial control system which I
shall consider in illustration of the 'local' structural frame-
other components, the reward system within industrial organis-
ations fundamentally reflects the major premises of the capitalist
system. Of special significance when considering monetary
rewards (wages, salaries, dividends etc.) is, of course, the
logic of the labour market, and the specific organisation's
profitability in the product market. Material rewards are but
one aspect of the reward system considered in relation to the
10problem of control. Another reward-related mode of control is
built into the nature of jobs themselves.
It is organisationally most ratiortal, for the purposes of
profitability, to exert the maximum possible amount Qf control
over the activities of organisational participants, and I have
argued that the mechanisms and practices such as rules; technology
and capital accounting predispose organisational behaviour in the
desired direction. The logic of capital has an inbuilt pre-
intrinsic reward than others. It is paradoxical, but inevitable
disposition to increase formal rationality and tighten control
over organisational actions through the development of new
11techniques and procedures. However some organisational
activities are more susceptible to this 'he~~ing-in' process than
others, and those jobs, in which inhere greater responsibility and
discretion and which are part of a career ladder, offer greater
(under present circumstances anyway) that the same institutional
logic and economic rationality which create predispositions
towards more complete control of organisational behaviour, can
only do so by simultaneously creating positions with little such
12control.
My aim in this section has been to illustrate the con-
ception of the structural framework of organisational power, with
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specia,l.re:f;erence to LndustirLa.L o.rganisations in capitalist
Britain. I have :f;ocusedon.the control system of such ~rgan-
isations, and, by examining some of its important. features -
authority, rules, .technology, 'capital accounting and.rewards ~
I hope to have shmm two things. First, at the local-organis-
ational level, it can be seen that the control system (and its
component parts) of an industrial organisation is a system of
procedures and practices which derive their consistency and
rationality as administrative devices from their relationship to
the economic premises underpinning the organisation. Second,
and relatedly, these procedures and practices, which embody
economic rationality, by doing so additionally reflect the broader
institutional assumptions of the structural framework with
reference to which organisational rationality (administrative and
economic) itself "makes sense".
In 7.3 and 7.4 I shall discuss how the structural frame-
work of organisational power - with respect to industrial organis-
ations - can provide a vehicle for examining the ways in which
biases and predispositions are structured into organisational
arenas, thereby incorporating into the analysis of organisational
politics the potency of the 'second face of power' critique.
Before moving on, however, two final points need to be made.
First, in the arguments above I have not made reference to the
structural influence of trade unions on industrial organisation,
and many people would regard the former as counterweights to the
logic of capital. Industrial relations procedures are part of the
reality of industrial organisation in Britain, and the neglect of
the representatives of organised labour is a fundamental omission.
Although it is not possible to do justice to this issue in the
space available~ I shall return to it briefly in 7.5.
The second closing point is more in the form of a caveat,
made necessary again by the simplified illustrative analysis.
It should not be assQ~ed that important aspects of the structural
framework are static, as may be implied .in the above discussion.
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Institutional logic and organisational rationality are, I suggest,
relatively stable as long as the "core assumptions" remain the
same, but the procedures, techniques, practices etc. which embody
that logic and rationality change as knowledge about organisational
control advances. Specifically, as Weber (1964) suggests and the
Chemco studies (Nicholls and Beynon, 1977; Nichols and Armstrong,
1976) witness, the institutional logic of capitalism includes a
tendency towards greater precision in and increased scope of the
control system. From a more historical viewpoint, Burns (1977,
p.23ff.) surveys the changes in the "social technology" of organ-
isations (specifically of the B.B.C.) and the search for efficient
(rational) administrative control.
7.3 Structural Possibilities and Impossibilities
The structural framework of organisational power comprises
abstract, impersonal "forces" - predispositions - which are
exhibited in the way organisations work within the broader instit-
utional context. The logic or rationality of the 'system' is
embodied in the sets of arrangements (laws, rules, procedures,
practices etc.) which prevail at both the societal/institutional
and the local/organisation level and which confront actors as
"obdurate" "externally-given facts" about organisational life.
Before we can understand how actors deal with these structural pre-
dispositions in their (political) attempts to control their organis-
ational lives, it is necessary to construct a picture of how the
structural framework influences both the ability or potential to
effect control and the politically-relevant nature of the arena in
question. The first of these points relates to the conceptual
theme of possibilities/impossibilities, which directs the argument
in this section. In 7.4 I shall discuss the structural pre-
dispositions towards order and conflict, and their consequences for
the second face of power.
The proposition upon which the conception of the structural
framework (qua second face of power) is based, contends that the
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scope and nature of political actions in organisations is from the
start predisposed in certain directions by virtue of the biases
which are inevitably involved in any form of organisation. The
system, as it were, prefers some power actions over others and
endows some positions (and thereby people) with greater initial
capacity than other positions, to do those preferred actions.
In other words opportunities for organisational or self control,
and constraints against such controls, are structured into the way
things work in an organisation. By discussing the ways in which
the structural framework of organisations creates possibilities for
or imposes impossibilities on organisational participants, a sketch
of the second face of power may be made. As before, the general
argument will be framed with respect to industrial organisations
under British capitalism.
It is perhaps paradoxical that the structural framework, in
which organisational politics occur, presents all organisational
participants with the same facts of organisational life, yet at the
same time distinguishes between participants regarding how they will
be affected by the 'system'. The facts are equally "obdurate" to
everybody, but more "lenient" to some people than to others. Both
points require some elucidation.
In Capital, Marx commented upon the impersonality, even the
imparti~lity (in a limited sense) of the logic of capit~l. Although
the immutable laws of capitalism affect capitalists and workers
differentially in many senses, they are equally "compelling" for
both social groups :
" The development of capitalist production makes
it constantly necessary to keep increasing the amount
of the capital laid out in a given industrial enter-
prise, and competition makes the immanent laws of
capitalist production to be felt by each individual
capitalist, as coercive external laws. It compels
him to keep constantly extending his capital in order
to preserve it, but extend it he cannot except by
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means of progressive accumulation." (Marx in
Jordan (ed.) 1972, p.229).
In this classic statement, the capitalist has to confront the same
compelling facts of life as the worker: the structural framework
renders certain forms of activity impossible. This of course should
not be construed as meaning that the capitalist, in a concrete
situation, has no choice. He may misunderstand the demands of
capital or choose to ignore them, but, ultimately, on certain matters
(e.g. survival as a capitalist) in certain circumstances (e.g.
fierce competition, economic depression) profits can only be ex-
tracted from t.1,.eproduction process with disastrous consequences.
In modern Britain the problem of organisational control is
largely one for managers, not capitalists in the pure sense. However,
in spite of the fact that profitability does not directly affect their
pockets, managers are also subject to the structural logic of the
system:
" the power of capitalists and managers in capitalist
society is itself circumscribed by the [anonymous
'""1socia~ mechanisms from which these people themselves
benefit" (Westergaard and Resler, 1976, p.143).
Nichols and Beynon (1977), like Marx in Capital (in Bottomore and
Rubels (eds.), 1963, p.158ff.), theorise the activities of managers
and workers as being more or less the same within the capitalist
structural framework:
" while often living quite different lives - and
belonging to different social classes - bo~h
managers and workers can increasingly be seen as
labour, whose future is structured by the needs
of capital. II (Nichols and Beynon, 1977, p.xv;
see also p.31ff.; and Beynon, 1973, p.95ff. and
p.103; and Fletcher, 1973, p.138) •
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The 'impartiality' of the structural framework is demonstrated by
the fact that it subjects managers, supervisors and workers alike
to the same rationality or logic, built upon the core assumptions
of the system.
This argument is very important for demonstrating the point
in question, but it should not be overlooked that, while everybody
is subject to what westergaard and Resler (1976, p.14lff.) call
the anonymous power of capital, the latter distributes power, the
social potential to control and opportunities to do so, in a quite
uneven manner. The same structural facts of life confront people
in different (though equally compelling) ways according to how they
slot into the "organisational nature of things". The logic of
capital, in its institutional and organisational, economic and
administrative guises, creates a formal pattern of relations and
control mechanisms, as described above, which confront all organis-
ational participants but systematically distinguishes between them
in varying degrees. These procedures and practices are established
to make behaviour accountable to the basic premises of the system
and thereby inevitably predispose power actions and the distribution
of power in certain directions. Because structural possibilities
and impossibilities accord with the way the system woxk s, their
differential distribution within the organisation sets up biases as
to who is in the better initial position to establish or expand
their own control, ann constitutes a basic structural fact of great
political relevance.
In order to simplify explanation of this argument, I shall
concentrate on two categories of participant in industrial organis-
ations - the manager and the worker - although obviously other
1 doth i.d 13 h 1 fcategories can be ana yse uSlng e same leas. T e pace 0
trade unions in industry rather complicates the picture, but I shall
return to their role below (7.5). In general, I shall be arguing
that the structural framework presents managers with greater inbuilt
possibilities of using power for their own, their group's and the
organisation's ends (including the shaping of these ends), whilst
workers to a greater or lesser extent are faced with a fairly
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extensive range of structural impossibilities which, to be
politically active, they must seek to avoid, adapt or change.
At any rate, lower participants start off with inbuilt dis-
advantages regarding control and politics. This proposition
can be illustrated with reference to the predispositions structu~ed
into the organisational control system which was discussed in 7.2
above.
The most clearly discernible difference between managers
and workers in industrial organisations concerns their relationship
to the control system which embodies organisational rationality.
Managers are to a greater or lesser extent controllers of the control
system in that they design, operate and interpret the findings of
the system. The nature of this relationship provides basic possi-
bilities for political action. Workers, on the other hand, tend
to have their behaviour monitored and processed by the control
system, and their relationship to it is therefore characterised more
by constraint than opportunity.
Being in control of the organisation (although subject over-
all to the logic and rationality of the structural framework)
provides the manager with definite structural possibilities derived
from the facts that he is endowed with institutional authority to
instigate control; he is less subject to rules because of inherent
difficulties in hemming-in his job; he ~as access to information
which the control system generates; and his job is part of a
career structure that provides future rewards for conducting his
activities satisfactorily. Conversely, the worker is processed by
the control system, and this involves being subjected to
increasingly direct and precise procedures of which authority is the
most personalised; being specific, the worker's job tends to be
closely defined by rules, and indeed, in many circumstances, by the
technological parameters of his work situation; information to
which the worker has access is of avery limited, local kind,
created by his own experience of a restricted aspect of the work
process; his basic rewards are extrinsic, and his job is 'career-
less', with limited prospects of improvement of work either within
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or outwith the organisation. These four points of contrast -
authority, discretion, information and career - can be elaborated
to illustrate how organisational rationality stratifies the inbuilt
possibilities and impossibilities of political action.14
works as to be taken-for-granted and impartial. How the manager
To conduct his job 'rationally', the manager enjoys an
institutionalised right to command both human and material resources.
Supported by the institutionally-defined prerogatives, this
authority ('domination' in Clegg's interpretation (1975) of Weber)
forms the structural and ideological base of the manager's power
position - a capacity which is so ingrained into the way the system
acts upon his political base - for personal, sectional or organis-
ational purposes - is a problem for further sociological analysis,
but the opportunities for such action are structured into his
organisational position. Contrarily, the worker starts from no
structural base of institutional authority; moreover his actual
political actions depend upon his ability to overcome the structurally
predisposed limitations. It might be possible, for example, to
Fox (1974a) has analysed in some detail the distribution of
types of work role in (particularly industrial) organisations,
distinguisbing those which are closeJy-defined and controlled by
rules, supervision and technical aspects of the job, which, after
generate authority of a normative type grounded in the rationality
of social solidarity rather than of capitalist economics.
Jacques, he calls "prescribed" roles, from "discretionary" work
in the literal sense, self-control. The occupant
roles :
"By contrast, performance of the discretionary content
requires, not trained obedience to specific external
controls, but the exercise of wisdom, judgement,
expertise. The control comes from within - it is,
of the role must himself choose, judge, feel, sense,
consider, conclude what would be the best thing to
do in the circumstances ..•" (Fox, 1974<'1.,p.19).
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These "circumstances" - of economic and administrative rationality
are only very broad influences which do not impinge directly on
what to do. The tasks of management tend to have a high dis-
cretionary content, and discretionary work roles involve
structurally-predisposed possibilities for choosing action (Loasby,
1968, p.358). Not only do managers control the control system,
but also, within limits, have the inbuilt capacity to control their
own organisational fates. By contrast, the work-roles of lower
participants are "prescribed", with built-in constraints on self-
control. Possibilities and impossibilities are therefore
structured into work roles, and stratified in the same way as
other major dimensions of organisational inequality (cf. Fox,
1974a, p.49ff.j Fox, 1974b, p.30ff.).
Institutional authority and discretion, allocated differ-
entially to increase organisational rationality, are part of the
structural framework of organisational power, creating for managers
greater possibilities of self-control and control over others.
Access to information is also structurally predisposed in favour
of those controlling the control system, and the business infor-
mation techniques and practices - for example, of accountancy, of
work study - provide more precise data about the state of the
organisation with respect to its premises. Such organisational
'knowledge' is itself an important facet of institutional
authority and discretion, but may be seen, at a general level,
as providing a greater range of structural possibilities for the
exercise of power. Workers, or lower participants whose behaviour
is directly or indirectly accountable to quantitative, precise
scrutiny, find their range of actions structurally limited and
their control of the work situation consequently restricted.
Although much of shopfloor politics is aimed at creating some
degree of influence over the supply of information and freedom
from such scrutiny, the facts of organisational life are, from the
start, weighted against such control.
Not only do jobs differ in control possibilities in terms
of their specific content - i.e. discretion - but they also differ
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in terms of future possibilities and prospects. The managerial
work role is normally only one position in a time sequence of
possible positions, each future step, in general, bringing
socially more desirable rewards. Managers have careers which
are part of their reward and control system and are basic
motivators to satisfy the requirements of their present position.
For managers, therefore, the organisation is a career structure
(cf. Burns, 1969i Dalton, 1959) which provides the inbuilt
15possibility of increased inbuilt possibilities of work control.
Workers can also theoretically exercise choice over their jobs
in that in a "free" labour market they are "free" to move around
as they "wish". Indeed, in the 1960s many workers did just this,
but this means changing jobs which have basically the same limited
opportunities (cf. Beynon, 1973, p.113), rather than moving through
a career with improving possibilities. Furthermore, in less
buoyant economic circumstances even this limited freedom is further
reduced (cf. Nichols and Armstrong, 1976, p.23i Nichols and Beynon,
1977, p.28), as the structural facts of life become increasingly
compelling (see 7.4). A worker's job is normally 'career-less' and
the opportunities for controlling his organisational life are
structurally restricted both presently and in the future (cf. Lee,
1968) .16
This brief analysis of structural possibilities and impossi-
bilities in industrial organisations within a capitalist society
suggests that 'objective' opportunities for control are distributed
according to the premises and logic of the structural f ramewozk ,
and that this distribution is differential, providing greater
political possibilities for higher participants, and limiting the
possibilities (increasing impossibilities) at the lower echelons.
In one sense management are like workers, both groups' actions
liable to the logic of the capitalist system, but that same general
logic systematically biases the allocation of opportunities to
acquire power and to use it for various ends in favour of manage-
ment.
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7.4 Structural Order and Conflict
Having looked at how the structural framework engenders
distinct predispositions in the possibilities and impossibilities
facing different actors in the organisational arena, it is now
necessary to introduce the second analytical axis on which
theoretical discussion is focused. Power and politics in any
social arena revolve around the problems of order and conflict,
integration and disruption; it is therefore important for the
analysis of organisational power and politics to understand the
structural tendencies or biases towards order and/or conflict, built
into the system by virtue of the wider institutional logic and the
more local organisational rationality. It can be argued that, in
various conditions, organisational life is mainly predisposed
towards a state of order, while in other circumstances, the same
operative rationality will be conducive to conflict. More
generally, whilst 'the way the system works' will almost always
tend towards self-maintenance, it will also, again by its own
logic, contain the empirical possibilities of conflict. Marxist
theory argues with the use of dialectical logic, that the economic
logic of capital itself necessarily produces social consequences
that are conducive to conflict. As a general proposition then,
the structural framework of organisations is here conceived as
containing illi~erentand simultaneous predispositions towards order
due to the system's own logic of operation - and conflict, because
of contradictions in that same institutional logic. It should be
noted meantime that although these structural pressures are part of
the facts of organisational life, it is sociologically important
to know how these facts become incorporated in the (political)
actions of the various participants in that arena.
It was noted in Chapter Six that there has been a tendency
to focus on the orderly aspects of the second face of power. There
is something rather self-evident about the proposition that the core
assumptions and the logic of a system tend to maintain the latter,
and the analysis of the industrial organisation's rationality and
its embodiment in the control system would seem to confirm such a
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proposition. This self-evidence is especially strong in
societies which have experienced relatively high degrees of
social stability - such as Britain. However, it is rather weak
theoretically to dismiss the possibility of conflict (and change)
based upon such "self-evidence", for to do sO is to entangle one's
own theorising within the logic of the system itself - especially
within the ideological aspects of that logic. Dependence on
such self-evident facts, and their reflection in what one's theory
deems empirically possible, is to provide one good theoretical
rationale as to why a society (or organisation) is orderly; but
to overlook the empirical possibility of structural conflict is
not only to be politically uncritical (a point which Marxists
obviously consider important) but also to be theoretically so in
that there is the danger of failing to appreciate (i.e. of over-
simplifying) L~e structural framework of power and politics in
society and its constituent arenas.
The structural framework, with its abstract premises and
logic incorporated in an organisation's concrete modus operandi,
by definition favours the realisation of its "promises", although
their realisation is not a fait accompli as "optimistic" function-
alists or "pessimistic" Marxists might have; both because it is
inadequate to presume the compliance of actors to structural pre-
dispositions (i.e. the latter are not dictates), and because the
same structural framework creates unintentionally predispositions
towards conflict, often by 'logical' extension of the same facts
and processes conducive to order.
Concentrating on order for the time being, classical
sociological theory offers two possible structural conditions
for the achievement of the pure state. The Hobbesian and simple
Marxist approach ground a state of social order in the coercive
enforcement (or its threat) of law and the integrative mechanisms
of state. The second approach is best represented by the
Parsonian/neo-Marxist viewpoints which stress (in different ways)
the achievement of social order through voluntary consent to the
way the system works (or its 'central values') • This convenient,
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albeit oversimple distinction, can refer to analytically pure
states of social order but is more usefully seen as real historical
,moments' which may arise, although the tendencies towards order
structural framework. Although Gramsci's analysis was levelled
normally involve some mix of the two types.
In spite of the controversies surrounding his work, it is
insightful to pursue this distinction by relating Gramsci's now
famous concepts of 'domination' and 'hegemony' to the notion of a
at society in toto, the ideas appear to shed much light on the
nature of organisational order. In his discussion of aspects of
Gramsci's thought, Femia (1975) identifies these two concepts
with something akin to what I have been calling the structural
framework :
"Gramsci states that the supremacy of a social
group may manifest itself in two forms
'domination' [dominioJ, which is realised
through the coercive organs of the state, and
intellectual and moral leadership which is
objectified in and exercised through the instit-
utions of civil society, the ensemble of
educational, religious and associated instit-
utions. This latter form of supremacy
constitutes hegemony [eqemoniaJ. n (Femia, 1975,
p.30) •
Although, as Williams (1960, p.587) has suggested, these concepts
have implicit connotations about direction or manipulation by a
dominant group, it would seem feasible and pertinent to present
purposes, to consider 'domination' and 'hegemony' as general
modes of structural order. These concepts are used to refer to
socio-political situations as 'moments' in history where the
strain towards order has been achieved through structural processes
either of force, coercion and constraint or of ".•. persuasion,
consent and consolidation" (Williams, 1960, p.591).
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The application of coercion and the acquisition of
consent may be considered as alternative modes of creating
an orderly, stable organisation in which (organisational)
rationality may be most easily realised. As I have already
suggested, the structural framework should be viewed not only
as presenting a logic which is descriptive of how the system
works - and thus how it confronts people as 'factual' - but
also as being a normative theory or ideology which functions
to legitimate the facts as "right", "good", "natural" etc.
The 'factual' and 'ideological' aspects of the structural framework
are not, of course, independent - indeed, in certain circum-
stances, ideology becomes so obvious and unnoticed as to become
a fact of life itself. In this light, it should be remembered
that I am not here concerned wiLh the concrete process of
applying coercion (or threats) or of engineering consent - both
of which emphatically belong to the 'first face' of organisational
politics; what is of importance is that the facts of everyday
organisational life, the associated theories 6f how the system
should work, and the mechanisms and procedures which are
infused with this logic, are conducive to organisational order
in the two modes described, viz. domination and hegemony.
Relating to the discussion in 7.3, domination would involve the
tightening of the range of structural possibilities (i.e. more
rigid limitations on organisational actions, including what is
politically possible), whereas hegemony may well involve extending
the range of structural possibilities within the given framework -
for example, in order to generate trust relations (cf. FOX, 1974a,
p.27lff.) or moral commitment.
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Within the organisation, the mechanisms and practices of
control, and the ideas underlying these mechanisms create structural
predispositions towards order and conflict. To the extent that
these mechanisms work automatically and provide participants with
very little potential for (self) control, we may speak of a
structural state of 'domination' in the organisation. The
ultimate form of domination is the right of employers to terminate
employment. Where order is predisposed by consent-generating
techniques of persuasion - which typify many aspects of the
technology of organisational control that reflects the prevailing
human-relations ideology of British management with its emphasis,
for example, on greater self-control, responsibility etc.
17possible to speak of structurally-predisposed hegemony.
it is
Devoid
of political rhetoric, Nichols and Beynon's (1977) report on
Chemco's New Working Arrangement emphasises the latter's actual,
economic rationality which, in order to produce consent, was clothed
in human relations verbage :
"The trick, and the problem, which faced Chemco
was to socialise production the capitalist way:
to bring about a capitalist socialisation.
Workers were to be invited to get more 'involved'
in their work, to 'self-actualise' and actually
to be more exploited". (Nichols and Beynon,
1977, p.10i see also pp.72-73).
Thus a structural arrangement which was above all economically
rational was introduced to increase control and organisational order
by consent. This is evidently also the reasoning behind multi-
farious participatory schemes, as Brannen et al. (1976) indicate
in the case of British Steel.
structural order, then, has two interrelated aspects:
'hegemony' which involves such a degree of ideological dominance
as to reflect "genuine" consensus with the way the system works:
and 'domination' wherein the facts of organisational life starkly
constrain the lives of participants. Gramsci's insight about the
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historical inter-relationship of these two states is as relevant
to the understanding of organisational power and politics as it
is to national power and politics. As Gramsci observed, the
structural facts and Loq ic of capitalism may be relatively
constant, but economic-historical factors - themselves part of
what Marx might call the immanent logic of capital - alter the
ways in which the structural framework imposes itself upon social
and organisational life. Gramsci came to understand that the
order of Western capitalist society had increasingly become based
upon hegemony as the "normal form of control" (cf. Williams, 1960,
p.591; Femia, 1975, p.31), because the system could normally
supply the wealth necessary as a basis for generating consent.
In times of economic strength, the facts of capitalist society
can be made less obviously constraining; when profitability in
the market is certain and predictable, the logic of the system is
not immediately compelling and organisational life is often
cushioned from the "harsh" facts.
However, those same facts become at once more compelling
and coercive for both management and workers when economic
depression sets in. Rising prices, higher costs, lower demand,
lower profits and unemployment are also part of the structural
facts of life, as Britain has experienced during the 1970's.
These facts have instant effects on the lives of all participants
(and ex-participants) who feel the belt of organisational ration-
ality tightening. As the structural framework becomes revealed
in all its immediacy and starkness, and the ranges of opportunities
decrease and of constraints increase, 'domination' becomes the
prevailing mode of creating order.
Obviously at any given time, the structural framework of
organisational power will involve both hegemonic predispositions
towards order, as ideological procedures and practices within the
organisation operate towards the creation of consent for organis-
ational rationality; and biases towards order generated by the
constraining facts of the control system. The societal-instit-
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utional logic and the local-organisational rationalities are
conducive to a state of orgarisational order because they
anonymously predispose social action by the alternative modes
of ideological persuasion and social constraint. The former
mode, with its basis in legitimacy and consent is stable in the
longer term, but its existence cannot be assumed or taken as
self-evident.
"System integration" thus stresses the possibility of
"institutionalising" order and control with reference to both
ideologies (norms, values) and coercion (cf. Lockwood, 1964),
but the structural framework may also be conducive to conflict
or disintegration. As Clements (1977) suggests of pluralism,
there is a mistaken tendency to
" assume the existence of social structures
free from internal contradictions." (Clements,
1977, p ,312) •
The argument that the way the system works itself produces 'logical
inconsistencies' which may result in SOcial conflict is of course
to return once more to classical Marxian analysis and the relevance
of the latter is particularly important in a discussion of
industrial organisations in Britain. The contradictions which
arise in the structural framework of capjtalism, by virtue of its
logic, create external, 'objective' tendencies towards conflict
between social groups within the organisation (cf. Hyman, 1972,
p.83ff.). Lockwood (1964) summarises Marx's view of system
conflict as arising through :
" the contradiction between 'forces of production'
(technological potential) and the 'relations of
production' (property institutions)"
1964, p.251).
(Lockwood,
This operational incompatibility becomes a problem for social order
when the social conflicts it implies become realised in concrete
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social situations, and when the machinery of social order is
unable to cope with politically-expressed conflicts.
As with the relationship between any structural pre-
disposition and social action, that between system contradiction
and social conflict is inevitably contingent :
"Conflict in the sense of active struggle pursued
in the context of clashes of interests, is a property
of interaction. Contradiction, on the other hand,
may be understood as a property of structures, and
as standing in contingent relation to conflict.
Contradiction can be conceptualised as the
opposition between structural 'principles' ... "
(Giddens, 1976, p.125).
I shall be using the terms 'system contradiction' and 'structural
conflict' interchangeably, because such an objective inconsistency
in institutional logic or organisational rationality, either as
ideas or in the form of procedures, rules etc., implies a structural
predisposition towards social conflict within the organisation.
phenomenon. I have already outlined some major features of the
Examples of structural conflict in organisational life are
well documented, so I shall provide only a few illustrations of the
structural framework of power in industrial organisations, and, in
the context of structural possibilities and impossibilities,I have
shown how the logic of capital creates a distinct system of inequal-
ities - especially inequalities of control potential. Systems of
stratification, however created, are always the potential focus of
tension and conflict because they create differences between groups
based upon the ultimately fragile foundation of social assumption.
The same institutional logic, as we have seen, produces ideological
machinery which operates to elevate assumptions to the status of
consensually-defined facts, and, in the last resort, bolsters
partially-defined assumptions by coercion; but under certain
circumstances, social facts may be de-mystified, coercion resisted,
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and system contradiction translated into social conflict.
1973, p.103).
(Beynon,
Dahrendorf (1959) has argued that organised life in
industrial society depends upon the differential allocation of
authority, and that such inequalities, grounded in organisational
rationality, mean that (latent) conflict is endemic to the system.
Marx was the first to analyse a further contradiction based upon
the very logic of capitalist organisation viz. that factory work
life generates the need for cooperation between workers, and between
management and the workers, but the point and purpose of such life
leads simultaneously to an 'objective' conflict of interests.
The system contradiction between cooperation and conflict in
industrial organisation has been examined in a number of places by
Beynon (1973, e.g. p.159).
It seems, then, that whereas the initial and manifest
thrust of the structural framework of industrial organisations is
towards organisational order, examination of the social implications
of that economic rationality reveals pOints of system contradiction.
The ideolOgy of British society stresses individual freedom and
self-determination and yet the reality of organisational life for
most participants is one of limited structural possibilities.
When circumstances permit, it is possible for workers to increase
their r.ontrol, and in dOing so, they themselves adjust the
'objective' reality of organisational life, and thus partially
conceal the contradictions which are structurally conducive to
capitalism is at its clearest. Hence while job controls may be
social conflict. These contradictions are most likely to become
apparent and open to discussion and dispute where 'domination' is·
the prevalent mode of structural order, where the logic of
politically accomplished with the consequences of reducing the
structural potentiality for conflict, the
II extent and durability of job controls are subject
to the market. Fluctuations in the sales of cars,
in the rate of capital investment, soon reveal
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themselves on the shop floor" (Beynon,1973,
pp.132~133i see also Lane, 1974, pp.20S-206) •
When control possibilities are reduced, and hard earned discretion
is eroded - at last resort when unemployment becomes a fact of
life - structural conflicts become more liable to social manifest-
ation.
In this section, I have attempted to demonstrate how
organisational order and conflict may be predisposed by the
historically conditioned structural framework which circumscribes
organisational behaviour. More specifically the integration of
organisations subject to the logic of capitalism may take the two
analytic and historical forms of hegemony and domination, but the
same logic may at the same time set up predispositions towards
conflict.
7.5 A Clarificatory Note on Trade Unions
In the above discussion, I have focused, for illustrative
purposes, upon'industrial organisations, and attempted to show that
their structural framework has a general institutional logic and
organisational rationality, which predisposes the process of organ-
isational politics before power is exercised in concrete arenas.
One of the problems with such an illustrative discussion is that
it is impossible to do justice to the complex nature of the
structural biases that circumscribe organisational power. A
particularly important example of this problem - important enough
to require this brief note of clarification - is that of the effect
of trade unions on the structural framework of industrial organis-
ations in Britain. This somewhat cursory reference to trade
union organisation simultaneously permits further illustration of
the basic ideas under examination.
Trade union organisation interlaces with industrial organ-
isation, and the important question of relevance here concerns the
extent to which the former's involvement affects the structural
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framework of power in the latter. For all participants in
industrial organisation, trade unions are part of the given
structural facts of life. It might be supposed that trade
unions qua organised labour (i.e. representing labour and deriving
their power from the social solidarity of labour) not only act as
focal points of structural conflict but also aim to increase the
social possibilities of its membership. From one viewpoint
there is some truth in this supposition, but from the pOint of
view of understanding the impact of trade unions on the structural
framework of industrial organisations, it is important to under-
stand their structural, institutionalised role in the state of
organisational order.
As well as being part of the structural facts of life in
industrial organisations, trade unions themselves are circumscribed
by their own structural framework, and the institutional logic and
premises which rationalise their existence and function are in
essence the same as those already examined in 7.2 (cf. Hyman and
Fryer, 1977, p.153ff.). As organised labour, trade unions are in
opposition to the logic of capital, but, paradoxically, their
institutionalised function incorporates them within that very
logic :
" trade unions are dialectically both an opposition
to capitalism and a component of it ... As
institutions, trade unions do not challenge the
existence of society based on a division of
classes, they merely express it by their nature
they are tied to capitalism". (Anderson, 1977,
p.334i cf. Beynon, 1973, pp.220-221; Lane, 1974,
p.230ff.).
Having an institutionalised bargaining role, unions act within
rules and procedures laid down at societal and local organisational
levels, and to be a bona fide trade union involves accepting (and
implicitly reinforcing) the biases of the structural framework :
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·"The plain fact is that union action is limited
by the system unions have to operate in and is
tempered by the values of that system" (Allen,
1966, p.l3) .
Needless to say, acceptance of the rules and procedures (and, by
inference, the institutional logic underlying them) also enables
certain union actions at the same time (above all, the fundamental
possibility of representing members) .
The structural framework of trade unions at the same time
predisposes the way in which they influence the nature of power
in industrial organisations. In this context, trade unions are
party to the institutionalised industrial relations procedures,
which express the basic values of the system (e.g. adherence to
agreed rules, negotiation, compromise etc.) and through which
(potential) organisational conflict is channelled. Incorporated
within the industrial relations system - the only way they can
represent members' interests against capital ~ unions become
subject to the facts of capitalism which they oppose but upon
which their existence depends. By accepting the values of the system,
and reducing societal (class) issues to organisational (work) issues;
by limiting organisational issues to economic ones (cf. Mann,
1973, p.20ff.; Beynon, 1973, pp.230-231 and 299-300) subject to
bargaining within institutionalised rules and procedures; by
encouraging restricted economistic issues to be understood as
sectionalist disputes instead of as collective problems; in these
ways unions de-focus structural conflict and play an essential role
in realisation of structural order in industrial organisations
(cf. Lane, 1974, p.179ff.i Hyman, 1972, p.72ff.).
Institutionally, then, trade unions contribute to the
structur al predispositions towards organi.sational order, but it
might also be argued that they rarely increase the control possi-
bilities of their members. First, by its very implication in the
values of the industrial relations system, a trade union tends to
reduce its scope primarily to economic issues. However, even where
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a union does show interest in control possibilities (i.e. in
matters of job regulation), it:
" is essentially conservative - it seems to
establish de jure what has already occurred
de facto, namely that workers in their relatlons
with shop floor management are able, informally
and surreptitiously, to increase the scope of
their activities by being in physical possession
of the shopfloor. It is very rarely that a trade
union is oriented towards an increase in actual
job controL •." (Mann, 1973, p.20).
Furthermore
"With the increasing trend towards productivity
bargaining, job control is viewed by trade unions
as something which can be exchanged periodically
for economic rewards" (ibid., p.21).
The lack of priority given by unions to extending job regulation,
means that they tend not to create greater structural possibilities
for their membership.
Thp. second implication of in,titutionalised trade unionism
for control possibilities lies in the increasing centralisation of
industrial relations procedures. Bound up in the economic logic
of industrial organisation - of the accumulation and concentration
of capital in larger units of production - trade unions have become
increasingly involved in national-level negotiations. The central-
ising of negotiations between full time trade union officials and
specialist managers has a tendency of taking bargaining away from
the shop-floor, thus restricting the amount of discretion that could
be achieved. Often such centralisation occurs on paper only (cf.
Hyman and Fryer, 1977, p.166), but sometimes its implications are
more constraining :
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"Central to the [New Working Arrangemen~ ••• was
the establishment of a national wage rate •••
The deal did away with local wage negotiations
and replaced it with a centralised, national
structure ..• The stress in this part of the
agreement was upon the isolation of local shop-
floor organisations from the collective bargaining
process" (Nichols and Beynon, 1977, p.112).
This trade union acknowledgement of and participation in the
"corporate rationality" (ibid. p.133) of institut.i.onal procedures
add to the weight of structural impossibilities, by taking control
potential out of the organisational arena.
The shop steward, as representative of the trade union on
the shop floor, may on the one hand be freer than the full-time
official to evade the structural constraints operating on trade
union action, and as such be party to the social practices of job-
control (cf. Beynon, 1973, p.129ff. and p ,299ff.); on the other
hand, unlike the full-time official, shop stewards are directly
subject to the same structural predispositions as all shop floor
" the general fact that to work in a factory is to
workers. Although shop stewards are distinct in their power base,
ultimately they have to live with the rationality of profitability
and the market, and this constitutes one basic fact of life in an
industrial organisation:
work on management's terms. Where management finds
that its right to manage is being challenged within
a factory, it is involved in a political struggle.
Often this struggle takes the form of skirmishes on
L~e shop floor, and at this level shop steward
organisations can be extremely effective, and shop
stewards can amass a considerable amount of political
influence and personal prestige. Where the challenge
to managerial authority seriously affects the
profitability of the Company, howeve r I the response
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of management is likely to be firmer. To lay
men off or to close plants down permanently,
ultimately involves political decisions, and it
is at this level that the conflict between capital
and labour becomes obviously biased against the
worker" (Beynon, 1973, p.1S3).
The shop steward is basically a worker, and in the last resort,
where organisational rationality is contravened, structural possi-
bilities for control are governed by his membership of the indus-
.trial organisation, rather than the trade union. (See also Lane,
1974, p.195ff. and specifically p.214) .
To silllli~arise,the place of trade unions in the structural
framework of power in industrial organisations does not fundamentally
alter the direction of the structural biases because, in the end,
trade union organisations, and their participants, are subject to
the same core institutional assumptions and logic which underpins
capitalist society. This means that the social commitment to
opposition, conflict and labour power, in normal circumstances
becomes a structural involvement in consensus, order and the power
f . 1 18o cap.it.aL, Having said this, it is important to realise that
there are limitations to the institutionalisation of industrial
conflict, and the aforementioned structural involvement (cf. Hyman,
1972, pp.104-105).
influence upon the topic. Having accepted the broad, critical
Concluding Remarks
Organisational power and politics are circumscribed by the
context in which they occur, so that it has been necessary to
consider theoretically the nature of this context and of its
themes of the 'two faces of power' thesis, the basic task has been
to formulate a sensitising conception of the 'second face' without
contravening the theoretical and methodological premises of the
thesis. I have argued for a notion of 'structural framework' and
have explored its features both in abstract and by illustration.
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The structural framework, as impersonal, anonymous tendencies that
inhere in the institutional arrangements of society and organisation,
predisposes the possibilities and impossibilities of actors, and is
conducive to order and ccnflict. These propositions have been
developed in the specific context of power in industrial organis-
ations in Britain.
independent of what the latter do. However these structural
It is in the nature of organisation that biases are
structured into the initial potentials and capacities of actors
biases are not sufficient to explain the processes of political
action and interaction which are part of the everyday lives of
organisational participants. It is essential to know how parti-
cipants themselves make sense of these limitations and opportunities
if we are to explain organisational politics, for it is a Iway s after
their own interpretive work that participants engage in the courses
of political action observed. In the next two chapters, I shall
focus on the interpretive activities of actors in organisations and
show how they intermediate between the "structural facts of life"
and organisational politics.
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Chapter·seven
NarES
1. In Chapter Nine, I shall take up the distinctions between
social and structural context, and between political
action and political process.
2. Glucksmann (1974, chapter 2) conducts a restricted survey,
but only touches upon the variety of meaning and breadth
of scope of the concept. Clarke (1975, p.144ff.) is more
interested in the theoretical possibilities of the concept
of 'structure'.
"Thus 'structure' refers not to observed social
relations but to a more abstract level of reality,
and is the syntax of transformation which is
present only in its manifestations but can never
be observed as such in itself ••• It refers to the
more abstract principles governing the organisation
of social relations". (Glucksmann, 1974, p.45).
3. The abstract aspects of this conception correspond generally
with the notion of 'structure' in structural linguistics,
Levi-Straussian and Althusserian structuralism :
4. In a more specific context, Baldamus (1961, p.17) makes a
similar distinction.
5. More specifically, I am thi~~ing of Beynon (1973), Clegg
(1975), Nichols and Armstrong (1976) and Nichols and Beynon
(1977). Apart from Clegg, D~ese studies are mainly
empirical in focus, in spite of being underpinned by a
general Marxist viewpoint. For this reason they were not
included in Part One.
The restriction of discussion to British society is a
reflection of this choice of research studies, although it
might be argued that the general propositions are relevant
to all Western capitalist societies (cf. Miliband, 1973b).
6. Baldamus (1961, p.32-43) distinguishes b70 types of
control of work behaviour (effort) within an industrial
organisation viz. "effort stability" and "effort intensity".
Being more general, my arguments will not follow up the
possible implications of such control differences.
7. The latter are themselves held accountable to others
according to their performance on economically-rational
criteria (cf. Nichols and Beynon, 1977, pp.38-39). See
also below on the calculability of control criteria.
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8. For example, Kynaston Reeves and Woodward write :
"A feature of impersonal controls is that they
operate more or less impartially and more or
less automatically". (Kynaston Reeves and
Woodward, 1970, p.45).
9. Accounting theory and practice can, of course, be
constructed upon different premises and thus be 'rational'
on different grounds. Weber (1964, p.195) sees capital
accounting as formally rational where profit-making in
market situations provides the structural context. But
accountability may also be assessed with respect to
different "ultimate values" (cf. Weber's notion of sub-
stantive rationality, 1964, p.184ff.) e.g. "the social
needs of the community" (Coates and Topham, 1974, p.112).
Within a capitalist context, this has given rise to the
social audit and social accounting whereby actions are
.held accountable to user-groups other than capital e.g.
labour, customers, local community.
10. For discussion of further, less visible workplace in-
equalities in organisational rewards, see Wedderburn, 1969;
1970; Wedderburn and Craig, 1974.
11. The Chemco studies (Nichols and Armstrong, 1976; Nichols
and Beynon, 1977) document the development of new,
"progressive" techniques. The New Working Arrangement,
although enveloped in a humanising philosophy, was
effectively aimed at tightening the control possibilities
for workers, supervisors and managers alike.
12. For now classic arguments about variations in control and
discretion of workers between industrial settings, see
Blauner, 1964.
13. For example, Marx was particularly interested in the capit-
alist: Nichols and Beynon (1977, p.44ff.) have discussed
the structural influences on the supervisor; Beynon
(1973, e.g. p.220) analyses the position of the shop
steward in a similar way; Lockwood (1958, p.41ff.) is
concerned with the office clerk, and Mills (1951) examines
a number of middle class occupations.
In concentrating on the categories of managers and workers
(i.e. those with and without institutional authority) for
the purposes of theoretical discussion, I am more or less
following sociological conventions (see, for example,
Dahrendorf, 1959, p.165ff. i Martin, 1977, P .102ff.)
14. On rationalisation and the increasingly impersonal control
of clerical office work, see Lockwood, 1958, p.85ff. and
Mills, 1951, p.192ff.
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15. The realisation of career possibilities, as Dalton and
Burns suggest, thus become the focus of managerial
politics. See Chapter Nine.
16. For career possibilities of clerks, see Lockwood, 1958,
p.57ff. and Mills, 1951, pp.274-275.
17. It would seem that Clegg (1975; 1977) has conflated these
two structural modes of organisation, although his
discussion of 'domination' seems to reflect more Gramsci's
idea of 'hegemony' (see 4.3).
18. For an insightful discussion of how structural pressures
influence the social activities and oppositional rhetoric of
shop stewards and trade union leaders, see Lane, 1974,
Chapters Six and Seven.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
EVERYDAY ORGANISATIONAL THEORISING INTERPRETIVE ASPECTS
8.1 Organisational Politics and the Structural Framework
of Power
In both the Marxist and the non-Marxist traditions of
social science, a perennial concern has been the relationship
between social action and social structure. At the root of this
matter lies the question: how, and to what extent do the
objective (social, economic, political) conditions of society
influence the subjective consciousness of individuals (in groups)
so that the latter behave in the ways observed? The nature of
the relationship between organisational politics and the structural
framework of organisational power raises the same issues as those
that have troubled social scientists of diverse suasions. My
approach to this relationship is to build a view upon the theo-
retical efficacy of the postulate of voluntarism and to eschew
the neat but contradictory dichotomies that are to be found so
frequently in the literature. In everyday organisational life,
people cannot sit back and philosophise about the strange contra-
dictoriness of choice and constraint, action and structure,
.subjectivity and objectivity etc. - they simply experience such
polarities (maybe not as polarities at all) and contrive their
sensibility for the purposes at hand.
" 'we are not free to choose' 'to view and hence
to construct' the world in any old way. Rather
the experience of social structure, which we embody
in our social relations and our language, leads us
to expect certain material constraints in any social
world; but, of course, these contradictory
opposites are unified because they have to be lived".
(Corrigan, 1975, p.222).
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By examining how participants experience and respond to the
structural framework that circumscribes the organisation qua
political arena, the dichotomies, contradictions, opposites which
permeate academic theorising become academically understandable.
In organisations, power is exercised, control attempted,
in the context of structural pulls and pushes which inhere in the
dominant ways of 'doing' organisation. The structural predis-
positions, while grounded in a more or less stable set of
assumptions and mode of rationality, are subject to variations
in their implications for organisational politics because of
changes in historical-economic factors - in Chapter Seven structural
order and conflict were seen as variable. However, structural
factors are not the only significant theoretical variables;
'objective', structuralist analysis has shown itself to be generally
incapable of explaining observed actions with any accuracy (cf.
Wolpe, 1970; Maravell, 1976). Simultaneous variation in the ways
organisational participants interpret and attempt to exercise control
(for themselve~, for groups, for their organisation) over their work
situations, leads to a highly complex picture of multiple objective
and subjective factors. I have written in some detail about the
structural side of organisational power, so, in the next two
chapters I wish to investigate power and politics from the partici-
pants' viewpoint - the first face. However I shall make clear
that the tNO faces are not independent of each other.
It is in the interpretive and strategic work of organisational
participants that the political life of organisations becomes
apparent: in the creation, expansion and exploitation of possi-
bilities; in the avoidance, reduction and changing of impossi-
bilities; and in the unintended, cumulative repercussions of these
conscious efforts to control work. I shall be arguing that the
significant variable in question is the ways in which participants
theorise their everyday organisational lives. The ways in which
they make sense of the organisational "facts of life" (i.e.
interpretive work) will further, for those participants with an
active interest controlling their work situations, be related to
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their attempts to handle those "facts" (i.e. strategic work) •
For the purposes of discussion I shall therefore distinguish inter-
pretive from strategic aspects of everyday organisational theoris-
ing.
Interpretive work refers to the attempts by actors to make
sense of their organisational and social experiences so that they
are able to make their lives "reasonable" and "accountable".
Strategic work implies a conscious, planning of future courses of
action based upon one's current understanding (possibly 'false')
of what is possible and desirable.l Clearly, while all organis-
ational participants will perform, consciously or otherwise,
interpretive work, some proportion of them will actively seek to
expand possibilities of action or to reduce social/structural
impossibilities. Where organisational participants are conscious
control strategists - and I suspect that most are at some level -
they will be considered as political actors. For the most part,
I shall discuss interpretive aspects of everyday organisational
theorising in the present chapter, and the strategic aspects in
Chapter Nine.
that it is necessary to enter a caveat. This .arises in part
Before moving on to the more substantive arguments, I think
from the language which I have been using to describe theorising
activi':ies. It is important to understand how participants give
meaning to their organisational lives, and how they interpret
political aspects of their work situations, but interpretive work
should not be envisaged as self-creating and self-sustaining.
Sociological explanation can only take place at the juncture
between structure and action (i.e. theorising), but it is both naive
and unhelpful to study theorising as a socially detached activity :
"Man's consciousness does have a certain independence
from ••• structural factors .•. ~ut i-tJ is not
wholly autonomous. Definitions of reality are
themselves socially generated and sustained, and
the ability of men to achieve their goals is
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constrained [and, one might add, facilitated -
E.D.CJ by the objective characteristics of the
situaton". (Hyman, 1972, p.72).
Everyday organisational theorising constitutes the starting point
for explaining political actions in organisations, but it is an
encumbrance to understanding the latter if such theorising is
seen only as a feature of the immediate occasion of its use - as
is definitional of ethnomethodological investigation and implicit
in much symbolic interactionism.
Everyday organisational theorising, at any given point in
time, reveals a social-historical process in which 'experience'
meets 'facts' and endeavours to rationalise them. Theories-in-
use therefore "know" or "have known" the structural world of
organisational reality, and provide their user with concepts and
propositions that aremor~r-less well tested. Theorising
activities thus already embody a vision of the structural frame-
work distilled from their continuing interface with the. latter.
·Everyday organisational theories will invariably reflect, though
not uniformly nor necessarily consistently or accurately,
experiences of the localised structural framework, its procedures,
rules, practices as well as its ideas and rationality; they will
also incorporate broader experiences of the institutional facts
and ideas which give reaS0n to organisational activities.
Experiences of ideology and of 'factual' reality, at the localised
organisational and the institutional societal levels, will influence
in complicated ways the interpretive and strategic work of
participants in the political arena of the organisation.
The nature of these experiential sedimentations and
distillations of the system qv~ fact and qua ideology imply complex
(Marxists might prefer the term 'dialectical') interrelationships
between the structural framework and politics, between organisational
and extra-organisational life, and between everyday theorising and
ideology. In turn, this means that the concept of "organisational
politics" necessarily opens up broader issues about the social and
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cultural sources of everyday theories of organisational power
and politics, and to neglect these broader sociological matters
is inevitably to shortcircuit an understanding of the topic in
question.
also in societal terms. As in Chapter Seven, much of the dis-
In the following discussion I hope to demonstrate that
everyday organisational theorising - in both its aspects - is
grounded, in a variable and contingent way, in the structural
framework of organisational power, and that such activities can
and should be comprehended not only in organisational terms but
cussion will focus on power and politics in industrial organis-
ations in capitalist societies - particularly Britain.
8.2 Theorising=Awarenessand Political Strategy
Theorising - of academic or of everyday varieties - serves
a number of functions stemming from its basic aim, i.e. to make
rational and accountable for the theorist his observations and
experiences. In considering L~e matter of organisational politics,
two of these functions appear to have special importance viz.
providing a general awareness or image of social existence, and
establishing a basis of 'knowledge' from which future plans or
projects may be deduc;d and enacted.
Social actors behave in accordance with their awareness of
the situations faced, and this awareness or consciousness will
involve an interpretive assessment of the way the system works, of
their social possibilities and impossibilities, of the obduracy of
the system etc. 'Awareness' itself is of course a variable
factor, which is rooted in the type of theory being employed
some theories will encourage or permit a greater degree of aware-
ness, while others will tend to restirct the awareness in some way.
A second dimension of awareness refers to the type of awareness
produced by the theory in question - different theories will focus
on different aspects of social life and therefore may produce an
equal degree of awareness of opposing "sides" of reality.
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Considering degree of awareness first, it seems possible
to distinguish two related matters - the completeness of the
image(s) produced by a theory, and the commitment which a theory
invokes. Theories may create a high degree of awareness by
constructing a more-or-less complete picture of the structural
framework and the ways in which it 'reacts' to social actions.
To this extent, theorists are in a position to interpret and
rationalise most of all of their experiences.2 Other theories
will be limited in their scope of application and thereby provide
only a restricted or partial awareness of the "nature of things".
'ideological'. This has the added implication that complete
Where everyday theories create relatively complete closed
world-views - i.e. internally consistent views about the (possible)
nature of the social (or organisational) world - I shall call them
world-views will tend to induce a greater degree of commitment
than would be true of incomplete, open, non-ideological theories.
Indeed, completeness and commitment are mutually reinforcing to
the extent that complete images will tend to create greater ad-
herence because of their 'success'; and intellectual and emotional
attachment will tend to make adherents blind to any weaknesses
or loopholes. Completeness, 'success' and commitment thus tend
to engender a certain resistance to "antithetical" experiences,
while non-ideological theories will tend to lead to flexible,
uncommitted interpretations adapting to inconsistent experiences.
The distinction between ideological and non-ideological
theories shows fundamental similarities to that between 'closed'
and 'open' academic theories (see Chapter Five) for obvious
reasons.
Two theories may be equally complete, invoke similar levels
of commitment and similar degrees of awareness, and yet, by
providing a different type of awareness, they may have entirely
different implications for power and political action. Awareness
may vary in its understanding of how the system works or should
work, of how the structural framework interacts with social life,
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of the possibilities and impossibilities for socio-political
actions etc. However, in general, I would suggest that every-
day organisational theorising may involve an awareness that is
either oriented towards organisational order (i.e. acceptance of
the structural framework as it is or oriented towards conflict
(Le. opposition to the structural framework as it is) . Clearly,
order and conflict awareness are critical factors in the analysis
of how actors theorise power and politics in organisational life.
Concerning political action, it is necessary to examine
how participants translate their interpretive understanding of the
organisation into active plans to control their organisational
lives. In Chapter Nine, I shall be arguing that these plans of
organisational participants. Such political strategies,
action, or political strategies, are also related to the degree
and type of awareness created by the theorising activities of
necessarily implicating other actors in the intricacies of inte-
gration and conflict, are central to the analysis of organisational
politics.
In the rest of this chapter I shall examine some major
"modes of theorising" and the images that they produce for their
adherents. I shall also consider sOme of the complications that
arise from the fact that organisational participants are in general
"inconsistent" theorists. Throughout this discussion, I shall
consciou~ly link organisational theorising with actors' experiences
of the structural framework in its localised and institutional,
I factual' and 'ideological' aspects. These arguments are carried
forward into Chapter Nine, where the political-strategic impli-
cations of everyday organisational theorising are developed.
8.3 Modes of Everyday Organisational Theorising
The argument that organisational participants employ
'theories', not unlike academic ones, in order to impute order
and reason to their daily experiences is not particularly
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contentious. Such everyday theories may be relatively in-
articulate, maybe inarticulable, but people do tend to develop
patterned ways of perceiving social reality - that this happens
in spite of sociologists' organised and comprehensive attempts
to sabotage any 'inherent' orderliness in reality, is one of
ethnomethodology's major contributions to social sCientific
knowledge. There are two main problems which need attention
because they underscore the actual complexities of the apparently
simple proposition with which I opened this section. These
problems, which I shall call the variability and inconsistency
of everyday theorising, refer respectively to an empirical and
a theoretical issue. Inconsistent theorising arises when actors
employ diverse and (apparently) incompatible theories in their
organisational lives - I shall return to this matter in section
8.6 below, after having explained some of the modes of theorising
available.
The problem of variability is, in a sense, more serious
because, in a theoretical thesis, it can only be "resolved" by
assumption. The number of particular theories used in everyday
life is potentially infinite, and each theory will have some
implications for the political conduct of its adherents. It is
important to be theoretically sensitive to these variations:
"To neglect the possibilities of variation in
perceptions and definitions, goals and motives,
is to trammel sociological analysis". (Hyman,
1972, p.69).
Yet in the present context to discuss everyday organisational
theorising meaningfully requires a bit of "tramelling": variability
of theories needs to be reduced analytically. As such, using the
arguments in 8.2, I suggest that, for the purposes of studying
organisational politics, the general range of such theories may
be established - from 'ideological' 'order' theories to 'ideologi-
cal' 'conflict' theories - and four basic "modes of theorising"
may be identified within that range.
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concerning degree and type of awareness. These modes of
A "mode of theorising" may incorporate any number of
concrete everyday theories, but the latter belong to the mode
in question because they share certain general characteristics
theorising are distinct for explanatory purposes, but are not
necessarily mutually exclusive - in fact in section 8.6 I shall
suggest that it is perfectly rational for participants to use
(elements of) more than one mode, and to shift between them.
Furthermore, these modes of theorising are not randomly distributed
amongst the organisational personnel, since their appropriateness
to organisational and extra-organisational experiences varies.
Figure 8.1 Four Modes of Everyday Organisational Theorising
Types of Awareness
Degree of
awareness
(completeness
and
commi tment)
'Order' Awareness 'Conflict'
Awareness
(Acceptance) (Rejection)
High Normative Alternative
(ideology) Theorising Theorising
Low Pragmatic Oppositional
(non-ideology) Theorising Theorising
In terms of the sensitising themes of the thesis, everyday
organisational theories can be classified according to the awareness
they reflect and promote of organisational order and conflict, and
to their completeness and the commitment they generate. Figure
8.1 summarises this relationship. It should be remembered that
these four modes are not intended to be analytically distinct,
although discussion of them in the following sections may at times
give this impression. Before coming to a documented explication
(sections 8.4 and 8.5) I shall briefly outline the main character-
istics of each mode.
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The central feature of 'normative theorising' in organis-
ational life is its acceptance of the structural framework (in
both its local and institutional aspects) as socially legitimate.
Such profound acceptance of the way things work will thereby
influence actors' responses to the system (e.g. institutional
authority tends to become transformed into normative authority)
creating active support for the organisation and its definitions.
Normative theorising implies a degree of commitment which is
liable to invoke conscious efforts to maintain organisational
order by adopting strategies which appeal to cooperation, ·harmony,
loyalty etc., reflecting the actor's assessment of the structural
framework as socially legitimate.
The second mode of theorising, which I have called 'prag-
matic' is unlike the first in that it involves little depth of
awareness about how o~ganisations work, and barely a commitment
to anything - save, perhaps, survival. Without contemplation of
the 'whys' and 'wherefores' of the structural framework in general,
attention is focused on localised, immediate issues that affect
day-to-day existence. Pragmatic theorising thus connotes neither
promotion nor rebuttal of the institutional logiC, and, being
neither for nor against, implicitly favours organisational order.
Being confronted with unalterable, often unrecognised, facts of
life, pragmatic theorists opt to live with them, to "ride the
waves", making sense of their experiences on a daily basis. This
'unideological' mode, responding to and coping with issues as they
arise, will tend to be associated with strategies that appear
apathetic or indifferent, usually being piecemeal and disconnected.
Although such theorising does not positively endorse the status
quo - under certain circumstances, it may lead to pressure for
localised change - the general tenor of the pragmatic mode and
related strategies is acceptance by default.
In contrast to the above modes, alternative and oppositional
theorising, either consciously or potentially, operate in the
direction of conflict and rejection. Oppositional theorising
implies a questioning of the status quo and its legitimacy, but
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this questioning is restricted to localised issues rather than
being generalised to the institutional basis of the organisation
its rationality. The incomplete, unideological nature of such
theorising leads neither to a systematic understanding of why
things are "wrong", nor, therefore, to a high degree of awareness
of how to resolve the conflicts for good. Low commitment to
change, and the restricted scope of theorising leads to the develop-
ment of piecemeal strategies oriented to the elimination, by
opposition and resistance, of finite problems as they arise. In
spite of an implicit embryonic awareness of the social contingency
of the structural framework, limited, unorganised strategies of
opposition will, by themselves, tend to be channeled within the
system.
The alternative mode of theorising3 shares with its norma-
tive counterpart a high degree of awareness, and with oppositional
theories an orientation towards conflict and change. The
defining characteristic of alternative theorising is adherence to
a different set of premises and logic as a basis for assessing social
life. Its rejection of the existing structural framework thus
follows from a thoroughgoing analysis of the latter's rationality
combined with an explicit understanding of its social contingency.
Defining conflict as an inevitable precursor to the establishment
of an alternative way of organising work, and supported by high
commitment to change, alternative theorists are likely to adopt
political strategies of a militant, organised nature.
In sections 8.4 fuid 8.5, I shall examine these modes of
theorising in the context of other studies in order to illustrate
their usefulness, and to indicate the theoretical need to see
everyday organisational theorising in the context of the structural
framework of power.
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8.4 Everyday Organisational Theorising and Organisational Order
In the remaining.sections of Chapter Eight, I shall be
liberally drawing upon available sociological research which relates
directly and indirectly to the various ways in which participants
perceive and define their organisations as political arenas. The
materials will be organised for two purposes: first, to illustrate
the potential usefulness of the categories introduced above;
second, to illuminate the relationship of theorising activities to
experience, both within and outwith the organisation. In respect
of the latter point, although the aim of this thesis is to develop
an interpretive approach to internal organisational politics,
social reality is not so easily compartmentalised.lndeed the
following arguments reference this resistance to simpliste dis-
cussions of organisational politics per se by demonstrating the
reciprocal nature of experience, theorising and consciousness
inside and outside organisations.
Before moving to an exploration of 'order theorising', I
need to raise, but not resolve, a theoretical problem. In the
following paragraphs I shall be illustrating my arguments with
reference to 'class-images',. 'meaning-systems', 'social conscious-
ness', 'modes of adaptation' (and other more diffuse but parallel
conceptions), but at the same time it is necessary to accept these
terms fairly unquestioningly. There are intuitive overlaps and
similarities which defy explicit analytical clarification even
were the time and space available. Because work in this area
has been, and still is, subject to continuous debate and criticism
the main thrusts of which will become apparent below - I shall be
invoking these conceptions for illustrative and illuminative
purposes only, in order to suggest lines of enquiry into the
nature of everyday organisational theorising and its social and
ideological sources.
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8.4.1 Normative Theorising
Discussion of the normative mode immediately opens up the
question cf the relationships between theorising and organisational
position on the one hand, and between theorising and social (class)
values on the other. Accepting that very few participants will
adopt the normative mode to the exclusion of all others, docu-
mentary evidence would suggest that normative theorising permeates
more fully the interpretive work of higher participants in organis-
ational and class terms.
Parkin writes of the 'dominant value system' which re-
inforces the structural framework of society by providing
" a moral framework which promotes the
endorsement of existing inequality"
(Parkin, 1972, p.81).
Dominant values "naturally" inform the mode of theorising employed
by those participants whose "objective interests" (cf. Balbus,
1971, p.152ff.) are directly tied to the way things are i.e. the
higher social classes/occupational groups who benefit from and
through the institutional premises of society. In capitalist
society, employers, executives and share-holding managers appear
to appr-oach most closely this natural affinity with the dominant
ideology (cf. Burns, 1977, pp.109-110; Brannen et al., 1976,
p.43) • Mills (1951, Part One) discusses at length the "old
middle classes" and the "rhetoric of competition" in the U.S.,
and, with respect to industrial organisations in Britain, FOx's
classic analyses of the "unitary" and "pluralistic" ideologies of
management (1966; 1973; 1974a; 1974b) demonstrate the appli-
cation of dominant social values in the organisational theorising
of that group. In non-industrial organisations too top partici-
pants theorise their organisational existence in the belief that
all participants are bound together in a moral order which legit-
imates fully the status quo (cf. Burns, 1977, p.84).
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In spite of this."natural" association of certain higher
participants to normative theorising, it should be assumed
neither that all such participants employ such a mode all the
time, nor that some lower participants do not identify with the
structural framework to a significant extent. Indeed the latter
question is more interesting theoretically and this has been re-
flected in the amount of research devoted to it. Sociologists
who have examined class attitudes towards the status quo provide
evidence for two major normative theories in use.
The first of these theories may be called "aspirational"
(Parkin, 1972, pp.86-87). The white-collar, lower middle worker
class is probably archetypal of normative identification which
arises through his valued social association with or proximity to
higher organisational groups. This association, more historical
than current, creates the upward-looking clerk who emphasises his
future promotion possibilities and thus accepts the system which
he believes will fulfil his aspirations. In spite of the re-
duction in the real career possibilities of clerks - albethey
higher than shopfloor workers - the latters' individualistic,
future-looking status consciousness is congruent with high job
commitment and a positive evaluation of the organisational order
(see Lockwood, 1958, p.68 and p.201ff.i Mills, 1951, p.259ff.i
Dahrendorf, 1969, pp.147-148i also Burns' discussion of vocational
commitment, 1977, p.112ff.).
Lockwood's conception of the "traditional deferential
worker" (1966, p.252ff.) provides some illustration of a second
type of normative theorising "from below". Deferential theoris-
ing also involves a status consciousness but the images of society
and work suggest a socially legitimate acceptance of the structural
framework in itself, rather than for its reward system. As with
other types of theorising, research on deference indicates that
the images associated with it tend to intermingle with images more
akin to other modes (cf. Bell and Newby, 1975; Martin and Fryer,
1975; Batstone, 1975) - this point is germane to the arguments
developed in section 8.6 below - but the proposition that elements
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of deferential theorising are found amongst workers, and
influence their interpretation of organisational power, in
supportive of the present view.
Evidence of normative theories in use also comes from
organisational studies. Nichols' work (1974; also Nichols and
Armstrong, 1976, p.130ff.) indicates that under certain circum-
stances foremen, with "hard", Northern working-class backgrounds,
make sense of parts of their work (and social) experiences by
expressing explicit support for the status quo
"Within their knowledge of what is possible,
the company has done them well. Ask them
about shareholders, profit or capitalism,
then, and they will tell you how what is,
works. For them, the present represents
a more or less unalterable order of things".
(Nichols, 1974, p.493).
The case is not clear-cut; normative ideas coexist with pragmatic
and even oppositional ones, but the former are used coherently to
interpret certain features of their organisational lives, e.g.
strikes, unemployment. As with managers, other professionals,
clerks and workers, some foremen are more fully in possession of
a normative theory thnn others; Nichols and Beynon (1977,
p.48ff.) thus speaks of "management men" who identify with the
goals of top management.
Even among shop stewards, research has revealed elements
of normative theorising in varying degrees. Poole (1974, pp.62-63
and 73-74) discovered that almost a quarter of his sample of shop
stewards could be considered as "active conciliators" who defined
their organisational role in consensus terms (cf. Miller and Form,
1951, p.265ff.; Batstone et al., 1977, p.24ff.). Similarly,
Brannen et aI's worker-directors also held, or had developed
through their boardroom experience, a normative outlook to their
organisational lives, in spite of their "traditional proletarian"
.backgrounds (Brannen et al., 1976, pp.126-128, and pp.164-165).
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There would appear to be some documentary support for the
normative mode of theorising both in general social life, and in
industrial and non-industria14 organisations. Normative theorising
will rarely constitute the total view of any group or individual,
and elements of it can be found in most parts of the organisation,
developed to varying degrees of coherence and awareness. Where
normative theories are used to any great extent, one may expect
both commitment to, and often active support for the structural
framework (see 9.2).
Identification of full normative theorising may be hampered
by two complicating issues: first, normative ideas and propositions
may be adopted for pragmatic and strategic reasons, rather than
for their own sake - such adoption would indicate the pragmatic
mode of theorising (see note 11). Second, normative theories and
imagery appear to exist on two distinct levels - the abstract and
the concrete between which, for the purpose of analysis, it is
important to distinguish.
Regarding the latter issue, much research indicates that
most actors will apparently concede social legitimacy to some more
general aspects of the dominant ideology and, at an abstract level,
will theorise their social and organisational lives normatively.
It is one variant of "inconsistent" theorising (section 8.6) that
working class people will both socially legitimise the status
quo in abstract, but act in accord with other (e.g. pragmatic)
theories in concrete situations:
" members of the subordinate class are
constrained to accept the dominant moral frame-
work as an abstract and perhaps somewhat
idealised version of reality, although their
life conditions tend to weaken its binding
force in the actual conduct of affairs."
(Parkin, 1972, pp. 94-95).
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A general "normative" acceptance of social values (e.g.
the importance of ambition) become redefined to make greater
sense of real experience (e.g. lack of opportunities) - see also
Mann (1970) and Femia (1975, p.46). The existence of normative
theorising alongside non-normative theorising illustrates the
success of the legitimation machinery in industrial society, but
does not indicate a fully-fledged, widespread social consensus
(cf. Mann, 1970).
In a few cases, normative theorising serves as a means of
interpreting both the abstract and the concrete levels of organis-
ational experience. This may be expected to occur most frequently
and fully amongst top managers, executives and higher professionals,
whose experiences - ideological and "factual" - are likely to be
clearly understandable within such a ~ode.
Research indicates that "pure" deferentiai or aspirational
theories are unlikely to exist except amongst a small minority of
lower participants, but that such theories would act to· short-
circuit the possible realisation of any ambivalence between local/
abstract or factual/ideological experiences. (cf; Martin and
Fryer, 1975, p.llOff.; Nichols and Beynon, 1977, p.47ff.).
8.4.2 Pragmatic Theorising
Implicit in the above discussion of the normative mode
of "order" theorising, is the possible alternative of understanding
organisational power and politics pragmatically :
"...pragmatic acceptance is where the individual
complies because he perceives no realistic alter-
native, and normative acceptance, where the
individual internalises the moral expectations
of the ruling class and views his own inferior
position as legitimate" (Mann, 1970, p.425).
My notion of pragmatic theorising goes beyond the rather static
concept of 'acceptance', to view the interpretive process whereby
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such. acceptance is forthcoming, and.the variety of political
forms it may take. An .'understanding based upon the appli-
cation of pragmatic theorising will tend to.be localised in
focus, restricted in scope and directing attention to the problem
of coping with immediate matters-in-hand. This mode may well
co-exist with a normative understanding of abstract values (as
suggested above), but, as a "deviant" (Mann, 1970) or "subordin-
ate" (Parkin, 1972) meaning-system, will tend to apply to the
everyday organisational experiences and "accommodate" those
experiences within the broader structural framework :
system's] representation of the class
" that is to say, [the subordinate value-
structure and inequality emphasises various
modes of adaptation, rather than either full
endorsement of, or opposition to, .the
status quo" (Parkin, 1972, p.88).
At the level of concrete work experience, acceptance will be forth-
coming not through belief in the moral rectitude of the system as
a set of facts and ideas (indeed, the 'system' may not be perceived
as such), but because of an uncommitted need to subsist in the
5system (cf. Brannen et al., 1976, p.33).
The idea of "passive consent" (Femia, 1975, p.34) or
"reluctant acceptance" (Parkin, 1972, p.90) stresses one possible
form of pragmatic theorising, in which participants simply and
apathetically interpret their work lives as uncontrollable, and
the structural framework as highly constraining, unalterable
facts. At this extreme, pragmatic theorising becomes apolitical
in the sense that the "apathetic" acceptance of structural im-
possibilities implies no strategic attempts to support, change
1968) has probably been overdrawn. Lockwood's "privatised
or adapt the system. The case of assembly-line workers is
probably the most documented example of such apathy, although, as
Beynon has indicated, this stereotype portrait of the car assembler
as purely "instrumental" in his theorising {cf. Goldthorpe et aI,
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worker" with his "pecuniary" model of society and work (Lockwood,
1966, p.256ff.), with his withdrawal from active organisational
6participation , presumably suggests an extreme form of pragmatism
involving adaptation to the system rather than adaptati.on of the
system. Such fatalism and indifference may result in organis-
ational inaction in a minority of cases, but for the most part
does not constitute a satisfactory description of the complexities,
shiftings, ambiguities and potentialities of the pragmatic mode
in general (cf. westergaard, 1970; Moorhouse, 1976, p.490ff.).
Lack of moral involvement and acceptance of the structural
framework are indicative of pragmatic theorising and are common
features of the attitudes and behaviour of participants at all
levels of the organisation (e.g. see Beynon, 1973, p.113 and
pp.118-119; Blackburn and Mann, 1975, p.155; Nichols and
Armstrong, 1976, pp.58-59; Burns, 1977, p.llO), but they do not
necessarily imply a failure to act, to attempt to grapple with the
problems of organisational life at a local level, in a piecemeal
fashion. It is probably more accurate to emphasise the complexi-
ties and ambiguities involved in pragmatic theorising (section 8.6),
and the ways in which participants contrive to "get by", or
actively seek to control possibilities in concrete work situations.
By conceiving of pragmatic "theorising" as an activity, and
relating it to political strategy at the local level (see 9.3),
conflicts, ruled insignif~cant or uninteresting by ~ther approaches
(e.g. Clegg, 1975) become important in revealing the political life
of the organisation, its relationship to the structural framework,
and its future possibilities. Nichols and Armstrong follow this
line of argument in considering the large majority of Chemco
workers who are relatively inactive
"These men do not, by any means, all 'say nothing'.
Whether they assert themselves, however, depends
very much more on the particular situation they
find themselves in than is the case with the
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bloody-minded or the politicals, compared to whom
they have a far higher tolerance threshold."
(Nichols and Armstrong, 1976, p.61).
This lack of involvement in the organisation combined with an
uncommitted acceptance of its political order is found at all
levels - although most notably perhaps amongst lower participants
and in all organisations. Burns (1977), for example, speaks of
professional administrators in a professional organisation :
"What was evident [bY 1973J was the more familiar
attitude of stoic dedication which senior civil
servants in this country have made so very much
their own - a cultivated demeanour and mode of
expression designed to display a determination to
keep the system going at all costs, or to
furthering its growth merely because to do so is·
better than any bearable alternative, and offers
the best ~hance in a deplorable and actively
hostile world for the survival of oneself and
what one values". (Burns, 1977, p.llO).
mode. With respect to total institutions, Goffman (1961, p.64)
"Stoic dedication" differs in substance from a subordinate meaning
system, but shares some of the characteristics of the pragmatic
writes of the opportunistic mode of adaptation he calls 'playing
it cool' - a further survival theory (or combination of theories).
Amongst shop stewards also, it is not uncommon to find
attitudes towards their tasks which stress a piecemeal, localised
understanding of organisational issues, and a similarly uncommitted
acceptance of the structural framework. poole's conception of
the "active defensive" stewards whose main duty was to see the lads
are "'tret" right' (Poole, 1974, p.62) reflects a form of prag-
matic understanding. Some shop stewards accept the nature of
their relationship with managers as natural - a "..• fact of life
as far as their daily dealings were concerned .••" (Lane, 1974,
pp.213-214) - and interpret organisational power in terms of the
practical, given structural framework.
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Within the pragmatic mode of theorising there will exist
a range of possible interpretive schemes and related strategies.
Because it is part of the nature of pragmatism that inter-
pretations will vary according to exigencies, and that theories
are incomplete, and do not induce high commitment, theories in
the pragmatic mode will always have a potential instability.
When experiences are no longer rationally interpretable by a
given theory, the pragmatist will look to a different theory
and it is this continual potential for change that makes such
theorising of special political interest.
8.5 Everyday Organisational Theorising and Organisational
Conflict
8.5.1 Oppositional Theorising
Remaining on the level where the understandings produced
of organisational power and politics are relatively localised and
restricted, I shall now consider the oppositional mode of theor-
ising. Pragmatic and oppositional theorising have certain
similarities which have persuaded some theorists (e.g. Parkin,
1972; Mann, 1970) to treat them as effectively the same. There
is, indeed, some merit in doing so, for as I shall argue in section
8.6 they are so intertwined in practice as to require simultaneous
examination in many cases. However they do have different theoret-
ical implications, they can exist independently, and to see them
as constituting a dynamic interrelationship rather than a unity
has analytical advantages in the analysis of political instability
and change.
As with pragmatic theorising, the structural framework is
assessed in terms of its everyday facticity rather than its social
legitimacy, but, unlike the former, oppositional theorising inter-
prets organisational life in terms of conflict and resistance. The
literature provides support for this cluster of characteristics,
as well as its instability and potentiality.
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The link.between p~agmatic and oppositional theorising is
so strong that Parkin (1972, p.88ff.) subsumes both modes of
interpretation under his "subordinate value-system". However,
there is good reason to believe that he oversimplifies the sub-
category of "fatalistic" responses and underplays the oppositional
and conflict aspects of what he calls "instrumental collectivism".
While the former implies an apathetic, pragmatic understanding
of social life, the latter contains the seeds of oppositional
theorising specifically associated with a "trade union conscious-
ness".
Within the oppositional range of theories it is possible to
distinguish two recurrent variants which combine opposition with
a lack of ideology and c01lll11itment. These may range from a quasi-
emotional feeling that "they" are against "us", with a similarly
inspired "gut" strategy, to a more intellectualised but still
localised analysis of the conflictful content of specific organis-
ational issues. Regarding the former, in a non-industrial context,
Goffman discusses
" the 'intransigent line': the inmate
intentionally challenges the institution by
flagrantly refusing to co-operate with staff."
(Goffman, 1961, p.62).
"Some •.• are militantly non-political, but so
bloody minded they are just the opposite of what
you are - whatever you (including managers) happen
to be. Others are men who simply will not put up
with being 'messed about' ..• These men are
responsible for a disproportionate share of those
incidents that have to do with resentment about the
way the workers are treated". (Nichols and Arm-
strong, 1976, p.61).
Within an industrial organisation, Nichols and Armstrong consider
the "bloody-minded" to constitute a useful category of response
to organisational control and authority. In this category,
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'Jacko' (see Nichols and Beynon, 1977, pp.136-137) typifies this
view of organisational life in which conflict is a reasonable
though localised and unsystematic response. This negative,
personalised opposition was also noted by Beynon, who described
it as the least developed form of "factory class consciousness"
(Beynon, 1973, pp.98-99).
over ours - at least on a localised, interpersonal level., Beynon
On a more intellectualised plane, sOme participants tend
to interpret organisational life as a set of shifting, local,
narrow issues which pitch 'us' against 'them' on a day-to-day
basis. Such theorising involves less apparent arbitrariness,
and may even dispute the priority of their rationality and perceptions
(1973, e.g. p.149 and p.165), and the Chemco studies (Nichols and
Beynon, 1977, e.g. pp.125-126 on grading) provide a number of
examples in which workers and stewards are critically aware of
conflict at the level of local rationality.7
Although Lockwood (1966) appears to conflate aspects of the
two conflict modes in his discussion of "traditional proletarian"
social images, the latter conception does offer the basic ingred-
ients of oppositional theorising :
"Shaped by occupational solidarities and communal
sociability the proletarian social consciousness
is centred on an awareness of 'us' in contradist-
inction to 'them' who are not part of 'us'"
(Lockwood, 1966, p.251).
Moore (1975, pp.53-54) unscrambles the intermingled aspects
of the two implicit modes by distinguishing limited "market
interests", which constitute the focus of his miners' oppositional
theorising, from "class interests" which generalise conflict and
opposition beyond local economic issues to the structural framework.
Brannen et al. (1976, p.31) make a similar distinction in their
discussion of "dichotomous frameworks" which divide industry into
two opposing camps.
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The limited conflict awareness, which centres on immediate
organisational experiences and problems, has been explored in
terms of various restricted versions of Marxian class conscious-
ness, and, in the British context, has inevitably been linked
with the traditions and ethos of the working class movement :
"Trade unionism and workshop organisation is, and
always has been, a direct response to economic
forces A factory class consciousness grew out
of thisi it understands class relationships in
terms of their direct manifestations in conflict
with the boss." (Beynon, 1973, p.98i also
between the bosses and workers within the
factory. It is rooted in the workplace •••
Implicitly tied up with the day~to-day battle
p.197i see also Batstone et al., 1977, p.125):
Trade union consciousness, stressing narrow 'economistic'
issues, also relates to L~e workers' current and historical,
factual and ideological experiences, and is necessarily sharply
distinguished from political class consciousness (cf. Lenin, 1977,
p. 66ff. i Wolpe, 1970, p.267ff.i Clements, 1977, p.316ff.i
Anderson, 1977, pp.336-337; Parkin, 1972, pp.91-92i Nichols,
1974). studies of worker and shop steward orientations provide
evidence identifying the sectionalism and economism implicit in
theorising which ties opposition and conflict to issues arising
within the organisation. For example, with the trade union
connection, it is not surprising to find significant elements of
oppositional theorising amongst shop stewards.
speaks of "active militants" who
Poole (1974)
" expected to be active and aggressive, challenging
existing managerial prerogatives, the distribution of
rewards and the conditions under which work was
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performed" (Poole, 1974, p.63; see also Batstone
8et al., 1977, p.268).
However, in general, this localised conflict awareness
" did not extend ••. to a wider critique of the
socio~ecQnomic system in society at large."
(poole,1974, p.63; see also Lane, 1974, p.2l3).
Or else, broader alternative views, although held, may be seen
as "impossible dreams" with little relevance to dealing with daily
problems (cf. Brannen et al., 1976, p.32).
Much documentary evidence supports the argument that oppositional
theorising may be analysed as separate from the pragmatic mode,
although their concrete interrelationship, and its roots in the
everyday experiences of power and politics, must remain a signi-
ficant theoretical issue. The existence of critical and
oppositional attitudes, however mixed with forms of acceptance,
may have important consequences for future empirical possibilities.
employ to make sense of their work experience. Simultaneously,
8.5.2 Alternative Theorising
It has been possible to introduce evidence which provide
suggestive corroboration of the usefulness of the above three modes
of theorising which participants, at various organisational levels,
I have discussed in passing some of the likely sources of these
theories. Two relab:!d problems arise with alternative theorising
that make it difficult to examine in any detail here. First,
there is very little evidence concerning its existence on any scale;
second, and one reason for the paucity of empirical data, there
are fundamental experiential dilemmas which the alternative
theorist must face - notably the need to survive in the short run
9in a structural framework which he is committed to destroy.
As one might expect, the examination of revolutionary class
consciousness has been largely the domain of Marxists, and their
treatment has been generally either highly abstract and/or founded
upon unsatisfactory objectivist-structuralist premises (cf. Wolpe,
1970; Maravell, 1976). In spite of its empirical rarity and
326
"To my mind ••• the fundamental weakness of •••
Lockwood's 1966 typology was that allowed no
room, no box, for 'universalistic class
consciousness' •.• or for the elements of such
a consciousness ••. But one cannot simply ignore
their past and present reality, even though they
have been mixed with contradictory features".
(Westergaard, 1975, p.251).
theoretical mishandling, alternative theorising is an empirical
possibility whlch must not.be ruled out by fiat.
Parkin's "radical value-system" (1972, p.97ff.) provides
a parallel conception to alternative theorising. In the context
of organisational power and politics, the former promotes a class
consciousness of organisational order and conflict, and suggests a
clear perception of an alternative structural framework (cf.
Goldthorpe, cited in Bulmer, 1975, p.5; see also Mann, 1973,
p.13) . Alternative theorising thus permits a clearly articulated
analysis of the existing system in terms of its broad institutional
topic and the latter's relationship to organisational life. It is
the lack of just such a broad critical base that characterises the
oppositional mode.
Like normative theorising, the alternative mode reflects
and generates a broad theoretical understanding of the organis-
ational facts at both the local and the societal level, so that
issues which arise in the restricted organisational arena are inter-
preted in terms of (and as symptomatic of) the way the system in
toto operates. However, while the former mode rationalises the
given facts with respect to the social legitimacy of the status quo,
alternative theorising comprehends them in terms of another
rationality, another structural framework. Organisational
relations are thus localised reflections of, and reinforcements to
class relations as economic-political categories (cf. Nichols and
Beynon,1977); economic organisational issues are inherently
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control and political issues; organisational control and political
issues are really questions about societal 'Politics and their
relations to the prevail,ing institutional logic (cf. Nichols and
Armstrong, 1976, p.28ff.). In general, then, the shift from
oppositional to alternative theorising involves a process of
political generalisation reasoned with respect to an alternative
way of organising social and work relations.
Unlike the piecemeal,_restricted scope nature of the
oppositional mode, alternative theorising provides a general,
coherent and relatively complete system of ideas for interpreting
organisational reality, and can thus perform a social function:
"Members of the subordinate class who endorse
radical values are thus provided not merely with
a certain explanatory fxamework for the inter-
pretation of social facts, but also a more
favourable social identity". (Parkin, 1972,
p.97).
For reasons of completeness and commitment, an alternative theory
forms an ideological framework from which a consistent political/
political strategy of conflict can emerge. Such a mode - and
of organisational power and politics.
westergaard(1975, pp.251-252) distinguishes between degrees of
awareness within this category - enables the committed adherent
to evaluate critically (and formulate viable courses of political
action - see 9.4) the rationality of the capitalist structural
framework which permeates the 'obvious' .and 'inevitable' structure
As with the other modes of theorising, the researcher
should not expect to find an alternative theory being used in any
pure form. The truly politically conscious worker is a rare
character, as Lane (1974, pp.213-2l5) and Poole (1974, pp.63-64)
indicate in the context of shop stewards, but alternative theorising -
its concepts and propositions - exist in varying degrees amongst
the working class. It has been westergaard's continuing contention
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Ce,.g.westerga.ard, 1970) .tihat; empirical ,research reveals the
existence of elements 0;1; a'radical class consciousness (cf. Moor-
house and Chamberlain, 1974), albethey incoherently organised,
inarticulately expressed and intermingled with contradictory
elements of other modes (see also Blackburn and Mann, 1975,
p.155), and that this very fact requires the researcher to have
such an 'alternative' category in his framework.
position of its user. Unlike any of the other modes, alternative
However, any examination of alternative theorising must
return in the end to the paradoxical - even contradictory -
theorists interpret in terms of, and act for, another rationality
i.e. their interpretation demands, for consistency, withdrawal
from and aggressive acts against the system - and yet their concrete
survival demands participation in it, and conducting relationships
with participants who interpret organisational life in terms of
acceptance. The alternative theorist may face, in the short run
anyway, a dilemma wh.i.chis ideologically insoluble; but all
organisational participants face smaller scale problems of inter-
pretation which call for theoretical inconsistency.
8.6. Inconsistency in Everyday Organisational Theorising
8.6.1 The Problem of Inconsistency
according to type and degree of awareness implied. The discussion
I have argued the case for seeing the interpretive activity
of theorising organisational power and politics as being analys-
able within four general modes of theorising which form a continuum
in sections 8.4 and 8.5 was concentrated upon the need to illus-
trate these separate modes, although it was inevitably impossible
(indeed, undesirable) to treat them as if they existed in real
independence of each other. In section 8.3, I referred to the
theoretical issue of "inconsistency" in everyday organisational
theorising, which points directly to the problem of interrelation~
ships between these modes; it is to this issue that I now return.
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It is possible, and observable, that organisational
participants possess and use a number of theories according to
their experience of organisational life. Where a theory is only
partial or restricted in scope, it is probable that new or
different experiences may induce the seeking of other theories in
order to make sense of those experiences (cf. Brown and Brannen,
1970, p.207). Multiple theories may, and often will, fall
within the same mode, but without more empirical knowledge about
"variability" (see 8.3) the theoretical implications of such
10shiftings within a mode cannot be traced. However, where
simultaneous possession and use of theories - their concepts and/
or propositions - covers two or more modes some general points of
theoretical substance may be discussed. In this latter case I
shall speak of inconsistency in theorising, although actors them-
selves may not (and often will not) perceive their interpretive
activities as inconsistent in any way.
We have already seen how the idea of inconsistency or
confusion or ambiguity or ambivalence (etc.) in everyday theorising
has emerged from empirical work, but in terms of sociological theory
it remains largely unexplored, even if it has been recognised.
Schutz (1970) speaks of the actor's stock of knowledge which
" embraces the most heterogeneous kinds of
knowledge in a very incoherent and confused state.
Clear and distinct experiences are intermingled
with vague conjectures etc •••. There are every-
where gaps, intermissions, discontinuities."
(Schutz, 1970, pp.97-98).
In spite of the generality and implied universality of such a state-
ment, and of Schutz's neglect of how and why such inconsistency
exists, the problem is clearly recognised - it is still in need of
prolonged theoretical examination.
In examining the problem of inconsistency I shall continue
the policy of indicating probable sources of (multiple) theorising
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i.e. perceiving the latter as the subjectively rational response
of organisational participants to the structural framework of
organisational power. I shall in general be arguing that incon-
sistency in attitudes, concepts and theories tends to reflect
the subjectively-experienced world of fact and ideology, and that
it is a normal and common feature of the participants' inter-
pretive (and strategic) activities (cf. Nichols and Armstrong,
1976, p.152); further it should be sociologically explored rather
than neutralised by constructing static typologies with assumptions
of 'primacy' (e.g. Etzioni - see Chapter Two), or by reducing
inconsistencies to statistical "central tendencies".
Nichols and Armstrong's strategy :
This is also .
"Theoretically, we will not be concerned to round-
out seemingly sensible typifications of social
perspectives - an enterprise which is likely to
lead to a representation of people's thought
which is more logical, more functional and
apparently stable than the thought of the
individual represented, or of whole classes of
individuals may be. We want to concentrate
precisely on this inchoateness" (Nichols and
Armstrong, 1976, p.1SO).
In short, inconsistenr.y, inchoateness, incoherence (or whatever)
may themselves be theoretically significant in understanding the
dynamics and potentialities of organisational politics (see 8.6.3).
In discussing the question of consistency or inconsistency
in everyday theorising it is necessary to consider two related
factors concerning "internal" consistency and "external" consistency.
Internal consistency involves the completeness of the "imagery" of
the theory in question - the more complete and coherent a theory,
the more stable it is likely to be. External consistency is
compatible with organisational experiences. Obviously, to an
related to the nature of social commitment, so that, to be
consistent externally, a theory must provide imagery which is
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extent, an inte;r;-nally.,--consistent,complete theory, will be able
to make sense of any and all experience; but few theories can
aspire to this theoretical ideal. In the ensuing ~ages I shall
suggest that normative and alternative theories are most likely
to approach this ideal of consistency, whilst pragmatic and
oppositional theories are most likely to encourage inconsistency.
The implications of theoretical inconsistency for understanding
organisational power and politics will be traced and followed into
Chapter Nine.
8.6.2 'Consistency' in Theorising
Although inconsistency is likely to characterise most
participants' interpretive efforts, it is possible for actors to
become committed to one theory, or mode of theorising, to such an
extent as to render unnecessary or irrelevant the employment of
theories - particularly the former. Both of these modes offer
other theories or modes. Where consistency does arise, however,
it is most likely to concern the use of normative and alternative
a closed system of ideas in the context of which societal and
organisational issues derive a coherence and rationality. To the
extent that they are complete, they make it possible to rationalise
and justify all experiences either with respect to the social
legitimacy of the status quo, or with respect to an alternative
structural framework. In short, they are most likely to be
"internally consistent".
The stability of these modes derives not only from the
complete,overarching nature of the theory, but also from the level
of commitment they tend to invoke. .The greater the commitment
the more total the dedication (cf. Burns, 1977, p.llO) - to the
ideological order or conflict viewpoint, the more incontravertible
11becomes the theory. High social commitment and 'completeness'
of social imagery are obviously compatible with a stable consistent
mode of theorising; but on the other hand, such consistency is
only likely to endure where the concrete experiences of everyday
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Internal consistency can coexist with external inconsist-
ency when the latter is not subjectively perceived, or not under-
theorists are entirely in tune with the imagery and expectations
of the theory in question, i.e. where there is external
consistency.
stood as significant. Such coexistence may on the one hand
demonstrate the degree of success of an ideology in rationalising
even apparently contradictory experiences - the hallmark of
hegemonic order or a developed counter-hegemony; or on the other
hand emphasise the human characteristic of being able to live
through contradictions perhaps by compartmental ising experiences.
In spite of the possibility of such coexistence giving rise to
stability and consistency in the use of theories, incompatibility
between theorising and experience always makes that stability and
consistency precarious. Aspirational theories may be rejected
when ambition meets recurrent failure; deferential theories may
falter when organisational rationality creates insecurity and
unemployment; furthermore, as mentioned above (8.5.2), alternative
theories will always be subject to compromise because of the
theorists need to subsist within the structural framework he opposes.
8.6.3 "Inconsistency" in Theorising
Although inconsistency can and does exist in theorising
centred around the normative and alternative modes - as just
proposed - I shall be specifically concerned with restricted,
localised theories. The reasons for this are fairly straight-
forward: first, research indicates that most participants perceive
their organisational lives from either a pragmatic or an oppos-
itional base - in many cases the relationship between these two
modes is so close as to make it empirically impossible to locate
such a base (see section 8.5.1); second, the incompleteness and
restricted scope of such theories, and the relative lack of
commitment to them, implies internal inconsistency and a tendency
to shift from one theory (its conceptions and propositions) to
another in order to account sensibly for organisational experiences.
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I shall, moreover, only be pay'~ng attention to instabilities and
shiftings which.result ;trom the use of multiple theories spanning
two or more modes (see 8.3) •
above. First, there is the simultaneous possession and use of
It is possible to distinguish between two types of incon-
sistent theorising in the context of the arguments presented
conceptions and propositions at different levels of awareness
within the same type of theorising i.e. shiftings between normative
and pragmatic (i.e. order) theories or between alternative and
oppositional (i.e. conflict) theories. The coexistence of active
and passive consent at different levels of social action has been
explored empirically and theoretically (cf. Mann, 1970; Parkin,
1972, p.91ff.; Femia, 1975, pp.45-46), while studies of shop
stewards in particular (cf. Lane, 1974~ Poole, 1974) illustrate
the dialectic between localised opposition and generalised social
criticism. The second type of inconsistent theorising is perhaps
more important because it implies not simply inconsistency between
levels of awareness, but apparent contradiction between types of
awareness.
In regard of this latter point, the notion of 'contra-
dictory consciousness' seems to be of special significance:
" in Gramsci's view, the ordinary man possesses
a 'contradictory consciousness'; his perceptions
and evaluations of social life exhibit inconsistency
and superficiality, which express the gap bet",een
the dominant interpretation of reality and his
objective situation. Lurking beneath the usually
conforming surface are subversive beliefs and
values, latent instincts of rebellion, which are
sometimes translated into actual behaviour". (Femia,
1975, pp.42-43).
In contradictory consciousness there exist side-by-side, consensus
and deviance, order theorising and conflict theorising. In the
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context of organisational power and politics, the available
evidence, and theoretical argument, would point to the localised
modes of theorising - viz. pragmatic and oppositional - as
constituting the focus of this inconsistency. The relationship
of these two modes is important in understanding both the nature
of organisational politics at any given time and the potential-
ities implicit in organisational theorising and strategies by
virtue of the (tenuous) balance between these 'opposing' views
being united in the everyday activity of living one's organis-
ational life (cf. Corrigan, 1975, p.222). If experiences arise
which are no longer tenable within this interpretive coalition of
modes, the seeds for change may germinate.
Recurrent discussions of various restricted variants of
class consciousness amongst organisational participants would seem
to support this proposition concerning the dialectical relationship
between pragmatic and oppositional theorising e.g. Beynon's
discussion of "factory class consciousness" of shop-floor workers
and stewards (cf. Clements, 1977; Mann, 1973). That these forms
of localised class consciousness consist of both consent and
conflict aspects is now well demonstrated both in general theoret-
ical terms (e.g. Parkin, 1972; Femia, 1975) and in specific cases
(e.g. Nichols, 1974; Beynon, 1973; Nichols and Armstrong, 1976,
p .153ff.) •
The problems remain as to why and how a large number of·
organisational participants can maintain an interpretive position
of dual or multiple inconsistent theorising. As implied above,
the most tenable argument about the source of inconsistent inter-
pretations of social and organisational reality is that the latter
itself provides factual and ideological inconsistencies which are
experienced and made sense of on a day-to-day basis, rather than
seeking, on an intellectual level, some over arching framework that
explains contradictory experiences. Illustrative of this
suggestive proposition are Beynon's arguments about the personal
and impersonal aspects of managerial behaviour as experienced by
stewards (1973, p.105) and the cooperative and the conflict
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aspects of shop-floor experience (1973, p.102); Nichols (1974)
traces such inconsistencies further at the institutional, ideol-
ogical level, by suggesting that "labourist" ideas which inform
shop-floor theorising are themselves inconsistent. At an equally
general level, Moorhouse (1973) examines how working class
political consciousness has been historically influenced by the
inconsistent development of the structure of the British political
system. Such contradictory elements of social and organisational
life are normal, sociologically expected features of the capitalist
structural framework (see 7.4), and they enter into the everyday
experiences of participants, theorised and made rational "despite
their conceptual contradictoriness" (Corrigan, 1975, p.223).
It is probable that organisational participants are able to
theorise such contradictions for a long period without becoming
aware of their experitnces as contradictions. Habitual,
routinised use of theorising and compartmentalisation of
experiences are features of normal interpretive activities which
serve to inhibit awareness of contradictions at a structural
level. However, the very coexistence of consent and conflict,
co-operation and opposition etc. creates a latent or potential in-
stability which, under certain circumstances may be realised, with
subsequent repercussions for political interpretation, political
strategy and political action. In order to clarify these
continually-present empirical possibilities, I shall briefly (and
tentatively) consider the interrelationships between modes of
theorising.
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Figure 8.2
Interrelationships between Hodes of
Everyday Organisational Theorising.
'rype of Awareness
Degree of
Awareness
(complete-
ness and
commit-
ment
'Order Awareness 'Conflict' Awareness
High Normative Alternative
(ideology) Theorising Theorising
t 't
Low Pragmatic
~
) Oppositional
I
(non-ideology) Theorising I Theorising
pragmatic-oppositional relationship. In examining a participant
Figure 8.2 suggests some simple lines of argument concerning
potential shifts between modes of theorising centred upon the
with a basically pragmatic base to his theorising, for example,
one would also be likely to find elements of the normative and
oppositional modes intermingled in an apparently inchoate or in-
consistent interpretive scheme. Westergaard, for example,
suggests that
" There is a fair amount of evidence - form the
Luton survey, the other studies under discussion
and further recent work to show that 'social
criticism' co-exists with 'social apathy' in
contemporary British working-class consciousness"
(Westergaard, 1970, p.12l).
This implies a combination of pragmatic and oppositional (or rather
"part-alternative, part-oppositional") theories; on the other hand,
I have already detailed the debate over the coexistence of active
and passive consent. As mentioned above, Beynon (1973) and the
Chemco studies provide ample documentary support for the idea of a
"pragmatic cluster" of theories at the organisational level.
general, tentative picture. Under certain circumstances, one
The empirical potentialities of the px:agmatic cluster
are obviously co~plexin their detail, but one may sketch a
might expect the focus of·such everyday organisational theorising
to shift to the broadly normative mode - specifically where
participants perceive the structural framework (or its represent-
atives) as being benevolent, and permitting them to realise an
enlarged range of social possibilities without direct hindrance
or constraint. Such a shift both reflects, and is descriptive
of the social accomplishment of hegemonic order. On the other
hand, where the structural framework (or its representatives) is
experienced as coercive and restrictive of participants' social
possibilities, where struggle and resistance become the sole means
of maintaining economic or social welfare, the shift in the focus
of theorising is likely to be towards the oppositional mode.
12In generaZ the move to an oppositional base, and its limited
recognition of structural contradictions, will be associated with
the social accomplishment of structural order in its 'domination'
pragmatic, instrumentally-oriented workers. His proposition goes
mode. Westergaard's analysis (1970) of the potentialities of a
"brittle cash nexus" is based upon just such arobivant theorising
when the economy no longer produces the necessary cash to satisfy
one step further, in suggesting that opposition and discontent may
become generalised as a result of the failure of the cash nexus,
thus poten~ially creating a radical ~lass consciousness - a
" 1· th .. 13"counter-ideology - based upon a ternatJ.ve eorJ.sJ.ng.
The effects that experiences (contradictory or otherwise)
have on the open theorising implicit in the pragmatic cluster, will
in turn operate upon the formulation of the political strategies
of organisational participants, and such strategies will have
some influence (intended and/or unintended) on the shape of the
political process.
Parallel to the pragmatic cluster is another cluster of
theories which has a base in the oppositional mode. The same
arguments, founded upon the precariousness of the pragmatic-
oppositional interrelationship under conditions which encourage
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cluster. Under structural conditions of domination, workers or
the transparency of its inconsistencies, apply to the oppositional
shop stewards who theorise in oppositional terms, may generalise
an organisational issue·.(e.g. static wages; unemployment) to its
source in the institutional logic and hence ground their political
challenge to the organisation in an alternative rationality. On
the other hand, a degree of market and organisational slack which
enables workers to benefit directly from the system is more likely
to lead to a pragmatic, practical acceptance of the status quo
for the time being anyway. Once in the position of passive
consent, the possibility always exists for a complete conversion
to order theorising (e.g. by promotion).
By investigating the concept of inconsistent theorising as
a focus of sociological interest rather than of neglect, I have
tried to portray it as both a static and potentially dynamic factor
in understanding the relationship between the structural framework
and the participants' interpretation of the organisation as a
political phenomenon.
Summary
By treating the participants' acts of theorising as the
important variable factor mediating the structural framework and
political action, while at the same time being interrelated with
the former, I hope to have established an interpretive sociological
foundation for the analysis of organisational power and politics.
All participants, whether consciously or habitually, employ
theories which attempt to make sense of the organisation in its
orderly or conflictful facets. Because of empirical ignorance
about the variability of everyday organisational theories, my
arguments were built upon a classification of theories according
to their sensitivity to political order and political conflict,
and each mode of theorising was discussed, with illustrative
empirical support, with respect to its internal characteristics,
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its possible variants, and its.relationship to different
participants' positions vis-a.,.visthe structural framework.
In order to maintain a meaningful degree of complexity to the
analysis, each mode was discussed in relation to the other,
and propositions about inconsistent theorising and its importance
for both current political action and future possible actions were
discussed.
In the final substantive chapter of this thesis, I shall
bring these interpretive arguments closer to concrete political
actions in organisations, by examining the strategic aspects of
participants' theorising activities. As I shall show, political
strategies embody the interpretive images that have been discussed
in projected courses of action to influence the structural frame-
work which underlies participants' organisational lives.
Chapter Eight
NOTES
1. This distinction between interpretive and strategic work is
very important if the interpretive sociological tradition
is to avoid the limitations of ethnomethodology, which
stresses the constitution of social reality as the inter-
pretive, reflexive accomplishment of making experiences
rational and accountable. Analysis of strategic work adds
the social dimension of active striving to accomplish some
future state of the world (cf. Giddens, 1976, p.40).
2. I am here divorcing the question of 'completeness' of image
from that of its accuracy. The latter problem leads to a dis-
cussion of 'true' Or 'false' consciousness which does not help
in this context. The 'success' of a theory in making
experiences rational and accountable does not depend upon its
truth-value, but upon its capacity to interpret all or most
things at any given time.
3. There are, of course, weaknesses in the labels I have chosen
in this context. Some theorists and philosophers have treated
'pragmatism' as a total way of understanding and responding to
social life, which induces a high degree of commitment. My use
of the term neither competes with nor reflects such an argument;
nor should my use of the term here and later be confused with
its deployment in Chapter Five. Further, 'alternative' may
better be rendered by 'alternative-normative', since this mode
is just as 'normative' as that which bears the latter label.
Finally, my analysis of their modes does not involve judge-
ments concerning the rationality of different modes for their
adherents.
4. Goffman's discussion of secondary adjustments to total
institutional life is interesting in this respect. He speaks
of "conversion" (Goffman, 1961, p.63) as a mode of adapting to
the special circ~~stances of the total institution, whereby in-
mates accept fully the institutional self propounded by the staff.
5. It is interesting to note that Brannen et al. attach the label
"pragmatic" to a "pluralist framework" of everyday theorising.
This linking of academic and everyday theories, as I have
argued, is obviously not incidental. (See 10.2.1.)
6. Again, Goffman (1961, pp.6l-62) speaks of "situational with-
drawal" as one "line of adaptation" to the pressures of
(total) organisational life.
7. The Hawthorne Studies researchers were probably the first
significant social scientists to formulate organisational
conflict in terms of opposing logics, although their contri-
bution failed to ground such a view in a political perspect-
ive.
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S. Batstone et al. (1977) identi;f;ya strong localised
con;f;lictawareness among shop~;f;loor stewards ~ grounded
perhaps in an equally strong. sense of wor'kLnq+c Las s
history - but staff stewards have ambivalence between
the normative/aspirational views associated with staff
status, and the oppositional experiences of being a
steward. In general the conflict aspects of their
theorising appear to become secondary (Batstone et al.,
1977, pp.26~29).
9. A second reason for the lack of evidence arises from the
social scientist's tendency to neglect the revolutionary
as a significant actor. This neglect often happens at
the level of theoretical assumption rather than as a result
of empirical study ~ another example of theoretical
circularity. For example, Goffman (1961) in his study of
mental hospitals distinguished between 'disruptive'
secondary adjustments ••.
"••• where the realistic intentions of the
participants are to abandon the organisation
or radically alter its structure •.." (Goffman,
1961, p.1SO)
and 'contained' ones (i.e. adapting to the system), but
concentrates only on the latter.
10. Since it is difficult therefore to judge whether shifting
within a mode is consistent or inconsistent, I shall make
no reference to this phenomenon in the following discussion.
11. This 'human commitment' factor is particularly important
in distinguishing 'genuine' alternative or normative
theorists from those who have strategically adopted this
apparent stance in order to achieve more limited goals.
In section S.4.1, for example, deferential theorising was
taken as illustrative of the normative mode, but it has
been suggested (e.g. Bell and Newby, 1975, p.S7) that
deferential attitudes and actions, giving the impression
of normative acceptance of their role, may be adopted by
house servants, slaves etc. for pragmatic and strategic
reasons (e.g. maintenance of income, status, even life
itself) • Indeed 'on~stage' deference may well be
compatible with 'off~stage' rebellion.
12. I stress "in general", because there will always be pockets
of conflict on specific issues even within a broad state of
hegemony. The latter, as in the pluralist image of power,
may refer to a broad acceptance of the rules and procedures
for dealing with and limiting organisational conflicts.
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13. Moorhouse and Chamberlain (1974) and Moorhouse (1976) argue
empirically for the real possibility of such a shift in
awareness :
"I.n certain cixcUIQstances, a conflict consciousness
fJ... e. oppositional theorising E .D.C.] ecm develop
into a radical or even.revolutionary consciousness
because underlying class conflict is the belief that
things could and should be better than they are,
however weakly this may be verbalised". (Moorhouse,
1976, p.471).
The underlying theme of Moorhouse's published work is the
spontaneity of working class political action, and the
irrelevance of clear, "unconfused", consiste.nt alternative
theorising to revolutionary action.
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EVERYDAY ORGANISATIONAL THEORISING STRATEGIC ASPECTS
CHAPTER NINE
In Chapter Eight, I examined the nature of everyday organ-
isational theorising with special reference to the interpretive
process of perceiving, constructing images of and evaluating the
organisation as a political arena. The central theme of that
chapter was to demonstrate the mediating role played by participants'
theorising activities in the relationship between the structural
framework of organisational power and organisational politics - the
latter being that process of social interactions created by actors
whose subjectively-meaningful behaviour is oriented towards the
problems of control in organisations. By concentrating on the inter-
pretive aspects of theorising, attention was drawn particularly to
the contingent and dialectical relationship between everyday theories
and the structural framework which they both comprehend and reflect
in varying degrees. In this last chapter, with its focus on the
strategic aspects of everyday theorising, the direct (i.e. intended)
and indirect (i.e. unintended) connection of theorising with political
action and process will constitute the major theme.
The proposition to be examined in the light of previous dis-
cussion is that certain participants, acting upon the social and
organisational imagery and awareness, and their ongoing experiences
of work life, consciously choose to support, to manipulate or to
challenge the structural framework which organises and rationalises
their organisational existence. In examining this proposition,
further points of substance arise. In pursuit of their planned
courses of action, some actors will have greater initial possi-
bilities of political success because of their relationship to the
structural framework; further, the unintended consequences of
pursuing political strategies - however well or badly conceived
or, more broadly, of the social intermingling of active support,
resistance, opposition etc., will influence the final outcome of
the political process. (see 9.5). Political strategies, then,·
will have both intended effects - these effects being reinforced
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ational politics. These points need emphasis, because parti-
or restricted by structur~l predispositions towards order and
conflict ~ and unintended e;f:fectson the process of organis-
cipants even tap participants - cannot construct their world
to order. However well-theorised or planned, strategies are
not self-fulfilling, since they confront both structural and
social (i.e. they exist with other complementary, identical,
opposing etc. strategies of action) limits to their successful
realisation.
as constraint.
Tnese are the structural and social faces of power
In this chapter I wish to bring my arguments to their
conclusion by examining the relationship betwcien the interpretive
and strategic aspects of theorising, and to illustrate very broadly
the three major categories of political strategy which emerge from
the foregoing analysis. In outlining these strategies, I shall
consider the structural and social contexts in which they occur,
and how these contexts reinforce or limit (intentionally or un-
intentionally) their realisation.
9.1 Political Strategy and Everyday Organisational Theorising
To speak of political action is to emphasise the conscious
interest of participants in the problems of power and control in
organisational arenaSi in attempting to increase their (i.e. their
group's or "the organisation's" or their own) control or to defend
it, they intentionally or unintentionally affect other participants'
range of possible actions and in doing so implicate others in the
political process. To study organisational politics as a social
process is thus to go beyond an investigation of actors' purposive
strategies, to the analysis of how these strategies interrelate and
influence each other within the structural framework which defines
the limiting possibilities and impossibilities of all actors. My
concern is only with establishing the sensitising building-blocks
of such a study, and before looking at the intended and unintended
consequences of political action, or examining the structural and
social possibilities and impossibilities of political success, it
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is necessary to.place the natian af "strat.egy" within the
established arguments.
far their experiences af organisatianal life. Organisatianal
All participants are thearists in that they all emplay
(cansciausly ar habitually) cancepts and prapasitians to. accaunt
participants are nat necessarily palitically active since same
prapartian af them will nat cansciausly attempt to. influence their
cantral passibilities in the arganisatian. Hawever, all parti-
cipants, whether palitically active ar passively accepting, are
implicated directly ar indirectly in the palitical pracess. In
arder to. understand ~~e palitical actians af participants, it is
imperative to. analyse that aspect af the everyday thearising af
arganisatianal pawer and palitics wherein caurses af actian are,
with purpase, planned and prajected. Such strategies may be
aimed at supparting, challenging ar atherwise affecting the distri-
butian af pawer in arganisatians, cansequently influencing the
structural framewark af pawer (cf. Duverger, 1966, p.141ff.).
Fram the actar's viewpaint, palitical actian may be seen as
cansciausly farmulated behaviaur with the abave ends. Strategies,
therefare, have a direct link with palitical actian, and, thraugh
the cansequences af such actian, bath a direct and indirect link
with the pracess af palitics.
At the same time, strategies may be seen as prajected
caurses af actian based upan the imagery and knawledge created
by the interpretive activities af arganisatianal participants.
In a palitical cantext, these strategic aspects af everyday
arganisatianal thearising camplement the interpretive aspects
described in Chapter Eight. Mareaver, ane might add, palitical
strategies may be analysed with respect af the structural frame-
wark af arganisatianal pawer in the ways indicated in Chapter
Eight. Same af the camplexities af these relatianships between
strategy, thearising, structural framewark, palitical actian and
palitical pracess will be unravelled in the fallawing sectians.
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Accepting, for the time being, the direct and indirect
links of political stra~egy with political action and process,
I want to suggest a set of sensitising categories which.derives
from the discussion in Chapter Eight and, at the same time,
points to distinct forms of political action. Figure 9.1
represents the three. general political strategies within the
framework of the now familiar diagram.
Types of Awareness
Figure 9.1 Three General Political Strategies
(Commitment
and
Completeness)
'order' awareness 'conflict' awareness
(acceptance) (Rejection)
High Conservative Revolutionary
(Ideological) strategy strategy
I
Low •I
(non- reformist.strategy
ideological) I
•
Degree of
Awareness
Since the component ideas have already been fully discussed in 8.2
I shall only summarise the diagram and leave detailed examination of
the strategies to the following sections.
Participants qua political actors who theorise their organ-
isational experience mainly in normative terms are most likely to
convert their understandings into projected courses of action aimed
at conserving the structural framework, to the premises and logic
of which they are committed. Those who directly benefit from the
status quo or indirectly benefit from or identify with its
continuity (see 8.4) may to varying degrees develop plans which
explicitly and actively support the organisational order.
"Conservative" strategies may thus be linked with the politics of
order and consensus.
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The practical difficulties of the alternative theorist
have already been touched upon with respect to the dilemma of
maintaining a strictly and entirely radical perspective. These
difficulties become more practical when he tries to translate his
alternative interpretation of social and organisational reality
into political action. "Ideally", anyway - and I shall speak
"realistically" in 9.4 - the alternative theorist may be expected
to adopt strategies which are actively oriented towards changing
the structural framework from the societal level downwards.
"Revolutionary" strategies, grounded in an alternative rationality,
are consequently associated with the politics of conflict and
change.
theorising. Both modes focus upon localised, restricted inter-
In Chapter Eight, I placed great emphasis upon the theoret-
ical interrelationship between pragmatic and oppositional modes of
pretations of the political dimension of organisations, and research
suggests that elements of each tend to coexist in most organisational
participants' interpretive schemes. Although it might be possible
empirically to distinguish between "clusters" of theories according
to their 'base' in either pragmatism or oppositionism, I have
decided - for the purposes of generality and simplicity - to treat
the strategic aspects of this large range of localised, inconsistent
theorising as one general category. I shall suggest that prag-
matic and oppositional theories, and particularly clusters which
involve elements of both modes, tend to encourage in political
actors the adoption of strategies aimed, consciously or by impli-
cation, at adapting those details of the structural framework which
affect the strategist. By calling such strategies "reformist", I
would tie these preconceived plans of action to the politics of
adaptation.
Before looking at these strategies in depth, I wish to make
four important theoretical po Lnt.s whi.ch are in danger of being lost
in the details of discussion and illustration. The first three
points are caveats to be taken up in the summary at the end of the
chapter (9.5), the fourth concerns an analytical distinction
between types of strategy within the three main categories.
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In sections 9.2, 9.3 and 9.4 I shall be examining each
general political strategy more-or-less separately, but it is
imperative to warn the reader against assuming thereby that these
strategies are either free-floating, or self-realising, or enacted
in a 'pure' form. Only by understanding the complex inter-
relationships between structural framework, everyday organisational
theorising, political strategies, political action and political
process, can the nature of organisational power and politics be
comprehended. Consider the first of these caveats viz. that
strategies are not free-floating.
Throughout Chapter Eight I reiterated the reciprocal
connections between the structural framework of organisational
power and participants' theorised interpretations and experience
of it. Everyday organisational theories are historically and
structurally grounded, in that they incorporate knowledge of the
structural framework accumulated and distilled L~rough previous
and ongoing experience of organisational life and rationality.
Strategies generated from and founded upon such knowledge will
therefore also embody participants' prior experience of what was
possible or impossible under certain circumstances. This is to
say that, for the most part anyway, political strategies will be
formulated from the start to reflect perceived possibilities and
impossibilitiesl, rather t.~an be "free-floating" or "unrealistic".
Structural possibilities and impossibilities may of co~rse be mis-
perceived, so that strategies, however well planned and internally
coherent, will not be realised in effective political action.
2
In this way, strategies and their enactment in political behaviour
have theoretically mediated relationships with their structural
and social contexts of use.
The question of realisation of strategies is at least
partially related to the last point. Although discussion will
mostly revolve around separate strategies, it is certainly not
assumed that, once formulated, they will be effective in the ways
intended by political actors. ·At one level, as suggested in the
previous paragraph, political strategies may to a greater or lesser
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structural possibilities of their success. For example, certain
extent incorporate .misperceptions and misunderstandings of the
adventures of the Red Army Faction throughout Europe reflect the
unrealistic premises of their strategies which have meant that
failure in their political aims was predictable - their planned
courses of action have met a completely resistant strategy from
the social representatives of the system they were threatening,
and these representatives could operate from a position of
supremacy regarding both coercion and organisation. Strategies
may fail, then, both because they are unrealistic in themselves,
and relatedly because powerful counter-strategies may be enacted
to resist or actively combat the former. In spite of their lack
of success, such strategies and their attempted enactments are
still important politically, because they may have consequences
which were not foreseen by their proponants. For example, the
'violent' revolutionary attempts of groups such as those mentioned
might act as a warning of later ones with consequent more effective
or stri~gent counter-strategies being developed in secret; they
might influence 'political opinion' making it more difficult for
'peaceful' revolutionary groups to gain credibility and extend
organisation; 'violent' reactionary groups might multiply, etc.
In short, attempts to enact political strategies may have both
intended and/or unintended effects, and the latter will often be
of greater social import. Relative success will thus depend upon
the extent of counter or supportive actions, themselves structurally
"helped" or "hindered", and upon the unintended repercussions of
the complex nature of purposive activity. The intended and un-
intended consequences of the strategies of the various political
actors may be understood as constituting the social (i.e. concrete)
context of any particular political strategy or action. As such
the social context.may be analytically differentiated from the
structural framework of organisational power and politics, but both
"contexts" are indispensable to the analysis of the topic.
Just as everyday theorising will in general be hybrid,
comprising elements from diverse theories often in different modes,
so too might one expect political strategy rarely to take any pure
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form. The empirical problems of "variability", and of possible
combinations of particular strategies falling within one category
or between many categories, are matters for research rather than
uninformed guesswork, but in writing of separate categories of
political strategy I am not limiting to only pure forms the scope
of this, after all, sensitising framework.
Political strategies are neither 'pure' nor 'free-floating',
nor inevitably realised, but they do constitute the second link in
the chain of everyday organisational theorising as it mediates the
structural framework of organisational power, and political action/
process. In order to further the analysis of political strategy,
I shall distinguish between two types of strategy, viz. control and
consensus. Contr-oZ strategies may be defined as plans of action
aimed at influencing the 'factual' aspects of organisational life
(e.g. procedures, work process, information etc.) which concretely
restrain or facilitate social actions. Such strategies may be
either defensive - if one's (i.e. individual or group) position
is perceived as being actively challenged - or positive, in the
sense of deliberately attempting to expand influence, increase
social possibilities or decrease social impossibilities. All
political strategies, by definition, will involve control aspects.
Consensus strategies will usually be associated with those theories
of an ideological kind i.e. to which there is a degree of moral
commitment. Such st.categies are planned attempts to control the
ideological context ofworki to achieve one's political ends by
trying to influence "••• the minds and wills of the men" (Nichols
and Beynon, 1977, p.113). Consensus strategies are designed to
legitimise one's position by affecting the way participants
theorise and perceive the organisation.
As with the distinction between the 'factual' and
'ideological' aspects of the structural framework (see Chapter 7.2)
that between 'control' and 'consensus' strategies is largely of
analytical interest. As argued in Chapter Seven, the facts are
always laden with values, although few participants may directly
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see them in this way. Similarly, control tactics within an over-
all conservative or revolutionary strategy themselves carry connot-
ations of the ideas and values which give them purpose. However,
the distinction does allow us first to distinguish strategies which
primarily or intentionally aim at control of the work situation
from those which seek to establish the legitimacy of the group's
position or aims by "indoctrination"; it also allows us to distinguish
between 'control' and 'consensus' aspects (whether intended or uninten-
ded) of any particular strategy.
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to investigating
the general political strategies within these guidelines, and subject
to the caveats, expressed above.
9.2 Conservative Strategy and the Politics of Organisational
Order
9.2.1 Conservative Strategy and Conservative Strategists
Based as it is upon the legitimacy of the organisation and
its structural framework as a social, political and moral order,
normative theorising finds its strategic extension in the active
support of the status quo. Within an organisational context,
conservative strategies may be seen as relatively coherent plans to
maintain or increase the rationality of the organisation. In
general this would imply the employment of tactics which aim to
sustain the amount of control which the organisation (i.e.
executives, managers and other 'controllers') asserts over the work
process. Where conservative strategies are enacted and pursued, I
shall refer to the politics of order. The core processes of the
politics of order include the reinforcement and extension of organ-
isational rationality by the 'authoritative' application of the
control system and the design of improved techniques, practices etc.
They involve both the social enactment of structural predispositions,
and the social creation of more rational techniques that accord
with the dominant ideology and the dominant way of doing things and
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thereby reaffirm the structural framework.
One of the advantages of these conceptions of the politics
of order and of conservative strategy is that they provide an
important way of avoiding the structural determinism referred to in
earlier chapters. In order to explain organisational behaviour,
reference to 'rationality', 'techniques' or 'structure' is not
sufficient, because the latter only sets up predispositions which
must be socially mediated and enacted, however routinely. These
enactments - what I am calling the politics of order - do not occur
inevitably or automatically3, however 'obvious' or 'inevitable' what
is enacted may appear to participants or observers. It is, of
course, this 'obviousness' and 'routineness' of conservative
strategies which gives them a special 'power' by virtue of being
directly tied to the dominant ideology - the power of apparent
neutrality, impartiality and "unideology". It is the same
'obviousness' and 'routineness' which leads uncritical sociologists
to accept and analyse the politics of order as "apolitical" and
"objective", so reinforcing a structural image of the way organis-
ations work, i.e. without social mediation.
As all managers of men are only too aware, organisational
order does not occur automatically through the impartial operation
of structural or technical factors which determine compliance
objectively. In spite of the obviousness and routineness of the
organisational facts of life, order has to be socially and politically
accomplished :
" 'integration' is no neutral - or 'natural'
social process. It is a definite managerial
strategy .••" (Nichols and Beynon, 1977, p.107).
Conservative strategies, devoted to the realisation of structural
predispositions towards order, reflect and reinforce the factual
and ideological basis of organisational rationality, and derive
their great potential for success in their social grounding in the
structural framework of organisational power.
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In 8.4 I distinguished between types of normative
theorising and the organisational participants likely to indulge
in them. In particular I distinguished between those higher
participants - capital owners, executives, top management etc.
who will tend to have a direct identification with the structural
framework; and those normative theorists - aspirational and
deferential - who are committed through a rather more tenuous set
of subjective images. Conservative strategy and the politics of
order would seem to be especially prevalent amongst the former
set of participants, although there is evidence to underscore its
existence in the lower echelons of middle management, clerical
staff, supervisory and shop floor workers. The Chemco studies
provide illustrations of conservative strategy in the latter two
categories :
" some of the politically minded - though very
few - are ideologically committed to free enter-
prise. One for example attempts to 'control' his
fellow workers. He keeps a book on their absences,
checks their log keeping, and in other ways carries
out management's policy even more committedly than
management dares". (Nichols and Armstrong, 1976,
p.70) •
On the shop floor such active commitments are rare, but in slightly
higher groups they may occur through aspirational identification,
e.g. foremen:
"What makes management men exceptional is that they
actively search for more profits ••• Highly cost
conscious individuals, they watch their production
figures, check waste, 'get on top of the men',
'get on top of the plant', act not just for
management but like management". (Nichols and
Beynon, 1977, p.49).
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That such avid commitment and active striving to increase
'rationality' and control can exist in the lower ranks, simply
serves to emphasise the likelihood of more widespread use of
conservative strategy amongst top participants who benefit most
directly and fully from the status quo.
Being related to a mode of theorising of an ideological
kind, conservative strategy induces in its repertoire both control
and consensus types. Conservative control strategies involve
planned attempts to influence the factual context of work by
socially implementing the procedures, practices, techniques,
rules etc. which prescribe subordinate behaviour, and organise it
'rationally' in accordance with the organisation's structural frame~
work. Conservative consensus strategies concern the engineering
of active consent for the way the system works by trying to legiti-
mise the latter. The premise underlying expending effort on poli-
cies of legitimation is the sound social scientific principle -
popularised for management by various human relations SChoOls4 -
that the moral acceptance of the structural possibilities and im-
possibilities increases the probability of efficient managerial
control of the work process on a continuous basis. Remembering
that strategies of control always have implicit ideological
grounding in organisational rationality and institutional logic, I
shall now consider them, and follow this with a discussion of con-
sensus strategies.
9.2.2 Conservative Control Strategy
As suggested earlier, control strategies may be analysed as
having two forms viz. taking positive steps or making defensive
manoeuvres. Within the context of normative theorising, positive
control strategies involve following a course of action which
intends to maintain or improve the amount of control exercised over
organisational participants and their work. By enacting and en-
forcing structural possibilities and impossibilities - i.e. operating
the control system and its component parts - those who employ
conservative strategies attempt to make organisational behaviour
rational, in accordance with localised and institutional premises.
As argued earlier, the fact that such strategies invoke routines and
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apparently neutral techniques should not mislead the observer
into believing that they are thereby apolitical or impartial.S
Defensive control strategies on the other hand are employed in
order to prevent resistance or opposition from reaching dimensions
that challenge or reduce the rationality of the organisation.
While control strategies may be either positive or
defensive in intent, it is more sensible, on a priori grounds,
to consider most strategies as being mixed i.e. as having both
positive and defensive aspects. It is further necessary to re-
iterate that the enactment of purposive control strategies may
have unforeseen consequences which serve either to increase posi-
tive control, to establish defensive control, to reduce such
control, or to influence the course of political actions more
generally (e.g. by creating political squabbles between subordin-
ate groups) • The positive or defensive pursuit of organisational
order may therefore, unintentionally, add fuel to the politics of
adaptation and of change. In order to illustrate these points
about positive and defensive aspects of conservative control
strategy, and to demonstrate the importance of distinguishing
political intentions from political 'unintentions', I shall discuss
four well-documented examples of such strategy - coercion, fragmen-
tation, incorporation and restrictionism.
Strategies of coercion are probably the most obvious means
of politically enforcing structural possibilities and impossibilities.
Coercion may involve the explicit use (or threat) of physical force,
but it should by no means be identified with this extreme. More
broadly, coercion refers to the subjection of actors to unavoidable
constraint, and thereby cutting off certain courses of action by
rendering them socially impossible. Any organisational participant
who is dependent upon the resources or support provided by his
employment for the maintenance of 'essential' aspects of his social
life, is subject to coercion when such resources or support may be
withdrawn (or this is threatened) - cf. Fox, 1974b, p.37ff. At
last resort and subject to certain legal restraints, employers or
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management can terminate employment with various implications for
economic and social hardship. In industrial organisations, co-
ercive strategies are most likely to be adopted by highly
competitive, "cost-conscious" managements (Lane, 1974, p.193;
see also Nichols and Beynon's discussion of "management men" 1977,
p.48ff. - and of the division of managers into "bastards" and "bad
bastards" - 1977, p.34ff.); and managers are most likely to
become strategically cost-conscious when the market becomes 'tight'.
Where a tight market develops, it is organisationally rational and
politically strategic for managers to crack down on control possi-
bilities which have been extended beyond structural necessity in
slack times (cf. Beynon, 1973, p.132; Lane, 1974, p.205) •
Eradicating loose, localised job practices (see 9.3) is a
mild expression of conservative coercive strategy aimed at re-
asserting managerial control in changed economic conditions, but
coercion may take more extreme forms such as lay-offs, redundancy
and even plant closure. The severity of such strategies may, of
course, lead to unintended consequences of great importance for
understanding organisational politics. More recent history of
industrial relations contains innumerable examples of waves of
spasmodic or organised political resistance to coercion :
"In a situation ridden with latent conflicts,
the decision to lay men off can be likened to
a declaration of war". (Beynon, 1973, p.156).
Permanent factory closures have more serious repercussions for the
work force, although such closures, or their threat, may have
become part of the "international strategy" (Beynon, 1973, p.182)
of multinational companies, as a defensive reaction to organised
dissent and opposition. Recent experiences of factory occupations
and worker cooperatives in shipbuilding, motorcycles and newspapers
to cite the most publicised cases - evidence unforeseen, highly
6organised political counterstrategies and responses to this form
of conservative strategy.
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Under most circumstances, however, control may be maintained
without engendering extreme political responses. The second
conservative control strategy - "fragmentation" (Nichols and Beynon,
1977) or "sectionalisation" (Lane, 1974; Clements, 1977) - has
mainly defensive purposes, in that it endeavours to prevent the
possibility, or undermine the existence, of counter-organisation.
Organised opposition to organisational control is a possibility
rooted in the very co-operative nature of work in an industrial
organisation; but the existence of divisions in the work force
temporal, spatial, occupational etc. - also allows for the accomplish-
ment of political order by "divide and rule" tactics. Fragmentation
as a conservative strategy of control involves the creation and
enactment of teD~niques, practices etc. which both enhance ration-
ality and discourage unification of opposition. (cf. Nichols and
Beynon, 1977, p.107).
It is usually difficult to judge the intentionality of
fragmentation, but there is little doubt that management are often
aware of these consequences independent of their priority in the
formulation of conservative strategy.
While physical/geographical and temporal fragmentation of
the work force should not be underemphasised it is probably more
informative to consider procedural or technical factors which
sectionalise the work force. One well-documented practice is the
operation of grading arrangements for job evaluation. On the one
hand, such systems motivate participants to improve their performance
in order to enhance their status or increase their pay. However,
such arrangements inevitably advantage some participants or
occupations to the detriment of others thus creating disagreements
within a potential opposition (cf. Dreyfuss, 1952, pp.259-260; Beynon,
1973, p.160ff.; Nichols and Beynon, 1977, p.117; Burns, 1977,
p.88ff.) • Productivity deals operate similarly (e.g. Nichols and
Armstrong, 1976, p.llOff.), and "fragmented and complicated wage
structures" can act divisively even on members of the same trade
union (Brown and Brannen, 1970, pp.201-202). Management may also
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consider rotating personnel and wor~ allocations in order to
prevent the possible development of solidarity (cf. Pettigrew,
1973, p.145). Fragmentation is not restricted to capitalist
industrial organisations: Lane (1974, pp.249-250) describes the
strategic control advantages that British Trade Union leaders
enjoy as a result of having and maintaining a sectionalised member-
ship.
Fragmentation of the organisation's work force may be
supplemented by politically engendered splits between the trade
union rank-and-file and its shop floor leadership and organisation.
For example, in Chemco (Nichols and Beynon, 1977, pp.113-114), the
formal instituting of "check-off arrangements" for automatically
collecting union subscriptions through wage adjustments at source
permitted the trade union to operate a closed shop, but at the same
time separated members from their shop steward (who is, of course,
the traditional collector of dues) • In addition to reinforcing
socially the technical divisions of work, fragmentation often
serves to introduce active squabbling or in-fighting between
advantages and disadvantaged sections of the work force, thus not
only intensifying the lack of unity, but also having the unintended
consequences of providing a focus for the politics of adaptation
(see 9.3).
Strategies of "incorporation" (Nichols and BeYIlon, 1977)
or "institutionalisation" - to use a much broader notion - consist
of attempts to entangle participants within organisational
rationality so that their (potential) power and opposition are
maintained within the bounds of the system. By channelling
opposition through formal procedures, it becomes routinised and de-
fused. Institutionalisation of (class) conflict has been widely
discussed at the societal level (cf. Dahrendorf, 1959) but little
attention has been paid to it as a conscious conservative strategy
of sustaining order within organisations.
In Chapter Seven, the proposition was made at the general
structural level of analysis, that trade unions have become
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entwined in the institutional logic of capitalism, but it has been
suggested that employers and managers purposefully contrive to
weaken potential opposition by a process akin to "formal co-optation"
(Selznick, 1966, p.219ff.)
" the most progressive agents of capital seek
to incorporate trade unions within a web of
centralised procedures •••" (Nichols and Beynon,
1977, p .108) •
At Ford and at Chemco, trade unions became party to national
agreements over pay and grading which were held to be binding on
members whose views had not been consulted. By "participating"
within the structural framework of the organisation (cf. Coates
and Topham, 1974, p.143ff. on union participation at U.C.S.),
unions became responsible for decisions which increased control
over their members. By thus being incorporated within the system,
union organisation no longer acted as a focus of conflict and
resistancei a further political consequence is often to divide
disillusioned members from informal shop-floor leadership (cf.
Beynon, 1973, p.173) thereby increasing fragmentation.
The worker director scheme of British Steel constitutes
another classic example of incorporation by participation. Other
directors worked at "fitting the worker directors into the on-
going framework" (Brannen et al., 1976, p.170), while, almost
reciprocally, worker directors became enmeshed in the rationality
of capitalist organisation - even when mass redundancies resulted
by such a rationality.
" during our period of observation at board
meetings there was no instance in which the
ass~~ptions behind any [plant] closure were
challenged ..• But the economic data presented
by the directors appeared to be invested with
impartiality and objectivity ••• ~n~ whilst
the figures 'talked for·themselves' and the
industry had to be made viable, redundancy
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was essential". (Brannen et al., 1976, p.173).
The undeniability of the objective, economic necessity to make
fellow workers redundant reflects the real strength behind
conservative strategy, but the worker directors unquestioningly
accepted the logic and the rules of the management game, and,
through boardroom experience and training, even adopted the
language of the prevailing rationality (Brannen et al., 1976,
p.209; see also Ramsay, 1977 on the incorporative aspects of
participation in general) •
On a more personal level, management try to incorporate
shop-floor leaders - particularly shop stewards - by providing office
space and facilities (cf. Lane, 1974, pp.208-209); by influencing
nomination and selection of stewards (cf. Nichols and Beynon, 1977,
p.llS); by secondment of stewards or representatives to training
courses which stress their bureaucratic role within the present
structural framework (cf. Brannen et al, 1976, p.130ff.); by
promoting stewards to supervisory posts (cf. Lane, 1974, p.207) and
so on. Where shop steward organisation provides a strong focus of
opposition (independently of the union), managers may well establish
special procedures specifically to routinise contacts and
institutionalise conflict (cf. Poole, 1974, p.73).
For managemen~s which believe that conflict is better
expressed than left latent (i.e. those with a distinctly pluralistic
perspective), the incorporation of opposition within organisational
procedures has a further strategic purpose, viz.
" to restrict discussions so far as possible to
questions associated with welfare, safety,
productivity and so on". (Poole, 1974, p.73; see
also Brannen et al, 1976, p.3S) .
Supported by institutional definitions (and the dominant ideology
in general) about the rights of ownership and control, it is
conservative strategy to limit the arena for conflict to a
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restricted number and type of questions viz. minor issues within
the inviolate structural framework, rather that questions about
the latter's assumptions. Such a "restrictionist" strategy often
merely involves the enactment of procedures and regulations (and
their legal and ideological underpinnings) which rule 'fundamental'
structural questions as "unconstitutional", although the continuing
debate about "nondecision-making" in communities (Bachrach and
Baratz, 1963; see also Lukes, 1974; Crenson, 1971) raises
increasingly complicated matters about the ways in which such a
strategy is pursued and realised. In organisations it might be
argued that conservative strategy is enhanced by making concessions
on minor issues - thereby reinforcing the pluralist image - in
order to conceal more fundamental issues, and to encourage the
adoption of 'reformist' strategy as a means of political achieve-
ment (cf. Lane, 1974, pp.206-207).
9.2.3 Conservative Consensus Strategy
Underlying the use of all conservative control strategies
is the dominant ideology which gives rationality and meaning to
the technology of organisational control. The major strength of
conservative strategy is that its ideological assumptions are so
embedded in the notion of "organisational control" as to allow it
to appear apolitical, the neutral operation of a rational
instrument. Although starting from this advantage, it is evident
from even a cursory glance at the behaviour of organisational
participants, that conservative strategists cannot assume positive
approval of the structural framework. In order to engender maximum
acceptance of the organisational order and to minimise disruption
of it, it is necessary to pursue conscious strategies of legitim-
ation. These consensus strategies seek to control the way
participants interpret and "strategise" their work lives, appealing,
at best, to the social legitimacy of the organisation, at worst to
the fact that the latter exists as an unalterable state of affairs.
At their disposal, managers have all the organisation's
means of communication - newsletters, meeting, other publicity
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leaflets - and these methods are themselves supported by the
external mass media. Organisational rationality is reinforced
by institutional logic, the dominant ideology of the macro system.
As Nichols and Beynon (1977, p.119) suggest, managers need to
interpret the logic of capital in terms of ideas to which lower
participants can relate. The most general way of doing this is
to stress the compatibility between organisational values and
standards and abstract cultural values to which it is assumed most
participants subscribe - at least at a non-operational level. For
example, the appeal to "humanistic" aspects of job enrichment
reflects not only cultural trends in that direction, but also
academic "human relations" theorising which, itself interwoven
with cultural trends, imbues such arrangements with the socially
legitimate scientific qualities of "impartiality" and "objectivity"
(cf, FOx, 1974b, p. 70ff.), whereas "job enrichment" has its
ideological appeal to "humanising work"; the grading system appeals
to individualism and achievement;. the language of "participation"
relates to democratic tradition; wage deals reflect cultural
materialism. All these elements were present in Chemco's New
Working Arrangement, and they coexist in differing combinations in
various managerial packages designed primarily to increase control
and rationality.
To summarise, factually and ideologically, managers are
aided in th~ir attempts to enact socially, and support politically,
strategies which seek, often simultaneously and unintentionally, to
both improve control of the work process, and limit the extent
of opposition and challenge to the organisational order. However,
it is highly improbable that management can successfully monopolise
both "organisation" and "ideology", because conservative strategies
and political action will have unintended effects on the political
process, and will, in varying degrees, be purposefully resisted
and opposed.
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9.3 Reformist strategy and the Politics of Organisational
Adaptation
9.3.1 Reformist Strategy and Reformist Strategists
A combination of theories from the pragmatic and
oppositional modes is likely to be a very common occurrence in
organisational life which provides its participants witharobiv-
alent, even contradictory experiences. The incompleteness and
lack of full commitment that typifies localised, restricted
theorising of both the pragmatic and the oppositional kind, is
associated with an instability which leads to multiple, 'inconsis-
tent' images of the organisation. Reformist strategy is rooted in
imagery that casts the organisation as both hostile and benign,
constraining and promising i.e. in the day-to-day problems of
surviving in a system which creates discomfort and yet is perceived
as unalterable and permanent. Whereas conservative strategy
reflects an active interest in maintaining and improving the
structural framework as it is, reformist strategy concerns the
active manipulation of the structural framework in order to resolve
perceived local or limited issues, whilst leaving unasked and un-
touched fundamental questions about organisational rationality. The
very existence of rules, authority, procedures, practices etc.
presupposes the possibility that they may be strategically used,
or even evaded, in order to improve an actor's (individual's or
group's) social possibilities, or reduce his social impossibilities.
Since reformist strategy is concerned with restricted adjustments
of the system (and their defense) I shall refer to its enactment
as the politics of adaptation.
conflict theorists. The advantage of the present approach is that
The politics of adaptation corresponds more or less to the
total view of political process offered by pluralist or political-
reformist strategies and adaptive politics are placed firmly in the
context of other essential aspects of organisational politics, viz.
structurally predisposed tendencies towards order and conflict, and
the concrete ways in which order and opposition are, or potentially
may be, realised and frustrated.
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Reformist strategy and the associated actions cover a
vast range of localised politics, from the passive resistance that
typifies more or less apathetic pragmatists, to active struggle
and opposition over day-to-day affairs, which are more ~ypical of
quasi-committed oppositional theorists, bordering on alternative
7theorising. The considerable variation of strategy and political
action that characterises this range of reformist strategy points
to the need for empirical research - and in sections 9.3.2 and 9.3.3
I shall refer to the problem with respect to managerial and work-
place strategies - but I suggest that all strategies and actions
within the range have broad similarities by virtue of their limited
aims and their inconsistent base.
structurally buttressed. Strategies of reform, however, can and do
In 9.2.1, I argued that conservative strategies are employed
throughout the organisation, but both evidence and intuition suggests
that they belong mainly to top participants whose power is
arise at all levels of the organisation, have similar aims, and may
be considered as rational means of attempting to manipulate the
"facts of organisational life" to suit particular ends. In 8.6,
I proposed that localised inconsistent theorising tends to reflect
participants' often ambiguous or contradictory experiences of work
and (capitalist) organisation. Effectively writing of the strategic
aspects of inconsistent theorising ("factory-based class conscious-
ness"), Beynon suggests thl:!follovdng of the shop st ewar ds ' committee
at Halewood :
" shop stewards were active trade unionists,
and their shop stewards' committee was a trade
union organisation. Activism and organisation
held together by a class consciousness that
derives its politics from a detailed under-
standing of relationships within the factory.
A politics that finds its expression in
'taking the piss' out of the foremen, in a
laugh and joke, and in the strike. A
politics that is structured by ambivalence.
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A dislike and distrust of the employer but
a need for employment". (Beynon, 1973,
p.23) •
The ambivalent experiences of organisational life from which
localised inconsistent theorising is distilled and of which the
latter attempts to make sense, are not located solely in the lower
echelons of the organisation such as among shop floor stewards
(Beynon, 1973, p.121; Lane, 1974, p.197), manual workers (Nichols
and A~strong, 1976, p.150ff.; Brown and Brannen, 1970, p.207;
Westergaard, 1970, p.121), foremen (Nicholls, 1974, p.496ff.), staff
stewards (Batstone et al., 1977, pp.26-27) and clerks (Lockwood~
1958, p.99ff.). Top managers and executives also confront ambiv-
Clegg, 1975, p.91ff.) or innovation. Within management circles
alence: they have to "manage the contradictions" (Nichols and
Beynon, 1977, p.130) which conservative strategies may unintentionally
create (see 9.2.4), and to do so often requires informal and non-
legitimate "juggling" (Nichols and Beynon, 1977, p.33i see also
themselves, organisational rationality produces structural conflict
by working in two opposing directions :
"Members of the management team must cooperate and
compete to serve their own ends ..• The competitive
element concerns the desire for promotion and for
greater shares of scarce resources" (Lowe and Shaw,
1968, p.305i see also Martin, 1977, pp.104-105).
Given that the organisation is a competitive career structure, that
managers and executives are themselves subject to evaluation of
performance, that competition for organisational resources is
structured into their lives, and that organisational control in-
. 8volves teamwork and confllct, it is inevitable that even top
executives
" manoeuvre and manipulate in order to get the
job done and, in many cases, to strengthen and
enhance their own position. Although they would
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fact is that they are politicians".
and Sims, 1964, p.217).
(Martin
hate the thought and deny the allegation, the
The politics of adaptation include actions that adjust the
system wittingly and formally, or unintentionally and informally
(cf. Strauss, 1964, p.245), from an individual or a collectivity
power-base, with positive opposition or defensive resistance. As
with all political strategy the chances of the successful accomplish-
ment of reformist strategies will depend not only on their internal
coherence and accurate projections, but also upon social resistance
from other actors, the unintended repercussions of the various
courses of action pursued in the organisational arena, and, at least
as important, the "assistance" strategists receive from structural
possibilities or lack of structural impossibilities. In the latter
case specifically, one would expect managerial reformist strategies
to have better initial chances of success,9 in spite of their general
theoretical similarity to those of lower participants.
problems whose solutions are sought at a localised level. Where
Wherever it occurs, reformist strategy is a response to
problems are perceived as social (i.e. created more or less ad hocZy
within the work situation) rather than structural (i.e. symptomatic of
the way the system works) strategies and political actions will tend
to be piecemeal, limited, sectionalist, n0n- or quasi-legitimate,
and competitive. However, as I shall argue below, there is reason
to believe that adaptive politics at the management level differ in
certain important respects from those at lower levels. In general
these differences arise because of the participants' relationship to
the structural framework and its rationality, and their theorised
experiences of it. In short, managers have greater structural
potential for self-control (see 7.3) and 'tend to adopt reformist
strategies with a primarily pragmatic base - this in turn leads to
political actions being undertaken from an individual or small
clique viewpoint with great opportunities of some success. On the
other hand, shop floor workers do not have structurally-predisposed
control possibilities, and the fulcrum of their strategic plans may
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be either pragmatic or oppositional; in general, in order to
achieve any success, adaptive politics in the workplace cannot
be rooted in organisational rationality, but in some other
localised logic, e.g. social solidarity.
Being 'nonideological', adaptive political actions will
tend to be formulated according to control rather than consensus
strategies, i.e. they will attempt to influence the 'facts'
(rules, procedures, practices etc.) of the immediate organisational
situation. As with all control strategies, those of the reformist
kind will have positive and defensive purposes and consequences.
Positive control strategies refer to plans to increase one's
(social) possibilities beyond those structurally defined;
defensive control strategies aim to maintain those politically-
earned possibilities against attempts by others to challenge or
10reduce them. These positive ("aggressive") and defensive
aspects of reformist strategies have been well-documented in the
work of Dalton and Burns (see Chapter Three), especially at the
managerial level. It is at this level that I shall continue my
exploration of adaptive politics.
(regarding union leaders, see Lane, 1974, pp.252-253). Having
9.3.2 Reformist strategy at the Managerial Level
In all organisations, higher participants enjoy an initial
advantage in their ability to increase their personal or group
control by manipulating institutional authority, rules, discretion,
and information and by manoeuvering within the career system
greater access to the control system and greater freedom from it,
higher participants - top managers, executives and professionals -
can exploit and expand their position in order to increase power and
status beyond structural allocation, and they do so by adopting
positive control strategies. Politically-acquired status and power
in a competitive organisational world need defensive strategies in
order to protect them for other individuals or groups seeking to
expand their possibilities.
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Two of the most familiar and powerful reasons for
adopting managerial reformist strategies are predisposed by the
structural framework of organisational power. First, careerism
or self-advancement (cf. Burns, 1977, p.106ff.) reflects the
competitive system of promotion which seeks to channel highly
motivated and able participants to the top of the organisation.
However, unintentionally, it creates conflict and struggle
between ambitious managers and executives whose aims are not to
increase organisational rationality and control, but to increase
their own social possibilities (cf. Stagner, 1968, pp.186-187) •
A second and related reason concerns "expansionism" or "empire-
building" (Burns and Stall:cer,1961, p.194ff.). The expansionist
manager aims to extend his department or subunit - in size, power
or status - with respect to other departments, thereby increasing
the perceived importance of himself and his staff - and, not
incidentally, to improve his promotion possibilities.
The positive manipulation of the organisational control
system in order to serve sectional or personal ends has been widely
discussed in the literature. Where it helps to achieve one's
goals a rule may be religiously followed (cf. Strauss, 1964,
p.23ff.; Crozier, 1964, p.160 and p.199), or interpreted to serve
a purpose (cf. Clegg, 1975, p.132ff.) or even evaded altogether
(cf. Dubin, 1968; Strauss, 1964, p.235ff.; Dalton, 1959, pp.lll-
113) • Institutional authority provides a legitimate bdse from
which rules and procedures may be manipulated, and job discretion,
with its inbuilt freedom from external control, makes it difficult
for supervisors to identify and specify points at which control
possibilities have been strategically acquired. Discretion is an
important part of organisational rationality, but it also provides
the role occupant with
" power against top management in the sense
that he could; if he chose, use his job discretion •••
in ways which could do it considerable harm" (Fox,
1974b, p.44).
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In this way, managerial reformist strategy which uses the
structural framework, is not only grounded in the structural
framework but also protected by it.
A more striking illustration of adaptive politics at
the level of management is the intentional biasing of information
in order to either increase control possibilities and/or defend
against threats to such earned control.
"It is clear that •. ,[?rea managerij saw
it in their personal interest to obtain
lower rather than higher budgets
[Th~ reward system had the effect of
inducing ••• !!rea manager~ to bias
their forecasts downwards ••, in order
to improve their future income."
(Lowe and Shaw, 1968, p.307 and p.308) •
Such biasing acted to improve income, and similarly raised
the prestige and potential power of area managers with regard to the
available funds in the organisation. In Lowe and Shaw's study
(1968), this strategy of control also had defensive aspects
because, feeling threatened with possible demotion, a.rea managers
"dressed up" or favourably distorted the budgetary information that
was used by superiors to assess their performance. (cf. Loasby,
1968, pp.359-360i Dubin, 1968, p.435i Jasinski, 1968, p.439).
The ways in which the "doctoring" of information is achieved
depends upon the loopholes in the (budgetary) control system of
the particular organisation (cf. pondy, 1965,pp.1-2) but in general
it is clear that managers can and do distort information to serve
personal or sectional ends - positive and defensive.
The career system, with its grading arrangements and
appointments/appeals procedures, can also become the direct focus
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of positive control strategy. From the perspective of a
professional group of specialists, for example, the appropriate
combination of tactical skill and group support can permit the
manipulation of the grading system to its own advantage :
"The secretary of one major trade union
said that the BBC grading system was
God's own gift to his union. It
certainly enables groups of specialists
to manoeuvre themselves into higher
grading by exploiting the openings
presented by shifts in the technical
or organisational setting, or in the
grading system itself."
1977, p.89).
(Burns,
Playing the strategic game of "boardsmanship" (ibid. p.115ff.)
may appear a harmless pastime for the career-minded, but where
candidates become allied to, and supported and sponsored by
"cabal"-like groups (Burns, 1955, p.480ff.i cf. Martin and Sims,
1964, pp.2l9-220i Dalton, 1959, pp.62-63), an intellectual quasi-
political game becomes a fully-fledged political manipulation of
the system.
As in the previous illustration, grading and status are
also subject to defensive strategy from those individuals and
groups who are threatened by changes in the system. pettigrew's
computer programmers (1973, p.147ff.) and Burns' insecure older
managers (1955, p.473ff.) employed tactics based upon group
solidarity in order to attempt to protect themselves against
erosion of power and status.
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The examples cited illustrate how higher participants use
the structural possibilities implicit in their positions to
manipulate for sectionalist ends the structural framework from
which they derive their control potential. Positive control
strategies involve explicit manoeuvres to increase their power,
income and status, whilst defensive control strategies are
designed to resist challenges to those socially-generated possi-
bilities. The higher one climbs the organisational ladder the
more possible it is for participants to introduce important
adjustments by themselves for themselves, but, for most managers,
adaptation can only be accomplished with some socio-political
support.
9.3.3 Reformist Strategy at the Workplace
1975, p.33). Unlike top participants, shopfloor and office workers
Like managers and executives, shop-floor and office workers
are seldom satisfied with the control and freedom structurally
allocated to them, although few feel that they can do anything
positive about it (cf. Nichols and Armstrong, 1976, p.64; Femia,
do not have the initial structural advantages of authority, dis-
cretion, access to information, realistic career possibilities etc.
Lacking a power-base in organisational rationality reformist
strategy at the workplace draws strength mainly from the collectivity,
using it to manipulate the structural fraJ..1eworkin order to es't.abLi.sh
direct control over the work process. As before, such control
strategy may be analysed as possessing positive and defensive
aspects. I shall be focusing upon shopfloor politics for illustrat-
ive purposes; because of the plethora of research at the "frontier
of control" (Goodrich, 1975), I shall restrict discussion to a few
general points.
I have argued above that managerial reformist strategy may
be expected to be formulated from a primarily pragmatic base of
theorising, whereas the reformist strategy of lower participants is
likely to be both pragmatic and oppositional. This latter duality
is reflected in Nichols and Armstrong's distinction between "getting
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by" and "getting back" (1976, p.69fL). At its most blatant,
"getting back" is a negative, emotional expression of resentment
which finds its extreme in spasmodic, uncoordinated acts of
sabotage. Often being individualisticll responses to control and
constraint - associated often with "bloody-minded" participants -
such acts tend not to have sustained effects on the process of
organisational politics (see also Taylor and Walton, 1971).
Similarly, workers make their mm individual adjustments to and of
their situations (i.e. getting by) according to their particular
jobs, but being very small adaptations on an unorganised basis they
tend to go unnoticed, and be of little political import.
The most relevant examples of reformist strategy on the
shopfloor concern coordinated, group-based attempts to influence
the amount of control workers have over their own activities;
these job practices in a sense combinE.:"getting by" and "getting
back" in an organised manner. Most of the recorded illustrations
of workplace adaptive politics involve the control of wages.12
Concerned with making a "fair day's pay" in spite of organisational
rationality as enacted by management, piecework workers employ a
range of tactics to improve a job's return: "scheming and
conniving" on the timing of a job (Roy, 1969, pp.362-363; also
Beynon, 1973, p.135ff.); "streamlining" a job, thereby sacrificing
quality for quantity (Roy, 1969, pp.363; on supervisors' "bleeding
the line" to meet deadlines, see Jasinski, 1968, p.439); the
informal coordination of tasks in order to make "hopeless" jobs
worthwhile (Roy, 1969, p.368; also Lupton's discussion of the
"fiddle", 1963, p.139ff.). Attempts to increase or stabilise
earnings are complemented by strategies which aim to improve other
aspects of working life including job grading (e.g. Beynon, 1973,
p.129ff.) and exercising control over work allocation (Beynon,
1973, p.147). One might add, of course, that sectionalist interests
also involve and create intergroup conflicts in the office or on the
shop floor (e.g. wage disputes; demarcation disputes), thereby having
significance for the realisation of conservative strategies of
fragmentation (cf, Brown and Brannen, 1970, pp.202 and 203) .
373
Shopfloor practices flourish most freely where the
industrial organisation enjoys a certain, preferably expanding
market, for it is at this time that work groups can push for
increased control which does not squeeze the management economic-
ally. Organised expansion of shopfloor control, whether under
trade union auspices and shop steward leadership (cf. Beynon, 1973,
p.129ffi Coates and Topham, 1974, p.76ff.i Lane, 1974, p.200) or
through intergroup collusion (cf. Roy, 1969; Lupton, 1963), can
proceed steadily until the market begins to squeeze, or until, in
some other way, management begin to feel threatened e.g. with respect
to their "right to manage" (e.g. Beynon, 1973, p.134i Roy, 1969,
p.370ff.) • The durability of job controls depends upon conserva-
tive strategy in varying economic-historical circumstances, but
when the market tightens, so does the flexibility of the politics
of order, and hard-earned shopfloor controls need to be defended -
as they do when challenged by other occupational groups. Lacking
a structural (i.e. organisationally rational) basis to its controls,
political resistance, other things being equal, is mainly a matter
of social solidarity and collective recalcitrance (e.g. Crozier,
1964, p.llOi Scheff, 1970, pp.335-337) combined with the exploit-
ation of any particular managerial dependence upon one's goodwill13
solitary acts of sabotage (see note 11) or "work-to-rule" exemplify
such defensive control tactics.
All reformist strategies, then, are oriented to~ards
"working the system" (cf. Goffman, 1961, p.189ff.) to sectionalist
advantage, increasing power in the work situation by manipulating
or evading rules and controls, by optimising remuneration, by
playing the grading arrangements or whatever. These strategies
try to use the system to improve or protect social possibilities
(and to minimise social impossibilities) within the system.
However
"Essentially the controls obtained over the job
by shopfloor ..• activities involved little more
than a different form of accommodation to the
more general controls imposed by management".
(Beynon, 1973, p.149).
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In this general respect, shopfloor politics differ little from
those at management level. However, as mentioned above, there
are important differences.
and defense. Due to their position, politically favoured as it is
The adaptive politics of higher participants are grounded
in structurally-based possibilities, their expansion, exploitation
by organisational rationality, executives, managers and profession-
als have a structural buffer to changing economic-historical
conditions. As the market tightens, higher participants can to
some extent maintain politically-accomplished controls longer and
more completely, if only because politically-generated control and
freedom are often difficult to separate from structural-discretion-
ary elements of a role. On the other hand, the expansion and
defense of workers' control possibilities need to be supported by
a collective rationality. The "commonsense rationality of workers
in the work situation" (Beynon) lies not in the institutional logic
of capitalism or the formal rationality of organisation, but in a
collective logic - one of solidarity.
Discussion in 8.6 centred on the proposition that restricted
theorising - particularly when it involves inconsistency - exhibits
features of instability that could, under certain circumstances lead
to shifts in the way in which organisational life is interpreted.
Reformist strategy embodies such potentialities. The argument that
workplace adaptive politics need to have roots in a localised
collective logic hints once more at empirical possibilities viz.
that if such a logic becomes generalised, it may serve as an
alternative rationality of which revolutionary strategy becomes a
normal political extension.
9.4 Revolutionary Strategy and the Politics of Organisational
Change
9.4.1 Revolutionary strategy and Revolutionary Strategists
Revolutionary strategy incorporates in its intentions the
dilemma of alternative theorising already described (see 8.5), viz.
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while it is perfectly feasible in an organisation to interpret,
plan and act "normatively" - for both such political "theory" and
political "practice" have institutional support and credibility -
it is impractical (i.e. institutionally and organisationally
impossible) to act out persistently the demands of an alternative
theory. A full analysis of revolutionary strategy in organis-
ations must bear in mind this political dilemma, and consider the
ways in which revolutionary strategists seek to resolve it.
Alternative theorising provides a critical analysis of
organisational life and the structural framework which circumscribes
the latter, from the standpoint of another way of organising society
and work. The commitment to an alternative rationality becomes
politically relevant when theorists plan courses of action with the
direct intention of challenging, and ultimately overthrowing the
present system. Because of the dilemma mentioned above, it is not
probable that revolutionary strategy will inform all the organis-
ational action of the revolutionary strategist, but where it does,
we may speak of the politics of change. Whereas conservative
strategy may be seen as the social endeavour to enact the structural
predispositions towards organisational order, revolutionary
strategy may be understood as the socio-political counterpart to
structural conflict, i.e. the active attempt to realise the struc-
tural potential for organisational change.
As I have suggested (see 8.5), empirical evidence regarding
alternative theorising and revolutionary strategy is sparse for
various reasons. Most considerations of the politics of radical
organisational (or social) change is either highly abstract theoret-
ical work and/or studies of the failure of such politics e.g. the
structural limitations to political change by active trade unionism.
Because of this I do not intend to be very thorough in my discussion
of revolutionary strategy; indeed I shall make only very general
pOints to demonstrate how it fits in with the themes already
suggested. The main purpose of doing this is to overcome a funda-
mental weakness of most previous approaches to organisational power
and politics, viz. their neglect or oversight of this theoretical
category and of its empirical possibilities.
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Because revolutionary political strategy derives from a thorough-
going critique of the structural framework in its broadest sense,
the politics of radical organisational change must be analysed
within the broader societal/institutional context. Revolutionary
strategy, being generalised and seeking change is identifiably
ideological because it challenges the institutional assumptions
and logic which seem to be neutral and obvious. Unlike conserva-
tive strategy which appears 'apolitical' or reformist strategy
which is deemed 'political', revolutionary strategy is definitely
Political.14 Since radical organisational change is seen as
only one aspect of social change, revolutionary strategy is likely
to have its social foundation not in the organisation but in some
extra-organisational movement. Lenin's critique of trade unionism,
with its conclusion that structural change can only be achieved
through Political organisation, and the practical impossibility of
radical workers realising their political aims on or from the shop-
f~oor (cf. Lane, 1974), serves to underline the significance of the
extra-organisational roots of revolutionary strategy (cf. Parkin,
1972, p.97ff; Clements, 1977, p.318ff.; Anderson, 1977, p.341ff.;
Contrast Moorhouse and Chamberlain, 1974 and Moorhouse, 1976).
Whilst it is imperative to understand this point, my concern with
the internal politics of organisations makes it unfeasible to
conduct a comprehensive analysis of radical politics and Party
organisation. I shall explore some of the implications of
revolutionary strategy for the process of organisational politics.
Amongst organisational participants, revolutionary strategy
is rare, and where revolutionary strategists are participants they
are not likely to be able to profess or practice their views to any
significant degree. As with conservative strategists their views
and acts will be assessed by different participants in different
ways according to the latter's theorised experiences of everyday
organisational life. In the political arena, where the current ways of
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doing things have a facticity, a self-evidence and a desirability -
actively supported by conservative consensus strategies within the
organisation (as well as other legitimation processes outwith the
organisation) - the revolutionary strategist faces immense political
barriers. He competes with his conservative counterpart for
ideological commitment, but the competition is heavily structurally
biased. In moments of negemonic order, organisational parti-
cipants are likely to be both unreceptive and hostile to the
politics of change. It is only when structural conflict becomes
more visible - for example, where domination prevails - that the
possibility of an organised collective challenge to the structural
framework arises, for it is then that the alternative conflict-based
interpretation of organisational life becomes most tenable for the
. d 15uncomm~tte •
In spite of the structural and social biases against the
politics of radical organisational change, revolutionaries face the
same basic problems as conservative strategists. The first of
these concerns the establishment of a coherent organisation to pursue
their rationality and to effect control of work life i.e. the need for
control strategy. Second, the need to persuade (i.e. to "educate")
work, i.e. consensus strategy. By presenting a viable alternative
participants about the legitimacy of changing the structural frame-
explanation of participants' experiences of organisations and thereby
establishing a "counter-hegemony", and binding localised conflicts
into a broadly-based organisation, collective logic can defeat the
dominant institutional logic.
Revolutionaries are not totally free to pursue these
questions o~ organisation and educati~n, because they are involved in
an unequal political struggle for the commitment of the majority of
organisational participants. The heart of the revolutionary
strategist's problem lies in the highly restricted awareness of social
actors :
"The very framework of his analysis of the existing
system is fixed by the dominant vision of the world.
The apparent limits of the possible are defined by
the existing order." (Femia, 1975, p.33).
Organisational participants have to be able to experience their own
work lives in conflict terms; they have to be able to experience
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such conflict not just as economistic or other minor (e.g. health,
safety) issues, but as political issues; political conflict over
organisational control and rationality must be generalised beyond
localised "faults" to structural/societal causes, i.e. Political
conflict; the structural framework - its "facts" and "ideology" -
must be interpreted as being vulnerable, contingent and not "fixed",
and replaceable by an alternative framework with a more acceptable
rationality. These general aims of revolutionary strategy, com-
bined with the need to organise the political challenge, form the
foci of revolutionary control and consensus strategy.
9.4.2 Revolutionary Control Strategy
Control strategy within an alternative mode of theorising
attempts to reduce or negate the control and rationality produced
through the politics of order. Because it seeks radical change in
the organisation and rationality of work through broader societal
change, revolutionary strategy cannot derive any power from the
"routine", "obvious" organisational embodiments of the structural
framework. As with other control strategy, it is possible to
consider the revolutionary kind as having bvo aspects: in its
positive sense, revolutionary control strategy actively challenges
the dominant way of organising work by trying to realise socially
and po Lxtically those system con txadf.ct.Lons which imply d generalised
collective opposition; defensively, such strategy resists attempts
by conservatives to destroy an effective organisational and ideologi-
cal base for challenge and opposition (see 9.2.2). Like their
conservative counterpart, the revolutionary control strategy is in
reality imbued with ideology so that it overlaps with consensus
strategy, which seeks to alter participants' perceptions of their
organisational world. It should be remembered that the political
actions of revolutionary strategists in organisations are only part
of their broader aims; and their organisational success depends
upon their societal strategy, as well as conservative and reformist
responses and the unintended consequences of the whole process.
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The most immediate task is to break the management's
monopoly of knowledge and rationality. There is evidence to
suggest that shop stewards with active socialist politics attempt
to do this by deliberately conceiving their steward's job as a media-
ting interpretive role. By intercepting management communications
the face-value of which, in the context of a dominant ideology, is
"reasonable" - the socialist steward can translate the message in
terms of the underlying political strategy of managerial control
(Lane, 1974, p.200). At the daily organisational level, strategic
intervention of this nature serves to promulgate actively a political
interpretation of management's apparently neutral actions and at the
same time to establish some degree of resistance to the latter's
structurally-based attempts to monopolise organisation and knowledge.
In discussing the other types of political strategy, it was
argued that participants often experience the organisation in conflict
terms, but that its intermingling with order theorising and the
tendency to restrict their perception of conflict to limited,
localised, sectional and usually economistic issues (itself encouraged
by conservative strategy) channel the collective energy produced into
adaptive processes. Revolutionary strategy aims to exploit localised
issues which create conflict and resentment - wage claims, lay-offs,
redundancies etc. - and are theorised solely in oppositional terms,
by taking active steps to generalise the participants' understanding
of them. Any dispute which challenges organisational rationality in
its own terms may thus be turned into a potential issue for change -
especially where it involves a large number of people and has general
solidarity amongst fellow participants because it contravenes their
"commonsense" rationality and morality. Positive tactics need to be
complemented by defensive ones, in order to resist conservative
strategies of, for example, fragmentation and restrictionism.
Positive strategy to demonstrate the structural causes of organisational
conflict may include the militant pursuit of wage bargaining, or an
organised demand for greater shop-floor control - through mass walk-
outs, factory occupation, local strikes, industry-wide strikes,
demonstrations etc. and these may have consequences beyond adaptation
if they occur in favourable economic conditions, if they increase the
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conflict awareness of participants beyond the immediate issue, if
they overcome sectionalist perspectives; in short, if the local
issues can be collectively interpreted as Political. However,
control strategy needs to be complemented by strategies to incul-
cate and legitimate everyday theories which permit such an inter-
pretation.
9.4.3 Revolutionary Consensus Strategy
Underlying control strategy is an ideological theory about
society, the nature of social conflict, and the possibilities of
structural change. But the problem of the revolutionary is to
create in participants a commitment to overthrow the organisation
which provides for their survival - on an interpretive level, this
entails questioning the unquestionable in terms of a rationality
which has no comparable facticity. Although alternative ration-
ality and ideology is not a formal part of the 'factual' organis-
ational setting, they may be found in embryo in the localised
collective logic which bolsters some forms of reformist strategy
(cf. Moorhouse, 1976, p.492) . It is the aim of consensus
strategy to generalise this logic and to use it as a means of
creating a radical opposition which is organised within a social
movement.
collectively. Not only are such campaigns unfavourably predisposed
It is imperative, therefore, for revolutionary strategists
to join with their conservative opponents in the "battle for the
minds and wills of the men". This in turn requires campaigns
within and outwith the organisation to "educate" participants to
be able to interpret organisational issues structurally and to under-
stand the vulnerability of the structural framework when challenged
because of the lack of access to large-scale means of communication,
but also, and relatedly, because of the apparent 'naturalness' of
prevailing ideas.
Lacking empirical data to illustrate these arguments about
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revolutionary strategy and the politics of radical change, it has
been necessary to draw out sensitising themes in a manner which is
patently inadequate. Information about internal radical politics
and their relationship to external Political Organisation would
add enormously to our knowledge of the potentialities for organis-
ational change through collective action, although clearly the
realisation of such empirical possibilities, grounded in historical-
economic, structural and social factors, depends upon a "mass"
conversion to some degree of conflict awareness. The circumstances
under which such large-scale re-orientation of everyday organis-
ational theorising may occur cannot be specified in detail, but they
certainly require some combination of positive strategy to make
active progress, of defensive strategy to resist conservative
strategies, and, possibly most important, of consensus strategy to
legitimate the social critique and the structural alternative and to
motivate relatively uncommitted participants to collective, organised
action on a societal scale.
9.5 Political Strategy, Political Action and Political Process
My aim throughout Part Three has been to focus upon how
organisational participants theorise their work lives with reference
to problems of control, order and conflict. Such theorising,
dialectically related the structural framework of organisational
power and the experiences which participants have of the latter, may
be analysed, first, in its interpretive aspect as providing images
of the ways in which organisations do and/or should work; and
second, with respect to the political strategies which those images of
order and/or conflict imply. In this way everyday organisational
theorising provides a complex but necessary sociological variable
that mediates the structural framework, participants' experiences of
the latter, and courses of action strategically and intentionally
adopted in order to accomplish political ends varying from committed
support of, to committed opposition to the organisation, its control
and rationality.
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The immediate work of the thesis - to .build an interpretive
sociological base for the analysis of organisational power and
politics - is thus finished, in that I have offered a set of
theoretical concepts and propositions, supported by illustrative
evidence, which can sensitise research on this topic from this
perspective. A short, final section is however required to complete
the theoretical picture. A sensitising framework for the analysis
of organisational politics needs to take the sociological view beyond
that of political strategies in which participants attempt or pZan to
realise certain ends. I have made it clear that such plans may obtain
structural "help" or "hindrance" according to their relationship to
the prevailing conditions, and that they may indeed be reformulated to
take cognisance of such experiences. However, the political process
of organisations cannot be assumed to reflect some predictable
"combination" of pursued courses of political action, however flexible
or adaptive.
The political arena of organisations is circumscribed by the
factual and ideological, societal and localised, aspects of the
structural frame\'lOrkwhich favour or disfavour certain actions by
certain participants. Strategic political actions, theorised in
accordance with participants' past and present experiences, tested
ideas, political ends and social images, collectively "fill" the
political arena and thereby form a socially-constructed network of
action. Pulitical action may succeed or fail dependent on whether
it is structurally realistic (i.e. possible) or not, or whether it
is socio-politically (i.e. intentionally) approved or supported by
other strategists whose plans are equally subject to structural
predispositions.
This socially-constructed network of political action may
be seen as the social outcome of political strategists - what may be
expected by a sociologist who has been able to accumulate infor-
mation about participants' interpretive and strategic activities.
But the political process of organisations is created not only by
actors realising (or not} their intentions according to the
intentional activities of challenge, support and opposition in a
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structurally-circumscribed arena; its shape and path is also the
result of the unforeseen effects of political actions, and the
unanticipated repercussions of intentions meeting other intentions.
There is no space in this thesis to investigate in depth
the implications and complications for organisational politics of
the unintended consequences of political action and of the inter-
action between the politics of order, of adaptation and of radical
change, but the importance of "unintentions" must never be under-
rated (cf. Atkinson, 1972, p.229ff.i see also 10.2.2 below).
Whereas 'intentionality'in social action can be examined theoretic-
ally, unintended consequences of action are not so readily open to
a priori discussion. Although such consequences are unanticipated,
hence not 'theoretically' predicted by social actors, they may
sometimes be expected by the sociologist whose academic theories
have been sensitive to similar sets of empirical circumstances.
For the most part, the ramifications of "unintentions" for the
political process - and these consequences may conceivably alter
the whole nature of organisational politics especially if they
become cumulative - are a matter for detailed empirical research.
To conclude this chapter, I shall give one fairly simple
example of a chain reaction of intended and unintended consequences
which draws upon some of the ideas developed above: it is in Burns'
study o:l the BBC (1977, p.87ff.). For purposes of increasing
control and motivation, management introduced a new grading system,
using a number of criteria to rank jobs for seniority, responsi-
bility and pay. This conservative strategy, however, had unantici-
pated consequences, in that the grading system became the focus of
discontent, and of reformist strategy to improve pay and status
within the procedure. Through organised pressure and manipulation
of the rules and criteria, the lighting supervisors achieved an up-
grading, but this political success had repercussions throughout the
organisation. For example, sound supervisors, formally on the same
grade as the lighting supervisors, immediately commenced manoeuvres
to regain parity. It can be seen that, although political action
is aZhlays intentional, the actual process of organisational politics
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depends upon the complicated, often unpredictable effects of those
actions as they interrelate within a social and structural context.
In Part Three I have taken up the major conceptual themes
of Parts One and Two, and have developed them as analytical foci
for the study of organisational politics. I have examined the
interrelationships between the structural (second face) and action
(first face) dimensions of power and politics, between order and
conflict in those two dimensions, and between opportunity and
constraint; all this has been conducted under the auspices of the
uncontended postulate of voluntarism. This has led to a deliberate
concentration on everyday organisational theorising as the mediating
variable which makes sense, for participants and, by implication,
for academic sociologists, of the apparent oppositions and contra-
dictions in the above analytical axes. By adding the study of
unintended consequences of socio-political actions to that
described above, it is possible to reach a coherent, realistic
picture of the political process in organisational life without
foreclosing on future empirical responsibilities. Figure 9.2.
presents the concepts and propositions of the sensitising inter-
pretive sociological framework as developed during Part Three.
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Figure 9.2 A Simplified Representation of the Arguments Presented
in Part Three
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Crenson's study of nondecision-making in a local community
(197U demonstrates how the powerful interests of industry
entered into the formulation of antipollution legislation
without taking direct action - the local politicians and
functionaries perceived the impossibility of generating
support for effective legislation, and so incorporated into
their strategies their previous experience of structural
predispositions that had been socially realised.
The political strategies of many international revolutionary
groups appear to have been based upon such misperceptions of
what could be done. In spite of their persistent historical
experiences reinforcing the structural and social limits to
the success of hi-jacking, kidnapping etc. as revolutionary
tactics, revolutionary groups have continued to act in-
effectively as political agents of structural change.
I would distinguish these from "habitually", because. habits
can and do change, and they were consciously subjectively
"meaningful" at some stage in the past, and, presumably,
still are now, even if they are not reflected upon (cf.
Giddens, 1976, p.76ff.).
This argument introduces the historical dimension of conser-
vative strategy, for until fairly recently organisations
were controlled in fairly direct, coercive ways - it being
historically and culturally unthinkable that owners and
managers should even worry about lower participants' re-
actions to authority, control etc. Trade union organis-
ation, full employment, cultural change, and economic
pressures for rationalisation, are just four factors
generating the need for managers to think about the problem
of consensus. See Fox (1974b, p.46ff.) for general argu-
ments, and Brannen et al. (1976) for a specific example.
The improvement or streamlining of the control system in
order .t.oenhance its rationality may also be considered part
of the politics of order. Where improvements or additions
are made to the control system, of course, conservative
strategy is more likely to provoke political challenge
because intentionality is no longer camouflaged by routine
and tradition.
It should be added, of course, that such counter-strategies
often go beyond the 'political' with a small 'p'. Worker-
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7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
(cont'd)
run organisatiolls, for example, have needed Politically-
.backed aid.
Indeed, in many ways, the extreme oppositional theorist
with only restricted consciousness is indistinguishable
in his behaviour from the alternative theorist who finds
that, in practice and in the short run, he has to act
within the system. (cf. Lane, 1974; and below, 9.4).
Fletcher (1973) provides a highly illuminating discussion
of the internal contradictions of being a modern manager.
It is important to bear in mind the fuzziness of the dis-
tinction between the politics of order and of adaptation.
The former relates to the formally legitimate enactment of
structural predispositions and the pursuit of organisational
control (i.e. rationality). Yet, higher participants are
often in a position where they can manipulate the system to
their own advantage, and smn-Lt.aneous Ly claim formal legit-
imacy. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that some-
times the very enactment of structural predispositions is at
the same time achieving or realising sectionalist interests.
As argued earlier, the later (see 9.5) - I believe that it
is a point worthy of reiteration - these propositions about
reformist strategy and adaptive political action make no
presumption about the success of such efforts. Since any
strategy will normally have political repercussions on, and
provoke reactions from other actors and groups, strategic
success (and the course of the organisational political
process in toto) depends upon one's own and other's
intentions, structural "help" and the unanticipated conse-
quences arising from the pursuit of political strategies.
Sabotage need not be individualistic, of course. Beynon
(1973, p.141) describes a mild form of sabotage on the wet
Deck of the Paint Shop at Halewood, used as a means of sus-
taining job controls when challenged.
This stress on economism itself reinforced by trade unions
(cf. Lenin, 1977; Lane, 1974; Clements, 1977i Anderson,
1977), is encouraged by management as part of the conserva-
tive strategy of 'restrictionism'. Furthermore, competit-
ion between work groups for higher wages - again a conse-
quence of trade union organisation - helps management attain
their aim of sectionalisation.
All participants possess the ultimate capacity to withdraw
their contributions by leaving, absenting themselves or
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13. (cont I d)
striking, but in circumstances that are compatible with
conservative coercive strategy (lay-off, dismissal etc.),
such political actions may not be perceived as realistic
possibilities.
14. For example, strikes led by shop stewards who belong to
the Communist (or other radical left-wing) Party are out-
wardly condemned by the popular press because of the ideo-
logical and political inspiration of their leaders. Lay-
offs, redundancies, plant closures etc. may invoke a
sympathetic understanding in all quarters of the national
press, but they will also be seen as rational. and necessary
(whether or not the involved managers are members of the
Conservative Party) .
15. This analysis complements the arguments about the insta-
bility of inconsistent theorising in various economic-
historical conditions (see 8.6) .
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CHAPTER TEN
CONCLUDING REMARKS
With the end of Chapter Nine so too ends Part Three of
this thesis in which I have attempted to establish theoretical
points of reference for the interpretive study of organisational
life as a political process. It is characteristic of a sensi-
tising methodology that academic theorising is an ongoing
activity so that it would be misleading to consider the present
work to be exhaustive or complete in any sense other than having
more-or-less fulfilled the promises outlined in Chapter One. As
in any thesis, my arguments have raised many issues and problems
which, because of their reZative peripherality to the central aims,
have been put aside only partly examined, or totally unexplored.
These issues will, in general, need to remain in such states,
although in the second section of the present chapter I shall at
least identify explicitly three of the most pressing problems that
are outstanding. Before attending to this unfinished business, I
shall summarise the foregoing theoretical arguments by way of
drawing out some of the major implications of the thesis for the
sociological study of organisations, and, in so doing, I shall
indicate some of the points at which the conceptual levers of a
political approach to organisational life may prove helpful to that
study.
10.1 Summary and Conclusions
My concern has been to show that theorising power and
politics, or any other topic, is more than a formal operation of
defining those concepts in clear unambiguous terms. The ways in
which power and politics are viewed by both academics and organis-
ational participants depend·upon a whole range of politics-
related matters, from visions of order and conflict, to perceptions
of social opportunity and constraint. In order to ascertain the
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effective, usually implicit conceptions of power and politics in
organisations, it was necessary to devote much energy probing
beneath the formal concepts offered by theorists in this area of
research.
These detailed critiques of the major contributors to the
politics-related literature reveal that three main types of approach
have been used, and that these types of approach exhibit thematic
similarities to those perspectives or frameworks which have guided
research in other political arenas. The unitary approach focuses
upon the formal hierarchical aspects of the localised structural
framework of organisations, and assumes - by resort to (implicit)
postulates of consensus - that political action and organisational
order are explicable with reference to such information. On the
other hand, the pluralist type of approach concentrates on political
behaviour and processes in their competitive social context, but
fails to appreciate the structural factors circumscribing ~uch
social action. Finally, the critical type of approach comprehends
the latter structural influences, but overemphasises their strength
in relation to constraint and order.
Within the broad framework of assumption and argument
adopted in the present work, none of these types of approach provides
a satisfactory account of. the organisation qua political arena :
an account in which the organisation is constituted by the subject-
ively-meaningful behaviour of organisational participants; an
account which would guarantee that the empirical possibilities of
organisation are maintained rather than closed by arbitrary
theoretical dictate. In Chapter Five I suggested that these in-
adequacies lay as much in the dominant methodology of theorising,
with its stress on closely-defined formal conceptual structures, as
in the content of the theorising itself. I also proposed that a
sensitising methodology, in which concepts and propositions are
understood as unavoidably revisable and corrigible, would be not
only more appropriate to the interpretive-sociological task-in-
hand, but also more compatible with the epistemological possibilities
of theory.
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Given these shortcomings in the literature, my specific
aim has been to theorise organisational power and politics by
giving due weight to the ways in which power and politics are
theorised by organisational participants themselves. In this
way, academic theorising could be ushered in a direction congruent
with the postulate of voluntarism and its corollary, social
contingency. In spite of their weaknesses, the existing academic
theories and approaches raise a number of pertinent theoretical
issues, and provide some useful conceptual themes, through the
analytical juxtaposition of which it has been possible, in Part
Three, to develop suggestive lines of penetration into the topic of
organisational power and politics. In particular, the themes of
order-conflict, of possibilities-impossibilities, and of the two
faces of power have informed theoretical discussion.
The interpretive-sociological framework which has developed
in response to the above assumptions, issues and themes is con-
structed around five major conceptions (see Figure 9.2, p.386) -
the structural framework of organisational life, everyday organis-
ational theorising, political action, social context and political
process - although it has only been possible to examine in detail
the first three. Tne structural framework of organisational power
responds to the "second face" conception, being the historically
grounded theory and practice of life in organisations; the
"established" ways of organising work in s:)ciety, which predispose
social action in certain directions. Everyday organisational
theorising, which for reasons already explained has constituted the
focal point of my thesis, refers to the manner in which partici-
pants perceive, interpret and make strategic plans to act in the
organisational arena. Everyday organisational theorising and the
structural framework are variable and contingently related, but the
former conception provides the important interpretive link between
the objective social-organisational world and the participants'
observable, subjectively-meaningful political actions .
. However, these theorised political actions must not be
equated with organisational politics, which process is the object
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of sociological understanding. Political actions of various
participants intermesh in the concrete social context of the
organisation, and, in doing so, have both intended and unintended
consequences for the realisation of political ends, and for the
(re)planning of COurses of action. Participants' theorised
political acts are thus socially and structurally influenced,
and the result of this complex, socially-mediated interaction of
factors may be called the political process of organisational life.
The "gap" between political action and political process, "filled"
by the social context, remains to be explored more fully elsewhere,
with the help of empirical research.
One of the major implications of conceiving organis-
ational power and politics in the way advocated in this thesis, is
that the process cannot be explained merely with reference to
internal factors. The narrow views which have prevailed in the
literature tend to neglect the rather obvious points.that organis-
ations exist with societal contexts and that organisational
experiences are only with difficulty divorced from social life in
general. I have emphasised the need to correct this tendency both
in the conception of the structural framework,with its two
levels - societal and organisational - of ideological and factual
influence; and in the investigation of everyday organisational
theorising, the sources of which can only be fully explored in the
context of sucietal ideology and social class. These consider-
ations of organisational life serve to make the conception of
internal power and politics more complete and realistic, and result
only from asking much broader sociological questions than is typical
of research into formal organisation. By placing organisations
back in their societal context, and by broaching issues of wider
theoretical interest as organisational problems, I hope to have
contributed in part towards the reintegration of the sociology of
organisations within the general discipline.
In this thesis, my aim has been to theorise the organis-
ation as a political phenomenon. However this should not be
considered as necessarily an end-in-itself, because an adequate
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sociological view of organisational politics has obvious appli-
cations in the unravelling of the social intricacies of a large
number of organisational topics and issues which have hitherto
been treated more or less mechanistically. Before considering
some of the unfinished business of the present effort, I shall
suggest a few of the mOre promising points of application in the
sociology of organisations.
Organisational change constitutes one of the most
obvious topics which benefit from an explicitly political view.
It is no coincidence that a number of the political-conflict
approaches examined in Chapter Three emerged from initial intrests
in the problem of change and/or resistance to change at management
and worker levels. In the dominant organisational approaches
change and development occur as more-or-Iess automatic responses
to structural pressures, but a political/interpretive view would
envisage internal structural adaptations and changes as being
socially-mediated, sponsored and opposed, predisposed or not •••
and so on. Such a framework would incorporate the idea that top
management enjoy "strategic Ohoice" in organisational decisions, but
would recommend that such choices be analysed as a political process.
The systematic application of an interpretive sociological
analysis that concentrates on power relationships could also
complemert the normal struci;-uralist, often unsociological approaches
to horizontal and hierarchical organisational relations. While
several sociologists have partially realised in interdepartmental
studies the potential of this sort of approach (see Chapter Three),
none has consistently applied it. On the other hand,
analysis of hierarchical relationships has invariably been
conducted without reference to political factors. Similarly, the
problems of managerial succession and of the changing of organis-
ational regimes are inexorably political in nature; remaining at
the level of managerial behaviour, studies of committee processes
have tended to be formalistic or social-psychological in orientation.
Seen as political, such processes become analysable, with increased
credibility, within my framework.
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The question of organisational goals has received a
great deal of attention in the social scientific literature, but
with few exceptions the tendency has been to treat them either as
parameters or as explanatory factors in analysis. By theorising
the setting and executing of organisational goals as a strategically
political process - i.e. by adopting an approach which focuses on
the precarious, contingent, and emergent nature of objectives
the study of this topic could be sociologically enriched.
Industrial relations may serve as a final example of an area of
study that may benefit from a political view of organisational
processes. Whether interested in the internal dynamics of trade
unions, in the field of management-union relations, or in the
specific problems of industrial democracy, an explicitly political
orientation wiL~ an interpretive-sociological foundation could prove
highly insightful.
It is because a great proportion of social life is now
conducted in, or influenced by, organisations, and because many
processes, activities and relationships within organisational arenas
are inevitably politicised or politicisable, that the sort of
framework which I have been advocating promises so much in terms of
sociological explanation.
10.2 Unfinished Business Three outstanding Problems
As a concluding section to this final chapter, I wish
to acknowledge a number of issues which, although they have been
raised in passing, have been neglected in the foregoing analysis.
Since it is impossible to deal with all such matters, I have
selected three which I, as the architect of this thesis, consider
would benefit from more extended exploration. The following brief
comments attempt to view the issues of everyday and academic
theorising, of the intended and unintended consequences of social
action, and of operationalising the proposed framework, in the
context of the ideas already outlined - such sketches in no way
constitute the extended exploration that is called for.
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10.2.1 Academicand·EverydayTheorising
Without entering into a rather lengthy philosophical
debate about the superiority or relativity of scientific and lay
thought concerning "truth" and "knowledge", there is little doubt
that academic and everyday theorising about. organisational life
exhibit substantial similarities regarding their content and
variety of form. In Chapter Five I wrote of 'open' and 'closed'
academic theories, while a similar distinction underlay much of
the discussion of everyday theorising in Chapter Eight and Nine.
More specifically, however, it could be reasonably argued that the
three types of academic approach abstracted from the literature in
Part One - viz. unitary, pluralist and critical - bear a certain,
though not exact, resemblance to the modes of everyday organis-
ational theorising explored in Part Three - respectively normative,
pragmatic and oppositional.
Just as the unitary type of approach takes as its primary
problem the question of organisational order, which is answered
unconvincingly with reference to an assumed state of normative
consensus over the formal structure, so the normative mode of
theorising is grounded in the social or moral legitimacy of the
organisational order. The balance conception of order that under-
lies the superficial face of conflict in the pluralist approach,
envisages organisational life as a competition between more-or-less
equal parties which results in the adjustment of peripheral aspects
of the basically accepted structural facts; whereas in the prag-
matic mode of theorising, participants' attention is restricted to
dealing with localised issues as they arise in a structural frame-
work which is generally accepted as unalterable. In many ways,
as I have shown in 6.3 and 6.4, the critical type of approach
complements the pluralist one, as does the oppositional mode with
the pragmatic (see 8.6). The former type of academic theorising
expresses a critical understanding of the grounds of organisational
order, yet assumes an unthoughtful acceptance of that order; an
uncritical acceptance of the general logic and premises of organis-
ational life, coupled with a localised conflict awareness of
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While I would not like to overstretch the case, these
similarities in the form and content of academic'and everyday
theorising raise a number of questions about the relationship of
these organisational vocabularies. To a degree, of course, such
relationships should be expected because both sociologists and lay
participants are "interested" parties in the same broad socio-
cultural context of organisations, but the implications of
borrowings and loans from one sphere to the other need thorough
peripheral ("insignificant") issues, characterises social actors
who employ 'the oppositional mode of theorising.
examination. The interpenetration of academic and everyday
theorising has consequences for methodology and for the sociology
of knowledge, but the extent of interpenetration that exists in
the organisational field provides some indication of the power of
dominant ideas as they become transposed into both professional
and lay thinking.
It has been a recurrent topic of interest in the method-
ology of the social sciences that academic sociology has borrowed,
indeed cannot avoid borrowing, concepts and propositions from every-
day life and thereby, to some unspecifiable degree, includes the
preconceptions and ideas of the groups under scrutiny. In the
field of organisations, these preconceptions and ideas have largely
belonged to management, in whose territory and with whose per-
mission research is undertaken. The problems incurred from
borrowing are particularly intense for interpretive sociology which
by definition builds its understanding of the social world upon the
various views of social actors.
However the effects of commonsense views upon social
scientific knowledge have been subject to intense discussion, so
that it is possibly of more interest, given the relative paucity
of debate, to consider the inverse relationship. (Giddens, 1976,
p.llS). In meeting non-sociologists, or reading the news-
papers, or watching the television, it is impossible not to notice
that the concepts and ideas of sociology filter through social and
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linguistic barriers to enter into the vocabulary and thinking of
actors in everyday life. Apart from the methodological problems
of such infiltration of commonsense theorising which may affect
the (natural) course of events under sociological investigation,
the everyday acquisition of academic language is of ideological
and political relevance. As already suggested, academic theories
of organisational life have tended to be distilled, at least in
part, from the dominant vocabulary in that sphere, so that mana-
gerial theorising, through its association with social science,
acquires a greater respectability and neutrality. Moreover,
managerial wisdom re-enters organisational life clothed in
scientific language, which not only reinforces the political
actions and positions of higher participants, but also percolates
through the levels of the organisation lending scientific
credibility to what are partial views. The existence at all
levels of organisational life of potted versions of the academic
theories of alienation, of resistance to change, of participation,
of motivation, of job enrichment and involvement etc. illustrates
the political implications of the dialectical relationship between
academic and everyday theorising.
10.2.2 The Intended and Unintended Consequences of Social Action
As explained earlier, my thesis ~as stopped short of
examining the relationship between strategic political action and
the process of organisational politics which is collectively and
historically constituted by such action. This omission refers
to what I have called the "social context" of organisational
politics, which, being socially created by the actions of partici-
pants in the concrete situation, directly relates to the observable
first face of power.
As I have suggested in Chapter Nine, the theoretical
gap between political action and political process may be investi-
gated in terms of the intended and unintended consequences of
political courses of action. Employing the type of sensitising
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framework proposed in Part Three, it is possible to arrive at an
interpretive understanding of the courses of political action
theorised and projected by organisational participants. However
it is a further problem to comprehend the outcome of the complex
relationships between historically and currently intersecting
courses of political action. Such actions will enjoy varying
degrees of success and failure according to structural predis-
positions and the situational responses of other participants, and,
since few participants are likely to experience absolute success
(i.e. complete realisation of political intentions), it is important
to consider the social repercussions of relative success and failure.
Merton's (1968, p.73ff.) classic analysis of the manifest
and latent functions of social patterns rightfully made a lasting
impression upon sociologists working within the then dominant
functionalist and structural-functionalist perspective, but nocompar-
able theoretical clarification has been forthcoming on the intended
and unintended consequences of social action. This distinction is
particularly relevant to the study of politics, whose main feature
is the strategic pursuit of intentions.
The political acts of a given organisational participant
may meet with (relative) failure for structural and social reasons
although the two are often related in that structural predis-
positions may become the focus of polit:ical leverage. Intentional
acts may be frustrated by the (more powerful) intentionality of
other political actors, who defensively or positively counter the
first actor's moves (which, possibly, were structurally unrealistic
in the first place) . A more complicated situation arises when
intentions suffer because of the unanticipated consequences of an
actor's own actions and/or those of other actors, these
(accumulated) consequences effectively increasing the social im-
possibilities inhering in the social context. Alternatively,and
equally feasibly, the intended actions of others (or indirectly of
structural biases) or the unintended consequences described, may
enhance the social possibilities of realising an actor's goals.
In turn, of course, our given actor's behaviour contributes to the
social possibilities and impossibilities of other participants.
399.
In this view, the intended and unanticipated consequences
of political actions in the social context will influence the out-
come of those actions as they interrelate to create the observable
political process. Indeed, the feedback derived from the experience
of other actors' intentions and the resulting consequences may well
lead participants to reassess their possibilities of success, and
revise their strategies in accordance with their new information.
Although a great deal of theoretical work is required in order to
explore the ramifications of the distinction between intended and
unintended consequences for interpretive sociology, it is undoubtedly
at least as urgent that these ideas, and the others developed in
Part Three, become subject to empirical research.
10.2.3 Problems of Empirical Research
My aim L~roughout this thesis has been to conduct a
theoretical investigation into the interpretive nature of organis-
ational power and politics, but a priori theorising, however well-
supported or illustrated by secondary data, is only the initial,
albeit indispensable, step in sociological research. The detailed
problems of putting the proposed interpretive sociological frame-
work "into operation" must remain unfinished business in the present
context, but to neglect the matter altogether would be to abrogate
my respoilsibility to the type of sociological methodology which I
espoused in Chapter Five. The close relationship between theory
and empirical evidence inherent in a sensitising methodology needs
to be acknowledged in a few general comments.
The approach outlined in Part Three requires access to
information about three crucial conceptions : first, about the
structural framework of power in the organisation(s) being studied;
second, about the theories used by organisational participants;
third, about the social context of the political process.
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The most accessible information about the structural frame-
work derives from an examination of the formal and customary ways of
organising human being.s in the arena in question. The legal system
as it relates to the organisation under study provides good indi-
cators of both the factual and the ideological aspects of the
societal-institutional level of the structural framework, although
these formal images need to be complemented by knowledge of the
customary practices and cultural values which influence the nature
of power and politics in the given organisation. It would be
shortsighted, for example, to examine power and politics in mental
institutions or prisons without attending to the commonsense stock
of knowledge (e.g. "public opinion") and background understandings
prevailing in society. At the level of organisational rationality,
knowledge of the rules, procedures, controls etc., as outlined in
Chapter Seven, provides fundamental insights into the "factual"
aspects of organisational life, and, by inference, into its ideol-
ogical aspects. While information about the "dominant theory" of
how organisations (should) work is available directly and indirectly,
in the end the task of constructing an overall image of the structural
framework as a set of ideological and factual givens, is an inter-
pretive problem for the sociologist.
Whereas the latter interpretive task may be founded upon
more-or-less tangible factors - laws, rules, wage-systems etc. -
which are understood as embodying an overall rationality, logic or
ideology, the need to comprehend the everyday theorising of organ-
isational participants poses; more difficult, and more contentious
problems for empirical research. The "double hermeneutic"
(Giddens, 1976, p.79) of interpretive sociology, involving the
academic theorising of lay theorising, involves complex issues both
of research philosophy and of concrete research procedure which can
only be hinted at in these closing paragraphs. In order to acquire
an interpretive understanding of social-organisational life, the
researcher needs to discover the intentions and interpretive
schemes of social actors, their commitments, their perceptions and
their projected views. The methodological complexities and in-
herent diff{culties of such an approach must be confronted, for the
sake of adequate sociological knowledge.
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How is it possible to "know" the intentions and motives
of social actors, and the broader interpretive schemes through
which their courses of action acquire a rationality? As Schutz
(1972, p.229) argues, mere observation cannot provide the researcher
with a satisfactory grasp of the subjective meaningfulness of
social action - what is needed is an "immersion" (Giddens, 1976,
p.161) in the social-organisational life of participants.
Thorough familiarity with and experience of living in a particular
political regime at various levels, it becomes more feasible for
the researcher to characterise modes of social existence as theoret-
ically mediated by participants. Participation in the shared
organisational lives of participants implies a nlli~er of methodolog-
ical issues (e.g. the relationships between expressed language,
intention and meaning; the ItruL~fulness' of informants) and has
its attendant methodologtcal dangers (notably, subjective bias) -
all matters which have been exhaustively debated in various wings
of th~ sociological discipline - but it remains the most suitable
means of gathering the kind of information needed. It has the
additional advantage of permitting fairly unobtrusive simultaneous
use of other methods of data collection e.g. unstructured interviews,
access to documents.
The social context of the process of politics requires no
special methods beyond those described above. Participant obser-
vation, together with the informed interpretive powers of sociologi-
cal inference, allows the researcher to obtain information about
intended courses of political action and the actual course of
events. However, the distinction between the intended and un-
intended consequences of social action does raise a complicated
question upon a satisfactory answer to which the theoretical and
methodological efficacy of interpretive sociology depends - viz.
to what extent can one trust the images of organisational life which
participants describe, directly or indirectly, to researchers?
Through malevolence, ignorance, misunderstanding, inarticulateness
etc., participants may give false or misleading information about
their own intentions, or about their perceived intentions of others.
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One might suspect that this matter is of special importance
to the study of power and politics, since in political life, even
if an actor's 'real' intentions are known to himself, it is often
not the "done thing" to disclose them publicly. As Burns (1961,
p.260) has argued, the language of politics in many organisations
is not publicly available to be directly observed, because the
(self) attribution of "political motive" only occurs behind closed
doors or on similarly private occasions. In public, therefore,
actions are taken for the "common good", for the "organisation",
for the "work force", for the "customers" etc. - such is the
accepted "vocabulary of motive" (Mills, 1940) in organisationa.l
life even if everyone "secretly" knows differently.
The question of the "·truthfulness" of research informants
thus reveals further aspects of the nature of organisational power
and politics which are too important to neglect but too detailed to
examine herein. In organisational life, as elsewhere, the "real
motives" of political action, as avowed or imputed by participants
themselves, become muddled with rationalisations which lay claim to,
or dispute, social legitimacy on grounds acceptable within the
organisation as a specific arena of situated actions; because the
attribution of motive and intention is so much part of the culture
and linguistic tradition of the particular arena, this muddle can
often not be clarified by the actors themselves. Managers will
not embark upon a course of action aimed at fragmenting work shop
organisation without having good "organisationally rational"
reasons e.g. job enrichment; socialist stewards will not endeavour
to create a collective militant action without having good
"rational" trade union reasons e.g. an intransigent management on
a wage-issue.
Rationalisation of intentions is thus a strategic aspect
of the everyday organisational theorising of power and politics,
and needs to be understood as an integral part of the socially-
mediated political process. The tasks of comprehending rational-
isation and of inferring "real" intention are truly interpretive,
and are necessary to the empirical study of organisational. power
and politics :
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" the imputation and avowal of motives by
actors are social phenomena to be explained.
The differing reasons men give for their actions
are not themselves without reasons." (Mills,
1940, p.439).
Only from an immersed position within the organisation, in spite of
the methodological problems this creates, can the sociologist
enquire into questions such as the ones posed during the last four
chapters.
These problems, with their various theoretical and
methodological implications, require further attention eLsewhexe ,
and, no doubt, there are other matters which the reader, from his
or her own viewpoint, can identify as worthy candidates for more
extensive treatment. However, it is now necessary to draw my
arguments to an end. Two general propositions permeate this
thesis : first, that an adequate theory of organisational life
(including power and politics) must be constructed upon inter-
pretive sociological foundations whose building blocks are the
postulates of voluntarism and of social contingency; second, that
academic theorising within the organisational subfield must take
stock of, ano contribute to, the major issues and debates which
engage sociologists throughout the discipline. The current state
of organisational sociology is broadly, but demonstrably, resistant
to both propositions, so that in focusing specifically upon the
everyday theorising activities of social actors I have attempted
to substantiate their relevance and wisdom in the context of one
particular topic - that of power and politics in organisational
arenas.
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